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Dello Buono, Lat in Am erica Aft er Neoliberal Debacle: Anot her Region is Possible ( Rowm an & Lit t lefield Publishers, I nc., 2009) . 452 Rev iew ed by: Alexander Boniface Makulilo Harald Baldersheim and Hellm ut Wollm an ( eds.) , The Com parat ive St udy of Local Governm ent and Polit ics: Ov erv iew and Sy nt hesis ( Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006) . 455 Rev iew ed by: Monica Bucurenciu Tim Unw in ( ed.) , I CT4D: I nform at ion and Com m unicat ion Technology for Developm ent ( Cam bridge: Cam bridge Universit y Press) Rev iew ed by: Dinoj Kum ar Upadhyay 459 Thad Dunning, Cr ude Dem ocracy: Nat ural Resource Wealt h and Polit ical Regim es ( Cam bridge, Cam bridge Universit y Press, 2008) Rev iew ed by: Monika Dabrow ska 462 Goran Hyden, African Polit ics in Com parat ive ( Cam bridge: Cam bridge Universit y Press, 2006) Rev iew ed by: Nat han Andrews Perspect iv e 466 Rachel Riedner and Kev in Mahoney, Dem ocracies t o Com e, Rhet orical Act ion, Neoliberalism , and Com m unit ies of Resist ance ( Lexingt on Book s, 2008) Rev iew ed by: Paula Gânga 469 Darren Lilleker and Richard Scullion ( eds.) , Vot ers or Consum ers. I m agining t he Cont em porary Elect orate (New cast le upon Ty ne: Cam bridge Publishing Scholars, 2008) Rev iew ed by : Sergiu Gherghina 473 Susanne Jungerst am - Mulders ( ed.) , Post - Com m unist EU Mem ber Stat es: Part ies and Party Syst em s (Aldershot : Ashgat e, 2006) . Rev iew ed by : Penny Pardoe 476 + 8* $ ; " " !+ $2 * 6 7$ .//$ +0 ; .<<J: " 5$ ; 2 #' - > % 8 :; ) 1JD 11- C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 EFFICIENT AND INEFFICIENT SOCIAL CONTROL IN COLLECTIVE ACTION1 Béla Janky Budapest University of Technology and Economics Károly Takács Corvinus University of Budapest Abst r act This study investigates how and under what conditions networks and dyadic social control rationalize participation in collective action. Social control mechanisms, such as behavioral confirmation and social selective incentives, do not necessarily help mobilization in collective action, but they might also act against it. In certain network configurations, not only an increase in the strength of conformity, but also an increase in selective incentives could turn out to be inefficient to establish mass collective action. This contradiction is captured by an integrative model that combines the n-person social dilemma model of collective action with local interaction games. Predictions of the integrated model reveal non-monotonic effects of the strength of social control on full contribution. For structural effects, the model predicts that cohesion is the most important catalyst of full contribution; besides, modularity of the network facilitates partial contribution equilibria. Keywords: Collective action; Social dilemmas; Social networks; Structural balance; Social control; Local interaction games 1 We would like to thank Andreas Flache, Russell Hardin, Zoltán Szántó, Benedek Kovács, and Attila Gulyás for their comments on an earlier version of the paper. The authors acknowledge support of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA, T 49432; T 76223; PD 76234). 316 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 1. Introduction This paper analyzes the interdependence between social control mechanisms, social networks and collective action. We study how different forms of social control influence decisions of rational individuals and we examine how and under what conditions networks rationalize participation in collective action. Besides, we focus on the interactions between network effects and social control as we investigate which network properties form favorable conditions for the emergence of collective action when a selective incentive is the main driving force for cooperation, and which properties favor mass mobilization when conformity is an important form of social control. In order to capture the interrelations between social control, network structure and collective action, an integrative model is presented that is built on the n-person social dilemma model of collective action on one hand, and on local interaction games that capture social control mechanisms in network relations on the other hand. The integrated model provides a ground for a family of new models that can handle and help to explain a wide variety of social phenomena in which macro and micro interdependencies are interrelated. Similarly to the majority of existing models, this study models collective action as an n-person social dilemma.2 As narrow selfinterest does not provide sufficient incentives for participation, a baseline economic model predicts collective action failure. Empirical studies, however, have found several examples of successful mobilization driven by social control mechanisms.3 Theoretical developments, therefore, incorporated different forms of social control in modeling collective action and set down conditions for the possibility of mobilization. In its most widely used meaning, social control is a constraint on individual decision 2 e.g., Mancur Olson Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.); Russel Hardin Collective Action. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982.) 3 for an overview see Mario Diani, “Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Actions, and Social Networks: From Metaphor to Substance?” in Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam. (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.) 317 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 posed by the influence, as well as by the behavior, opinion, and expectations of relevant other individuals. Several studies pointed out that the set of relevant others in practice is not the entire society, but only related others: family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues and neighbors.4 Consequently, characteristics of the social network influence the impact of social control on collective action. Social network effects are important, because individuals tailor their behavior conditional on the behavior and expectation of relevant others. For the integrated analysis of social control mechanisms and collective action, social control has to be conceptualized. As in previous studies, either in an internal or in an external form, social control will be modeled as a system of mutual rewards and punishments. Someone’s decision whether to join a public protest or not is contingent on the decision of her friends. Besides, she gains additional satisfaction if her action meets the expectations or sympathy of friends. This holds also for their decisions and for their calculations on her expectation. This kind of strategic interdependence is modeled in local interaction games.5 The existing literature on local interaction games, however, disregards the possibility of community interdependence. Local coordination games provide an illustrative basis for the influence of certain social control mechanisms, but neglect the macro effects of coordination. Successfully coordinated behavior often provides positive externalities and additional value for the entire community. The modeling framework presented here incorporates dyadic social control mechanisms as strategic interactions and consequently social network effects in the single-shot n-person social dilemma model of collective action. We provide a simple 4 e.g. Karl-Dieter Opp and Christiane Gern, „Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation - The East German Revolution of 1989” American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 659-680.; Anthony Oberschall, “Rational Choice in Collective Protests” Rationality and Society, 6 (1994): 79100. 5 1047-1071. 318 e.g., Glenn Ellison “Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination” Econometrica, 61 (1993): C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 game-theoretical analysis of the conditions under which individuals are better off by participation and we also examine equilibrium conditions for the emergence of collective action. The model assumes that players are rational and perfectly informed about the rules of the game. These restrictions do not mean that we disregard the impacts of bounded rationality, imperfect information or repeated interactions on mobilization in collective action. On the contrary, our restrictive assumptions may help to distinguish the different sources of success or failure of collective action. As a main substantive goal of model building, we aim to present a theoretical rationale for some of the intriguing empirical results of the collective action literature. First, similar to the findings of Sandell and Stern we would like to demonstrate that collective action may exist even if rational actors prefer to free ride on all but few of their fellows in the group.6 Second, the study is to present some new predictions about the possible effects of social control and network structure in a situation where individuals are rational, well informed and there is no iteration in collective action. We aim to show that there are network structures at which the effect of social control on cooperation is nonmonotonic. That is, at certain parameter values, stronger control may decrease the chance of mass collective action. This objective is in line with earlier findings that demonstrated reverse effects of social control.7 In the next section, we provide arguments for the necessity of including social control mechanisms in the explanation of collective action. We summarize previous findings and our research questions afterwards. We present our model and subsequently, we derive under what conditions social control would lead to an equilibrium in which collective action is established. This is followed by a discussion of the impacts of network properties on participation and by the analysis of 6 Rickard Sandell and Charlotta Stern “Group Size and the Logic of Collective Action: A Network Analysis of a Swedish Temperance Movement 1896-1937” Rationality and Society, 10 (1998): 327-345. 7 e.g., Andreas Flache The Double Edge of Networks. An Analysis of the Effect of Informal Networks on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. (Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 1996.) 319 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 interaction effects of social control and network characteristics. Implications and prospective directions are discussed in the concluding section. 2. Social control mechanisms and their operation in the network Individual decisions are constrained by social control mechanisms and this is not otherwise also in collective action situations. The decision to participate (contribute) or not is affected by various forms of social control. Social control in the form of selective incentives implicate that defectors are punished or contributors are rewarded. The incorporation of selective incentives into the models has been prevalent since the beginning of collective action research. Some studies also addressed the second order free rider problem that stems from the costs of providing selective incentives.8 Other models have emphasized the positive impact of cooperation of others on the individual’s own decision. Conditional cooperation mechanisms work, for instance, in critical mass models.9 The assumptions about fairness considerations in Sugden's and Gould’s models also imply conditionally cooperative behavior.10 Besides, in Oberschall's block-recruitment model cooperation is also conditional on cooperation of relevant others.11 8 Pamela E. Oliver “Rewards and Punishments as Social approval for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations” American Journal of Sociology, 85 (1980): 1356-1375.; Douglas D. Heckathorn, “Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem” Rationality and Society, 1 (1989): 78-100. 9 e.g., Thomas C. Schelling Micromotives and Macrobehavior. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.); Marwell, Gerald and Pamela E. Oliver Critical Mass in Collective Action. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.) 10 Robert Sugden “Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions” Economic Journal, 94 (1984): 772-787 Gould, Robert V. “Collective Action and Network Structure” American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 182-96. 11 100. 320 Anthony Oberschall “Rational Choice in Collective Protests” Rationality and Society, 6 (1994): 79- C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Laboratory experiments of public good games confirm the importance of social control even among strangers.12 From our point of view, the most important results of these experiments can be summarized as follows. First, contributors feel compensated for their effort and similarly, defectors seem to experience a smaller subjective gain because of a sense of guilt, embarrassment or punishment. Second, the perception of social approval/disapproval may have an impact on cooperation even if no monetary (or physical) incentives are available. It is sufficient if the peers express their approval/disapproval by symbolic points - the provision of which is costless. What is more, even the observation of the decisions or merely the presence of other players may be sufficient for higher level of contribution in a oneshot public good game. That is, the provision of effective social control might be costless in some situations. Third, experiments have provided evidence for the existence of altruistic punishment of defectors. These experiments show that individuals have intrinsic incentives to punish free riders, even at the cost of their own welfare. That is, the internal costs of watching an unpunished free riding friend may outweigh the cost of punishment itself. Fourth, if social control mechanisms operate, the level of contribution is positively correlated with the group size. That is, more people can impose stronger control. Fifth, the characteristics of social control also depend on the level of (expected) contributions of those actors who reward/punish the individual. A defector gets higher level of punishment from a cooperator than from another defector - or a cooperator gets higher reward from another cooperator than from a defector. That is, as the number of defectors increases, the social incentive for contribution decreases. Nonetheless, a contributor's positive effect on the individual's cooperation tends to be stronger than a defector's negative one. These experimental results are mostly in line with the assumptions about social control in the most cited models of 12 e.g., Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good Experiments” American Economic Review 90 (2000): 980-94; David Masclet, , Charles Noussair, Steven Tucker and MarieClaire Villeval “Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism” American Economic Review, 93 (2003): 366-380., 321 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 collective action. Olson’s term of social selective incentives, for instance, can be interpreted in a way to match most of these observations. However, selective incentives and social control that is conditional on others’ decisions are fundamentally different and hence one should distinguish at least two types of social control. The first simply rewards the cooperator or punishes the defector irrespective of the action taken by others. The second implicates that individuals compare their decisions with decisions of relevant others, and gain rewards if the decisions are similar. Following these arguments, we incorporate social control into our model in the form of two separate incentives. We will refer to the rewards for cooperators (punishments for the defectors) as selective incentives. We will refer to social control that rewards the similarity between decisions as behavioral confirmation or conformity. We are well aware of further social control mechanisms, for instance, people might participate in collective action precisely because they expect that others don’t do anything, but for the sake of simplicity, we restrict our interest for the analysis of these two forms. Similar to Holländer’s analysis, we incorporate social control in the model as an automatic response to cooperation.13 Nonetheless, providing social control may be costly and a second order free rider problem may emerge. Our model, however, is restricted to those situations in which provision of social control is costless, social control is internalized or the costs of not rewarding/punishing counterbalance the ones of giving approval/disapproval. As laboratory experiments show, this assumption fits the behavior of real-word individuals. We will concentrate on selective incentives and conformity that operate in dyadic connections between individuals (friends, relatives, neighbors, etc). Those who contribute to the public good, get some (non-pecuniary) reward from their friends in the form of a positive social selective incentive. This form of social control is independent of the action taken by those who provide it. Behavioral confirmation or conformity, on the other hand, 13 Heinz Holländer “A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation” American Economic Review, 80 (1990): 1157-67. 322 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 depends on the relations between the individual’s choice and the decisions taken by her friends. The individual is rewarded if she does the same as her peers act. Anonymous relations do not transmit these forms of social control as close contacts do; individual actions are relationally and structurally embedded. Intensive interpersonal ties are therefore the key routes of the spread of social control that facilitate mobilization in collective action. As the system of actors and interpersonal ties among them is referred to as the social network, macro properties of the social network are correlated with the success of mobilization in collective action. The models of network effects in collective action, however, should not disregard the interdependence in the collective action situation that is inseparable from relational interdependencies. For instance, joining friends at a demonstration is partly a contribution to the success of collective action and partly a provision of conformity to all friends who participate. This does not require multiple decisions from the individual. For this reason we integrate global and local interdependences in a unified model that takes both into account simultaneously (Figure 1). On one hand, we model collective action as an n-person public good game that assumes global interdependence (left side of Figure 1). As we emphasized, this standard model does not distinguish between connected and unconnected pairs of actors, that is, between friends (relatives, neighbors, etc.) and strangers. On the other hand, our integrative model is based on a “network approach” that concerns dyadic relations as local interaction games (middle of Figure 1). Local interaction games deal with a network of dyads involved in two-person games, but they are unable to cope with a situation in which the entire set of players is involved in a public good game. Unlike these network models, we assume the presence of global interdependence between the players. Global interdependence links even those who are unconnected in the social network. We will refer to this as the structurally embedded public goods game. 323 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Figure 1. An Illustration of Our Approach Global interdependence n-person public goods game Local interdependencies local interaction games Global and local interdependencies structurally embedded games Note: Thin lines symbolize global interdependence in n-person relations and thick lines mark interpersonal relations between actors. 3. The impact of network structure on collective action In most of the models on collective action, social control is considered as a possible facilitating factor of cooperation. Nonetheless, conformity does not obviously help; it might also undermine collective action in large groups. Gould, for instance, showed that conformity may not foster but rather inhibit cooperation in large, but dense networks.14 Conformity is captured in game-theoretical terms by modeling dyadic interdependencies as assurance games, in which mutual cooperation is payoff dominant equilibrium, but not a unique equilibrium. 15 Selective incentives, on the other hand, are defined as rewards (punishments) for cooperation (free riding). Some studies on collective action that encountered effects of social control, also drew attention to the consequential effects of network structure on mobilization.16 These studies emphasized 14 Gould, “Collective Action and Network Structure” 15 Oberschall, “Rational Choice in Collective Protests” 16 e.g., Gerald Marwell and Pamela E. Oliver and Ralph Prahl “Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III.” American Journal of Sociology, 94 (1988): 502-534.; Hyojoung Kim and 324 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 mainly the effect of two network properties: density and centrality. Most analyses demonstrated that closed and dense social networks could produce more social capital for maintaining group norms, including norms of cooperation than atomized networks. The positive impact of density on cooperation is also supported by empirical evidence.17 On the other hand, when large-scale cooperation is established, sparse networks might set more stable barriers against the spread of occasional defections.18 Diani also concludes based on different empirical findings that dense networks support mobilization in small networks with strong identity, but the chances to find examples in large populations are low, while it may be possible to find activity in modular sections within them.19 Gould’s abovementioned analysis also provides examples when a highly dense network is capable to establish only a mediocre level of collective good production. How density will affect the success of collective action; depends on the rate at which normative pressure and enthusiasm about the prospects of mobilization encourage individuals to emulate the contribution of others and on the structural location of zealous actors. Marwell, Oliver and Prahl emphasized that network centralization has a competing impact on collective action with density.20 The key importance of central actors and the efficiency of centralized structures in mobilization have also been demonstrated by several other scholars. Gould emphasized that a volunteer can trigger the most contributions in a star-shaped structure. Central actors are less capable of spreading cooperation in highly dense networks with low degree variance. Moreover, Cummings and Peter S. Bearman “The Structure and Dynamics of Movement Participation” American Sociological Review, 62 (1997): 70-93. 17 e.g., Robert V. Gould Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.) 18 Michael W. Macy “Chains of Cooperation: Threshold Effects in Collective Action” American Sociological Review, 56 (1991): 730-747. 19 Mario Diani “Networks and Social Movements: A Research Programme” in Social Movements and Networks. Relational Approaches to Collective Action ed. Diani and McAdam. (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.), 308. 20 Marwell, Oliver and Prahl “Social Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III.” 325 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Cross have found in an empirical study of work groups that coreperiphery and hierarchical network structures were negatively associated with performance.21 This completely contradicts to empirical findings on the superiority of core-periphery structures for cooperation,22 but also to theoretical predictions about the viability of cooperation in different network topologies that find that the evolution of cooperation is most prevalent in starshaped, highly centralized networks.23 The effect of degree is prevalent in the study of Ohtsuki et al. that finds a general condition for the evolution of contribution conditional on the average degree in large random, small-world and scale-free networks.24 The general condition prescribes that in an evolutionary perspective and fixed networks a sparse structure and low average degree is favorable for the evolution of cooperation. Another studies confirm that low density and heterogeneity support the evolution of cooperation also when the structure and behavior co-evolves.25 When individuals are able to update their ties, the time scale parameter that determines how frequently the network is updated compared to the update in the cooperation strategy is among the most important determinants of the extent to which cooperation spreads.26 The seminal work of Granovetter highlighted the importance of bridging relations for getting important information and social 21 Jonathon N.Cummings and Rob Cross “Structural Properties of Work Groups and Their Consequences for Performance” Social Networks, 25 (2003): 197-210. 22 Jeffrey C. Johnson, James S. Boster and Lawrence A. Palinkas “Social Roles and the Evolution of Networks in Extreme and Isolated Environments” Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 27 (2003): 89-121. 23 e.g., Hauert, Christoph Virtuallabs 2004. Database on-line. Available at http://www.univie.ac.at/virtuallabs/Moran/ 24 Hisashi Ohtsuki, Christoph Hauert, Erez Lieberman and Martin A. Nowak „A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks” Nature, 441(7092, 25 May 2006): 502-505. 25 e.g. Francisco Santos, Marta D. Santos and Jorge M. Pacheco “Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games” Nature 454 (2008): 213-216. 26 Toshio Yamagishi and Nahoko Hayashi “Selective Play: Social Embeddedness of Social Dilemmas” in Frontiers in Social Dilemma Research ed. Wim B.G. Liebrand and David M. Messick. (Berlin: Springer, 1996). 326 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 capital.27 These bridging ties might also be important to disseminate contribution norms between subgroups, as it is also suggested by Csermely.28 Subgroups, however, are often reported to be highly reluctant to change their local behavioral code and to adopt established norms from outside. This also has the consequence that structures in which many ties need to be removed for collapsing into components; that are called cohesive structures; provide the ideal environment for high levels of cooperation. As previous studies have demonstrated, structural effects are prevalent in collective action and they are caused by underlying social control mechanisms. In our analysis we will focus on the dependence of network effects on the type of social control that operates in dyadic relations. In particular, we examine whether selective incentives, when they reward contributors, would always foster collective action or under certain structural conditions they could also hinder mass collective action. As we compare macro effects of positive selective incentives and conformity, we demonstrate what they imply for social network effects in collective action. As far as network effects concerned, we emphasize which mechanisms of social control are responsible for the impact of network properties as density, minimum degree, network clustering, and bridging ties. 4. The structurally embedded public goods game In this section, we introduce the model that integrates social control mechanisms and local interactions into the analysis of collective action. The fundaments of this model have also been introduced in the studies of Takács, Janky and Flache.29 We assume that a final set of players (N={1, …, i, …, n}, where n>2) play an n-person public goods game with a linear production 27 Mark Granovetter “The Strength of Weak Ties” American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360- 80. 28 Péter Csermely Weak Links. The Universal Key to the Stability of Networks and Complex Systems. (Berlin: Springer, 2009.) 29 Károly Takács and Béla Janky “Smiling Contributions: Social Control in a Public Goods Game with Network Decline” Physica A, 378 (2007): 76-82., Károly Takács, Béla Janky and Andreas Flache “Collective Action and Network Change” Social Networks, 45 (2008): 177-189. 327 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 function. In this game, every individual has to decide whether to take part in the collective action or not. That is, each player has to choose between two alternatives: they can either participate in collective action (contribute to the provision of the public good) or not (defect). The action taken by the individual i∈N is denoted by σi, where σi=1 is contribution and σi=0 is defection. Contribution has a cost c, and this value is the same for everyone. Contribution means a provision of a unit of a public good α for all players and defection means no additional provision. Hence, the amount of public good that is provided equals to α ∑σ n j =1 j (there is a linear production function). We assume that narrow monetary interest does not provide sufficient incentives for cooperation, i.e. c>α. Although the cost of contribution is higher than the gain of the provision of one unit of the public good, we suppose that if there are enough contributors, the value of the public good provided to every individual is higher than the cost of contribution. In other words, there is a threshold number of contributors n* (1<n*≤n), for which αn*>c. This is a standard starting setup used by models of collective action. To incorporate structural effects in the model, we assume that players might be connected to each other by symmetric links. For the sake of generality, we do not specify what sort of relationships (friendship, kinship, or simply acquaintance) these links indicate. It is sufficient to claim that social control operates in these relationships. Social control can only be experienced between connected individuals, but it is also inevitable between them. Hence, we consider a network of dyadic relations among the players involved in the standard n-person PG-game, in which nodes are individuals and edges are relationships. An undirected graph is considered, that is we assume that the transmission of social control is independent of the direction and strength of relationships or alternatively, every connection is mutual and equally important. We will denote the existence of a direct relationship between individuals i and j by rij (i,j∈N, and i ≠ j), where rij = 1 if there is a direct relationship between them, and rij 328 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 = 0 if they are not directly related (they are not adjacent in the network). As we discuss undirected graphs, rij = rji always holds. For the sake of simplicity, we will denote the total number of i’s ∑r n ties by ri ( j =1 ij = ri , where i ≠ j). The existence of relational ties in combination with action profiles has payoff consequences. First, we suppose that every player receives rewards (punishments) for contribution (defection) from each of her friends. The amount of this selective incentive from a single tie is denoted by s, hence the total amount of selective incentives that i receives is sri. We assume that actors always reward/punish those cooperators/defectors who are connected to them. One should note that, a selective incentive is an element of the rational calculation of the receiver, but is not of the one of the provider as it is free to produce and provided automatically. In addition to this selective incentive, individuals might prefer to follow the behavioral patterns of related actors. The individual’s deviation from a related player's choice implies lower payoff than the outcome where they behave in the same way. In the model, both the absolute number and the proportion of the deviators among the related actors matter. That is, we assume that conformity consists of two elements. The first form of conformity is received as a linear function of the number of friends with the same choice and we call it mass conformity. Formally, all related actors with the choice equivalent to i’s decision increases i's payoff by b1. When mass conformity operates, an individual, who intends to participate in a demonstration, would like to be sure that there are enough friends in the crowd. On the other hand, in case this individual prefers to stay at home, she would like to be assured that many friends choose the same option. The second form of conformity is received as a linear function of the proportion of friends with the same choice, and we refer to it as proportional conformity. Proportional conformity is independent of the number of ties the given individual has. The coefficient for proportional conformity is denoted by b2. When proportional conformity operates, the individual prefers to follow the decision of the majority of her friends. 329 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that α,c>0; b1,b2,s≥0, as we present all of them as rewards in (1). However, this assumption could easily be relaxed in a subsequent analysis. Assuming social control in terms of punishments instead of rewards would lead to a slightly different model with similar results. Denote C and D two disjoint sets of the group N, such that C={N\D}. Moreover, let us denote ric and rid the numbers of i's connections who are elements of sets C and D, respectively (ric+rid=ri). If every member of C contributes and every member of D defects, then the payoffs of defection and contribution for i are the following: n rid π i (σ i = 0) = rid b1 + b2 + α ∑σ j ri j =1 n ric π i (σ i = 1) = ri s + ric b1 + b 2 + α ( ∑ σ j + 1) − c ri j =1 (1) where j ∈ N\{i}. One can see that in a given network, social approval is the strongest if one cooperates in a cooperating social environment. Cooperation or defection in a group of defectors implicates weaker approval. Our model allows for the assumption that a community of defectors fosters individual’s defection (this is the case if b1 and b2 are large comparing to s). Nonetheless, it is possible within this modeling framework that the defectors provide more approval for cooperators than for other defectors (in this case s is large relatively to b1 and b2). Social approval is the weakest if one defects while her friends cooperate. From (1) it follows that the contribution of the individual i is rational if b α + ri s + ( ric − rid )(b1 + 2 ) ≥ c . ri (2) It implies that selective incentives foster contribution relative to the number of connections of the given individual. Conformity promotes contribution only when there are more contributing friends than defectors. In case the number of defecting friends 330 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 exceeds the number of contributing friends, conformity drives towards defection. Mass conformity supports contribution to the extent of the difference between the numbers of contributing and defecting friends; while proportional conformity promotes contribution to the extent of the proportion of contributors among the related individuals. In case the cost of contribution is too high we cannot expect any provision of the public good. If there are strong incentives for contribution, however, then collective action can be established. Defection is not a strictly dominant strategy of i anymore, if the individual’s benefits from social control and provision of a unit of the public good exceed the cost of contribution at least in the case when all of those players contribute who are connected to the individual (ri=ric). That is, if α + ri (s + b1) + b2 ≥ c. (3) Moving a step further, contribution can be a dominant strategy of i, if the individual’s benefits from social control and provision of a unit of the public good exceed the cost of contribution even in the case when all of those players defect who are connected to the individual (ri=rid). That is, if α + ri (s - b1) - b2 > c (4) holds. Hence, under certain conditions, social control rationalizes unconditional cooperation in collective action. Due to the simplifications of the model, it is relatively easy to calculate an arbitrary actor's payoffs for a certain decision. One should note, however, that the costs and benefits of contribution and defection differ for players in different structural positions. Thus, it is misleading to conduct an equilibrium analysis similar to that is adopted in n-person games with a homogeneous set of players. In our model, the conditions for contribution at the individual level do not fully specify the macro level determinants for the emergence of collective action. 331 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 5. Possibility of collective action After a brief analysis of individual decisions, let us now consider under which conditions collective action may emerge assuming an exogenously given network. Primarily, we search for situations in which collective action is equilibrium over the set of pure strategies. Foremost, we focus on the conditions for the emergence of full contribution in which each actor contributes to the provision of the public good. We also analyze the conditions for the existence of partial contribution equilibria, primarily because of their relevance for the predictions about the emergence of full contribution. In this way, we spare some additional assumptions and carry out a less extensive analysis. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ri>0 holds for all i. One can see from (2) and (4) that a situation in which all actors defect (overall defection) is a Nash equilibrium if there is no i for whom contribution would be a dominant strategy. This means that c ≥ α + ri (s - b1) - b2 should hold for all i. On the other hand, full contribution is Nash equilibrium if there is nobody for whom defection is a dominant strategy. In other words, in case (c - α - b2) / (s+b1) ≤ ri holds for all i (ri>0, that is the graph is connected), then full contribution is a Nash equilibrium. That is, for full contribution being Nash equilibrium the network should have the property () c −α − b 2, min r ≥ i s+b 1 (5) where min(ri) is the minimum number of ties individuals have in the group (minimum degree). A network parameter (here the minimum degree) on one side of the equation and social control parameters and other incentives on the other side simplifies the analysis of structural effects on collective action. In this case, we could make it transparent that as a necessary structural condition for overall mobilization in collective action; everyone has to be connected to the network to a certain extent. Individuals with few connections make overall participation impossible. As far as social control concerned, a stronger selective incentive and stronger 332 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 conformity increase the chance of overall contribution. Moreover, in spite of the significant difference between their micro effects, selective incentives and mass conformity influence for the emergence of full contribution equilibrium exactly the same way. In case the threshold number n* is not very high, partial contribution can also produce beneficial collective action. A partial contribution outcome, where all i∈ C contributes and all j∈ D defects, is a Nash equilibrium, if such C and D (C={N\D}) nonempty sets exist for which α + ri s + ( ric − rid )(b1 + b2 ) ≥ c for all i∈ C ri b α + r j s + (r jc − r jd )(b1 + 2 ) ≤ c for all j∈ D rj and (6) (7) hold. In this case, there is no clear relation between a certain network property and partial contribution equilibrium that would be independent from the structural distribution of contribution choices. The existence of partial contribution equilibrium is most likely in a segmented network. For instance, if there is a dyadic component that is isolated from the rest of the network, then partial contribution in which they defect is an equilibrium, given that full contribution is an equilibrium, if c ≥ α + s - b1 - b2. On the other hand, partial contribution equilibria do not exist in a network in which everyone is tied to everyone else. No further formal analysis is necessary to see that a coreperiphery structure is favorable for partial contribution. In this case, members of the core may cooperate, while individuals with few connections and in small components will be free riders. Thus, according to the model, when, for example, workers of a factory launch a wild cat strike and members of the major workshops participate, some new or part-time employees, members of small, peripheral units, and those who work individually outside the workshops may stay out of the strike 333 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 without a negative impact on the contribution of the rest of workers. In the next section, we will show further structural determinants of the conditions of partial contribution equilibria. If there is one Nash equilibrium over pure strategies of the game, we consider it as the expected outcome. In several cases, however, there are multiple equilibria. For equilibrium selection there are different approaches we could follow. Without choosing sides in the ongoing debate, the only assumption we make is that if there is a payoff dominant equilibrium, we consider it as the expected outcome of the game.30 An equilibrium is payoffdominant if it provides more (or equal) payoff for every player than any other equilibrium. In this study, we do not go into further analysis of what happens when none of the existing equilibria is payoff dominant. If full contribution and overall defection are two Nash equilibria of the game and the number of players exceeds the threshold number n*,31 then full contribution always dominates overall defection. In this case, it is likely that collective action emerges. Partial contribution equilibria, however, are not always dominated by full contribution. If there is a subset of players for whom collective defection provides higher rewards than collective contribution, then full contribution is not payoff dominant over the partial contribution equilibrium, in which this subset of players defects. In other words, full contribution is payoff dominant equilibrium in case it is a Nash equilibrium, and there are no partial contribution equilibria, or if they exist, in any set of possible defectors, contribution of the whole set provides higher payoffs for its members, than the equilibrium where they defect. 30 One should note that from a purely theoretical and general viewpoint, payoff dominance cannot serve as a solution for the problem of equilibrium selection in games. If one approaches the problem of uniqueness from the perspective of our study, however, the concept of payoff dominance provides the most fruitful selection mechanism. Experimental findings are also ambivalent about whether subjects play the payoff dominant equilibrium or another outcome. In coordination games with multiple equilibria, for example, in case of few players and a salient payoff dominant equilibrium this outcome is played often, but more players and a higher resistance makes the rival risk-dominant equilibrium a more likely outcome. Ses e.g. Dean Corbae and John Duffy Experiments with Network Economies. (Mimeo, University of Pittsburgh, 2002.). 31 As we defined above: αn* > c. For the production of public bads, for which this assumption does not hold, the overall defection equilibrium is likely to be payoff dominant. 334 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 That is, the existence of partial contribution equilibrium may undermine full contribution as a likely outcome. The conditions for full contribution being Nash equilibrium are given in (5). Partial contribution equilibrium exists in which all i∈ C cooperates and all j∈ D defects (C={N\D}; C and D are nonempty sets), if equations (6) and (7) hold. In case both equilibria exist, full contribution is payoff dominant over partial contribution if rewards for all j∈ D are higher in the former case. That is, nd α + r j s + r j b1 + b2 > c + r jd (b1 + b2 ) for all j∈ D, rj which is simplified to nd α + r j s + r jc (b1 + b2 ) > c for all j∈ D, rj (8) where nd is the number of members of D. The smaller the number of defectors in the partial contribution equilibrium, the smaller the likelihood that full contribution dominates this partial contribution equilibrium. That is, full contribution is more likely to be undermined by some defectors if there are small and segregated subgroups in the community. These subgroups should be small enough not to have, even collectively, a significant effect on the public good. Moreover, they should be segregated not to be influenced too strongly by outside pressure. Note that if the entire community can be split into such small segregated subgroups (for instance, into components or bi-components, or it is a highly modular structure), then any level of contribution might be undermined by strategic considerations, even in case of strong social control and relatively high density of the network. Granovetter’s seminal study provides a classical example of this kind. He points to the failure of collective action in an ethnic Italian community in Boston that could be characterized by dense network and strong social ties. The source of cohesion in this community was the close-knit family network, in which every 335 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 member knew and influenced one another. The emphasis on intra-family relations, however, resulted in the ignorance of other types of relations. Thus, one could observe high level of cohesion in any part of the community, although the lack of ties between families inhibited the provision of community-level public goods. 6. Social control, network properties, and collective action Density and full contribution equilibrium In this section we turn to a closer analysis of the effect of certain network properties and of their interactions with social control on collective action. First, consider the preconditions of full contribution equilibrium. Equation (5) reveals that the key structural property that is associated with the emergence of full contribution is the minimum degree of the network. Among other network characteristics, density positively correlates with the likelihood of full contribution equilibrium. The relation between density and full contribution being an equilibrium can be derived from the statistical relation between density (the number of edges in the graph) and the minimal number of individual relations (the minimum degree). The higher the density of a network, the smaller the likelihood is that there will be individuals with zero or few connections. It is easy to see that the general likelihood of min(ri)≤t (t<n-1) decreases, if density or the number of relations (r) increases (if n is given), which means that the likelihood of full contribution equilibrium increases by network density on average. The general likelihood min(ri)≤t (t<n-1) is equal to one, if r<(t+1)n/2 and it is zero, if r>(n-1)(n-2)/2+t. For the range in between, extensive calculations are necessary. In Figure 2 we only provide an illustration of the general likelihood that the minimum degree of a random graph with n nodes and r relations reaches a certain level (min(ri)=t). This likelihood is associated with some known properties of degree variance. Higher degree variance is associated with a smaller likelihood of full contribution equilibrium. The relationship between degree variance and full contribution equilibrium is weaker when density is very low or very high. As Figure 2 shows, density positively correlates with minimum degree, which supports the densitycooperation hypothesis. 336 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Figure 2. The general likelihood of the minimum degree being t in a network n= 8 with r connections The relation betw een density (r ) and minimum degree 90 80 % of cases 70 r=6 60 r=10 50 r=14 40 r=18 30 r=22 20 r=26 10 0 0 2 4 6 8 minimum degre e = t The distributions are overlapping, which means that higher density does not necessarily mean a higher minimum degree and consequently a higher likelihood of full contribution equilibrium. In highly centralized networks, in which most relations lead to relatively few individuals, the minimum degree and the likelihood of full contribution equilibrium is low. This result is in contradiction with findings that emphasize the efficiency of centralized structures in mobilization for collective action.32 The model shows that high group centralization in itself does not strengthen the effect of social control in collective action. For example, in the factory, where workers are thinking of organizing a wild cat strike, a central actor will not be able to initiate collective action, if other workers have only connections to her and not to each other, since one tie is not likely to provide sufficient social benefits for them to participate. The central actor 32 Opp and Gern „Dissident Groups, Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation - The East German Revolution of 1989”; and Gould “Collective Action and Network Structure”. 337 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 will be left alone with her enthusiasm. When the network of informal connections in the workshop resembles a star-shaped structure, workers in peripheral positions will not participate, because they would not be confirmed for their behavior by their peers. In a dense network, workers in relatively central structural positions will more likely have a key role in mobilization than in a sparse network as the colleagues in peripheral positions reassure each other that they have been convinced to participate. This also leads to a prediction that is competing with the theoretical results of Gould about the impact of density on the influence of central actors in collective action and with theoretical predictions of Hauert’s study about the superiority of star-shaped structures in the evolution of cooperation.33 Payoff dominance: non-monotonic effects of social control Similar incentives and structural characteristics foster the existence of a partial contribution equilibrium as of the emergence of full contribution (see equations 6, 7, and 8). The existence of partial contribution, however, might inhibit full contribution becoming payoff dominant. As a consequence, social control may have adverse effects, and the influence of network structure is strongly shaped by the relative importance of different types of social control. The emerging complexity cannot be interpreted as a purely technical problem and it has a clear substantial relevance. Contribution may be more stable, if everybody knows that any provision of the public good is possible only if everyone contributes to it. The possibility of partial contribution equilibrium means that some people reckon that others might contribute anyway, and therefore their incentives for contribution weaken. That is, if the conditions for contribution become more favorable for a subgroup of players, the rest of the group is tempted to become a free rider. Thus, strategic considerations may lead to the disappearance of large-scale collective action. The model mostly predicts positive correlation between the strength of social control and collective action. Weak control is 33 338 Hauert Virtuallabs. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 never favorable for collective action and extremely strong incentives always facilitate full contribution. In a certain range of parameters and in certain structural conditions, however, stronger social control might result in a lower likelihood of collective action. The double edge character of conformity is apparent at the micro level and therefore it is not surprising if it also appears in macro predictions. More surprising is that a stronger selective incentive may also undermine the emergence of collective action. Let us illustrate the paradox effect of a positive selective incentive with a simple example. Figure 3 shows a network structure in a 5-person structurally embedded public goods game. For the sake of simplicity we focus on the change in the strength of selective incentive (s) and consider other parameters as given. Let the other parameters be c=3, α=1, b1=1, and b2=1. From equation (5) it follows that full contribution is an equilibrium outcome at any non-negative value of s. As we emphasized earlier, the full contribution equilibrium is always payoff dominant compared to the overall defection equilibrium, but not always when compared to partial contribution equilibria. At the given parameter values, in a possible partial contribution equilibrium players A, B and C participate in collective action, while D and E defect. This equilibrium exists if C receives sufficient incentives for contribution, in spite of her connection to D and if D does not have sufficient incentives to turn to contribution. After substituting the parameter values into equation (6), it follows that C may cooperate in case of D's defection if s≥2/9. Moreover, one can see from equation (7) that D might defect in this case if s≤1. There is also a third condition, the one that tells us whether the partial contribution equilibrium in which D and E defect is dominated by full contribution. Equation (8) shows that full contribution is not payoff dominant if s≤1. Considering this network and these parameter values, there is another partial contribution equilibrium in which A, B, and C defect while D and E participate in collective action. This equilibrium exists if 1≤s≤10/9. However, full contribution equilibrium is always payoff dominant in comparison to this equilibrium. Since there are no other partial contribution 339 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 equilibria in this game, the full contribution outcome is a payoff dominant equilibrium except the cases at which 2/9≤s≤1. That is, a small value of s (0<s<2/9) is more favorable for mass collective action than a value almost equal to one. Figure 3. Illustration of a 5-person structurally embedded public goods game This example demonstrates that in spite of the significant difference between the micro effects of a selective incentive and conformity on individuals’ contribution, both types of social control may inhibit collective action under specific circumstances. The non-monotonic effect of a selective incentive shows that stronger social control is not always beneficial for mass collective action. As far as the network structure is concerned, counterproductive effects of control parameters show up when it is possible to divide the group into fairly segregated subsets. Adverse effects of social control are stronger if certain subsets have dense connections within while other subsets are not as cohesive. The phenomenon is even more likely if the latter subsets are relatively small. Let us take our example about a wild cat strike in a factory. When normative pressure is low but significant (small selective incentives), workers of the major and most cohesive workshop 340 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 participate in the strike only if their friends at peripheral units also join their demonstration. In this case, these friends do not risk the failure of the strike. However, when normative pressure becomes stronger, members of the major workshop sufficiently enforce each other to strike without the participation of peripheral units. In this case, workers at the periphery with connections to the central workshop do not have the same responsibility and they might stay out of the conflict and collectively free ride on the effort of the major workshop. Interactions of network structure and social control In the next step we consider the relationship between different forms of social control and the effect of network structure on collective action. In order to make the analysis as simple as possible, we inquire the marginal effects of s, b1 and b2, respectively, by assuming that the two other parameters are equal to zero. If social control only means the operation of a positive selective incentive, then from (5) it follows that full contribution is a Nash equilibrium if ri ≥ c −α s (9) holds for all i. On the other hand, from (7) it follows that partial contribution equilibrium exists if there is a D subset of actors, in which rj ≤ c −α s (10) holds for all j∈ D. Equations (9) and (10) show that full contribution and partial contribution can only exist at the same time in case there is a subgroup D of individuals for whom the number of relations rj equals to (c-α)/s. From equations (8) and (9) it follows that full contribution is always a payoff dominant equilibrium. Consequently, the structural determinants of full 341 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 contribution being a payoff dominant equilibrium are equivalent to the conditions of Nash equilibrium. As we demonstrated before, the existence of full contribution equilibrium depends on the minimum degree of the network and therefore positively correlated with density and negatively correlated with degree variance and centrality measures. Let us now consider the structural effects in case where only mass conformity (b1) operates and s and b2 are equal to zero. In this case full contribution is Nash equilibrium if ri≥(c-α)/b1 for all i. The existence of partial contribution equilibrium is much more likely than in the previous case as the conditions for this are given as: c −α for all i∈ C and b 1 c −α for all j∈ D. r jc − r jd ≤ b 1 ric − rid ≥ (11) (12) Equations (11) and (12) show that for the existence of partial contribution equilibrium the difference between contributing and defecting friends for some individuals have to exceed a certain threshold, while for others it has to remain below this threshold. This happens most likely, if contributors and defectors are segregated in the network. Local confirmation pressure drives certain parts of the network towards contribution and other parts towards defection. Consider any partial contribution equilibria where all i∈C cooperates and all j∈D defects. From equation (8) it follows that full contribution equilibrium is payoff dominant over partial contribution, if min⎛⎜ r ⎞⎟ > ⎝ jc ⎠ 342 c−n α d , where j∈ D, b 1 (13) C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 and nd is the number of individuals (defectors) in D. It means that the necessary structural condition for full contribution equilibrium being payoff dominant over a given partial contribution equilibrium is the existence of contacts between each defector and a certain number of contributors in the latter equilibrium. In case there are defectors that are only connected to defectors in partial contribution, full contribution will not be payoff dominant compared to this equilibrium. Here again we have to emphasize the importance of universality; all defectors should be integrated to the required extent in order to achieve the benefits of full contribution. Density within the subset of defectors in this respect is irrelevant. What matters is the minimum degree of connectedness to the subset of contributors. Strong segregation of defectors inhibits full contribution in the community. In case when only proportional conformity (b2) operates and s and b1 are equal to zero, the conditions for full contribution being Nash equilibrium are completely independent of network characteristics. Nonetheless, the minimum degree should also be greater than zero in this case. If this presumption holds, then the existence of full contribution Nash equilibrium depends only on payoff parameters. That is, b2≥c-α should hold. In this case, segregation plays an even more important role for the emergence of partial contribution equilibria. The conditions for the existence of partial contribution equilibrium are: r −r ic id ≥ c − α for all i∈ C and r b i 2 r jc − r jd c − α ≤ for all j∈ D. rj b 2 (14) (15) Given that full contribution equilibrium exists, the necessary condition for partial contribution equilibrium is that for some individuals the proportion of contributors among their friends has to exceed a certain threshold and for other individuals it has to remain below this threshold. This is more likely to happen in 343 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 clustered network structures. Dense subgroup structures increase, but overlapping dense structures decrease the chance of partial contribution equilibria. In a highly dense network it is less likely that a subgroup exists that is sufficiently isolated from others. Full contribution is payoff dominant over partial contribution, if ⎛r ⎜ jc min⎜ ⎜ rj ⎝ ⎞ c−n α ⎟ d ⎟> b ⎟ 2 ⎠ (16) where j∈D, and nd is the number of individuals (defectors) in D in the partial contribution equilibrium. It means that the necessary structural condition for full contribution being payoff dominant over a given partial contribution equilibrium is that the proportion of contributors among the connections of each defector should exceed a certain threshold in case of partial contribution. This is a requirement of minimum relative connectedness, unlike in the case of mass conformity, when it was a requirement of minimum absolute connectedness to contributors. Here the number of defecting friends also matters. Full contribution can be payoff dominant also when in the partial contribution equilibrium some defectors have only few contributing friends. On the other hand, they should also have only few defecting friends. This also means that if proportional conformity is highly relevant, then full contribution can be payoff dominant equilibrium also in highly centralized structures. For this, central actors have to be connected to diverse subgroups. This short analysis of marginal effects showed that the minimum degree is a strong determinant of overall collective action in case selective incentives operate. Network clustering and segregation of defectors has a strong influence when conformity mechanisms are strong. The payoff dominance of full contribution equilibrium is not likely in centralized structures when mass conformity is strong, but it is possible in case proportional conformity is prevalent. Another often-cited network hypothesis, according to which bridging ties support the transmission of contribution 344 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 incentives between subgroups, is not relevant if only selective incentives are at work. In case the segregated subgroups have dense networks the hypothesis may fail even if conformity plays a significant role. In this case, single bridging connections do not change defectors' incentives. 7. Discussion This study investigated the effects of social control and network structure on the emergence of collective action in n-person communities. We analyzed network effects in single encounters, and highlighted interactions between social control and structural characteristics. To reach these objectives, an integrated framework of analysis has been used that combined the analysis of n-person games with local interaction games. We discussed different social control mechanisms that are transmitted by interpersonal relationships. These mechanisms were incorporated in the standard n-person public goods game. Relationships and individuals were considered anonymous; there were no leaders, privileged actors, or binding coalitions. Social control mechanisms, namely selective incentives and forms of conformity were modeled as rewards that influence individual decisions through actors’ relationships to relevant others. We demonstrated that as a consequence of social control, network topologies matter for the emergence of collective action. Some results support widely accepted hypotheses about the facilitating factors of collective action. Besides, the analysis also shed some new light on the underlying mechanisms of social network effects in collective action. Results support the hypothesis that strong social control, on average, facilitates collective action. We also emphasized that it is not always necessary to provide a selective incentive for cooperation. Public good provision might be possible even in a large group where members match their behavior with a little subgroup of their friends. On the other hand, as a main achievement of this study, we demonstrated that under certain circumstances, stronger social control may inhibit overall contribution. Not only conformity, but also selective incentives might have adverse 345 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 effects. This result provides indirect support to the “double edge of networks” hypothesis of Flache and it fits in the theoretical research line that demonstrates reverse effects of social control mechanisms.34 Among social network effects, we found that cohesion is a crucial determinant of mass collective action. As cohesion is associated with density, this is also in favor of the density-cooperation hypothesis. Density, however, is not the most useful indicator of cohesion. Our results showed that the minimum degree of the network and fragmentation are directly related to full contribution, which is in line with the concept of cohesion but has no close association with density itself. Density increases the chance of full contribution mainly because it is correlated with these measures. The model also showed that the impact of minimum degree on full contribution is correlated with the strength of selective incentives, while the lack of clear network clusters foster collective action if conformity plays a significant role in players’ decisions. We also showed that clustering in a community might inhibit full contribution even when social control is relatively strong. Nonetheless, we did not relax many of the model restrictions in this analysis. The floor is open, however, for generalizations as we tried to develop a flexible framework of analysis. That is, several restrictive assumptions of the model can be relaxed in subsequent research without shifting the basic building blocks of the model. For instance, the analysis can be extended to cases in which a different production function is assumed for the public good provision. Basically, it is not even necessary to assume an increasing production function. Similar results can be produced for cases in which α<0, where we have the problem of sustaining a public bad. Similarly, instead of rewards of social control, punishments could be considered, for instance in the form of negative selective incentives for defectors. This modification, however, would not reshape model predictions radically. Another 34 346 Flache Double Edge of Networks. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 example is to relax the assumption of binary social relations (two individuals are either friends or not). We could assume that there are good friends and also mere acquaintances in the network by ordering weights to each tie. The strength of social control would then depend on the strength of the given tie. As we investigated one-shot interactions with perfect and complete information and forward-looking, strategically rational individuals, a natural development is the consideration of repeated structurally embedded games. Furthermore, the rationality assumptions of the game theoretical approach could be regarded as serious shortcomings, although we are convinced that there are well-founded theoretical reasons for taking this type of actor-model as given. The presented equilibrium analysis also presumes perfect information of actors that is very likely an implausible assumption in large communities. One possible way to tackle this problem is to consider limited information and structurally constrained information flows. A game theoretical analysis in this direction is presented by Chwe.35 Another possible way of relaxing the strict assumptions of the model is to consider boundedly rational actors. Backward-looking learning models fitted to collective action problems go in this direction.36 A critical assumption that can be relaxed in a subsequent analysis is the stability of the network, as it is done by Takács, Janky, and Flache.37 Individuals develop new relationships and sometimes abandon old ties, and this might have some consequences also for their decisions in collective action, especially if the structural change is a cause or a consequence of their behavior in the public context. This could be followed by a dynamic interrelated analysis of repeated collective action problems and structural dynamics. Most important, however, is that any model extension and theoretical development should also be fruitful for empirical 35 Michael Suk-Young Chwe, “Structure and Strategy in Collective Action” American Journal of Sociology, 105 (1999): 128-156. 36 Michael W. Macy "Backward Looking Social Control" American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 819-836.; Michael W. 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Berlin: Springer, 1996. ______________., ______________. and Nobuhito Jin “Prisoner’s Dilemma Networks: Selection Strategy Versus Action Strategy” in Social Dilemmas and Cooperation ed. Ulrich Schulz, Wulf Albers, and Ulrich Mueller. Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1994. Zimmermann, Martín G. and Víctor M. Eguíluz “Cooperation, Social Networks, and the Emergence of Leadership in a Prisoner's Dilemma with Adaptive Local Interactions” Physical Review E, 72 (2005): 056118. 354 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 POLITICAL BLOG INFLUENCE RECONSIDERED: A NETWORK ANALYSIS OF MAINSTREAM AND ALTERNATIVE ETHNIC-RACIAL AMERICAN POLITICAL BLOGS Jaira J. Harrington University of Chicago Abst r act According to a 2008 Pew Poll, nearly 1 in 4 Americans visited blogs for information about the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign. Researchers Drezner and Farrell argue that politically influential blogs direct, shape and limit discourse by “socially constructing interpretive frames for current events”.1 However, this particular study reflects a larger trend in political blog research that limits research to the mainstream, or top 100 blogs. Previous studies neglected publics outside of the mainstream and, by extension, suggested that alternative discourse lacks influence. Open communication networks are vital for issue representation, ideology and opinion formation especially among minority groups. The sample for this study focuses on ethnic-racial political blogs as one example of blogs outside of the mainstream blogosphere to explore the following questions: Can political blogs that exist outside of the mainstream, or alternative blogs, influence the mainstream network? If so, how can political blog influence be reconsidered to include these blogs? I use both network analysis and logit regression to explore these questions. My findings conclude that mainstream political blogs will be more likely to establish a direct link to an ethnic-racial political blog with higher influence within the alternative blog network. Keywords: blog influence, social network analysis, political blogs, political communication, race 1 Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell, “The Power and Politics of Blogs” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, September 2-5, 2004): 4. 355 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 2 1. Introduction A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong gives it a superficial appearance of being right. --Thomas Paine (1737-1809) In the heat of the Revolution, Thomas Paine publicly expressed his political doubts, fears, and desires for young America by widely distributing his pamphlet Common Sense. By pamphleteering, Paine was empowered to inform the public of his views and, as a result, influence the policy discussions surrounding America‘s transition from detached British colony to independent nation. In the 21st century, a technologically driven society, the explosion of the World Wide Web has taken a similar and increasingly important role in shaping public political discourse. According to a 2008 Pew Poll, nearly 1 in 4 Americans visited blogs for information about the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign. The billowing size and range of influence of the Internet in American new media has transformed the way in which public opinion can be influenced by creating a space for political information to be distributed, analyzed and debated. Most important to Internet public commentary and debate is the weblog, or blog. Blogs are relatively simple networks of individual authors or small groups of authors, called bloggers, who share periodic commentary through posts on various topics of personal interest. Some authors suggest that political blogs epitomize the idea of a “representative democracy” by aggregating political ideas and discourse from diverse perspectives.3 2 Acknowledgments: To my primary advisors on this project—Michael C. Dawson and Betsy Sinclair—thank you for your support, guidance and encouragement. Thank you to Ramaesh Bhagirat for your copy-editing assistance. I would like to especially thank Christopher Berk and Amir Shawn Fairdosi for their attentive and helpful comments. I would also like to thank the seminar participants at the 2009 Ford Foundation Fellows Conference, Irvine, CA; the 2009 Princeton University Graduate Women of Color Caucus Symposium, Princeton, NJ; the 2009 University of Chicago Minority Graduate Student Association Research Conference, Chicago, IL; and the 2009 Northwestern University Black Graduate Student Association Conference, Evanston, IL. 3 Stephen Coleman and Scott Wright, “Political Blogs and Representative Democracy,” Information Polity 13 (Jan. 2008): 1-8. ; Richard Davis, Politics Online: Blogs, Chatrooms and Discussion Groups in American Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2005).; Hugh Hewitt, Blog: Understanding the information 356 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Many authors have suggested that political blogs and bloggers are the pamphlets and pamphleteers of the technological age.4 Unlike the pamphlets of the past, blogs facilitate instant communication with opportunities for the reading audience to post user-generated content directly on the website through comment boxes. Frequently, these comment boxes become a forum within the blog where readers and bloggers alike debate and discuss issues. In addition to internal communication between blog visitors and bloggers, there is substantial diffusion of information external to blogs as well. Bloggers frequently look at other blogs for news tips and provide information and publicity to one another through links. The increasing influence of political blogs on public discourse has caught the attention of some political scientists who have tried to create a method of measuring political blog influence.5 reformation that’s changing your world (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2005).; Micah L. Sifry, “A See Through Society,” Columbia Journalism Review 47 (January/February 2009): 43-47. 4 Daniel K. Glover and Mike Essl, “New on the Web: Politics as Usual,” New York Times, 3 December 2006, Opinion Section, Electronic edition. ;Charles P. Pierce, “Mud in the Digital Age,” The Boston Globe Magazine, June 17 2007, 24. ; Alan Wolfe, “The New Pamphleteers,” The New York Times, 11 July 2004, Books Section, Electronic Edition. 5 Robert Ackland, Mapping the U.S. Political Blogosphere: Are Conservative Bloggers More Prominent? (BlogTalk 2005) [Accessed http://incsub.org/blogtalk/images/robertackland.pdf; Lada Adamic online];available and Natalie Glance, “The at Political Blogosphere and the 2004 US Election: Divided They Blog” (Presented at the Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Chicago, Illinois, USA August 21-25, 2005) [Accessed online]; available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid-1134271.1134277. ; Joel Bloom and Matthew Kerbel, “Campaign blogs in 2004 and Beyond: The Care, Feeding and Harvesting of Online Communities of Supporters” (Presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America, August 31- Sept 3, 2006).; Drezner and Farrell, “The Power and Politics of Blogs”, 10.; Kathy Gill, “How Can We Measure the Influence of the Blogosphere?” http://faculty.washington.edu/kegill/pub/www2004_blogosphere_gill.pdf. (2004): 1-10. Matthew Hindman, Kostas Tsioutsiouliklis, and Judy A. Johnson, “Googlearchy: How a Few Heavily-Linked Sites Dominate Politics on the Web” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, March 31, 2003).; Laura McKenna and Antoinette Pole, “Do Weblogs Matter? Weblogs in American Politics,” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, September 2-5, 2004). 357 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Yet, the typical methods of measuring blog influence have inadvertently marginalized smaller communities of weblogs, particularly those that cater to feminist, LGBTQ and ethnic/racial minority audiences. Rochet calls the imbalanced number of minority weblogs a “data slant”, in that these sites are few in number. In addition, these weblogs do not receive the massive number of daily site visitors required to have high authority blog status and rarely, if ever, break the top 100 list of any blog authority-granting site6. Yet, open communication networks are vital for issue representation, ideology and opinion formation, especially among minority groups. On the one hand, the relative isolation of minority, or alternative blogs, will help to consolidate a “subaltern counterpublic” as shown in Dawsons’s work on the American black opinion in the black public sphere7. These alternative blogs will be able to define a unique voice and have an opportunity for ideology formation and public debate. However, the effects are not always positive. Through Cohen’s previous scholarship on marginal public spheres regarding the HIV/AIDS crisis in the African-American community in the 1990s, it has been shown that issues within these publics can be exacerbated from minority public sphere isolation8. From these offline examples of marginal public spheres that are both independent of and yet not completely detached from the mainstream, it is clear that an examination of alternative weblog communities will assist in an understanding how the openness of political communication networks in the blogosphere may help facilitate ingroup communication and/or foreclose debate on minority issues in the mainstream. This matter is significant to the concept of blog influence, but has not yet been examined. Kevin J. Wallsten, Public Opinion and the New, “New Media”: How Political Blogs Influence Journalists, Politicians and the Mass Public (PhD diss, University of California, Berkeley, 2007). 6 Laura Rochet, “The “Data Slant”: Why Lack of Media Generated by Minority Users Online is an Offline Problem,” Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy 19 (2006): 39-51. See listings for “Top Blogs” at blog authority sites including: www.blogpulse.com, www.blogrunner.com, www.technorati.com and www.truthlaidbear.com. 7 Michael Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2003). 8 Cathy Cohen, The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 358 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Although these alternative sites do not have the high traffic of their larger, more mainstream peers, this ought not indicate that their presence in the smaller blog communities they target and inhabit is any less influential. A 2006 Pew report on ethnic media reveals that nearly 24 million Americans are either primary or secondary consumers of ethnic media of all forms9. Within communities, political discourse on these blogs is of significant consequence. My study seeks to demonstrate the influence that racial-ethnic alternative weblogs' communications have on mainstream communities. The invisibility of alternative weblogs and the overrepresentation of mainstream blogs in past studies of blogosphere influence points to a need for research that accounts for both groups. Authors Drezner and Ferrell argue that because of the skewed distribution of a few “elite” blogs, the median blogger has almost no political influence as measured by traffic or hyperlinks.10 However, this understanding of political influential power is incomplete. Although alternative blogs have substantially lower traffic and less hyperlinks than elite blogs, they have a significant impact on the communities they primarily serve and broadly inform the mainstream. This study will directly question this current notion of blog influence by examining mainstream blog decisions relative to alternative blog in-group behavior. The peripheral status of these blogs is rooted in the methodological leanings of past studies, which do not allow for a holistic examination of these minority blog communities within the larger Progressive-Conservative spectrum. Studies centered on partisanship have been the general orientation for prior research.11 Combined with exclusive examinations of the top 100 9 A 2006 Pew report on ethnic media reveals that nearly 24 million Americans are either primary or secondary consumers of ethnic media of all forms. Pew Research Center, “Ethnic Media Audience Trends,” Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, accessed online at http://www.journalism.org/node/465. 10 Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell, “The Power and Politics of Blogs”, 4. 11 Robert Ackland, Mapping the U.S. Political Blogosphere: Are Conservative Bloggers More Prominent?, 2.; Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 US Election: Divided They Blog”, 2. 359 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 blogs, such research has had the iterative effect of studying relationships among the same blogs in every study. Until now, this method of analysis has continued uncontested. Political influence of blogs cannot be truly measured when significant sectors of public opinion and alternative spheres of political conversation are not included. My model is a step toward fully including these spheres. My application of a network analysis frame will help clarify, describe and examine the interactions within these small alternative blog communities. Quantitatively, I expect that my statistical model will help to explain the mainstream blogging community’s relationship with alternative networks. The findings will only gesture toward the quality of relationships within the blogging community. This study will also help political science researchers at the crossroads of network analysis, statistical inference, political blogs and public political discourse more critically interrogate the methods by which we determine blog influence. My central research question is: What is the probability that a mainstream blog will establish a blogroll link with an alternative blog that has a high Freeman centrality score? I hypothesize that a blog with greater Freeman Centrality within the alternative blog sector will be more likely to have a direct link from a mainstream blog. H0: Freeman Centrality has no effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. Ha: Freeman Centrality has a positive effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. To date, current blog network analysis, which privileges blogs with high hits and many hyperlinks, cannot fully capture the influential power of the political blog. This paper presents a twotiered network analysis and logit regression study of the top 19 Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell, “The Power and Politics of Blogs”, 21.; Matthew A. Baum and Tim Groeling, “New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse,” Political Communication 25 (2008): 345365. 360 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 mainstream and 37 alternative (African American and Latino) political blogs conducted in 2009, so that the academic understanding of political blog influence can be more inclusive and precise. This paper’s first section offers an overview of the current literature on mass media, new media and politics. In this section I clarify the relationship between individual blogs and the blogosphere and address the issue of diversity and inclusion/exclusion within the blogosphere. The second section presents the data and methods for my research. The next section offers an analysis of my data and presents the findings. This information is followed by a discussion of those findings. The concluding section offers future directions for research. These suggestions are situated in the implications of my research findings in a broader discussion of political blog influence. 2. Literature Review 2.1 Traditional Mass Media, New Media and Politics Mass media has been a mainstay in the distribution of political analysis, commentary and opinion. Traditional media has evolved from print media to broadcast radio to television. In the 21st century, Internet new media, most notably blogs, are now rising in importance as a source for political news. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center reveals the increasing importance of the Internet for obtaining political information: 33 percent of Americans used the Internet to monitor the 2008 presidential campaign compared with only 10 percent in 2004.12 During the 2008 primary and presidential election campaign seasons, many blogs provided by-the-minute insight to the political speeches, statements and events. According to a 2009 Pew Internet and American Life Project, this heavy Internet campaign activity was matched by Internet use of potential voters—74% of Internet users, about 55% of the entire adult population, used the 12 Pew Research Center. “Internet Now Major Source of Campaign News.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (October, 31 2008) accessed online at http://people-press.org/report/467/internetcampaign-news. 361 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Internet for news and information about the election.13 The study also revealed that nearly 1 of every 5 Internet users posted their thoughts, comments or questions about the campaign on a blog or social networking site.14 Undoubtedly, blogs are of increasing importance to the public understanding of politics. 2.2 Clarification of Terms 2.2.1 What is a Blog? A weblog, or blog, is an online journal whose content is posted by either a single moderator, a blogger, or a group of bloggers. The posted content of the blog, which could cover virtually any topic, is generally guided by the interest of the blogger or bloggers that support the site. These postings typically offer a comment section where site viewers have an opportunity to broadly contribute moderated and unmoderated commentary and ideas to the sphere of fellow blog visitors. In the political blogosphere, discourse about current events from the populace allows for the free trade of ideas between dilettantes and experts alike, broadening civic space for discussion.15 2.2.2 What is a political blog? For the purposes of this study, a political blog is a weblog whose main objective, but not necessarily sole interest, is to examine and discuss American politics. Active political bloggers run an expansive gamut of political exposure and experience, from newly interested amateur citizen journalists to veteran journalists and political insiders.16 Each author, by virtue of attained experience, contributes an additional perspective to the blogosphere and, additionally, the larger ongoing political debates. However, the 13 Aaron Smith, “The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008,” Pew Internet & American Life Project (April 2009): 3. 14 Aaron Smith, Pew Internet & American Life Project, 12-13. 15 Stephen Coleman, “Blogs and the New Politics of Listening,” Political Quarterly 76 (April/June 2005): 272-280. 16 Eugenia Siapera, “The Political Subject of Blogs,” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 97109. 362 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 utility of Internet-based new media extends well beyond the citizenry. Politicians are now extending their influence through involvement in the blogosphere as well.17 For the first time, in the 2004 elections, both presidential candidates, incumbent George W. Bush and Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, maintained blogs that provided detailed biographical information, explicated their policy positions and offered opportunities for donations. The strength of these blogs was that the content enabled the candidates the power to frame their campaigns.18 The technologically integrated campaign of United States President Barack Obama included a user-friendly website that submitted text, email and blog updates. These technological advancements have been attributed, in part, to his electoral success.19 President Obama also uses the Internet for policy updates and speeches to communicate with the public.20 International politicians have also embraced blogs as a medium of communication. Ministers of Parliament in the United Kingdom have campaign professional weblogs to create another pathway of communication with their constituency.21 With the ease of creating a personal blog, politicians are empowered by being able to speak directly to the through the web to their constituents without the filter of political commentary blogs or traditional news media. While politicians themselves have begun to increase their activity on the web to interface with the people, the interactions 17 Stephen Coleman and Giles Moss, “Governing at a Distance—Politicians in the Blogosphere,” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 7-20. 18 Shannon L. Bichard, “Building Blogs: A Multi-Dimensional Analysis of the Distribution of Frames on the 2004 Presidential Candidate Web Sites,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 83 (Summer 2006): 329-345. 19 Mark Hennessy, “Obama to continue exploiting the potential of web as president,” The Irish Times, November 11, 2008, World section, Online Edition. 20 See Office of the President of the United States, Barack Obama website http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology/ 21 Mary Francoli and Stephen Ward, “21st Century Soapboxes? MPs and Their Blogs,” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 21-39.; Nigel Jackson, “‘Scattergun’ or ‘Rifle’ Approach to Communication: MPs in the Blogosphere,” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 97-109.; Scott Wright, “Read My Day? Communication, Campaigning and Councillors’ Blogs,” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 81-95. 363 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 between blogs connected. and sources of news have become more 2.3 Competition between Political Blogs and Traditional Mass Media The growing interrelation between political blogs and the news media bears additional consequences for public political discourse. On the one hand, some research points to a convergence of news media agenda setting and information on political blogs.22 Whether watching television or reading a newspaper, the Internet likely has a significant impact on its content. Bloggers have become skillful at gathering information and breaking news stories before traditional sources that many mainstream newspapers and sources have attached blogs to their websites in order to keep up with the pace of independent bloggers.23 Yet, this flow of information occurs in both directions. Much to the chagrin of traditional news outlets, blogs still rely heavily upon their articles for news information. On the other hand, tension exists between political blogs and traditional media. Much of the debate arises from questions of ethics and professional standards of journalism. Where traditional journalistic modes of conduct including identifying reliable sources, rigorous editing and aggressive fact checking for accuracy are requisite in traditional media, the same codes are optional in the blogosphere.24 Some research suggests that culture clashes between blogs and traditional media have hindered a more integrated relationship between the two 22 Donald Matheson, “Weblogs and the Epistemology of the News: Some Trends in Online Journalism,” New Media & Society 6 (August 2004): 443-468. Marilyn Roberts, Wayne Wanta and Tzong-Horng Dzwo, “Agenda setting and issue salience online,” Communication Research 29 (August 2002): 452–465. Kevin Wallsten, “Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Mainstream Media and Political Blogs,” Review of Policy Research 24 (November 2007): 567-587. 23 Benjamin Burroughs, “Kissing Macaca: Blogs, Narrative and Political Discourse,” Journal for Cultural Research 11 (October 2007): 319-335. 24 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Storming the News Gatekeepers; On the Internet, Citizen Journalists Raise Their Voice,” Washington Post, November 17, 2007. Style Section, Online Edition. 364 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 coteries25. This divide further demonstrates the importance of examining the blogosphere separately from other forms of mass media. 2.4 Political Blogs, Activism and Diverse Voices As an independent form of mass media, the influential range of the political blogosphere is enormous.26 The content of the hundreds of active political blogs reflects the political diversity of the electorate, including the entire spectrum of ideological leanings to include conservative, liberal, independent and others.27 Beyond ideological classifications, there are still smaller subsets of political blogs that appeal to feminist, queer and racial diversity interests. These blogs frequently communicate within and outside of their smaller online communities. Researchers have gained interest in the ideological diversity of voices in the blogosphere, but the research has yet to engage blogs that cater to feminist, LGBTQ and racial/ethnic minority audiences28. This paper will focus on the interactions between mainstream blogs and the alternative subset African American and Latino political blogs. My central research question is: What is the probability that a mainstream blog will establish a blogroll link with an alternative blog that has a high Freeman centrality score? I hypothesize that a blog with greater Freeman Centrality within the alternative blog sector will be more likely to have a direct link from a mainstream blog. H0: Freeman Centrality has no effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. 25 John McQuaid, “New Media Battles Old to Define Internet-Era Politics,” Nieman Reports (Summer 2008): 42-44. 26 Smolkin, Rachel, “The expanding blogosphere,” American Journalism Review 26 (June/July 2004): 38–43. 27 Jose Antonio Vargas, “A Diversity of Opinion, if Not Opinionators,” Washington Post, August 6, 2007. Style Section, Print Edition. 28 Laura McKenna and Antoinette Pole, “Do Weblogs Matter? Weblogs in American Politics,”, 25. 365 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Ha: Freeman Centrality has a positive effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. This study will regress both the Freeman Centrality and Mainstream Blog Link variables to see if the null hypothesis can be rejected. 3. Data and Methods The blogosphere is a complex community of individual actors, or bloggers, tied to one another to form communities of varying size and influence. Social network analysis rests on these basic concepts of nodes and ties. Network analysis serves as an ideal tool to examine the interactions within, between and among blogging communities. The application of network analysis to the burgeoning complex of American Political blogs would help to explain the ways in which information, readers and other resources are exchanged between blog authors and blog websites. Network analysis also offers a clearer picture of which alternative blogs in the sample have the most influence within alternative racial-ethnic political blogosphere. The use of American Political blogs in this sample brings forth a set of limitations in issue discussion, as some Latino-American political blogs have bloggers who are American citizens that are stationed elsewhere in the world. The physical boundaries of the blogosphere are often unknown, as national boundaries are often neglected or unimportant. Additional American political blogs are also highly divided along ideological and party lines, in that blogs of like political persuasions tend to cluster. Such a clustering may have an impact on my claims to blog centrality. Despite these challenges to my research, the American case offers promise in that the blogosphere itself is becoming increasingly diverse and representative, with bloggers and blogging communities from various walks of life being represented. As discussed earlier, the role of blogs in political campaigns and political information has surged between the penultimate and ultimate presidential elections. The American case of the political blogosphere is ripe for analysis. 366 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Using network analysis, I used the Freeman Centrality score29 to determine a scale for the centrality of alternative blogs relative to mainstream blogs. To assess the impact of the Freeman Centrality score, I use a logistic regression. 3.1 Identifying Actors in the Network30 The primary source of data for gathering blog websites was Technorati.com. This search engine monitors 112.8 million blogs, updates live content, and has the overall mission of “collecting, organizing and distributing the global online conversation”31. Technorati grants authority to blogs that have the highest number of external hits, or visitors to the web site. 3.2 Determining Blog Influence Past studies have measured blog authority by using the top listings on Blogstreet, Truth Laid Bear Ecosystem, Truth Laid Bear EcoTraffic, Blogpulse and the Adamic and Glance ranking system.32 Despite the wide diversity of methods past scholarship has employed to identify the leading blogs in the blogosphere, alternative blogs are not included in the analysis because such blogs do not receive enough hits to be included in the overall top 100. Most blogs have a blogroll, or a list directly on the site that would direct readers other blogs of interest. In this study I analyze blogroll links among the top mainstream and alternative racial29 For an extended discussion of Freeman Centrality see L. C. Freeman, “Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification”. Social Networks, 1(3), (1979). 215-239. Without regard to the direction of ties, the Freeman Centrality score measures the centrality based on number of ties they have in the network and the centralization of the network. 30 For a list of the political blogs used in the study, please see Appendix Figure I: Blog Sample. 31 See Technorati website description at www.technorati.com/about 32 Laura McKenna and Antoinette Pole, “Do Weblogs Matter? Weblogs in American Politics,”, 15-16. Kathy Gill, “How Can We Measure the Influence of the Blogosphere?”, 6-8. Matthew Hindman, Kostas Tsioutsiouliklis, and Judy A. Johnson, “Googlearchy: How a Few Heavily-Linked Sites Dominate Politics on the Web”, 5.; Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance, “The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 US Election: Divided They Blog”, 8.; Robert Ackland, Mapping the U.S. Political Blogosphere: Are Conservative Bloggers More Prominent? 2-3.; Kevin Wallsten, Review of Policy Research, 567-587. 367 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 ethnic (African American and Latino) political blogs. The present (or absent) ties between the blogs will be identified by blogroll links between blogs, which can infer other aspects of influence through shared critical resources including political updates, readership and commentary. Drezner and Farrell state that, “permanent links in the blogroll are more valuable to third partyblogs than links from posts that are likely to disappear over time. Links in the blogrolls of prominent blogs with many readers are especially valuable, as they may lead to quite significant increases in readership”.33 I identified an absent or present tie by reading the blogroll of each blog in the sample and indicating an absent link with “0” and a link with “1”. Using this method, I can also make inferences about the structural opportunity (the ease or difficulty of resource diffusion due to network structure) of the entire network. 3.3 Defining a Mainstream Political Blogosphere The top 19 blogs in the mainstream political blogosphere were extracted from the Technorati top 100 overall blog sites and the top political blogs. First, I used the top 100 overall blog list to gather the most visited political blog websites. I did not include blogs that are owned or monitored by large, corporate websites like ABCNews. I excluded these blogs on the grounds that their number of hits may be influenced by the name recognition of their corporate sponsor. Instead, I exclusively included independent political blog sites. I sought to collect a larger sample, so I extended my search to the politics blog list, which is rank-ordered by the Technorati authority score. For continuity, I read each site to ensure that the content addresses political issues. On blogs there is typically an “about” section, which will describe the main goals of the blog. Any words in the description section that were derived from “politics” and “political” signaled a political blog. 33 368 Daniel Drezner and Henry Farrell, “The Power and Politics of Blogs”, 8. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 3.4 Defining an Alternative Political Blogosphere I used two separate methods to define and identify the top 37 members of alternative blog community. Members of the African American blogosphere at large may enroll on the ethnic search engine Electronic Village. Not only do bloggers self-identify as African American on this site, 1,600 blogs are arranged according to website rankings.34 I identified the top political blogs using nominal criteria. In the title or description section of each blog, if a word stated “politics” or “political” present on the site, the blog was considered to be an African American political blog. I read the top 150 blogs to ensure that each member of the sample community meets the criteria for my definition “political blog”. Electronic Village utilizes the virtual blog library, Technorati, to establish rankings. Using the Electronic Village website, I have constructed a list of the top 19 African American political blog sites. For Latino Political blogs, I conducted a Google search of first “Latino Political Blog” and then “Hispanic Political Blog”. Unlike African American political blogs, at the time of my study, there was no central virtual blog library for Latino Political Blogs. I identified the top political blogs using nominal criteria. I scanned the first 10 pages of each Google search. In the title or description section of each blog, if any word derived from “politics” or “political” was present, the blog was considered to be a Latino American political blog. 3.5 Freeman Centrality Variable (X) For my independent variable, I will use a common measure of influence in network analysis, centrality. Freeman centrality is an effective measure for the most significant actors within a network in that it is a count of the connections between actors and accounts for all network interactions. A higher Freeman Centrality score indicates higher authority and influence within the 34 See black blog rankings at www.electronicvillage.blogspot.com/2009/02/top-ten-black-blogs-feb- 2009.html 369 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 alternative network. The Freeman Centrality score of each alternative blog will serve as the independent variable. Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: The Freeman Centrality (X): Mean: Minimum: Maximum: Interquartile range: Standard Deviation: Variance 7.514 0 17 7 4.75 22.56 The Freeman Centrality scores for the sample have a mean of 7.514, a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 17. This means that the average number of connections per blog is 7.514, while the lowest number of connections is zero and the maximum number of links in the sample is 17. The distance between the first and third quartiles in the distribution for the variable is 7. The mean and interquartile ranges are proximate, so the spread in the sample does not have a problem with extreme values. The standard deviation and variance are 4.75 and 22.56, respectively. 3.6 Mainstream Blog Link Variable (Y) Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: The Mainstream Blog Link Variable (Y): Mean: Minimum: Maximum: Interquartile range: Standard Deviation: Variance .2162 0 1 0 (No Link) or 1 (Link) 0.417 0.174 The Mainstream Blog Link variable has a mean of 0.2162, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. This mean demonstrates that the absolute number of links from the Mainstream to the Alternative blogosphere is minimal. The range of scores is either 0 (No Link) or 1 (Link). The standard deviation of the variable is 0.417. The variance is 0.174. 370 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The dependent variable will measure the probability that a mainstream blog establishes a direct link with an alternative blog. This value is nominal and binomial. I use the binary link (link=1, no link=0) score to determine whether a mainstream blog connects to an alternative blog. Of the 3080 total observations from a sample size of 56, I focused my analysis on the direct links from mainstream blogs to alternative blogs. I isolated 37 cases of possible mainstream-alternative blog links. When attempting to test causality, the most appropriate method of analysis for a binomial dependent variable is logit regression analysis. I attempted OLS regression analysis for my research question and I was unable to reasonably interpret the data, as my dependent variable violates the key assumption of linearity. Logit regression is a more appropriate model in that there is no strict assumption of linearity. This condition is necessary because I use a binary variable (No Link or Link). The correlation coefficient for the two variables is .30. This is a moderately weak, but positive trend. 3.7 The Model p (Freeman Centrality Score) = 1/ 1+ e – (ˆß * X (Mainstream Blog Link Variable)) This logistic model regresses both the Freeman Centrality and Mainstream Blog Link variables to see if the null hypothesis can be rejected. I will focus my attention on the first mean differences in expected values coefficient. The findings below are my estimates for ˆß. 4. Findings and Discussion The data support the alternative hypothesis: Freeman Centrality has a positive effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. The expected value of mainstream blog links to alternative blogs with a high Freeman Centrality score is 0.07762. This value is located below in the Predicted Values of (Y|X) in the table and on the graph. This score means that mainstream blogs 371 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 link to alternative blogs only 7 percent of the time. This score further indicates the relative isolation of the alternative political blogosphere from the mainstream. Of the .07 percent cases where mainstream blogs establish such a link, the first mean difference of the expected value is .6486. In other words, 64 percent of the time mainstream blogs link to blogs with a high Freeman Centrality score alternative blogs within this sample. Mainstream blogs are more likely to link to an alternative blog as the value of its Freeman Centrality score increases. Tabel 3. The Logit Model Mean 0.07762 Standard Deviation 0.1158 2.5% 97.5% 0.002289 0.4525 Predicted Values: Y|X 0 0.93 1 0.07 First Differences in Expected Values: E(Y|X1)-E(Y|X) Mean 0.6486 Standard Deviation 0.3024 2.5% 97.5% -0.1207 0.9756 Risk Ratios: P(Y=1|X1)/P(Y=1|X) Mean 67.6 Standard Deviation 188.6 2.5% 97.5% 0.6289 410.8 Notes: Number of Simulations: 1000 Y: Mainstream Blog Link to Alternative Blog X: Freeman Centrality Score Expected Values: E(Y|X) Although the data show support for my hypothesis, the use of network analysis in a statistical model may be contested. Network interactions, unlike observations in a linear or logit regression, are seen as interdependent. However, my empirical analysis of mainstream link probability and Freeman Centrality scores, do not violate the contestation between both methods of analysis. Each Freeman Centrality Score is independent in that this particular score only accounts for baseline links within the network. A direct link with one blog does not detract from another blog‘s ability to 372 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 create another link with that same blog. This argument for a statistical and network analysis divide does not apply for this particular study. Figure 1. Graphical Representations of the Logit Model 7. Conclusion The central concern of this paper was to determine if mainstream blogs are more likely to connect with alternative blogs that have a higher level of influence within their sphere. The inadvertent marginalization of alternative political blogs from discussions of the American political blogosphere has offered an incomplete 373 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 understanding of political blog influence to date. My research uses a logistic regression model to regress both the Freeman Centrality and Mainstream Blog Link variables from the blog sample. From my findings, I can infer that the Freeman Centrality score of an alternative blog does indeed have a positive effect on a mainstream blogs decision to establish a direct link. The data support the alternative hypothesis: Freeman Centrality has a positive effect on a direct link from a mainstream blog to an alternative blog. These results are significant to the concept of political influence in terms of interactions both internal and external to the alternative blog network. This means that a mainstream political blog would be more likely to link to alternative political blogs that are more centralized within their alternative blog network. Implicitly, alternative blogs that are empowered by their status within the blogs network become more powerful by being linked to larger mainstream political blogs. Alternative blogs that are connected by association with alternative blogs connected to mainstream actors may also be strategically aligned for resource benefits from that mainstream site. The very links themselves among these political blogs could be used as politically beneficial leverage in communication as well. Mainstream political blogs are not connecting to the alternative blogs as shown in the model. Of the possible connections that exist, mainstream blogs make only 7 percent of those possible ties. Alternative blogs, or racial-ethnic blogs in this sample, are largely isolated from the mainstream. But of those that are connected to the mainstream, this model shows that alternative blogs are not only connected to the mainstream blogosphere, but their internal interactions can have an impact on mainstream blogroll linking patterns. The impact that alternative blogs may have on mainstream blogs has broad implications for the future of studying political blog influence. My research suggests that publics with fewer hyperlinks and smaller audiences may have an impact on mainstream blogs. The primary aim of this study is to highlight the need to look beyond mainstream blogs when researching political blog influence. Continued research on alternative blogs that move political blog influence research from 374 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 the mainstream to the margins of the blogosphere, can further the academic goal of understanding influence in political blog networks. For a future study, I plan increase the number blogs within each group35. I also plan to examine how the conservative-liberal argument that was made in prior research could affect affiliations within alternative blog connections to the mainstream. The map of the blog network,36 seems to suggest that political orientation of the alternative blogs may also come into play for mainstream blog links. More extensive research on the issue of alternative blogs is of significant consequence to our understanding of political influence in the blogosphere. I plan to extend future research to LGBTQ, Feminist and other racial-ethnic minority blogs. Yet, it must be noted that many of the blogs in the sample alternative community are also concerned with LGBTQ and women’s issues, despite being identified as solely ethnic-minority blogs in this study. Multiple identity attributes are relatively common in the alternative blogosphere. In addition, it is entirely plausible that blogs that do not espouse a discrete commitment to political discourse (such as entertainment or popular culture blogs) can have political conversations. A similar study of blogs that do not explicitly discuss politics could reveal new implications for online political discourse. Over 200 years ago, Paine‘s eloquent Common Sense pamphlet offered “simple facts, plain arguments and common sense” that helped to sustain a Revolution. His voice alone helped to shape modern American views of liberty. Similarly, the activist, pamphleteering spirit of yesteryear, embodied by the entire blogosphere, has helped to form a place for public political discourse, mainstream and alternative blog alike. 35 See appendix, Figure 2 36 See appendix, Figure 3 375 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Bibliography Ackland, Robert. Mapping the U.S. Political Blogosphere: Are Conservative Bloggers More Prominent? (BlogTalk 2005) [Accessed online]; available at http://incsub.org/blogtalk/images/robertackland.pdf. 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Burroughs, Benjamin. “Kissing Macaca: Blogs, Narrative and Political Discourse.” Journal for Cultural Research 11 (October 2007): 319-335. Cohen, Cathy. The Boundaries of Blackness: AIDS and the Breakdown of Black Politics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Coleman, Stephen. “Blogs and the New Politics of Listening.” Political Quarterly 76 (April/June 2005): 272280. Coleman, Stephen and Giles Moss. “Governing at a Distance— Politicians in the Blogosphere.” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 7-20. 376 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Coleman, Stephen and Scott Wright. “Political Blogs and Representative Democracy.” Information Polity 13 (Jan. 2008): 1-8. Davis, Richard. Politics Online: Blogs, Chatrooms and Discussion Groups in American Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2005. Dawson, Michael. Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2003. Drezner, Daniel and Henry Farrell. “The Power and Politics of Blogs.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, September 2-5, 2004. Francoli, Mary and Stephen Ward. “21st Century Soapboxes? MPs and Their Blogs.” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 21-39. Freeman, L. C. “Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification”. Social Networks, 1(3), (1979): 215-239. Glover, Daniel K. and Mike Essl. “New on the Web: Politics as Usual.” New York Times, 3 December 2006, Opinion Section, Electronic edition. Gill, Kathy. “How Can We Measure the Influence of the Blogosphere?” http://faculty.washington.edu/kegill/pub/www2004_blogo sphere_gill.pdf, (2004): 1-10. Hennessy, Mark. “Obama to continue exploiting the potential of web as president,” The Irish Times, November 11, 2008, World section, Online Edition. Hewitt, Hugh. Blog: Understanding the information reformation that’s changing your world. Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2005. Hindman, Matthew, Kostas Tsioutsiouliklis, and Judy A. Johnson. “Googlearchy: How a Few Heavily-Linked Sites Dominate Politics on the Web.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, March 31, 2003. Jackson, Nigel. “‘Scattergun’ or ‘Rifle’ Approach to Communication: MPs in the Blogosphere.” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 97-109. 377 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Matheson, Donald. “Weblogs and the Epistemology of the News: Some Trends in Online Journalism.” New Media & Society 6 (August 2004): 443-468. McKenna, Laura and Antoinette Pole. “Do Weblogs Matter? Weblogs in American Politics.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, September 2-5, 2004. McQuaid, John. “New Media Battles Old to Define Internet-Era Politics.” Nieman Reports (Summer 2008): 42-44. Pew Research Center. “Ethnic Media Audience Trends.” Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, accessed online at http://www.journalism.org/node/465 . _________________. “Internet Now Major Source of Campaign News.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (October, 31 2008) accessed online at http://peoplepress.org/report/467/internet-campaign-news . Pierce, Charles P. “Mud in the Digital Age.” The Boston Globe Magazine, 17 June 2007. Roberts, Marilyn Wayne Wanta and Tzong-Horng Dzwo. “Agenda setting and issue salience online.” Communication Research 29 (August 2002): 452–465. Rochet, Laura. “The “Data Slant”: Why Lack of Media Generated by Minority Users Online is an Offline Problem.” Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy 19 (2006): 39-51. Siapera, Eugenia. “The Political Subject of Blogs.” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 97-109. Sifry, Micah L. “A See Through Society.” Columbia Journalism Review 47 (January/February 2009): 43-47. Smith, Aaron. “The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008.” Pew Internet & American Life Project (April 2009): 1-92. Smolkin, Rachel. “The expanding blogosphere.” American Journalism Review 26 (June/July 2004): 38–43. Wallsten, Kevin J. Public Opinion and the New, “New Media”: How Political Blogs Influence Journalists, Politicians and the Mass Public. PhD diss, University of California, Berkeley, 2007. ___________. “Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Mainstream Media and 378 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Political Blogs.” Review of Policy Research 24 (November 2007): 567-587. Wolfe, Alan. “The New Pamphleteers.” The New York Times, 11 July 2004. Books Section, Electronic Edition. Wright, Scott. “Read My Day? Communication, Campaigning and Councillors’ Blogs.” Information Polity 13 (January 2008): 81-95. Vargas, Jose Antonio. “Storming the News Gatekeepers; On the Internet, Citizen Journalists Raise Their Voice.” Washington Post, November 17, 2007. Style Section, Online Edition. ___________. “A Diversity of Opinion, if Not Opinionators.” Washington Post, August 6, 2007. Style Section, Print Edition. 379 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Appendix Figure 2. Blog Sample 380 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Figure 3. Blog Network Legend for blogs included in the sample network (an arrow pointing toward a node indicates an external tie from another blog, a line with no arrow indicates and outward tie to an external blog): Mainstream American Political Blogosphere African American Political Blogosphere Latino American Political Blogosphere 381 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 SOCIAL NETWORKS OF THE ITALIAN MAFIA THE STRONG AND WEAK PARTS Baris Cayli University of Camerino Abst r act In this paper, it is argued that a well-built, social network system has enabled the Mafia to reach a certain level of success through three main networks: members, local people, and politicians. I assert that the role of the executive power of the state has been partially supportive in this success. Moreover, this paper also concludes that to combat different Mafia groups, it is essential to know their strong and weak parts. Consequently, it is found that their well-built network system does not solely comprise of strong parts but that the weak parts also exist, albeit, that they have not yet played a defective role in the resolution of the Mafia. Therefore, this paper suggests that the illustration of both the strong and weak parts of these networks can have prominent and assisting role in the combat against the Mafia phenomenon in the future, either by strengthening the weak parts or by weakening the strong parts of its networks. Keywords: Mafia, social network analysis 1. Introduction The mafia phenomenon in Italy has been discussed widely from sociological, economical, psychological, etymological and political points of view whereas the social network system of the mafia from the approach of closed networks has not taken its place in the literature. Therefore, this paper aims to focus on the social network system of the different Mafia associations so as to fill the gap in the mafia studies. I need to mention the name of the prosecutor, Giovanni Falcone, who was murdered in 1992 by Sicilian Mafia (Cosa Nostra) as the source of inspiration of this 382 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 paper through his words about the Mafia:1 "We have to learn to think about the methods of Cosa Nostra calmly and with an open mind."2 Hopefully, this paper shows a distinctive analysis on how different Mafia groups have built their methods through up-todate networks, reaching a certain level of success. The main aim of this paper is not to show how to combat the Mafia by using its networks but to examine how they built their networks and illustrating the strong and weak parts of these networks in order to assist the fight against the Mafia. In the first section, the paper emphasizes the theoretical and methodological reasoning of the paper. The paper highlights the social networks application to organized crimes, and finally, it explains the differential organizations theory of Matsueda3, before taking a further step and commencing the network analysis of organized crime in Italy. In the second part, the notion is regarded firstly with the members of the Italian Mafia associations. This is necessary to comprehend what kind of formation they have, how they gain new members and build a system of recruitment, the importance of leadership, and their communicative and descriptive type of relationship. Moreover, pentito (Mafioso who collaborates with the judicial authorities) is explained as a concept of the weak part of these networks. The open and closed network system of Matsueda4 is used to define their network system after gaining a new member and in altering the type of relationship among the members. In the third section, the main topic will be Italian Mafia groups’ infiltration into the local people, how they have dominated the people in the local regions, and subordinated them on behalf of their own targets. To make the argument clear, the historical link 1 Mafia is used as a term to refer to Italian organized crime. Different mafia groups Cosa Nostra (Sicily), the Camorra (Campania), the ‘Ndrangheta (Calabria), and the Sacra Corona Unita (Apuglia). 2 Diego Gambetta, "The Sicilian Mafia," Five Books, 6 October 2009, 6. 3 Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change 46 (2006): 3-33. 4 Matsueda, "Differential social organization," 3-33. 383 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 of the Mafia groups in rural and urban regions based on the economic, sociological, and cultural facts of these regions are presented. In the fourth section, Mafia groups’ network with the politicians is the main concern of this part. In this section, the corrupted politicians and different Mafia groups’ relationships are broadly described. In the next step, my argument suggests that there has never been consistent and cooperative commitment among politicians from the ruling and opposition parties in the fight against the Mafia. Furthermore, I assert that it is easy to break the relationship between politicians and Mafia groups. By using Matsueda’s two strong closed networks and a weak tie figure5, I define this relationship as weak tie of the two closed strong bonds: the Mafia groups and the politicians. In the fifth and the last part, the executive power of the state is analyzed in the consideration of its (dys)functionality and (in)effectiveness in the judicial and administrative divisions of the state. This is the last section as it signals that the Mafia's success does not simply belong to the efforts of its members building their networks but to the promotional and supportive influence of the half-functional administrative and justice system of the Italian state. . 2. Matsueda’a Theory of Social Networks in the Evaluation of Mafia Groups in Italy Social networking theory has been prominent in many fields: social psychology, communications, political science, and so on. Apart from these fields, it has gained essential importance for the study of organized crime. Moreover, a network perspective can be appraised as a social, political, and economic structure as lasting prototypes of the relational bonds between the actors.6 Thus, the denouncing of these bonds has critical importance for better comprehension of the workings of organized crimes like the Mafia 5 Matsueda, "Differential social organization," 15. 6 Jeffrey Scott McIlwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," Crime, Law & Social Change: An International Journal 32 (Dec. 1999): 301-323. 384 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 groups in Italy, which have taken their power from social, political, and economic discourses. It is argued that social networking is also observable in the underworld, in the system of organized crimes.7 In this social network of the Mafia, the communication networks have an essential place because social interactions are the main instruments of a social organization.8 In accordance with these communication networks, the argument has gained popularity which states that the Mafia’s main network systems are subordinated by three facts: kinship, patronage, and friendship.9 Additionally, these relationships, which are huge in number and variety, should be latent; each situation ought to be considered under their particular needs. Therefore, they have been master in binding those individuals in a traditional society. Similar to this, "a social network was viewed as a field of interaction that had neither units nor boundaries. It was formed by ties of friendship, kinship, and acquaintance partly inherited and partly constructed by the person himself or herself."10 These kinships, friendships, and networking structures of the Mafia phenomenon in Italy will be examined in the next sections within its members, local people, and politicians. The role of Matsueda’s noteworthy study11 on social organization and crime in this paper cannot be denied. His work on differential social organizations, collective action and crime is significantly important because it illustrates the conceptualization of an organization in favor of, and against crime as collective behavior. His figures, which are related with open and closed social networks, and local bridges linking two distinct closed networks, have been influential on my interpretation of the Mafia’s social networks within its members and politicians, respectively. Two main reasons explain the use of Matseueda’s approach to 7 McIllwain, "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," 310. 8 Charles W. Morris, ed., Mind, Self, and Society, George Herbert Mead 1934, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 253. 9 Raimondo Catanzaro, Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia, trans. R. Rosenthal, (New York: Free Press, 1992), 43. 10 Fortunata Piselli, "Communities, Places, and Social Networks," American Behavioral Scientist 50 (2007): 867-878. 11 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime" 385 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 scrutinize my arguments; first, this is the most appropriate orientation for understanding the Mafia’s complex relationship background in Italy because it prioritizes goal-focused organizations like the Mafia. Secondly, Matseueda prioritizes collective behavior, which is pivotal for the analysis of secretly bonded informal structures like the Mafia. Therefore, his theoretical framework sets the tone for this paper. Replication of Matsueda’s figures while analyzing the social networks is the main methodological reasoning in the paper. Nonetheless, this paper will hopefully bridge the gap in the academic field of Mafia research, where no evaluations exists of the Mafia phenomenon in Italy that takes into account its social networks and relations with members, local people, and politicians all together. 3. Italian Mafia and Its Members In this part, the regulation of the affairs of the Mafiosi in different Mafia groups and the network systems among their members are explored. Firstly, the importance of the concepts, which make these bonds stronger, is examined, and the meaning of these rules and conducts are evaluated from the point of view of different Mafia associations like the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Our Affair), the Napolitan Camorra, and the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta (Society of Men of Honor). Secondly, there is a need to clarify the organizational structure of the members of the Mafia family so as to comprehend and examine all components of the network system among the Mafia members such as the leadership, and the talent of adjustability. Thirdly, the vital importance of instrumental friendship, secrecy, and trust are the main notions of this section while establishing these networks. Finally, how they increase their members and include them in their closed network system and further recruitment process are explained by using the open and closed network system of Matsueda12 in Figure 1. Even though the Mafia associations have been successful in building these networks for its members, the existing weak parts among members have been emerging as the pentiti, Mafiosi, who after being captured, collaborate with the justice system and violate the code of silence. They are defined 12 386 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 15. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 as collaboratori di giustizia (collaborators with justice). This weak part in their network system is examined in the second subsection, where the importance of their organizational structure, trust, and loyalty are explained. Firstly, the bond among mafia members is defined in three basic concepts: conduct, rules, and trust. These concepts have a leading role in making close interpersonal relationships and have crucial importance for unification in attaining the goals of the Mafia. These relationships were labeled as a process for "idealization of Mafia phenomenon."13 This is because such an idealization would be indispensible for transferring feelings to the members of the Mafia associations in that they belong to an organization with certain types of ceremonies and norms. Thereby, these features are established in order to let the members feel themselves as ‘man of honor’. Additionally, these structural rituals create very close formations based on strong trust among the members, which are prominent for the existence of their future. Furthermore, trust and close personal relationships are fundamental for the strength of their networks. The struggle to be a family has significant importance for the different Mafia associations. From here, the concept of ‘family’ is the symbol of close relationships, secrecy, and trustworthiness as is expected of an ordinary family. Moreover, although blood kinship is a natural circumstance of an ordinary family, this is not always the case for different Mafia groups. For instance, formation of Mafia organizations, especially La Cosa Nostra, resembles a very large family, whose thousands of members are strongly bonded and secretly oriented. This is not preferable but demonstrates that having blood kinship is not indispensible. On the contrary, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta does not illustrate any hierarchical structure like the La Cosa Nostra but embraces a cell-based approach and the importance of blood kinships are more observable.14 Despite the existence of the differential 13 Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods, Organized Crime, Italian Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 89. 14 Christine Spolar, "New Mafia gains power in Italy, baffling law enforcement," Chicago,13 July 2008, in http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080713/NEWS07/807130540 387 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 structural formations among different Mafia groups, they have corresponding points, such as the importance of secrecy, the perception of being a family (with or without blood kinship), and demonstrating loyalty. Secondly, I argue that the organizational structure of the Mafia indicates differences among Mafia groups, but the same factor influencing contributions of the new members has not changed; this is the protection of the secrecy and building trust in order to reduce risks in the closed network system. The formation of the numbers of members, their kinship and territorial basement may vary from one type of Mafia group to another. For instance, the traditional Cosa Nostra is a male-dominated family structure ruled by a code of conduct for members forbidding them from sharing the secrets of their organization.15 Moreover, any disobedience may result with violence against the violator of the ‘code of conduct.’ Similarly, Sicily’s Cosa Nostra and the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta are observed as typical representations of the Mafia, and each is composed of more than 90 clans or ‘families.’ Certainly the most powerful are the Cosa Nostra clans, which have some 3,200 members concentrated in western Sicily.16 The mainland counterpart to the Cosa Nostra is the ’Ndrangheta, whose homeland is in the southern Calabrian province of Reggio Calabria. Around 4,500 members are grouped into some 90 clans or cosche, "a Sicilian term for ‘artichoke,’ which is intended to symbolize their intense cohesion."17 Finally, while establishing the new closed network system, Mafia members use special phrases and choose new members to include in their organizational chart by considering the strategic professions of those people from whose expertise they will benefit. In its special secrecy, instrumental friendship becomes crucially important while knitting the Mafia’s network system to establish its basis as it is vital in order to make their informal 15 Donald Ray Cressey, Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized. Crime in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 114-119, 242. 16 Letizia Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," Research et Society. Max Planck Research, 2 (2004) 58-59. 17 388 Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 59. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 organization more powerful through enlarging their members with strong bonds and specific communication systems. Thus, the expressions ‘Tell him that I sent you’ or ‘Go in my name’ are used in the Mafia network as a way of communication.18 These phrases create special bonds, which lead to the production of the social networks described in a popular way as ‘the friends of the friends.’ (Figure-1) Furthermore, when the notion is Mafia phenomenon, a distinction should be made between different Mafia groups because the Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta mainly prefer new members for recruitment from their neighborhood or towns in southern Italy.19 Conversely, the Camorra illustrates different characteristics and can establish its networks outside of their family or town if the candidate has the potential to increase the effectiveness of the organization.20 Finally the biggest fourth Mafia group from Puglia, Sacra Corona Unita (United Sacred Crown), consists of three main layers hierarchically, but it is important to note that a member can graduate its stature in the organization through demonstrating violence. The formations for closed networks and connection among the members have crucial importance for the Sacra Corona Unita because the networking should be like a ring of a chain.21 Even though there are differences in the formation of different mafia groups, one common point is both crucial and indispensible. This is the creation of trust as a value and its importance for the targets of the Mafia. The utmost importance of trust comes from "an emergent property of the social system, as much as a personal attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded."22 Trust has been established by the symbols and signs in the alteration of the Mafia’s network system from an open to closed network in order to add new members to their organization. (Figure-1) 18 Catanzaro, Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia, 54. 19 Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crimes, Italian Style, 18-47. 20 Tom Behan, The Camorra (London: Routledge, 1996), 191 21 Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe, Global Mafia; The New World Order of Organized Crime, (Toronto: McMillan, 1995), 69. 22 Robert D. Putnam., Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton Universitiy Pres, 1993), 177. 389 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 After the descriptive and normative formation of the Mafia members’ network system, it is time to illustrate it through the open and closed network system of Matsueda.23 I argue that the well-organized communication system of different Mafia groups has a leading role in the construction of well-working social networking. Clarity for this argument may be enhanced by focusing on the study of Matsueda. He states that "given common everyday knowledge of the way in which these structures operate, individuals can use the structures strategically, seeking out closed structures to increase control over members."24 He also added that in Figure 1a, both A and B can have influence C, but that they can only do it independently and with the help of individual sanctions, developing trust, establishing norms, and the like. However, they cannot influence each other because of the lack of social ties. As in Figure 1b, after this network is established, a close network system is built so that A’, B’, and C’ can influence each other by developing coordinated strategies, simultaneous sanctions, and similar rhetorical arguments.25 For the case of the Mafia system, while they are building their social networks for increasing their members and/or to solve the problems of their customers or to make cooperation with them, they effectively create a closed social network system through ‘trust’ and the famous phrase, ‘tell him that you are friend of mine.’ Thus, after establishing a network followed with requirements about efficiency, reliability, and trustworthiness, a new member in the Mafia structure can take his place in this closed social network. He is not in the open structure anymore, but in the closed structure, where he should now obey the Mafia ‘rules’. Additionally, the other significant feature is the importance of stability in the closed groups, which is gained through strong ties among members with similar ideas and homogeneity.26 Thus, the creation of this strong closed network among its members 23 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 15. 24 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 14. 25 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime," 13-14. 26 1380. 390 M. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (May 1973):1360- C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 has crucial magnitude in the targets of the Mafia thanks to the principles of solidarity and commitment. Despite differences in the structuring of Mafia associations, they all have the same common thread of trust and secrecy. Figure 1. Replication of open and closed social networks a. Open structure b. Closed structure Source: Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, Collective Action and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change, 46 (2006), 14. At this point, after examining the strengths of the Mafia while recruiting new membership, it remains important to stress the weaknesses of this network. Traditionally, secrecy is perceived as the most important criteria for membership. Contrary to this strict rule, Mafiosi have collaborated with police after capture on many occasions. Therefore, they violated these rules by becoming pentiti and sharing their secrets with the criminal justice system. Even Mafia leaders, through being pentiti, have violated these rules. Accordingly, such violations are a natural outcome of being arrested. This is because many Mafiosi prefer the favorable sentencing and privileges resulting from cooperating with the justice system. Thereby, the pentiti emerge as a significant weakness of different Mafia groups in Italy; the closed network system sustains its strength until the arrest of Mafiosi. The first pentito in 1973, Leonardo Vitale, confessed significant secrets; albeit he did not receive sufficient attention for his confessions because of his mental problems. Apart from him, the most significant Mafioso turned pentito was Tommasso Buscetta 391 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 in the 1980s. He helped prosecutor Giovanni Falcone in the identification of the main channels that the Mafia operated. Especially after the Maxi Trial process during the mid 1980s, important Mafioso figures decided to be pentiti, such as Salvatore Contorno, Antinino Calderone, Giovanni Brusca, and so on.27 In addition to this, it has rarely been observed that such collaboration has been done with willingness when there is no possibility for arrest. Therefore, the consistency, solidarity, and loyalty to the Mafia are widely followed until arrest. In sum, the success of Mafia groups has been limited by pentiti. Confessions of Mafiosi have played as an essential role many times to resolve the networks of different Mafia groups. 4. Italian Mafia and Local People This section aims to show the well-established communication networks of different Mafia groups, who take their territorial power from the relationships between Mafiosi and the locals. Throughout the section, territorial power of different Mafia groups is examined, which is a significant instrument to improve their influence over the local people. Firstly, Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning will be applied to examine the bond between Mafia groups and local people. Secondly, I will argue that the weaknesses of these networks is again the local people, who have tried to show resistance against the Mafia by protesting the Mafia individually or establishing civil associations against its culture. In this section, the main concern is adaptation of Kohlberg’s28 and Piaget’s stages of moral reasoning,29 which Matsueda references as well.30 This adaptation is focused on the relationships between the Mafia and local people on the one hand, and local people’s reactions to these relationship bonds on the other. Firstly, it is necessary to elaborate Kohlberg’s three 27 Martin Bull and James Newell, Italian Politics: Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge: Polity Pres, 2005), 111. 28 Lawrance Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981) 29 Jean Piaget, The Child’s Conception of the World (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1928) 30 Matsueda, "Differential social organization, collective action and crime" 392 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 levels and six stages of moral reasoning31 before making such a deep assessment. These six stages are based on the relationships between parents and children. I replicated the relationship between the child and parents to the relationship between Mafia and local people can be explained because of the similarity of those actors. The emergence of the Mafia from the late 19th century, its changing situation over time and its authoritative and repressive role in the contemporary era may share the attitudes of the parents who demonstrate violence to their children along with an irresponsible attitude. In the application of these principles, I examine the relationship between the locals and the historical Mafia, which exists in the towns of southern Italy and also in urban life in recent decades. I argue that since the middle of the 19th century, stage 1, stage 2, and stage 3 occurred and that stage 4 occurred partially because the representative of the ‘law and order’ was not extensively identical with the Mafia but did come under state control, particularly after the Maxi-trial in 1986. Additionally, this stage has not been completed because of the existence of untrustworthiness in the region, and Table 1. Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning Levels Level 1 Pre-Conventional Morality Stages Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation Stage 2. Individualism, exchange, and instrumentalism Level 2 Conventional Morality Stage 3. Good relationships and mutual expectations Stage 4. Law and order Level 3 Post-Conventional Morality Stage 5. Social contract and individual rights Stage 6. Universal ethical principles Source: Ross L. Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change, 46 (2006), 11. 31 Lawrance Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development 393 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 less likely, because of locals' willingness to cooperate with the justice system, although this number has increased in recent decades. I assert that the Mafia phenomenon in Italy can widely be eradicated from the country after the end of stage 4, where all residents of the southern region and the entire country admit the supreme power of the culture of lawfulness and legality and have sufficient encouragement to stand against the Mafia. Postconventional morality is the last level in Italian society that ought to be reached, as it is a level of morality to rid the severe grip of the Mafia. Stages 5 and 6 in this last level may provide an ideal country, where the Mafia cannot invade the social, political, and economic arenas anymore by subordination of the local people physically, psychologically, and sociologically. To fully comprehend such a relationship between local people and Mafia groups, I explain step-by-step how I raise these arguments through following three levels and six stages of Kohlberg’s moral reasoning. The first stage – obedience and punishment – occurred with the emergence of the Mafia phenomenon in the middle of the 18th century and was observed extensively until the period of the contemporary Mafia. Obeying the rules and not to be punished by the Mafiosi have been violated frequently in the last decade, but the fear of punishment by the Mafiosi is still effective in both rural areas and cities of Mezzogiorno – southern Italy. The local people witnessed brutality and violence publicly and observed clearly what happened to those who did not take Mafia threats seriously. These people paid for this opposition with their lives. Undoubtedly, an unequal relationship clearly exists between locals and the Mafiosi like the one that exists between a child and its authoritative parents. The Mafioso was the supreme authority over the local people. The second stage – individualism and exchange – was accordingly the outcome of such oppression. Security has been one of the crucial elements in taking care of the community and society. With violence that puts your life in danger, consideration of long term societal benefits is not expected, so from an egocentric perspective, the security of your life becomes more significant. This is also the reason why the Mafia has become more powerful through the features of this network structure and that people 394 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 valued it to ask for ‘private protection.’32 For these reasons, people preferred to obey ‘omertà’ –code of silence- with any issue relating to the Mafia. These first two stages would be labeled as preconventional morality reasoning, which emerged in the atmosphere of violence, embezzlement, and oppression, so egocentrism and personal benefits became the priority for the local people to survive under such a brutality. The second level – conventional morality – has not been terminated completely yet. Although the third stage – good relationships and mutual expectation – has come to an end, the fourth stage – law and order – is still in the process of completion. If I start from the third stage, this process has almost been completed in the demonstration of people’s attempts to consider the benefits of society as a whole through organizing civil societies and non-governmental initiatives against the Mafia. Aside from the anti-Mafia movement, local people have showed their cooperation by being pentiti and breaking the order of silence. In this regard, people who cooperated with authorities labeled their act as ‘good’ and the Mafia as ‘bad’. Thus, they started improving ‘good relationships’ with the justice, police, and administrative organizations of the state. On the other hand, this optimistic panorama can be deceptive because local people should take the most crucial step, the fourth step, in the fight against the Mafia. The supreme power of rule of law and the benefits of society, which are based on legality, should be the main cornerstone in the fight against the Mafia. Unfortunately, such a decisive struggle has not been observed in the region. For instance, in Sicily, the majority of the people and local shops still pay pizzo, a protection racket.33 In sum, the completion of the fourth stage and establishing the pure mechanism of law and order in the region is significantly prominent to terminate the second level – conventional morality. The devastating history of the local people and the relationships with the Mafia should not 32 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 3, 26-29. 33 Francesca Forno and Carina Gunnarson, "Everyday shopping to fight the Italian Mafia," in Michele Micheletti and Andrew S. McFarland eds., Creative Participation: Responsibility-Taking in the Political World, (Paradigm Publishers, Bolder, 2009), 101-110. 395 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 be underestimated for the completion of the third step on a permanent basis. After the victory of the fourth stage, the last level is likely to be less challenging. The last level – post-conventional morality – can only occur in the last steps of the fight if it becomes possible to eradicate the Mafia from the country completely. The fifth step – social contract and individual rights – may increase its importance on Italian citizens in an environment where they can enforce the political spectrum with mass social movements to ask for decisive and ad hoc policies, only associated with the social contract, whose particular characteristic recognizes the benefits of both individuals and society through anti-corruption, transparency, accountability, and matured democracy. Therefore, in the last step, it can be possible to talk about the universal values and ethics after taking account of the full consensus of the citizens’ participation in this process. In the last place, after a significant victory has been gained against the Mafia, the remaining Mafiosi breaking away from their illegal and violent business so they may potentially turn towards these universal values and ethics. This argument has already found its echoes in the definition of social equilibrium of Putnam. The high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement and collective well-being are noted as the traits to define civic community.34 In this regard, attaining the last level depends on the establishment of these traits so as to be a recognized civic community who demonstrates consistent resistance against the Mafia. Finally, a weakness also exists in the networks of the Mafiosi with the local people. Although this weak part has not been directly related to the success or failure of the Mafiosi, it has an indirect effect, which causes direct resistance from the local people to increase their voice against the subordination of the Mafia. It still remains difficult to declare that this weak part is strong enough to break all these networks of the different Mafia groups among the local people in today’s Italy. But it contains in itself an opportunity for the future to demolish its networks when the resistance of the local people is extended and becomes powerful 34 396 Putnam., Making Democracy Work, 177. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 enough to replace the culture of illegality with the culture of lawfulness. The first strikes of this resistance appeared generally as individual reactions. For instance, Italian journalist Mauro de Mauro was kidnapped by the Mafia in 1970 when he tried to investigate a murder.35 Secondly, in 1978 the Cosa Nosta murdered Giuseppe Impastato, a significant anti-Mafia figure and political activist. He was born in a Mafia family but decided to fight against the Cosa Nostra and paid for it with his life. This was the striking proof that the Mafia brutally reacts when their networks and ‘respectability’ are targeted. Mauro de Mauro and Giuseppe Impastato were not the only victims of this resistance. Libero Grassi was a businessman who refused to pay pizzo, extortion money, and he advertised in the newspaper by calling on other businessmen not to pay racket to the Mafia. He was murdered in 1991.36 Furthermore, the tragic assassinations of the prosecutors Giovanne Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 had been the limit for the civil society to illustrate their reaction in a well planned and intensive way. All these individual attempts to seek the Mafia’s dirty works and to fight against it lead to attaining societal reactions against the Mafia. Thereby, Libera was established in 1995 as a non-profit civil society aimed at fighting against the Mafia and giving self-esteem and support to the local people who show their resistance to it. This resistance has been institutionalized with over 1000 associations in the country, but it is still far from declaring that victory in this fight. Apart from Libera, many other civil society organizations were established to align themselves in the fight against the Mafia. What is more, this struggle should not be underestimated because of its potential to devastate local networks of the Mafiosi. For instance, in 2009, over 100,000 people gathered in Naples and marched against the Mafia.37 Even though dominance of the different Mafia groups is 35 Peter Popham, "Revealed: How Story of Mafia Plot to Launch Coup Cost Reporter His Life," The Independent, (June 19, 2005) [database on-line]; Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/revealed-how-story-of-mafia-plot-to-launchcoup-cost-reporter-his-life-494619.html 36 Dino Paternostro, "Libero grassi, martire civile," La Sicilia, August 30, 2009. 34. 37 Cristiano Corvino, "Tens of Thousand March in Naples against the Mafia," Reuters (21 March, 2009), [database on-line]; Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52K0Z220090321 397 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 still clearly observable in southern Italy, these popular protests are the weak part of the networks of the Mafiosi on local people who demonstrated clear reluctance to react against the Mafia for dozens of years. Therefore, the success of the Mafia's influence on local people depends on many factors, such as the socio-historical situation of the region, cultural patriarchy, economic factors, the lack of the existence of a responsible state mind in the region, and a combination of all these paradigms. All these reasons need to be counted in this complex sociological concentration of the Mafia. Further, if we do not consider their well-calculated social network system and influence on the local people through these networks, any explanation is far from complete. Indeed, I assert that the power of this network comes from the strong bond between local people and authoritative manner of the Mafiosi. This also makes it challenging to prevent the Mafia's extended power , but the recent civil society efforts to eradicate the Mafia provide hope for the future and become the weak link of the Mafia’s networks within the local people. 5. Italian Mafia and Politicians In this section, I argue that the relationship between Mafiosi and politicians is one based on mutual benefits. The polls are given as an example to indicate intersected points where the Mafiosi and politicians correspond. Secondly, I conclude that the contextual events are influential in the evaluation of the collusion between the politicians and the Mafia from the perspective of decaying corrupted institutions. Finally, I assert that the sensitive bond between politicians and the Mafia is the main concern. The argument concentrates on the sensitivity of this bond as the outcome of the existing weak link between politicians and Mafiosi, which is expecially vulnerable due to the lack of emotional attachment. I will illustrate my argument with Figure 2 through Matseuda’s weak tie of two strong closed networks. This deficiency of the emotional bond has also been the weak part of their successfully renowned history and mutual benefits, which is hard to discover but easy to break after its emergence. 398 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 I argue that the symbiotic relationship between Mafiosi and politicians dominates their networks, taking into account the benefits of both parts. In this context, the commencement of this strong relationship should be perceived as a historical phenomenon whose roots were established on the symbiotic bond of each party in the criminal world because of its appetite for profits.38 This bond managed to extend to the entire political system, especially after the emergence of the Mafia in the 19th century. In the meantime, this poison seems to have had an aphrodisiac-like effect in the spectrum of the cooperative Mafiapolitical nexus. Moreover, the pure dependency of politicians on the territorial power of the Mafia was more apparent during elections because winning a local or parliamentary election is almost unachievable without accepting Mafia protection.39 The Mafia had another arm in the Senate and Chamber of the Duties to use for their ends, which were mostly related with the political and administrative handicaps they faced.40 Thus, this system, which consists of real power groups, may have the potential to deeply affect political life by using its influence on people’s decisions during the elections.41 In sum, the baseline of these mutual relationships was determined by the obsessive power holders between the Mafiosi and politicians. The polls also can give clues about the rising power of the Mafia and it becomes clear after the emergence of Silvia Berlusconi in the political arena in the first half of the 1990s. That was interpreted as a ‘vicious circle’: "More than a few corrupt Christian Democrats and Socialists who were voted out in the anti-Mafia climate of the 1990s are now finding their way back into office – most of them as candidates for the right-wing conservative camp of Silvio Berlusconi’s governing coalition."42 In the last elections, by presenting the unified list under the slogan of Casa della Libertà 38 Pierre Tramblay and Carlo Morselli, "Patterns in Criminal Achievement; Wilson and Abrahamse Revisitied" Criminology 68 (May 2000): 659-663. 39 Gaetona Mosca, "Che Cosa è la Mafia," in G. Mosca, Partiti a sindacati nelle crisi del regime parlamentare (Bari: Laterza, [1900] 1949), 243. 40 Catanzaro, Men of Respect, 54,142, 201. 41 Salvatore F. Romano, Storia Della Mafia (Salerno: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1966), 172. 42 Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 62. 399 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 (‘House of Liberty’) more essentially, they gained extensive success by winning 60 direct seats.43 Political institutions, contextual events and even international settings may help to shed light on the relationship between politicians and Mafiosi. For instance, Propaganda Due (P2) was a secret Masonic lodge whose members are comprised not only of journalists and people from business and industry but also of members of parliament like Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.44 P2 influenced taking over Corriere della Sera, a prominent Italian newspaper,45 misleading police in the investigation of the 1980 Bologna Massacre which resulted with death of 85 people.46 Secondly, Gladio, the secret organization, was influential in Italy in creating resistance against communism with the collaboration of the CIA and other Mafia associations in Italy. The collusion of the Gladio with the politicians and the underworld have structured the political spectrum after post-war Italy and was used as yet another justification for mafia-politicians collusion.47 Thirdly, Prime Minister Aldo Moro was killed in 1978 by a communist organization, Red Brigades, and it is argued that he was not saved by the Italian government because of fear that Moro could confess about Gladio.48 Moreover, one of the most significant examples was the operation of ‘Clean Hands’. During this operation, 3,200 suspected bureaucrats and politicians were convicted between 1992 and 2002.49 Unfortunately, even before these corruptions, Mafia dominance in politics was expressed and approved by state funded organizations like the Ant-Mafia Commission which was established in 1962.50 Thus, it is clear 43 Paoli, "Family Crises among the ‘Man of Honor," 63. 44 Jones Tobias, The Dark Heart of Italy (London: Faber & Faber, 2003), 186-187. 45 Paul Gingsborg, Italy and Its Discontents; Family, Civil Society, State: 1980 – 2001, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), 144-148. 46 47 Bull and Newell, Italian Politics: Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge: Polity Pres, 2005), 100. 48 Par Hubert Artus, "Pourquoi le pouvoir italien a lâché Aldo Moro, exécuté en 1978," Rue8, 6 February 2008, available at: http://www.rue89.com/cabinet-de-lecture/pourquoi-le-pouvoir-italien-a-lachealdo-moro-execute-en-1978 49 Maffei and Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy," 474. 50 René Seindal, Mafia Money and Politics in Sicily 1950-1997 (Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1998), 50. 400 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 that other secret organizations accompanied the Mafia in the second half of the 20th century after the manipulation of Italian social and political life by the Mafia during the first half of the 20th century. It is remarkable to stress that the state demonstrated the capacity to counter attack on the Mafia and secret organizations. In this respect, Maxiprocesso, Maxi Trial, was held between 1984 and 1986. As a result, hundreds of Mafiosi were put behind bars. The destruction of the secret organization like P2 and Gladio and the operations of Clean Hands occurred during the 1990s. In recent years, famous Mafia Godfathers like Bernardo Provenzano and Salvotore Russo were captured. These developments have created the perception that the fight against the Mafia has gradually been more successful. But, the confession of the son of the former mayor of Palermo, Massimo Ciancimino, caused the public to doubt the anti-Mafia struggle of Berlusconi government. He declared that Forza Italia, led by Berlusconi, was the result of negotiations between the state and Cosa Nostra, Sicilian Mafia.51 Therefore, in order to make these complex networks more observable systematically, there is a need to elaborate and illustrate the network relations between politicians and the Mafia on a figure. According to Matsueda, as shown in Figure 2, closed network groups can establish weak ties with other closed groups to have benefits from information flows, novel ideas, more so, since all these exchanges are coming from a set of comparatively dissimilar groups.52 In addition to this, the weak ties between different closed networks provide group members chances to increase the likelihood of group members who organize into social movements.53 For the case of the Mafia, the weak tie between C and E in Figure 2 represents the mutual outcomes of this network between the Mafia and politicians and bureaucracy in the state. Furthermore, it is argued that resource mobilization theory through the utilization of the maximum benefits of the 51 "Forza Italia Born from Mafia Talks," Ansa, 8 February 2010, available at http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2010/02/08/visualizza_new.html_1701529485.html 52 Matsueda, "Differential Social Organization, " 15. 53 Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78(May 1973): 1360-1380 401 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 rational actors by using their social networks and political opportunities is significant with collective action.54 It remains important to stress that in order to design such collective action, civic engagement is less likely to be observed with the lack of trust in politicians.55 With hindsight it is clear that this is the road taken by the political institutions and regional governments in order to make cooperation with the Mafia. Besides, the significance of the accordance for the objectives and the struggle to employ them to make their targets attainable has become the remarkable argument for the criminal world.56 This argument is also operative for the case of the Mafia. On the one hand, the Mafia worked for politicians to help them win elections, or to make their positions stronger and support bureaucrats through bribes. On the other hand, its position and businesses became more and more secure under the protective umbrella of the state bureaucrats and politicians. This mutual network structure between the Mafia and the dark side of the state is one of the essential proofs as to why the vicious cycle of the Mafia has not been terminated to date. Their meeting point to serve their mutual benefits makes this bond stronger but not unbreakable. Furthermore, this bond is weak when we compare two groups’ network structures, which are based on rules, laws, and regulations for both the informal organization of the Mafia and the formal organization of the state. Therefore, since this bond between C and E (see Figure 2) is based on mutual material benefits but not strong emotional bonds, this tie can be defined as paradoxically weak but strong in terms of resisting showing their relationships explicitly. Moreover, the indispensable relationship between the Mafia and politicians is vulnerable when their benefits are at risk. Therefore, in this regard, this tie is also weak but breaking it is difficult since this 54 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611-639. 55 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 172. 56 Edwin H. Sutherland, "Development of the Theory," in E. H. Sutherland, On. Analyzing Crime (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1942] (1973), 13-29. 402 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 symbiotic relationship of the two closed group networks has a very little strategic gap that can harm their bonds. Figure 2. Replication of the Local Bridge (weak tie) linking two distinct closed networks Source: Ross L. Matsueda “Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime.” Crime, Law, and Social Change 46:3-33, p. 15, 2006.) 6. Italian Mafia and Executive Power of the State In this section, the role of the executive power of the state in its relationships with different Mafia groups is examined. I argue that the two most critical elements, dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness of the judiciary and administration systems of the state, fostered the power of the different Mafia groups. Even in the last decade, the performance of these institutions has gradually increased, but is far from filling the gap that has existed since Italian unification in 1861. First I elaborate on the role of the executive power of the state from the concepts of violence and power. I then examine the reliability of state institutions in the country. Finally, I scrutinize today’s political arena in the country and the latest developments in this field. Firstly, it is necessary to make the connection between how the Mafia became successful in the absence of state power and their background knowledge of society. Further, the state’s ineffectiveness in promoting territorial order made the Mafia's 403 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 infrastructure more profitable and serviceable. In the meantime, the origins of the Mafia’s emergence provided them with good knowledge of the society’s reaction, formation, and attitudes. Thus, the strength of the Mafia’s enduring position is related with their strong social networks, which were established in the consideration of the historical process and in mastering adaptability and power orientation. Using these features, the Mafia gained benefits for their ends through cooperating with politicians and legal authorities in the lines of the mutual outcomes. Today’s Italian administrative and justice system are in serious decline in terms of efficiency and reliability, which makes the Mafia’s position more durable. The decrease in public confidence in the justice system creates a dangerous atmosphere in the country.57 In support of this argument, "Italian criminal courts seem unable to deal with the backlog of cases. Further, a 2006 pardon law intended to put an end to the endemic overcrowding of state prisons, has further undermined public confidence in the state’s ability to bring justice to criminal matters."58 In fact, urgent reform in the Italian justice and administrative system is not an issue of recent years but one that stems from the historical ineffectiveness of the justice system, which has lead to the empowering of the Mafia through the socio-cultural and historical structure of the Mezzogiorno (southern Italy) since the mid-19th century. This appropriate atmosphere for the Mafia provides them the best conditions to make their bonds stronger and to increase their power and ‘order’ over the society. Thus, although all these statements draw a pessimistic portrait of the fight against Mafia, its elimination from society and state units is not unattainable. The severe hit to destroy the Mafia’s power and capacity should be breaking up its networks, especially the ones established with politicians. In recent years, it has been found that "organized crime is negatively related to police performance and the rule of law and positively related to 57 Sergio Fabbrini , "The Transformation of Italian Democracy," Bulletin of Italian Politics 1 (2009), 42. 58 404 Maffei and Betsos, "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy," 465. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 grand corruption."59 In this context, if organized crime is more powerful, legislation, policy-making, and legal rulings may not be in the general interest of the public but to benefit the few.60 Moreover, the importance of the value network cannot be denied by the essential struggle of the police through following goods, knowledge, and the connections between actors.61 According to this approach, the cooperation of legislative officers, analysts, and investigating officers may provide crucial support to resolve the organized crime networks. Above all, in order to break up the strong networks of the Mafia, what we need is a functional and effective justice system, police power, and more operative ways to increase local people’s cooperation with the state. The final essential requirements are to remove grand corruption and increase transparency in public administration and reinforcing the executive power of the state with the aim of constituting consolidated anti-mafia policies. 7. Conclusion The examination of the Italian Mafia groups from the perspective of social networks tries to fill a significant void in academia by being the first study of the strong and weak parts of these networks within three main actors: members, local people, and politicians. There is certainly much to be said about the importance of Matsueda’s work because his differential social organization sheds light on the strong and weak parts of the Mafia. Although the main aim of this paper is not to show how to resolve these networks, illustrating these strategic strengths and weaknesses of their networks may play an important role in simplifying the methodology of future research regarding the fight against the Mafia phenomenon in Italy. 59 Van J. Dijk, "Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impacts upon Societies," Trends in Organized Crime 10 (2007), 51. 60 61 Dijk, "Mafia Markers," 478. Peter Gottschalk, "Value Configurations in Organized Crime," Journal of Policing and Society 19 (Jan. 2009), 47-57. 405 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The findings of this paper hopefully fill the gap in the interdisciplinary field of social networks and organized crime structuring in Italy. These findings declare that the complex structure of the Mafia organization among its members, local people, and politicians has a strong historical background that affects the contemporary situation. Making the strong parts weaker and using the weaker parts to demolish the strong ones of its networks appear as a crucial strategy to be focused on it. Thus, this study’s findings announce firstly the strong parts of its networks among the members of the Mafia which are leadership factors; their solidarity and commitment until being arrested; the rules, codes, and norms in the organizations; adjusting capacity to the new situations by making their organizational structure tighter or looser according to this change in closed network structural formation. Secondly, the strong part of its networks established with the local people can be summed up as the domination of the people through violence; acting as the informal state in their territories; severe punishment of people who violate their rules; creating an untrustworthy atmosphere to settle private protection; and reference to the ‘man of honor’ or ‘respectable person’ phrases to legitimize their brutal authority. Finally, the politicians who collaborate with Mafia groups in exchange for electoral support and bribery in order to get legal and political protection summarize the strong parts of its networks. Therefore, another outcome of the relationship has been the enrichment of the each actor’s benefit in the system of corruption. Apart from the strenghts of these networks, the weaknesses provide an opening change for eradicating these networks. The first weakness in the network is the violation of their closed network system even by the leaders of organizations as being pentiti and collaborators with the justice system. Cooperation with justice and state organs and violating the basic rules after arrest emerge as significant outcomes. When there is no other alternative to save themselves, Mafiosi prioritize their personal benefits rather than the benefits of their Mafia family and friends while cooperating with the state. Secondly, the weakness of the networks of local people is the increasing willingness to resist the dominance of Mafia groups in the region, albeit this resistance is 406 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 still in the minority. Civil society groups, non-governmental institutions and personal endeavors may potentially lead to a decrease in Mafiosi extortion in the long-term. Even though this struggle is not directly related with the networks system of the Mafiosi, it is the outcome of past acts of violence of the Mafiosi against locals who demonstrated resistance against the Mafiosi. Finally, the weak part in the network with politicians is their bond, which is solely based on material benefit and the lack of any emotional link. This weak tie between two strong closed network systems is a breaking point when a threat appears and puts the benefits of each part in danger. The second part of the paper focuses on the role of the state and it bears emphasis that the state constituted the catalyst in fostering both the emergence and empowering of the Mafia because of its malfunction in the administrative and justice system. The decaying trust in the politicians has made the fight to eradicate the Mafia from political and social speres of the country quite difficult. At this point, it is worth noting that the lack of such a counter position from the state power for demolishing the Italian Mafia has made the humus of the Mafia’s culture of illegality more resilient over time. If different Mafia associations still exist and are invincible in Italy today, albeit in the late efforts of the state, their well-built and designed social network system has an essential place in this success story of the Mafia, but their achievement cannot solely be explained by the power of their networks. Ineffective and corrupt state institutions along with the cooperation of some politicians with the Mafia and the half functional criminal justice system have made the Mafia stronger and more overwhelming. Even though there have been combative periods to demolish the Mafia, with some fruitful results, these periods could never be followed up with corresponding and durable cooperation, including all state institutions and politicians to destroy the Mafia permanently. In contrast, the Mafia has always found another solution to cope with any threat or danger by adjusting themselves to the new situations through their disciplined and synchronized structure. Putting it differently, because of such a boomerang effect in the fight against the Mafia, the silence of the different Mafia groups in the last decade can create a butterfly effect for the Mafia groups 407 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 to increase their power and seek new, illegal, and profitable markets with a less risky atmosphere by strengthening its weak parts. All of this amounts to saying that both strong and weak parts of the social networks of the Mafia should be followed by a welldesigned systematic plan in the contribution of all stakeholders in society against the Mafia. At this point, it would be reductive not to mention the limitations of this study in order to construct the combat plan with the aim of getting rid of the Mafia's grip. Even though the Mafia phenomenon has been studied for more than a century, the subject contains obstacles because of the criminal secrecy of the underworld. In this study, as it commonly occurs in other mafia studies, the limitations are firstly based on the confessions of the captured Mafiosi. It is doubtful how much those confessions can be trusted. Secondly, there may be other strong and weak parts of the social networks of the Mafia groups which are not mentioned in this study. Thirdly, this study aims to focus on the Mafia networks’ from the point view of actor-based approach rather than target-based approach so it classified networks of the Mafia within local people, politicians and its members who are significant national actors in terms of emergence of the Mafia and gaining power over those networks. Despite these concerns, the limitations of this study provide opportunities for future studies of the Mafia as well. Firstly, the opportunity arises from taking a social networks approach as the point of origin and seeking the targets of the Mafiosi throughout those networks. Secondly, this paper is limited to one country and it does not examine the international dimension of the subject. Further research endeavors can take into account international social networks of the Mafia and their influence past, present and future. 408 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Bibliography Artus, Par Hubert. "Pourquoi le pouvoir italien a lâché Aldo Moro, exécuté en 1978," Rue8, 6 February 2008, available at: http://www.rue89.com/cabinet-de-lecture/pourquoi-lepouvoir-italien-a-lache-aldo-moro-execute-en-1978 Behan, Tom. The Camorra. Routledge: London, 1996. Benford, Robert D. and Snow, David A. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611-639. Block, Alan. East side, West side. Organizing Crime in New York; 1930-1950 New Brunswick, N.J, London: Transaction Books, 1999. Blok, A. The Mafia of a Sicilian village, 1860-1960. New York: Harper & Row., 1974. Bull, Martin and Newell, James. Italian Politics: Adjustment under Duress, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005. Catanzaro, R. 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"Forza Italia Born from Mafia Talks," Ansa, 8 February 2010, available at: 409 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/20 10/02/08/visualizza_new.html_1 701529485.html Gambetta, Diego. The Sicilian Mafia; The Business of Private Protection. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993. ______________. "The Sicilian Mafia," Five Books, 6 October 2009, 6. Gingsborg, Paul. Italy and Its Discontents; Family, Civil Society, State: 1980 – 2001. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003. Gottschalk, Peter. "Value Configurations in Organized Crime," Journal of Policing and Society 19 (Jan. 2009): 4757. Granovetter, M. "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (May 1973): 1360-1380. Hess, Henner. Mafia, Bari: Laterza, 1970. Lupo, Salvatore, "Uutopia totalitaria del fascismo (1918-42)," in La Sicilia, ed. M. Aymard and G. Giarrizzo. Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1987. 373-484. Kohlberg, L. The Philosophy of Moral Development. Harper & Row, San Francisco, 1981. Maffei, Stefano and Merzagora Betsos, Isabella. "Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled Country," European Journal of Criminology 4 (Apr. 2007): 461-482. Madno, Giuseppe C., L'opposizione mafiosa. Mafia politica stato liberale. Palermo: Flaccovio, 1986. Matsueda, Ross L. "Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime," Crime, Law, and Social Change 46 (2006): 3-33. McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott. "Organized Crime: A Social Network Approach," Crime, Law & Social Change: An International Journal 32( April 2006): 301-323. Mosca, Gaetona. "Che Cosa è la Mafia," in G. Mosca, Partiti a sindacati nelle crisi del regime parlamentare . Bari: Laterza, [1900] 1949. Nicaso, Antonio and Lamothe, Lee. Global Mafia; The New World Order of Organized Crime. Toronto: McMillan, 1995. Paoli, Letizia. 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Mafia Money and Politics in Sicily 1950-1997, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1998. Santino, Umberto. "Guida al processo Andreotti," Citt d'utopia (November, 1995) Schneider, Jane, and Peter T. Schneider. Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily. NewYork: Academic Press, 1976. Stille, Alexander. Excellent Cadavers : The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic. 1st ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1995. Spolar, Christine. "New Mafia gains power in Italy, baffling law enforcement," Mafia-News, 2008. Database online, available at: http://www.mafia-news.com/new-mafia-gains-power-in-italybaffling-law-enforcement/ Tarrow, Sidney G., Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967. Tobias, Jones. The Dark Heart of Italy, London: Faber & Faber, 2003. Turone, Giuliano, Il delitto di associazione mafiosa.Milano: Giuffré, 1995. 1995). 411 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Sutherland, E. H. "Development of the Theory," In E. H. Sutherland, On. Analyzing Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1942] 1973. Tremblay, Pierre and Carlo Morselli. "Patterns in Criminal Achievement: Wilson and Abrahamse Revisited," Criminology 38 (May 2000): 659-663. Van Dijk, J. "Mafia Markers: Assessing Organized Crime and its Impacts upon Societies," Trends in Organized Crime 10 (2007): 39-56. 412 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 SOCIAL NETWORKS ADDRESSING GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND IDENTITY FROM THE CONCEPT/ CREATIVE FUNCTION OF SOCI AL I M AGI N ATI ON Elayne F. Fracaro Graduate School of Social Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw Abst r act Exploring group membership and identity reveals how people use and rely on the collectiveness of social knowledge. Social imagination can be understood as collective mentality1-individuals who imagine themselves and others through social interaction in a place over time. This imagining of ourselves and others connects us in a social reality. Out of this forms the structure of social identity kept together through active social imagination that builds social networks. The idea for this paper came from qualitative comparative research. In that research, group identity was addressed and it was learned that respondents revealed strong preferences for their original socialization framework. The respondents emphasized original established webs of social networks, connecting and identify themselves in their acquired social imagination. Key words: group membership, identity, concept/ creative function as a state of social imagination, the collective mentality 1. Introduction We often view societies, a particular group of people in a place, as being adept at creating a reality where every individual has a 1 In this paper, imagining and thinking are viewed as different activities, imagining is a social collective phenomenon and thinking is an individual physical activity. Thinking can be viewed as the wiring of a hard drive, imagining as the program which is run on those wires. Imagining gives meaning, not thinking and in this sense, imagining includes collective views, perceptions and all means of seeing, visualizing and understanding social reality. 413 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 place and the group establishes and reinforces imaginations in order to keep the society functioning. However, societies today are seen as being in a state of flux as their imagination is seen as less than collective. The social networks of the individual and therefore all individuals appear to consist of mediocre and or comfortable social networks without real solidarity or cohesion. Eventually these break into small collectives, ‘social networks’ that come and go with no aim or hopes of restoring or creating a reality where every individual in society has a place and purpose in maintaining social order. This paper seeks to explore social networks as a social phenomenon generated by the concept/creative state of social imagination in the hopes of gaining insight toward the creation and value of social networks in today’s wider social reality; this paper will use a clearly structured argument and theoretical framing. By doing so, there is an attempt to learn about the development and organization of social networks. To define the concept of creative function of social imagination, let us begin with the French school, which has been investigating the “imaginaire” as something with particular roots and or orientation, taking a historical approach. As H. Védrine put it, “L’imaginaire” is the whole world of beliefs, ideas, myths, ideologies that pervade each individual and each civilization2. Emile Durkheim initiated this sociological approach to the imaginaire through his idea of the history of mentalities. Durkheim took this history of mentalities and saw in it a collective consciousness or conscience depending on the translation. This idea of Durkheim’s grew into the idea of- a sui generis3, a collective mentality which was for him the key to understanding society. 2 Vedrine H. 1990 Las grandes conceptions de l´imaginaire de Platon a Sartre et Lacan. París: Livre de Poche. 3 Emile Durkheim viewed society as a collective conscience that became an omnipotent entity which he referred to as the sui generis (Durkheim: 1995, 15) acting above and beyond the individual; yet, non existent without such a component as the individual. 414 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The field of the imaginary was explored in the thesis of another French school academic, P. Le Queau, who saw that there are two workings of the imaginary: the imaginative activity as therapeutic practice and integration in the group; and second, the religious symbols which intervene in the imaginative practices as narrations for group identity. In a sense, this idea of imaginative activity has been expanded on by Michel Foucault’s view of discourse, which suggests there is a necessary reference made to imaginative activity in discourse. Review of and repeating of imaginative activity is found in the work of Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus as habitus relates a daily imaginative activity that acts as a base with the purpose of sustaining the imagined identity and social reality of a group. The French School and its historical approach are helpful and interesting in view of social imagination. However, when reading the works of Charles H. Cooley, especially in his book, Human Nature and Social Order, you are sure that imagination is clearly a collective mentality as a network of imaginations existing only in the imagination and investigated there. Cooley described the collective mentality as the relation among personal ideas. In his symbolic interactionist perspective, he was able to show the imaginary as part of social reality unlike the French school of thought. For Cooley, the imaginary was not captured in history or a series of histories, but in the individual imagination in the present as he or she was a society unto him/herself, a relation among personal ideas and thus a member of a group unlike any other group, a unique social world connected to other groups through social interaction. Any cohesiveness that arises is dependent upon the stream of connectedness in the imagination. In a Cooliean sense, all experience is collective imagining; hence imagination is the locus of society. 2. Social Networks are created in the Social Imagination Social networks, applying Charles H. Cooley, are the relations among personal ideas. In this, there is the realization that in the imagination of the self there is the imagination of others, a network of selves is imagined. How? For the social scientist, there 415 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 is but one way to explore such a social psychological phenomenon. Not by diving into the abyss of individual analysis but into the wider aspect of social bein, in saying that it would be enough to say human being. To view one person’s relation among personal ideas is to view many. One is identified because of the group and the group because of all those ‘ones’. Thus, groups reinforce identity, belief and by nature of the one and how he or she sees him or hersel in that social reality - Social imagination is collective mentality which has three aspects and two functions. The first aspect is the source of social imagination a fundamental sub-structure, for instance, religion. Max Weber described the occident personality as that which is oriented in Judeo-Christian traditions. The second aspect are the components of social imagination; namely individuals who in their imagining, social interaction, create a symbolic universe which gives meaning to their social imagination and concretes their group membership and identity which acts as a security and motivation toward further social encounters, developing social networks. This concreting activity relies on the source and components4 which have arisen from congregating individuals in a place imagining themselves and other persons who thus by interacting together construct a social system as such mental representations of each other and each other's actions, become habituated into reciprocal roles played by the actors in relation to each other. The components, created by and creating a source, also establish another aspect of social imagination- boundaries or limits of social imagination are controlled by the source and components. When considering group membership and identity in the context of social networks, social imagination is the point of departure. The social imagination firstly is seen to have three fundamental aspects, and that it has two functions: one function, an everyday function and a concept/creative function that is accessed to go beyond everyday imagining. This notion was essentially put 4 In a sense, components are not only individuals but also the residues and products they create through social interaction. Therefore, components include symbols, values, ideas set forth or produced by individuals in a place. 416 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 forward in the work of P. Le Queau who gave us the two workings of the imaginary. The concept/creative and the everyday are thus functions of social imagination guided by the three main aspects. It was the function of the concept/creative that fascinated me in particular as it appeared to be functioning in the mode of reaching beyond the three main aspects utilized by a group for its survival and encounters with others. Going back to Emile Durkheim‘s work relates both functions, stressing that the everyday and concept creative are controlled by the multitude of social imagination, society. However, Durkheim is nearly religious in his view of what society is as a collective mentality which he named conscience whereas Charles. H. Cooley was pragmatic. For Cooley, society existed in the imagination available to us as the relation among personal ideas. For Cooley, the imaginings people have of one another are the solid facts of society and can only be studied in the imagination5; and moreover without imagination, we would be prisoners of our immediate environment and no more than simple organisms. Cooley can be said to have addressed the concept/creative function in his idea of imagination especially when he wrote about the activity of imagination as the relation among personal ideas. This approach is different from Durkheim in that Cooley stressed individuals, each and everyone is a unique ‘individual’ society connected to other societies through imagination. According to Cooley, in such a society, even imaginary people were not to be ruled out as part of the social reality, the ‘society’ of an individual. Cooley argued that the human mind is the place of human social reality and social identity. In many respects, Cooley followed in the footsteps of George H. Mead whose self and society concept saw the mind arising in the social process. Mead demanded that the individual self be understood fundamentally as a social reality, constituted through communication and thus becoming a web of social relationships. 5 Cooley C.H. Human Nature and the Social Order (NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992). 417 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The functions of social imagination can only be understood in context of social imagination’s three aspects. The source of social imagination happens as individuals congregate in a place over time, they in part establish the source inasmuch as they never can fully understand the source of their social imagination. The source can thus only be known by its components who share in imaginative activity, what Cooley called the relation of personal ideas. As they grow up in a place they become habit and allow for creativity once habit is secured. In that realization, Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus of repeating everyday action, creating habit, provide a framework for seeing this activity of the everyday function develop so that it can be followed by the concept/ creative, which also gives shape and continuity to a group. Stabilization sets boundaries and at the same time those boundaries aid and hinder the possibility of going beyond the everyday. At least, this is what I considered when I designed the research. When describing such a social phenomenon, the repetition of action in a place is made possible through the everyday function and or habit of imagining, which includes reimagining. The topic of ideal society was thought to be able to trigger the mode of the concept/creative. Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann and Alfred Schutz contribute to the idea of the everyday and including the concept/creative function in social imagination as they addressed in their work the stability of structure and agency. They treated life structures in a way to show the necessity of continuity in everyday social reality. Yet, they also saw a symbolic universe as it puts everything quotidien in its right place which provides meaning that everyone in the group participating in the everyday construction of social reality, can understand and develop from both as individuals and as a group. When we imagine behavior, we recognize agency action as by an individual in a social structure. Sociologists advocating action theory do not advocate behavior as being divorced from social structure which shares in meaning. Berger and Luckman were indebted to Mead as was Alfred Schutz to Max Weber’s view on action. Schutz saw action in a hermeneutic form wherein meaningfulness is absolute. Schutz held that the key to the 418 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 interpretation of action lies in the notion of a stream of experiences in time; our experiences form a continuous flow6. In attempting to better understand group membership and identity, it can be argued that there are many levels of thinking that cannot be ignored. Thinking is a brain process, imagining is a social process. In an imagining process, there are many levels to social imagination which fall under the everyday and the concept/creative. Allowing for argument is one way of viewing the active imagination, the concept/creative function of social imagination. The questioning of limits belonging to a group’s collective mentality, social imagination, while at the same time seeking continuity and new means or other approaches to group membership and identity in the social imagination is another way. 3. Other approaches for understanding states of the social imagination Gaston Bachelard’s7 Poetic Imagination is an approach to understanding social imagination. In this work, we rediscover the imagination as we understand that imagination has a social function of the utmost value for any society, in that there is a creative mode of imagination and a conceptual mode wherein there exist images socially acquired which inspire and draw society into the liberation from what is. Regarding sociology, Bachelard is akin to Emile Durkheim and Charles H. Cooley in many respects as the imagination, according to Bachelared, is human existence itself. For him, the imagination is not only the source of pleasure and satisfaction, but also more importantly it is the primary source that stirs and vitalizes our actions8. 6 Abercrombie N., Hill S., and Turner B.S The Dictionary of Sociology (NY: Penguin Books, . 2000) 7 Gaston Bachelard was a French philosopher. His most important work is on poetics and on the philosophy of science. To the latter he introduced the concepts of epistemological obstacle and epistemological break (obstacle épistémologique et rupture épistémologique). He rose to some of the most prestigious positions in the French academy and influenced many subsequent French philosophers, among them Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and Jacques Derrida [The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 200107. http://www.bartleby.com/65/ba/Bachelar.html]. 8 Bachelard G. Poetic Imagination (New York: Spring Publications, 1988) 419 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 In the realm of history, the most recent work pointing a traceable social imagination in the sense of having a source that can be followed back to a religion as a source is related in the 2006 book of Gerturde Himmelfarb, The Moral Imagination. In this book, Himmelfarb, a historian, points to the source of American social imagination as that which has arisen out of England, its culture with its Christian tradition as well as British political philosophy. What the English provided America was their take on a period in western philosophy, the Enlightenment. Can it be said that the Enlightenment stirred the social imagination there and in the New World? It can only be said, as many writers believe, to have stirred the imagination, whether it put the imagination on a good social course is still argued. The contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor wrote Modern Social Imaginaries in 2004 on the differences in modernities. Taylor's approach stands on the failure of ethical and moral thought in the post-Enlightenment world. The focus in his 2004 work was to understand the differences among modernities. It often appears that Taylor is an enthusiast of the idea of communitarisim in that he puts forward the idea of the social imaginary as the way people imagine their collective social life in a more intimate way9. As a philosopher he takes a similar position as the historian G. Himmelfarb in the sense that a moral aspect of social imagination is crucial for social order and hence his criticisms of Enlightenment stimulus and applications10. In many respects, Taylor’s work goes in a similar direction to Benedict Anderson whose imagined community arises out of the collective mentality of social order in a place that grows into the widest possible form of that, the nation. However, Anderson does not go deeply into the moral aspect but both clearly share the idea that civil society emerges in a kind of performative articulation which constitutes the public as nothing other than the common action of discussing itself. 9 10 420 Taylor C. Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke University Press, 2004) Himmelfarb G. The Moral Imagination (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee., 2006) C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Going back to a historical perspective on shared group thought, we find American historian James Gilbert and other colleagues from history and various social sciences, who in a collaborative effort in 1993, wrote about the social imagination in the United States. The result of their insights was the book, The Mythmaking Frame of Mind, Social Imagination and American Culture. The focus of their book was also to point to moral conduct oriented in religious and cultural values and passed on into the new world through the influx of immigrants by the upper-middle class who already had a stake in the new world. This required the ‘myth’ making that is the subject of Gilbert’s book. In a sense, it required a new imagination. In 2008, a study on geographical personality was conducted through Cambridge University by lead researcher Peter Jason Rentfrow, who investigated geographical personality in the United States. The Cambridge research, headed by Rentfrow11, was a large quantitative application based on more than 600,000 questionnaires and published in the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science. The study mapped regional clusters of personality traits, and then overlaid state-by-state data on crime, health and economic development in search of correlations. Rentfrow was keen to learn if states tend to nurture specific personalities because of their histories, cultures, or even climates. In such a statement, one can acknowledge that a larger group does have its access point to a historical social situation. What is particularly impressive about Rentfrow’s results is that the results show the effects of personality on people's social habits, values and lifestyles. The Rentfrow study, though more social psychological, suggests that personality and habits shape group mentality. Such results show that social imagination is that which is bounded by the group. Whether bounded by personality or shared group mentality, it says only that there is such a phenomenon as social 11 The Cambridge study, produced the report, "The Geography Of Personality; A Theory of the Emergence, Persistence and Expression of Geographic Variation in Basic Traits", which was published in the November 2008 issue of Perspectives On Psychological Science. 421 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 imagination as it is the draw of people to the group inasmuch as it is drawn by the group. From a social theory perspective, Rentfrow’s study shows the collective mentality as that which nurtures itself by attracting and connecting its direction and thus providing continuity. In Rentfrow’s research, there becomes visible a kind of map of social imagination showing preferences and or attractions based on the three aspects in their utilization of the two modes of function in the social imagination. With that in mind, the mapping of a group of people or category of people has been given consideration and the name cartographer metaphor. In Borders and Fields, Joanna Kurczewska in her paper, ‘Spaces and Borders and Social Values’ uses this metaphor as she recognizes this kind of mapping as one way to examine the mental access to geographical space and its boundaries as a component of the identity structures of late modern social mentality12. Kurczewska goes on to recognize that such a metaphor highlights ones contact with a locality, region and nation; thus, she emphasizes if attachment to those spaces is inherited, learned, or imagined13. In that same book in another paper, the social imagination was used as a way to approach issues of borders. The paper concerning issues of borders relied upon research initiated and sponsored by The Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education on the topic of ourness and otherness14. The conclusion as shown in that paper on issues of borders in the social imagination found that those respondents living outside of their place of origin tended to seek out others of like imagining, like social imagination15. In yet a another social study, Denis Waskul and Matt Lust used computer games, especially fantasy role-playing games, to view 12 Kurczewska J. Spaces and Borders as Social Values in: Borders and Fields, Cultures and Places: Cases from Poland ( Krakow: NOMOS, 2008) 13 ibid 14 The Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education research project No. 1 H02E 0 12 30 entitled Swojskosc i obcosc jak kategorie konstruowania rzeczywistosci kulturowej we wspolczesnej Polsce (Ourness and Otherness as categories in constructing cultural Reality in Contemporary Poland) implemented in 200607. This research resulted in the book Borders and Fields, Cultures and Places: Cases from Poland. Borders NOMOS 2008. 15 Fracaro-Bieniecka E. The Issue of Borders in the Social Imagination in: Borders and Fields, Cultures and Places: Cases from Poland ( Krakow: NOMOS, 2008) 422 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 participants' creative collectivity with fantasy personas in an imaginary universe by using a vast system of rules that function as guidelines for make-believe action and interaction. Consequently, role-playing games obligate participants to occupy a liminal role located in the boundaries of persona, player, and person.16 Their study, based on approximately ninety hours of participant observation and forty interviews with thirty roleplayers, explored how role-players actively negotiate these boundaries: how role-players carve out distinct spheres of meaning between them, their fantasy personas, and status as players of these games 17. Waskul and Lust concluded that through the lens of these games, we can examine simplified and exaggerated dynamics and entertain the possibility that we are all players located at the liminal margins between the people we believe or imagine ourselves to be and the personas we perform in situated social encounters18. What is relevant for this paper and the Waskul/Lust study is that even in ‘fantasy’ rules and boundaries are obtained and applied from what is already known by a group and the familiar becomes a requirement in the game. 4. Social Networks seen as a state of constant and stable flux of social imagination Basing on the theoretical arguments referenced in this paper and the indicated researches, one can see that the concept/creative state of social imagination creates social networks. Social networks are necessarily then created and sustained only as long as the social imagination requires it. The identity of the group and their imagination that created the social network is not seen as dramatically being changed. The same was concluded in the mentioned 2005 study whereby respondents were asked to describe their ideal society. The value of that study was found in the attention given to the organization of respondents’ ideal 16 Waskul, D. and Lust M. “Role-Playing and Playing Roles: The Person, Player, and Persona in Fantasy Role-Playing” Symbolic Interaction, (Vol. 27, No. 3. 2004). 17 ibid 18 ibid 423 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 society. Though it was noted that respondents remained in their primary social imagination original socialization framework, they also were contemplative and stated that stability was necessary yet at the same time there had to be struggle and determination to sustain the ideal society. In that struggle they communicated states of organization creating social networks that moved accordingly with the social imagination, collective mentality. Waves of networking that stirred the relation among personal ideas enough to reconstruct and or reestablish its continuity. The collective mentality, social imagination, has a source which in fact has no escape. The initial program cannot be rewritten. For a retro view on that scientific opinion Polish/American sociologist Florian Znaniecki addressed the problem of social organization and disorganization in this work on cultural development; he in fact wrote about it using the terminology imaginative reconstructiveness. He declared that cultural data is inescapable, but yet it can be reconstructed to a certain degree through the initiative of cultural data components when ‘individuals’ are found in a new situation or faced with having to describe one, they retreat to what they know, an original or primary program that contained original networks. Znaniecki concluded that cultural data does not change but rearranges itself to be comfortable in a give place or situation. Social networks behave in the same way. 5. Conclusion In sum, investigating social networks from the concept/creative function as a state of social imagination puts us in touch with a realm of social knowledge that is creative and conceptual assertions of collective mentality in action as embodied in the collective of people gathered in social imagination, whereby social networks are created and accessed as needed. The creative aspect is recognized as a flux of the state of this function of social imagination. The value of this lies in our appreciation not only for individual input. Group membership as an identity is also more deeply appreciated and seen more clearly as that which is the forefront of building social networks, those that come and go as well as those proposed for tomorrow. As the world grows smaller, 424 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 the need becomes more acute for dynamic social networks that create inasmuch as they are created by social imaginations. In saying that, is there mediocrity in today’s social networks (i.e., facebook) with their perceived comfort zones regulated by users? In some instance, yes and in a more in-depth view, we can see a move toward social networks that create a means to integrate differing social imaginations from around the globe into a dynamic social reality retaining sensitivity to a sense of belonging in the collective. However, there is a risk that such a network is exactly the mediocrity we question. Around the world, in many societies, social networks depend on the wave of needs by a group and with so many upcoming and weaker groups having differing network needs, compounded by domination by others, the needed dynamism can be suppressed. If it does surface, there is the risk that it will be suppressed and or reined in to shape political correctness of the wider social imagination, ironically leading us back to mediocrity. One thing remains, creativity surfaces through dialogue possible only in the concept/creative function of social imagination; all knowledge is socially created and mediated and access to such knowledge is in connecting with the people who create it,19 and in that there is gained a deeper content of our social knowledge. Bibliography Abercrombie, N. Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. Sociology: NY: Penguin Books, 2000. Bachelard G. Poetic Imagination. New York: Spring Publications. Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. NY: Doubleday,1988.. Bourdieu, P. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge UK: Polity Press. Cooley, C.H. 1992. Human Nature and the Social Order. New Brunswick:. Transaction Publishers, 1997. Durkheim, E. Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. London: Routledge, 1992. 19 Surowiecki J. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. NY: Little Brown 425 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Durkheim E. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. NY: The Free Press, 1995. Durkheim, E. Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Free Press, 1964. Durkheim E. Moral Education. NY: The Free Press, 1961. Gilbert, J. The Mythmaking Frame of Mind: Social Imagination and American Culture. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993. Himmelfarb G. The Moral Imagination. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee., 2006. Kurczewksa, J. “Democracy in Poland: Traditions and Context.” In: Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism. (ed) Mokrzycki, E. and Bryant, C. Warsaw Poland: IFiS Publishers, 1995. Kurczewska, J. and Bojar H. „A New Society? Reflections on Democracy and Pluralism in Poland.” in: Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism. (eds) Mokrzycki, E. and Bryant, C. Warsaw Poland: IFiS Publishers, 1995. Fracaro-Bieniecka E. “Issues of Borders in the Social Imagination.” In: Borders and Fields, Cultures and Places: Cases from Poland (ed. Wojakowski D.). Krakow: Nomos. 2008. Le Queau, P. “Les fleurs mystiques de Babylone. Sur le style de la religiosité postmoderne”, doctoral thesis, Université Paris V. 1997. Mead, G. H. Mind, Self & Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1967. Mead G.H. The Individual and the Social Self. Miller D. (ed). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982. Schutz A. Collected Papers 1, The Problem of Social Reality. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1990. Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. UK: Penguin Books. 1990. Taylor, C. Modern Social Imaginaries. USA: Duke University Press. 2004. Surowieicki J. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. NY: Little Brown. 2004.. Védrine, H. Las grandes conceptions de l´imaginaire de Platon a Sartre et Lacan. París: Livre de Poche, 1990. 426 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Weber M. The Sociology of Religion. London: Methuen, 1966. Weber M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. NY: Harper/Collins, 1991. Znaniecki, F. Cultural Sciences and Their Origin and Development. New intro. by Bierstedt. R.. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1980. Relevant Researches Cambrigde University 1999-2005. Geography of Personality: researcher- Rentfrow P.J. Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education in cooperation with Rzeszow University Poland 2006-2007. Research project No. 1 H02E 0 12 30. “Ourness” and “Otherness” as Categories in Constructing Cultural Reality in Contemporary Poland Polish Academy of Sciences 2005-2008. PhD research and dissertation-Exploring Social Imagination. Elayne F. Fracaro 427 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 HISTORICISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE CASE OF KARL MARX Valentin Stoian Central European University, Budapest Abst r act The article investigates Karl Marx’s theory of history in the light of arguments made by Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin and Friedrich Hayek. It investigates the concepts of historicism and determinism. Firstly, historicism is defined as a thinking which maintains that human history progresses according to certain laws, which can be discerned. Secondly, determinism is viewed as the belief that history has a predetermined ending, derivable from these laws. The article then applies the two concepts to Marx’s writings. The article argues that Marx’s theory of history can be understood in two ways: one centered on the struggle of classes, the other on development of productive forces. However both can be subsumed under a similar model. Finally, Marx’s theory of history is both historicist and deterministic. Keywords: historicism, theory, classes, society. 1. Introduction Within the history of political thought, authors have sought for the origins of the philosophical doctrines which lay at the basis of the two totalitarian political regimes of the XXth century: Nazi Germany and Stalinist USSR. Looking to condemn totalitarianism, scholars have first tried to understand it. While historians have sought for social and political causes, political scientists have explained mechanisms of terror and mobilization, intellectual historians have looked for the origins of the ideas. After the end of the Second World War, Karl Popper published two books: The Open Society and Its Enemies and Poverty of Historicism. Popper argued that the origins of totalitarian political philosophy lay in a type of thinking branded historicism. According to him, a philosophy which seeks to find the inexorable 428 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 laws of history and to predict its end necessarily leads to a totalitarian political action. This excludes the interests of the wide mass of individuals and justifies the use of unlimited power in order to attain the philosophically determined historical goal. Popper’s thoughts were later echoed by Isaiah Berlin and Friedrich von Hayek. Moreover, Popper focused his attention on three philosophers: Plato, G.W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx. He claimed that these three writers are those crucially responsible for the development of historicist, totalitarian ideas. However, Popper, Berlin and Hayek were severely criticized by other authors. Firstly, the critical connection between historicism and totalitarianism has been challenged. Secondly, Popper, Berlin and Hayek have been attacked as offering a very strong and mistaken reading of the philosophers under investigation. They have been accused of twisting the evidence in the heat of the moment, in order to suit their goal of defending liberal democracy. As the works of the anti-historicists were written during or shortly after the Second World War, this charge carries certain plausibility. Therefore, a deeper investigation of Popper’s, Berlin’s and Hayek’s argument seems necessary. This article will not look into the first charge: the connection between historicism and a totalitarian political philosophy. However, it will pursue the second argument against Popper, Berlin and Hayek: that they misread one of the key political thinkers of the XIXth century. In the light of the arguments formulated by Popper, Berlin and Hayek, the article will investigate Karl Marx’s philosophy of history. The main questions which the article will answer are: Is Marx’s conception of history a form of historicism? What are the mechanisms by which history proceeds, in his view? Does Marx’s conception lead to an unavoidable end? In order to respond to these questions, the article will make reference to such crucial Marxist texts as The Manifesto of the Communist Party and the Capital. However, the analysis of the primary evidence will not suffice when interpreting the texts. Marx has left an immense legacy and his often ambiguous texts are open to different interpretations. Two main understandings of the Marxist theory of history will be discussed in the article: one having class 429 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 struggle and the other relying on the development of productive forces as the main engine of history. The article will argue that the two types of theory of history offered by Marx are essentially similar and that they both can be subsumed under a single model: the “birth-pang” model. Both rely on an argument that each stage of history carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction. These seeds develop at once with the “host” and then complete the cycle by eliminating the previous historical period in a violent overthrow. Moreover, the final revolution is unavoidable. Therefore, Marx’s conception of history, in both its forms is both historicist (relies on the existence of historical laws) and determinist (leads to an unavoidable end). Karl Marx’s works have been selected for analysis because of both their importance and their ambiguity. Firstly, Marx has founded a tradition of thinking. His works have been interpreted and reinterpreted by both philosophers and politicians. Authors such as Antonio Gramsci, Gyorgy Lukacs, Ralph Dahrendorf, G.A. Cohen and John Elster have offered philosophical renditions of Marx’s ideas. Finally, Popper himself dedicates half of the second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies to Marx. However, all these interpretations differ to the greatest possible extent. Some read Marx as a prophet of destruction, others as one who simply analyzed the situation of industrial workers. Because of these ambiguities, Marx’s writings have special place in the discussion on historicism. The article will proceed by first defining historicism and determinism, as they have been explained by Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin and Friedrich Hayek. Moreover, the main arguments against such a thinking that the three philosophers have proffered will be reviewed. Then, the article will move to discussing Marx’s philosophy and analyzing it in the framework of historicism and determinism. Finally, the article will conclude that Marx’s philosophy of history is both historicist and deterministic. 430 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 2. Historicism and Determinism Karl Popper introduced the concept of historicism when trying to give a name to the doctrine he intended to attack. His definition still remains the most comprehensive one, which other authors follow in their work. According to Popper, historicism is an approach to the social sciences which assumes that “historical prediction is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history”1. Popper also defines historicism in The Open society and Its Enemies, claiming that there exist certain philosophical doctrines which aim at large-scale historical prediction.2 Determinism can be defined as the belief that history has a predetermined ending which will occur due to the operation of these above-mentioned laws. Moreover, in the rendition of Popper, Hayek and Berlin, determinism is not understood in a weak sense. In other words, history does not only have a predetermined ending which people cannot escape, but this ending also represents the goal of history. This “end of history” is not merely accidental: it is the supreme state of humanity. All the previous stages are not simply inadvertent; they are stepping stones towards reaching that goal. Moreover, this ending is universal: it is supposed to occur for the whole of humanity and to last forever. In other words, it is similar to a Christian “Kingdom of God”. In The Open society and Its Enemies, when analyzing the theory of Heraclitus, Popper establishes the connection between historicism and determinism: historicism implies determinism. Popper shows how Heraclitus believed not only that there are certain laws of change in history, but also that they are immutable. In Popper’s rendering of Heraclitus, everything is change and all change is inexorable decay.3 Moving to Plato’s writings, Popper further makes the claim that historicism implies 1 Karl Popper, The poverty of historicism, (London and New York: Ark Paperbacks, 1986), 3. 2 Karl Popper, The Open society and Its Enemies, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 3 3 Karl Popper, The Open society and Its Enemies, 16. 431 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 determinism. Popper describes Plato as having been aware of the fact that his belief in inexorable laws of change would lead him to supporting the idea that history has a predetermined ending. Plato, however, advocates that by arresting change there is a way to block decay. 4 Finally, in probably one of the most clear chapters of The Open society and Its Enemies, Popper argues that historicists are interested in finding out the “true purpose” of an institution, a purpose revealed by its history and to force that institution along what is its unalterable path.5 Moreover, Popper does not mince his words when stating his belief in the connection between totalitarianism and historicism. When referring to Hegel’s philosophy and its historicism, Popper directly claims that there is a strong connection between Hegelian philosophy and left-wing and right wing extremism. Popper argues that Hegel invented a “historicist scheme” in which nations were the main actors on the stage of history. From this, there is just one step towards totalitarianism and it is taken by both the left and the right. The left wing replaces the nation with class while the right wing replaces it with race, as the main actor in history. Further on, Popper affirms that modern totalitarianism is deeply indebted to Hegel and that Hegel represents the “missing link” between totalitarianism and Plato.6 Similarly, Isaiah Berlin maintains that certain philosophical conceptions claim to find the sources of historical events in causes largely outside the actions of individuals. He avers that, by supporting an outlook that there are certain discernible patterns in history, one refuses the notion of individual responsibility.7 Berlin charges the historicists with claiming that individuals who do not act according to their predetermined interests are simply blind and cannot see the underlying pattern according to which history proceeds.8 Therefore, individual freedom is only an illusion 4 Karl Popper, The Open society and Its Enemies, 24. 5 Karl Popper, The Open society and Its Enemies, 27. 6 Karl Popper, The Open society and Its Enemies, 226. 7 Isaiah Berlin, “Historical Inevitability” in Four Essay on Liberty, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992), 54. 8 432 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability”, 55. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 caused by lack of knowledge. Thus, on the historicist account, the more we know, the more we realize how un-free our wills truly are. 9 In a historicist view of the world, Berlin claims that notions of individual responsibility and guilt are meaningless. 10 What is left for the individual, is according to Berlin’s reading of the historicists, nothing more than to submit to the underlying patterns. Otherwise, when the forces of history act, the individual will be on the losing side of history. 11 The individuals who are aware of these forces and who can see them most clearly are humanity’s natural leaders.12 Finally, F.A. Hayek argues that there is a “scientistic” view of history which is looking for a theory of history. In its attempts, it seeks to divide history into stages or phases. Moreover, it relies in its analysis on certain “wholes” (theoretical constructs which are made up of organically linked individuals-armies, governments) which are the actors of these laws.13 Hayek argues that such a view of history is essentially anti-individualistic: it does not purport to understand “wholes” by looking at the individuals that make them up and at the relations between them. Conversely, historicism claims to understand individuals by looking at the larger units which they compose.14 Finally, Hayek blames philosophers such as Marx or Hegel for not trying to build an empirical science and, through theory, to construct the “wholes” on which human existence is based. Rather, Hayek claims, these philosophers have tried to grasp the laws of history by looking at the actions of the “wholes”, which they believe they can directly apprehend.15 9 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability”, 58. 10 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability”, 59. 11 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability”, 62. 12 Berlin, “Historical Inevitability”, 63. 13 Friedrich August Hayek, The counter-revolution of science : studies on the abuse of reason, (Indianapolis : Liberty Press, 1979), 128. 14 Hayek, The counter-revolution of science, 129. 15 Hayek, The counter-revolution of science, 130. 433 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 3. Karl Marx’s theories of history-classes and productive forces 3.1. Class struggle At least two contending interpretations of how Marx views the proceeding of history have been offered. The first is based on the struggle of classes. The second gives center stage to development and the fettering of the productive forces. Both of them are supported by textual evidence and both of them have been developed and explicated by other authors. However, what both of these interpretations have in common is the fact that the transition from one historical stage to another is governed by laws which make these transitions inevitable once certain conditions have been reached. Moreover, in both renditions, one historical period is parasitic on its predecessor and eventually brings its overthrow. Finally, in both models, violent changes are necessary in the transition from one stage to another. Karl Marx begins his most famous and simplest work with the following unequivocal statement: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”16 While heavily relying on the concept of class, Marx never explained what he intended to mean by it. Two attempts to elaborate on the notion will be discussed below. Firstly, G.A. Cohen constructs the meaning of class to be a “set of men bound by similar production relations”17. Cohen argues that a person’s class position is given by the person’s “objective placement in the network of property relations”18. In other words, Cohen defines classes by taking as reference the relations of production and people’s placement within them. This position is what determines a person’s behavior 16 Karl Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969 [1848]) http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#a2, Retrieved 22.02.2010. 17 Gerald Allan Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1991, c1978), 76. 18 434 Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history : a defence , 73 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 in the market: some will have to sell labor power to survive; others will be able to buy, while some will neither buy nor sell.19 Jon Elster improves upon Cohen’s interpretation of Marx and comes with a more elaborate vision. In Elster’s view, class position is “endowment-necessitated behavior”.20 Elster gives a coherent explanation to what Cohen had already hinted at before: a class is a group of people who have to behave in a similar fashion in the process of obtaining the necessary means of survival. People who compose a class possess goods or means of production which place them in a similar position in the market. Elster’s rendition of the classes avoids two main problems in the interpretation of Marx. Firstly, if classes are defined according to the simple ownership of means of production, then some absurd results might come out. For example, one might own a sewing machine, which can be a means of production, while another may own a ring made of gold of the same value as the sewing machine. However, this golden ring is not a means of production, as it cannot be used in creating new products. Thus, according to an interpretation of the concept of class relying on the ownership of means of production, the two owners would belong to different classes. However, since neither the sewing machine can sustain a small business or the golden ring provide enough resources for starting one, both owners are in a situation to sell their labor power.21 The second interpretation of the concept of class which Elster manages to avoid is that of basing class definitions on the value of the possessions which one owns.22 It is irrelevant for the argument if within the same class there are differences in endowments, as long as these endowments impose the same behavior on individuals. While in the previous example, the owner of the sewing machine and that of the golden ring possessed things of similar value, another example would be illustrative for 19 Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history : a defence , 72 20 Jon Elster, Making sense of Marx (Paris : Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1991, c1985),, 324. 21 For the example on which this argument is based see, Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history : a defence, 71 22 Elster, Making sense of Marx , 322 435 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 the second argument. Let us imagine a comparison between the owner of two golden rings and one who possesses none. One could arbitrarily decide that there is some kind of difference between those that own property of certain value and those who don’t. For example, if one golden ring cost $ 1000 and the limit between petty bourgeois and proletariat was set at $ 1500, then the owner of the two golden rings would pass the threshold while the other would not. However, this makes little difference considering that the value of the two golden rings would not allow their owner to start a business in which to employ labor. As much as the one who does not own anything, the owner of the two gold rings has to sell labor on the market. The first strand in Marxist theory of history is its class-centered form. Its textual base can mostly be found in the Communist Manifesto. This work gives the most detailed account of how classes evolve through history. The first part of the first chapter of the Communist Manifesto is dedicated to the detailed description of the rise of the bourgeoisie. Still during Medieval times, the bourgeoisie emerged from the free dwellers of cities, which were able to maintain their privileges in front of the feudal relations of production. Finally, when the bourgeoisie burst into the world, it transformed the world as it was known: The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part. The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. 23 23 436 Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The quoted passage sketches the development from feudalism to capitalism. In contrast to the theory of productive forces which will be outlined below, the class-centered form of the theory gives central place to two main contenders: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The transition from feudalism to capitalism is, as the passage shows, less of a transition from manufacture to industry but more a change of power between nobility and bourgeoisie. Each of these two classes has its own culture, which it imposes upon the world when conquering power. While the feudal nobility based its rule on “religious fervor” and “chivalrous enthusiasm”, the ideology of the free market legitimates the rule of the bourgeoisie. However, the free market, while being the instrument which allows the bourgeoisie to dominate the world is also its undoing: The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself. But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons — the modern working class — the proletarians.24 The constant development of the industrial capacity of society creates more and more the conditions under which a large part of the population loses all its possessions. These men and women have nothing to live on without selling their labor power. Because of the competition with large scale industry, those who had formerly owned some kind of means of production are forced to sell them and live by becoming employed in the large factories. However, while the economic development creates more and more proletarians, it makes them more and more alienated from the product of their work. Moreover, it also makes them poorer and poorer, a process known as the “immiseration of the proletariat”25 On the other hand, the development of modern industry creates the conditions for the forging of proletarian unity: 24 Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party 25 Terence Ball, “History: critique and irony” in Terrell Carver ed. The Cambridge Companion to Marx (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992, c1991), 137. 437 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes.26 According to Marx, the phase before the revolution is characterized by two facts: more and more cooperation and communication between workers and a greater development of the awareness of the proletariat. Together, proletarians put up a struggle against the bourgeoisie. Moreover, they realize the even if they work hard, as the rhetoric of the bourgeoisie claims, they will never end up as bourgeois themselves. With this realization, the proletarians become accustomed to the idea that their own situation is not their own fault, but is a consequence of class relations. Therefore, these have to be abolished completely.27 Eventually, these pressures come to the boiling point: In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.28 The revolution takes place and the state is seized by the proletarians. However, rather than ruling as a new bourgeoisie, the proletariat abolishes all class distinctions known before. The proletariat, because it is the “universal” class, is more interested in simply abolishing the difference between the few and the many. Thus, according to the interpreters of Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat is meant only as a temporary form of rule to be held only until the revolution is secure. Finally, once the power of the proletariat is secure, the state with its courts, 26 Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party 27 Ball, “History: critique and irony”, 138. 28 Marx, The Manifesto of the Communist Party 438 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 police and army has no reason to exist. The state withers away and the proletariat abolishes itself as a class.29 3.2. Productive forces The second and more elaborate strand of Marxism which Elster identifies looks at the development of the productive forces as the key to historical transition. Rather than viewing history as a transition from one ruling class to another, the productive-forces theory focuses on economic developments from one age to another. A new age is not determined by the class position of its rulers, but rather by the organization of the process of production. Transition between ages occurs when a certain type of relations of production fetter the development of the productive forces and a new organization is needed in order for these to continue developing. Since the concept of productive forces is vague, its definition had to be elaborated by the exegetes of Marx. Cohen explicates the term of productive forces by arguing that something is a productive force if control over it contributes to establishing the position of the controller in the “economic structure of the society.” Furthermore, in order to be a productive force, something must be able to develop throughout history, be in a condition to be fettered and explain, together with similar things, the economic structure of society.30 Finally, Cohen includes in his catalogue of productive forces such exemplars as means of production, raw materials, spaces and labor power.31 However, Elster refuses this simple definition and argues that Marx’s theory is not coherent when it comes to defining what productive forces actually are. He uses the case of science, an uncontroversial productive force according to Marx, but not easily fitting Cohen’s criteria and the case of population to attack Cohen’s classification. Elster looks at Marx’s ambiguous statements of population, which sometimes is classified as a productive force and sometimes not. 29 Ball, “History: critique and irony”, 139. 30 Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence, 41. 31 Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence, 55. 439 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 This is done in order to show the impossibility to define productive forces as neatly as Cohen desires 32 However, while the concept of productive forces is difficult to explain, what makes productive forces so crucial is the fact that they determine relations of production. Both Cohen and Elster take pains to explain this second concept and to differentiate it from the productive forces. While productive forces are material, relations of productions occur between other entities. Thus, each relation of production needs at least two terms: either two persons or one person and a productive force. Therefore, relations of production include such situations as ownership or control, slavery, mastery, hiring and being employed.33 Moreover, in an improvement of Cohen’s criteria of definition of relations of production, Elster also introduces the nature of the non-productive owners as a principle of differentiation. This is done in order to differentiate between serfdom and the Asiatic mode of production, two exemplars of modes of production mentioned by Marx. While in serfdom the non-productive owners of means of production are the nobility, in the Asiatic mode of production, these are the state bureaucracy.34 Finally, in the productive forces-centered interpretation of Marx, the key determinant of the change between historical periods is the interaction between productive forces and relations of production: At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the 32 Elster, Making sense of Marx , 253 33 Cohen, Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence, 35. 34 Elster, Making sense of Marx , 258 440 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.35 Thus, at the same time, productive forces determine the relations of production (“the windmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist36), and their development is affected by the existing relations. In the beginning of a new age, the newly developed relations of production permit the development of the productive forces. However, there comes a time when the maximum rate of development of productive forces possible under a certain arrangement of relations of production is reached. From now on, relations of production are fetters to the further development of productive forces. Once this point is reached, a revolution occurs and new relations of production are established. The following passage describes the transition from capitalism to communism: The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. 37 Thus, as the text suggests, there comes a point in which the rate of expansion of productive forces is not anymore permissible by the current economic organization. At that point, the relations of production have to be overthrown. The most important part of the argument, the way the text describes the overthrowing, is that it is a violent process. There is no gradual transition from the 35 Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977[1859]), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm, Retrieved 23.02.2010. 36 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/essays/ieesmarx.htm, Retrieved 23.02.2010 37 Karl Marx, Capital I, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1906) http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpA32.html, Retrieved 23.02.2010. 441 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 capitalist mode of production to communism. The passage’s apocalyptic tone and especially the last two sentences make it clear that expropriation has to occur. Moreover, the metaphor of a bursting integument leaves little to be expected when it comes to the methods by which this will be done. Another argument for Marx’s belief in the inevitability of the communist revolution and his unilinear view of history is his view that historical questions can only be raised when the answer is also within reach. Inquiries into overcoming capitalism can only emerge when a way of doing is already in sight. Thus, his own theory could not have emerged if the social organization under which he lives cannot be terminated. An end of capitalist society is visible and inevitable. As Elster points out, in order for the transition to happen, there must be an adequate development of the productive forces under capitalism. The capitalist relations of production will not simply go away when some desire. There has to be a building pressure on them and sufficient development such as after the transition to communism, the way that the productive forces will be put to use will be more efficient than under capitalism. If the revolution is premature (the question of ending capitalism is raised before the means for it are available) several unpleasant and unforeseen circumstances might arise. The new communist society might never overtake capitalism in the development of its productive forces and might perpetually lag behind. Or, alternatively, even if the new communist society will eventually overtake capitalism, it might not do it immediately.38 3.3 The “birth-pang” model The analysis of the two accounts of the historical process described by Marx has to take into account two main factors: the dramatis personae, or the agents who do the actions and the processes by which these agents interact. At a close inspection of the two versions of the Marxist philosophy of history, it can be seen that while the agents are different, the processes are extremely similar. The main agents of the class-centered theory 38 442 Elster, Making sense of Marx , 290-291 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 are groups of people while the agent of the productive-forces interpretation is technology. While the first is easier to comprehend because the concept of class can be easily expounded, the second needs much more articulation. However, after serious investigation, it comes out that technological development can provide as good a basis for historical progress as the struggle between poor and rich. The most important finding which one notices by the comparison of the two theories is their striking similarities. In both, history proceeds according to what could be termed, to use Marx’s own metaphor, a “birth-pang” model. In both of them, history is structured in several stages, according to the social or economic organization of the time. In the beginning, one social and economic system emerges. However, from the very start, this system carries within it the seeds of its own destruction. For example, feudalism, because of serfdom, makes people run away from villages into towns. Gradually, towns develop and obtain protection against lords. The bourgeoisie is thus born. However, from the very moment of the bourgeois take over of power, its organization of the economy has the seeds of its own destruction planted inside. The bourgeoisie brings with it its “grave-diggers.” Alternatively, the process has a similar development in the productive forces-centered interpretation. Inside capitalism, there is a constant increase of surplus and technological innovation. However, this rate of technological innovation eventually cannot be maintained by capitalism. Other relations of productions are needed. While each historical period develops, inside it, a future one also grows. In the beginning, the present period is strong and its successor is weak. However, one’s growth also triggers the growth of the other. In the early stages, this is not a problem, because the present mode of production can ensure prosperity and peace. But, there comes a certain moment in which growth stops, while the structural conditions for the transition to the next stage take a more clear shape. The disappearance of the present form of social organization becomes more and more obvious. Towards the end, the situation reaches a crisis point, in which social and/or economic problems lead to enough human suffering 443 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 that there are strong demands for radical change. Then, in a process similar to birth, the new historical period bursts into the scene by the violent overthrow of the previous form of social organization. The “birth-pangs” of history represent the upheaval by which one period succeeds its predecessor. The predecessor is consumed and exits the historical scene. Eventually, the process repeats itself until the last stage, communism, is reached. 4. Conclusion When judged according to the criteria of historicism and determinism, established by Popper, Berlin and Hayek, it can concluded that Marx’s conception of history is both historicist and determinist. He begins with the assertion that the important facts about human life can be found in the economic organization. The laws which govern the development of the human society are deeply embedded in the very way in which it organizes itself. The organization of the economy develops according to law-like regularities. Productive forces change, and with them do change the relations of production. Relations of production determine the organization of society. When the productive forces have changed enough, relations of production also have to change, taking the legal and moral framework along with them. Alternatively, classes develop. The very development of classes leads to an inexorable conflict between those who members of different classes. Some people exploit the labor or other people. However, the exploited organize and begin to act politically. Finally, the exploited classes take over power from their exploiters. These are, according to Marx, the laws of progress which govern the entire human history. Eventually, all these transformations have to end somehow. This is the reason why Marx’s theory can be said to be determinist. In both of its accounts, the end is settled, derivable from the observation of the natural laws of historical progress. Moreover, Marx postulates his findings with a claim of universality. The revolution that he envisions will occur all over the world, beginning from the most industrialized countries. Finally, after the proletarian revolution, history will stop moving forward. The 444 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 state, repression and need will wither away and the communist world will envelop the globe. Bibliography Ball, Terence “History: critique and irony” in Terrell Carver ed. The Cambridge Companion to Marx (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992, c1991). Berlin, Isaiah “Historical Inevitability” in Four Essay on Liberty, (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992). Cohen, Gerald Allan Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1991, c1978). Elster, Jon Making sense of Marx (Paris : Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1991, c1985). Hayek, Friedrich August The counter-revolution of science : studies on the abuse of reason, (Indianapolis : Liberty Press, 1979). Marx, Karl Capital I, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1906) http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpA32.html, Retrieved 23.02.2010. ______Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977[1859]), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critiq ue-pol-economy/preface.htm, Retrieved 23.02.2010. ______The Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969 [1848]) http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/com munist-manifesto/ch01.htm#a2, Retrieved 22.02.2010. ______ The Poverty of Philosophy, http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/essays/ieesmarx. htm, Retrieved 23.02.2010 Popper, Karl, The Open society and Its Enemies, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950) _______, The poverty of historicism, (London and New York: Ark Paperbacks, 1986). 445 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 BOOK REVIEWS Volume I: Paul D’Anieri and Taras Kuzio (eds.), D e m ocr at iz at ion a n d Elect ions in Post - Soviet Uk r a in e (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2008). Volume II: Bohdan Harasymiw in collaboration with Oleh S. Ilnytzkyi (eds.), I n for m at ion a nd M a n ipu la t ion St r at e gie s in t h e 2 0 0 4 Uk ra in ia n Pr eside nt ia l Ele ct ion s (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2008). Volume III: Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland and Valentin Yakushik (eds.), The Cont e xt a nd D yn a m ics of t he 2 0 0 4 U k r a in ia n Pr e sident ia l Elect ion s (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2008). Yuliya Zabyelina University of Trento Ukraine's Orange Revolution is a breath-taking example of epic political battles with charismatic heroes and anti-heroes surrounded by massive demonstrations and the plenty of pretentious incidents of poisoning, kidnapping, contract killings, and the numerous acts of other official intimidation and media deception. The Orange Revolution if juxtaposed with other recent political coup d’états of colors and symbols, such as Georgia’s Rose Revolution, or the Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia, outshines the rest, having become the brightest example of a peaceful political upheaval over the past few years of transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the electoral triumph of Yuschenko’s bloc over the country’s corrupt leadership represented a new landmark in the post-communist history of post-Soviet states. The multiple editors of the six-volume series of The Aspects of the Orange Revolution published by ibidem Publishers primarily coming from the Western academic environment put together an exceptional publication that paints a multi-faced canvas of the factors, the proceedings, as well as the consequences of the Orange Revolution. Not only do the volumes discuss the ‘democratic’ nature of the revolution, namely, electoral fraud, 446 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 human rights violations, legal reformation, but also observe other, seemingly detrimental, but intrinsically essential for understanding of this phenomenon issues of national identity, polarization, and cultural divergence. The volumes draw upon an extensive methodological variety of qualitative and quantitative research techniques, fieldwork and participant observations conducted by both established and young social scientists coming from a variety of academic backgrounds of political science, electoral studies, jurisprudence, communication studies, history, linguistics, and musicology. In such a multi-disciplinary manner, the authors explore the unique features of the Orange Revolution (OR) structurally organized for the purpose of this book review into five major categories: (1) OR as a regime phenomenon, (2) OR as an opportunity for foreign intervention; (3) OR as an incentive for legal reformation; (4) OR as a media event; (5) OR as a cultural revival stimulus, and, finally, (6) OR as a polarization instrument. Although the Orange Revolution was not only about democratization and elections, most of the studies on this bitterly-dramatic event approach the 2004 Presidential Elections in Ukraine as a perfect case for political science research. Taras Kuzio, Lucan A. Way, and Paul D’Anieri (volume I) set forward a discussion over the conceptual variety of the regime formation in Ukrainian politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Taras Kuzio revises the mainstream literature on democratization and transitology with a particular emphasis on the applicability of such widely-established concepts as Balzer’s managed democracy, Kryshtanovskaya’s militocracy, Birch’s concept of electoral clientalism, and D’Anieri’s electoral authoritarianism to appropriately reflect on the nature of the political regime in postSoviet Ukraine. Kuzio argues that these concepts are to be united under the category of hybrid political regimes, in which the distinction between the state and the ruling party is distorted, and in which there is fake pluralism build on family connections and corruption. In a similar vein, Lucan A. Way further elaborates on the hybrid nature of the political regime before and after the Orange Revolution. He argues that between 1992 and 2004 Ukraine serves a perfect example of rapacious individualism – a form of authoritarianism, in which elections are in place but 447 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 distribute the power in favor of corrupt and self-minded politicians. The idea of rapacious individualism is perfectly suitable to refer to Ukrainian politics as the one that promotes opportunism and fraud. Adding on to this debate, Paul D’Anieri reconsiders Ukrainian politics from the perspective of machine politics with respect to Kuchma’s Ukraine from 1994-2004 that was officially democratic but in reality was run by a patron-client political relationship dominated by one party in power. Looking internally at political agendas of the key actors of the Orange Revolution, Anna Makhorkina (volume I) argues that Yuschenko’s EU-Ukraine-Russia multi-vector foreign policy objective of Yuschenko’s bloс was indeed a winning strategy compared to a strictly pro-European BYuT, and a narrowly proRussian Party of Regions. Shifting the emphasis to the EU’s mission to Ukraine, Paul Kubicek (volume I) suggests that the EU foreign policy mechanisms, such as contagion, convergence of norms, and conditionality are crucial for the understanding of the political crisis in Ukraine in 2004. Andrew Wilson (volume III) discusses the extent, the success, and the outcomes of foreign intervention on behalf of Ukraine’s geopolitical rivalries of Russia and the EU. On the one hand, his article explores the political technology as the means of the Russian presence in Ukraine. Both Yuschenko’s and Yanukovych’s camps employed the political technologies developed in Moscow by such prominent polittechnologists as Gleb Pavlovski and Marat Gel’man. On the other hand, he deals with NGOs and the role of the West that obviously supported pro-democratic activities and the independent media. Western governmental and non-governmental organization in parallel to those of the Russians imported various techniques, which, without doubt, also had an impact on the outcomes of the Orange Revolution. Finally, he acknowledges that the West was trying to promote democracy, while the political technologists were trying to undermine it through their manipulating practices. The only true test of the outcomes of the Orange Revolution would, of course, be the performance of the government. Guided by an interdisciplinary approach, the authors of the series offer in-depth technically-legal articles that discuss the institutional and electoral reforms in Ukraine. The article by a 448 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 group of experts constituted by Robert K. Christensen, Edward R. Rakhimkulov, and Charles R. Wise (volume I) argues that the institutional transformation from a presidential-parliamentary form of government to a parliamentary-presidential, if other key intervening factors, i.e. political, economic, and historical national specificities are taken into a careful consideration, would most likely have a positive effect on the consolidation of the Ukrainian state as a democratic regime. Calling for an electoral reform, Bohdan Harasymiw (volume II) suggests that the electoral system in Ukraine is unstable as there is no consensus on the nature of democracy the Ukrainian elite envisions for Ukraine. Mixed majoritarian and proportional electoral systems hinder the parties’ cohesiveness, thereby promoting charismatic and clientelistic party factions. Shifting the emphases, Hartmut Rank and Stephan Heidenhain (volume III) evaluate the role of the Ukrainian judiciary and its decisions related to the elections of 2004. They point two major deficiencies of the judiciary in Ukraine to be urgently reformed: first – the Law “On Election of the President of Ukraine” that contains stipulations, such as absentee voting and correcting the voters list on the election day, which made the election fraud possible and even easy; second – the Law “On Election of the President of Ukraine” that failed to provide the possibility to declare the results of one of the rounds invalid even though it had not been possible to establish the election results because of irregularities. Finally, they argue that it is an eminent success for Ukrainian society that the legitimacy of the new President of Ukraine, despite all political difficulties, is not seriously challenged. The Ukrainian judiciary made an important contribution into the legitimacy of the newly-elected President. While the fact that the Orange Revolution made Ukraine a more democratic regime is still under question, there is no doubt that the Orange Revolution had a fundamental impact on the enhancement of media transparency in Ukraine. Ukraine is the only CIS country defined as partly free by the Freedom House1 1 Freedom House. Map of Press Freedom 2008. Available on-line at: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&year=2008, last accessed at 30.07.2009. 449 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 while the press of all the rest of Eastern Europe’s post-Soviet state is classified as not free. Several articles of the collection engage into the exploration of media aspects of the Orange Revolution. Focusing on campaign strategies, Marta Dyczok (volume II) argues that Yuschenko’s victory was secured by his political campaign’s media breakthrough. While the Kuchma’s bloc was continuously censoring news media and limiting Yuschenko’s campaign access to media, Yuschenko’s opposition employed the mirror techniques of traveling through the country, shooting positive advertising, and purchasing their own TV station (5th Channel). Exploring campaign strategies, Olena Yatsunska (volume II) applies American political advertising typology to the Ukrainian media context. Yet, although she find the typology particularly useful, she concludes that compared to US political advertising, Ukrainian political shots are dominantly negative and manipulative. She suggests that there should urgently media neutralization measures taken. Shifting the emphasis to Russian mass media, Ilya Khineyko (volume II) analyzes the coverage of the Orange Revolution in the Russian press. According to his content and frame analyses, the image of Yuschenko presented in the Russian press is the one of a chauvinist candidate backed up by the West and, automatically, unacceptable for the Russian government, while Yanukovych, although with doubtful proRussian credentials, is widely supported in the Russian press as a more preferable President of Ukraine. Focusing on the linguistic aspects, Lyudmyla Pavlyuk (volume II) identifies that there is an over-amplified by the media linguistic divergence between Yuschenko and Yanukovych that created media-constructed images of hostility, expression of ethnic phobias, and stereotypical schemes that she is exploring in a sophisticated analysis. The 2004 Orange Revolution was not only a test of Ukrainian democracy, legitimacy, and media, but also a contest over a cultural revival. Valerii Polkovsky (volume II) traces the development of lexical innovations, neologisms and satirical allusions in the Ukrainian language throughout the Orange Revolution. He argues that the Orange Revolution became a crucial event for the “re-orientation of native lexis, reconnotation,…and reinterpretation of words” (p. 171) in the 450 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Ukrainian language. In a similar vein, Adriana Helbig (volume III) contributes a uniquely multi-disciplinary article that studies the specificities of cyberpolitics of tak-techno music in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. She claims that the Orange Revolution marked a turning point for Ukrainian political expression as younger voters began to voice political dissent and culture-related grievances publically using the new opportunities of communication through the Internet. Finally, what should be also kept in mind is that regardless of the widely-accepted positive interpretations of the consequences of the Orange Revolution, the Presidential Elections in Ukraine in 2004 also produced negative corollary effects. Partially preconditioned by historical factors, partially artificially-created by polit-technologists and the media, national polarization is one of the most critical problems that endanger the unity, and consequently, the stability of the Ukrainian state. Dominique Arel (volume III) argues that although the Orange Revolution gave a birth to the Ukrainian political nation that is capable of organizing independently from the state, this young political nation is extremely divided. If civil rather than ethnic identity is not stimulated in all the regions of Ukraine, any Ukrainian government would fall prey to national divergence set up by geographically polarized citizens. Arriving to a similar conclusion, Ivan Katchanovski (volume III) analyzes the regional cleavages in electoral behavior, religious divisions, ethnic and linguistic differences in Ukraine. Having employed sophisticated statistical electoral data, national surveys, as well as the World Value Survey in multiple regression analyses, Katchanovski argues that the determinants of polarization are the results of historical experiences in Ukrainian regions in the period before and after the First and Second World Wars and imply that these inherent issues would not disappear in Ukraine in the near future, and therefore, the government should develop national policies that would smoothen the regional disparities. Ralph S. Clem and Pater R. Craumer (volume III) explore the electoral geography of Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections. Using the data from the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine they track the theeround elections’ geographical voter turn-out. They argue that there is an extraordinary degree of polarization evidenced in the 451 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 electoral maps of Ukraine that will portend difficult times for Ukraine that desperately needs unity. As a final point, it should be acknowledged that the series The Aspects of the Orange Revolution is a perfect example of a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of the intricacies of Ukrainian politics that requires an insider’s understanding of the political structures and cultural specificities of the Ukrainian society combined with a profound knowledge of the language and cultural geography of Ukraine. For an unprepared audience the collection might seem over-sophisticated and difficult to follow, while for those specializing in the field, the volumes would represent a valuable source of statistical, textual, legal, and linguistic data, as well as well-formulated conceptualizations and hypotheses. The collection indeed lacks a comparative perspective to other similar instances of political crises, as well as it is silent about any postOrange Revolution developments in Ukraine. Yet, this apparently purposeful gap leaves an open space for future academic inquiries on such an inspiring topic of Ukrainian politics and society in transformation. Ximena de la Barra and Richard A. Dello Buono, Lat in Am e r ica Aft e r N e olibe r a l D e bacle : An ot he r Re gion is Possible (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009). Alexander Boniface Makulilo University of Leipzig The “Neoliberal Debacle” addresses an important question of our contemporary time: the crisis of neo-liberalism and its alternative. Focusing on Latin America, the authors examine the impact of neo-liberalism over the region and the struggles to liberate it. The overarching thrust of this book is that the neoliberal project under the banner of the Washington Consensus is facing powerful popular resistances, signifying its legitimacy crisis and the decline in the U.S hegemony over Latin America. The book is therefore premised to primarily assess the emancipatory potential for the peoples of Latin America. 452 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Grounded on empirical evidence and well founded arguments, the authors meticulously articulate their chosen theme. With three broader parts and nine chapters, the book works from the problems of the neoliberal project, its sheer diminishing legitimacy arising from the emancipatory movements against it and finally to the proposed alternative. However, the book has a number of shortcomings. For example, socialism is loosely taken for granted and equated to social movements. A more serious fault is when the authors seem to suggest that socialism can be achieved through the ballot box during elections. A reader is more put off when he or she hears something like “Socialism of the 21st Century” without any discussion on its ideological foundation and how it operates. My critical reading of this fictitious socialism does not see any potential formidable force out of it. For one thing, it allows itself to coexist side by side with capitalism. Had the authors been able to read “Das Capital”, one of the great works by Karl Marx, their analysis would have made a more clearer contribution since Marxism views class struggle as the only way by which socialism can be established. Admittedly, it is only socialism in the history of mankind that has for a long time managed to offer a sharp and radical alternative to capitalism. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR do not signify the meaninglessness of the concept. At another level, one wonders if the authors were concerned with imperialism at the global scale or were just preoccupied with particularistic interests of the region around the two questions of “indigenization” and “sovereignty” against the USA. While the USA is a leading imperialist power today, equating it to imperialism is myopic (p.278). It is also ridiculous for the authors to insist that the USA has come under increasingly intense global competition from other superpowers. The question which is unanswered is whether such competition is anti-imperialism or is a simple manifestation of imperialist struggles among themselves over the repartition of the world for super profits. Surprisingly, the authors do not mention these superpowers. This kind of thinking, for example, has cost the African continent until today. In the 1960s, most African countries waged decolonization struggles to achieve their political independence; a phenomenon that was symbolic rather than actual. While they 453 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 were successful in replacing the colonial masters at least physically, the content and objectives of imperialism as a system remain intact. Thus, the issue of debate and discussion should be to end imperialism rather than blaming the USA. For one thing, the agents of imperialism are many, such as the so-called G8, the Paris Club, the IMF, World Bank and all the Western countries. If the USA collapses, it means another imperialist agent will take the leading role. It should be noted that before the USA ascendancy into its current global status and position, at one time in history, countries like Britain and Germany played the leading roles. So, a genuine liberation should be waged against the system and not individual countries. Methodologically, to treat the USA as an independent variable will not help to capture the struggles against capitalism. This is because within the USA itself neither all the people are capitalists nor do they benefit out of it. This is similar to Latin America. The authors do not state how much Latin America is a class society, much like the USA. This treatment overlooks how countries are structured and how classes interchange within, who benefits and who is exploited. This is very crucial since, as the authors correctly argue, no government in Latin America is strong enough to execute radical changes unless it has the majority support through elections or a referendum. On the other hand, the authors seem to establish a causality between corruption and electoral politics. They appear to suggest that the return of electoral politics and the unregulated neoliberal model of development in Latin America was concomitant with corruption. The authors argue further that although funding of electoral campaigns varies from country to country, it is a nearly universal source of corruption. This simply implies that in the absence of electoral politics and neo-liberal model of development, a society without corruption is realised; something which is fallacious. Corruption as we know it is a problem facing all societies. The question may be that of form and magnitude. Evidently, corruption is pervasive in any regime type or ideological formulation. In Africa for example, most authoritarian regimes did not conduct elections or practise neo-liberalism, yet corruption persisted. How, then, can this be explained? Besides, the authors lack evidence to substantiate their universal claim of 454 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 corruption in electoral politics beyond Latin America, something which would have otherwise strengthened their stand. The timing of the neoliberal crisis is contentious as well. If the authors link neo-liberalism to capitalism in a strict mutually exclusive term, then the crisis of neo-liberalism started long before. The legitimacy crisis of capitalism has been problematic since its inception in Great Britain. The working class movements during the Industrial Revolution between 1750 and 1850 testify as much to this assertion. Such resistances grew in scale and ferocity during the colonial plundering of the less developed parts of the world and the struggles still continue. Thus, to specify the time line for the crisis of neo-liberalism may be far from reality. The proposed regional integration as a way to challenge capitalism is attractive yet challenging. If these countries are founded on divergent class interests it will then be difficult to harmonise such interests. As the authors have noted, the first important thing is to transform these countries into socialism and later on to integrate them. Another challenge which was not discussed by the authors is the readiness by the heads of states to surrender their powers to honour such integration. Finally, the book provides insightful and systematic knowledge on neoliberalism. With empirical richness, the book is an indispensable resource for academics, college students, policy makers, as well as activists who fight to realise a fairer world. Harald Baldersheim and Hellmut Wollman (eds.), The Com par at ive St u dy of Loca l Gove r n m ent an d Polit ics: Ove r vie w an d Synt h esis (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2006). Monica Bucurenciu Oxford University At the European level in particular, interest for regional development and local government has significantly increased among policy-makers in recent years, particularly due to the emphasis that the European Union puts on decentralisation and 455 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 the importance of regions in social and economic development. The book by Harald Baldersheim and Hellmut Wollman on local government and politics comes as a response to this increased interest in the field and provides an overview of local government studies, paying particular attention to the development of a new research agenda. Goldsmith’s article analyses the way in which the research agenda regarding local government has shifted over the last four decades and reviews the contribution made to the study of urban politics and local government by political scientists over the last forty years, showing that each decade has brought about its own particular focus and approach. The author argues for a better use of the international relations literature in the field of local government and a better focus on developing countries. Clarke’s article looks at the way in which scholars have sought to come to grips with the process of globalisation and its impacts upon local politics and concludes that localities and local politics are key venues of globalisation, drawing attention to the fact that traditional political science concepts and approaches may not be appropriate for the analysis of local politics in a global age. Peter John addresses the issue of methodologies and research methods in urban political science. In his view, urban politics are characterised by two main specific features: numerosity (the abundance of cases which allows for the use of conventional statistical analysis) and propinquity (the closeness of urban political and social actors to each other). As a consequence, integrated research designs (which include both quantitative and qualitative methods) are best suited for the study of urban politics. Furthermore, adding a comparative dimension to such studies is also encouraged, as it would allow for a better understanding of the variations across nation states in regards to urban politics. Hoffman-Martinot presents an overview of the infrastructure of research that has evolved for the support of local government studies since the 1970s. Baldersheim and Wollman outline a new research agenda for the field of local government: “seeking to understand how change is shaped by, or hindered by, a combination of local contexts and external pressures with the aim of identifying the space for strategies that 456 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 may be pursued by local actors” (p. 123). The authors plead for giving more attention to cultural and identity issues, cross-border cooperation and the ethical issues raised by research programmes in local and government politics. Although the book aims to be international in scope, the focus remain the US and the UK, developing countries being almost absent from the overview. Furthermore, the book lacks consistency in terms of target audience: while some of the articles assume a rather knowledgeable reader, others seem to be targeted at complete novices. The book’s value lies in several aspects. First of all, it provides an up-to-date overview of local government and politics and a very good starting point for the understanding and study of the discipline. The book also contributes to a more refined understanding of globalisation and how it impacts the local level, avoiding the use of the classical neo-liberal argument that globalisation necessarily leads to a decrease of the importance of the local level. The social and political impact of globalisation is mediated by domestic institutional structures, public strategies and the region’s location in the global order and the local level should not simply be downplayed in this new political context. An innovative discussion on research methodologies also adds value to the book and convincing arguments are brought to support the idea that local government can prove to be a very useful laboratory for political science research in general (a very fertile idea that arguably deserves further analysis and study). Last but not least, the book lays out a coherent and informed new research agenda, particularly notable for its emphasis on the need for an interdisciplinary approach in matters of local government and politics. However, all these qualities taken into consideration, the book succeeds only partially in attaining the goals mentioned in the editors’ preface: to be international in scope, to provide an up-todate overview of a specific sub-field of political science, to be written in an accessible manner and to make proposals for the improvement of the sub-field under scrutiny. 457 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 The almost complete lack of information regarding local government and politics in developing countries renders the book biased towards very specific political contexts and regimes, to the disadvantage of others. In this case, it may very well be that some of the book’s arguments will not hold when tested in other national contexts. Although the authors argue for future research on local government in developing countries, the anachronistic and negatively-charged concept of “third world countries” that they use unfortunately compromises their research agenda. Furthermore, including China in this category, particularly in the current economic and political state of affairs, leaves the reader baffled. The book also suffers from its rather confusing shift from the analysis of local government in general to that of urban government and politics in particular, without a clear distinction between the two or an explanation concerning this shift. A question remains unanswered throughout the book: what differentiates urban government and politics from other types of local government? Without a clear answer to this question, both the structure of the book and its arguments suffer. But a major downside of the book comes from the fact that the articles do not all have the same scientific value and relevance. While the article on globalisation and its impact on local government is well structured and interesting, the article on the infrastructure of research and academic education lacks clear arguments and structure and reads like a long list of partially obsolete information about research institutions and programmes. In general, the articles are written in an accessible manner, although some concepts and theories remain unexplained throughout the book and the abundance of brief references to authors and theories tends to make some of the arguments difficult to follow. As a consequence, although the book aims to be targeted at both academia and policy-makers and others interested in the field, the focus on developing a new research agenda for the study of local government, decreases the relevance of the articles for those outside the academic world. 458 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Despite these shortcomings, the articles generally succeed in making proposals for the improvement of the field under scrutiny, although improvements do not target local government in itself (as one might expect from the title) but the research on local government. But, after all, the aim of the book (according to Baldersheim and Wollman themselves) is to develop a research agenda that better reflects the issues and concerns in the field of comparative local government studies as it is today. Tim Unwin (ed.), I CT4 D : I nfor m at ion an d Com m u n icat ion Te ch nology for D e ve lopm e nt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay Jawaharlal Nehru University Human interaction with new technologies has always been an interesting subject for academic debate. Innovation and advanced technologies always generate debate over their potential applications in the development process and socio-political transformation. As the advent of the information & communication revolution has transformed the world, now the emphasis has been placed on application for development purposes, particularly rural development and empowerment of marginalized communities. Falling in this line, “ICT4D: Information and Communication Technology for Development”, edited by Professor Tim Unwin, provides a conceptual as well as empirical perspective on the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for development, reforming governance, health, education, improving quality of life in remote parts of the world, etc. It provides not only interpretation of various old, modern and contemporary developmental theories, but also covers the practical aspects of the development process, with examples from countries across the world. It contains the “Boxed Case Studies” to highlight the issues and initiatives taken from a wide variety of places and organizations across the world. The main purpose of the book as author himself stated is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the emergence 459 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 of the ICT4D as a set of situated practices within the broad field of development, to provide accounts of key areas where ICTs have been incorporated into development practices, concentrating particularly on health, education, governance, enterprise and rural development. It also aims to challenge many taken-forgranted assumptions about ICT4D and provides a critique of recent attempts to use ICTs in development so that those working in the interests of poor people and marginalized communities can use these insights in their struggle for empowerment. The book consists of eleven chapters in two parts. The theoretical aspect is covered by the editor of the book, Prof. Tim Unwin himself, who has written six chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The second part, dealing with the practical side, contains a variety of essays on the different aspects of development practices in the world. Michael Best and Charles Kenny discuss the ICTs, Enterprise and Development, Michelle Selinger focuses on the role of ICT in education and how it can be a catalyst for development. The third essay of part II is on eHealth and provides an exclusive discussion on the application of ICTs for health. S. Yunkap Kwankam, Ariel Pablos-Mendez and Misha Kay discuss the World Health Organisation Knowledge Management and Health. The issue of e-Government and eGovernance is covered by Jim Guida and Martin Crow. How ICT can promote rural development, particularly in the developing countries of the world, is written Bob Day and Peter Greenwood. The remarkable aspect of Day and Greenwood's essay is that they try to define rural development according to the current circumstances and see the role of ICTs in the light of new emerging challenges such as climate change. A lot of discussion is taking place on the current and possible future uses of ICTs in development, and improving the impact of projects for eradicating poverty and enhancing rural development in the world, but scholarly work offering development practices in a theoretical perspective is missing. The book tries to fill the gap in development literature by providing a scholarly analysis of various aspects of development issues. Application of the ICTs is critical in making a positive difference and improving the impacts 460 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 of development practices. However, the book points out that ICT4D projects in Africa, Asia and Latin America have failed to yield desired results. The point worth mentioning is that application of ICTs requires sound infrastructure such as electricity, trained/skilled work force, conducive policy and regulatory framework, awareness, literacy, etc. The projects that failed achieved the desired goals should not be seen as a failure of the idea itself. Many factors contribute to success and failure of a project. We also must keep in the mind that ICT is not a panacea in itself and it is only an enabling factor in the developmental process. It must also be noted that development is always associated with normative values of the society and many developmental challenges and causes of underdevelopment are related with the norms and tradition of the society to some extent. The application of ICTs for social and political transformation also depends on how society takes it. The perception of the political elites also matters, since e-services transform the social, political and bureaucratic system to promote transparency, accountability that can erode their powers and influence. The process of globalisation and the information revolution has changed the world into a global village, but there are many isolated parts of the world still untouched by the information of communication. The challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, illiteracy, marginalization, digital divide, to name only a few, are enormous. There is growing realization across the world of the need to optimize ICTs to reform the governance process, the system of public service deliveries and to address the challenges of global development. The book also gives some practical suggestions to maximize the reach of technologies in order to increase the effectiveness of development practices and bring isolated and marginalized communities into the mainstream of development. It argues that first attention should be paid to “real development needs”, second, a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate, so suitable technologies should be used for effective implementation, and third, attention should also be given to the sustainability of projects. Last, but not least, vision, commitment, infrastructure, effective partnership and monitoring and 461 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 evaluation are transformation. also important for development and social One very critical aspect in bridging the digital divide in the world and opitimising the use of ICTs is left unnoticed in the book, and that is cooperation between North and South/developed and developing countries. Since a huge investment is required for proliferation of ICT, creating basic infrastructure for it and promoting its research & development, many countries are not capable of utilizing the benefits of ICTs due to a lack of capital. Second, North-South technological cooperation is very critical for the bridging the gap between connected and unconnected. Poor countries must be provided with new technologies at an affordable price. Finally, one can say that the book is a distinguished piece of writing and a must read for development professionals and researchers working in the field of ICTs. It will certainly enrich the literature on development and ICTs and stimulate thought for new innovations, research and development in the applicability of ICTs in wiping out poverty and social evils and ushering in the prosperity across the world. Thad Dunning, 2008, Crude D e m ocr acy: N a t ur a l Re sou rce W e a lt h a n d Polit ica l Re gim e s (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) Monika Dabrowska University of St Andrews When it comes to the concept of ‘crude democracy’, i.e. a democracy rooted in oil wealth, the popular understanding as well as the conventional wisdom supported by many political scientists and policymakers can be summed up by the following equation: the more oil, the less democracy. Consequently, for those believing that ‘crude democracy’ is an oxymoron, Thad Dunning’s book under the same title may sound provocative at best and naïve to the core at worst. 462 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Challenging the commonsensical understanding that natural resource wealth promotes autocracy is indeed the strongest point of the book. Rather than hinder democracy, oil might instead promote it, Dunning argues, but it does so through various mechanisms and for this reason an understanding of these is crucial for elucidating when either the authoritarian or democratic effects of resource wealth will prevail. Thus, in order to equip the reader with an analytic leverage, Dunning faces the analytic challenge and sets the ambitious goal to expose the relatively understudied democratic effects of resource wealth and to compare these to the authoritarian ones revealed in earlier analyses. The theoretical models developed by him through integration of the democratic and authoritarian effects of resources into a single analytic framework are important because they offer explanation on variation in political outcomes across resource rich countries. Dunning’s study proposes therefore a theory that clarifies the conditional political impact of natural source wealth and undertakes a comparative analysis which illuminates variables that tend to privilege the democratic or authoritarian effects of rents. The promise of “Crude Democracy” is that it will show why structural factors may influence the relative salience of these two effects, why these factors may matter, and how they can help us explain political differences in resource rich countries. To call things by names, what Dunning proposes is elegantly wrapped equifinality and multifinality. With regard to the former one, he acknowledges that there appear to be many ways that countries arrive at democracy; with regard to the latter, he insists that resource wealth can equally promote the emergence or persistence of authoritarian regimes as well as democracies. What may seem at first a bit of “eating a cookie and having it too” analysis, is in fact an intricate, if not too intricate, theoretical endeavour aimed at tackling the reality. It is not surprising therefore that the first of the book’s main advantages lies precisely in taking the process tracing into consideration and the second in author’s departure from ‘do?’ to ‘how?’: “How does resource wealth influence the economic foundations of political regimes?”. The initially broad question is specified and made narrower later in the book, as is the type of regime and the type 463 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 of resource. Hence, those who hope to find in “Crude Democracy” the ultimate answer will be unsatisfied, those who are looking for stimulating and fresh theoretical solutions will, no doubt, be content. As far as shortcomings are concerned, Dunning’s neat and elegant theory is based on only one type of resource; the book privileges the influence of economic sources on political regimes and by doing so it narrows our interest down to only one dimension of the state. Furthermore, even within the strictly economic vista, the author is discussing only one type of natural resource. Such approach consequently ignores or downplays other factors and hence the outcomes of the study could change with different variables. Dunning describes also one very special type of authoritarian regime since he builds on a certain kind of elite authoritarianism. Therefore, when reading the book, one needs to bear in mind that in the real world the overall outcome in not solely the product of resource wealth influence on political elites. Even if one does not agree with the concept of fivedimensional state as developed by Buzan et. al., one needs to acknowledge that political decisions do not always belong to the elites (the initial model starts with the elites contemplating the coup), and that the elites rarely make their decisions based solely on economical factors and, to say the least, that natural resources do contribute to, but in no way constitute, the whole picture when it comes to political decision-making process. “Crude Democracy” is written from a multidisciplinary perspective. In his quest to change our understanding of the politics of the resource-rich rentier states, Dunning uses a multimethod approach – among the employed tools the reader will find field research with detailed country-by-country case studies, series of game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and conceptual elaboration of the core idea of the ‘rentier state’. The last one entails a very subtle yet important, as the author claims, conceptual distinction between the states that are resourceabundant and those that are resource-dependant, which are much more prone to fostering authoritarianism. 464 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 As for the structure, the book is very clearly designed with the first introductory chapter providing the overall summary of the volume, followed by Chapter 2 where theoretical foundations and conceptual elements are laid as a basis for developing two related game theoretic models in Chapter 3. There the author builds up a dynamic model in the form of a game of democratization ascertaining that the formal models allow us to study conflicting political effects in a single theoretical framework. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 assess the empirical evidence against previous theoretical claims and thus detailed study cases of Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Botswana are presented. Irrespective of the academic depths of these qualitative analyses, the reader will notice that the whole sample is slightly biased since it contains only one country from outside Latin America. It is therefore worth asking whether the case selection restrained mainly to Latin America with the rest of the world sadly ignored was done for the author’s convenience or because other data was simply unavailable. In spite of the clear design, the book’s narrative is a bit jerky – a lot of ‘as discussed later’ references may be a bit overwhelming for a less disciplined reader. However, bearing in mind that the primary target group will be more sophisticated readers, such as scholars studying the impact of natural resource wealth and those exploring the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes, this should not prove to be much of an obstacle. Also, students of political economy, comparative politics, and international relations will indisputably find “Crude Democracy” compelling. It goes without saying that Dunning’s prize winning book is interesting conceptually but less useful in the practical sense of further inspiration for policy makers. This does not, however, obviate the usefulness of the theoretical framework itself: Thanks to this volume we know that natural resources do play part, we know how and now the only answer to unearth is when they are a crucial component that shapes the policy. Since the book’s findings are based on carefully crafted and precisely designed game-theory based models, they are reminiscient of a rare and sheltered orchid that, although very beautiful, is simultaneously very fragile and might not survive the real world conditions 465 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 outside the green house’s warmth and safety. To decide whether it is so, please read “Crude Democracy” yourself. Goran Hyden, Afr ica n Polit ics in Com pa r at ive Pe r spect ive (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) Nathan Andrews Brock University The focus on the study of African politics seems to come and go with the times, but there remain certain unique characteristics and features that make developments on the continent still tantalizing and worth researching. As the title suggests, Goran Hyden’s book clearly takes a comparative as well as a critical look at the nature, scope and character of African politics, shedding lights on why Africa still matters today in the study of political science. He uses Africa in the broader sense to refer to mainly sub-Saharan Africa, and touches on the politics of many of the countries in that region. Hyden begins by addressing some methodological issues political scientists face, particularly those in the sub-field of comparative politics who continually face the contention between “comparability” and “contextuality”. This is where the issue of the who, where and why in research comes in. Due to methodological weaknesses in data collection, he explains that data from Africa cannot be fully relied upon. Hyden dwells on social exchange theory to show how neopatrimonialism, reciprocity, and clientelism influence politics in Africa. To him, economy and culture are not separate spheres since political economy choices are socially and culturally embedded. For the economist, culture and informal institutions do not count so far as a country is able to get its GDP to rise to an appreciable level. The analyses Hyden present challenge such perceptions. To him, although informal institutions do not explain everything, much of what happens in politics and economics (and particularly in the case of Africa) is dependent on informal behavior and institutions. He argues culture is “the foundation on which not only formal, but also informal institutions arise” (p.7). 466 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Central to his thesis is the idea that the “untamed nature” of African politics is a paramount explanatory variable in Africa’s current predicaments. The untamed aspects of African politics he deals with include; the movement legacy that emerged after the departure of the colonial masters; the problematic state (inability to distinguish the private and public spheres); economy of affection (a social logic which centers on whom you know instead of what you know); the Big Man rule; the policy deficit (the fact that the Big Men’s thinking is often slow or even void); the agrarian question; restrictions on the female gender in politics; ethnicity and conflicts (that abound because of the fluidity of social relations); and the external dimensions (aid, dependency and capitalism). The striking thing about the book is how each chapter builds into the next in a somewhat chronological or sequential manner. The final chapter presents ideas on what Hyden calls “a political science-based approach to reform in Africa” (p. 253). Hyden achieves his goal of applying “a dose of realism” to the analyses of African politics, speaking plainly to issues that not everyone can be frank about. Almost all the points he raises are at the crux of Africa’s politics. What I find striking and very much true is the economy of affection. His concept of power and dependency resonates with Lucian Pye’s (1985) account of the Asian attitude to power and authority in Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. In both cases there is some degree of reliance on social relations and it is thus not virtuous to amass and invest wealth in private ventures. Other interesting themes are “the big man rule” and the impact of the external dimension. Yet it is surprising that although most scholars might agree that dependency is not a good thing, some still call for more assistance. This spoon-feeding attitude to helping the poor makes Africa overly dependent on foreign assistance and this explains why policy is often void of ‘economic’ thinking – contributing to what Hyden calls “the policy deficit.” The extent to which African countries can emerge as ‘strong’ states in the face of today’s globalizing trends is also not certain. Even if African leaders can develop more proactive policies, will they have ample ‘ownership’ of their development as the 467 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Washington Consensus is perpetually being forced down the throats of many of these countries? In fact, the ability of Africa to get out of these developmental shackles seems far more constrained now than it has been about two or so decades ago. Although Goran Hyden tries not to be Afro-pessimistic, he seems to suggest Africa has rejected modernity and that is why it is where it is today. He fails to recognize certain achievements some African countries have chalked as regards good governance, free press and dealing with endemic corruption. A case in point is the Millennium Challenge Account the ex-US President George Bush initiated to help with Africa’s development. Sub-Saharan African countries such as Benin, Lesotho, Liberia, Tanzania, Ghana, Liberia and Zambia are among the over fifteen African countries that have met the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s benchmarks of demonstrating a commitment to policies that promote political and economic freedom, investing in education and health, sustainably managing natural resources, controlling corruption, and showing ample respect for civil liberties and the rule of law. Additionally, Hyden in a few instances makes claims that can be considered simplistic generalizations of what happens in Africa. For instance, he mentions that “there is no such thing as an effective public opinion that operates with a view to changing regime or policy” (p. 20), and that Africa lacks an impersonal bureaucracy. He also argues Africa lacks a civic public sphere which is regarded as a significant ingredient in the evolution of democracy, and “because there is no autonomous state, civil society is also absent” (p. 233). While these may hold true for some countries, it is not accurate to generalize. The proliferation of the media, civil society groups and think-tanks in many African countries should be recognized, although much more could be done to better the impact of such groups on the politics of the day. For Peter Ekeh (1975) in Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement, it is not that Africa lacks a civic public. He believes there are “two publics” – the civic public and the primordial public – and it is the dialectical relationship between these two public spheres (caused by colonialism) that explains many of Africa’s problems. This does not dispute the fact 468 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 that there’s need to separate these two spheres or even combine them in a more convenient manner. Regardless of the criticisms, the book remains a scholarly discourse that recounts the very matters that play center stage roles in African politics. The book is rich in methodological and empirical value. It is suitable for anyone wanting to have a broader picture of African politics and why some conditions within the continent have persisted for a long time. Graduate, postgraduate as well as undergraduate students with focusing on subSaharan Africa might find this book rather scintillating. Although the book does not deal specifically with issues pertinent to what most international development books cover, development analysts and students of the politics of development can benefit from reading this book as the issues Hyden addresses (based on his fifty years of research on African politics) are at the core of Africa’s developmental dilemmas. Essentially, no one will argue that the nature of politics influences ‘development’ in one way or another, and it is very much so in the case of Africa. However, whether Africa can truly “claim the twenty-first century” or not, no one can decidedly say. Rachel Riedner and Kevin Mahoney, De m ocr a cie s t o Com e , Rh et or ica l Act ion , N e olibe r a lism , an d Com m un it ie s of Re sist an ce (Lexington Books, 2008) Paula Gânga Georgetown University According to the late French scholar Jacques Derrida, “democracy [is an idea that] remains to come (...) will remain always to come”. As modern-day followers of Derrida, Rachel Riedner and Kevin Mahoney seek to apply his technique of deconstruction by selecting contemporary examples that undermine what they see as a prevailing—and unquestioned—notion: that Western democracies are free and fair. Democracies to Come strives to facilitate the emergence of political formations that can offer new “languages of knowing, understanding, and learning” (p. 3) as an alternative to the neoliberal project. 469 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 In chapter-length essays, Riedner and Mahoney engage in a thought-provoking discussion about what they see as the current neoliberal establishment and its consequences for the academy, the wider world, and for rhetorical action in the age of globalization. Though not immediately recognizable as belonging to either cultural studies or rhetoric and composition disciplines, Democracies to Come is a useful guide for students of different perspectives who seek to understand the current context of neoliberalism. Emerging from discussions among George Washington University faculty and students following the protests of the International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington D.C. in April 2000, Democracies to Come begins by provocatively arguing that pedagogy should be rewritten as rhetorical action, “a political practice of making, reproducing, and rethinking of social relations, identities, and intervening in relations of dominance and exploitation” (p. 7). In the authors' opinion, universities must not only ensure that their students understand these “new social structures,” but also empower them with the means to interact critically with them. This, they contend, will make pedagogy a cultural force for democracy with far-reaching consequences in the process of making, reproducing, and remaking of social relations, identities, and intervening in relations of “dominance and exploitation”. The second chapter looks at the current position of universities when the move to connect education to the market has slowly undermined another important purpose of the higher education system: that of preparing the students for their role as citizens in a democratic society. The increasing demand for “relevance” in research, and education puts the university under the logic of the market. According to the authors, this process has occurred in parallel with the extension of the neoliberal logic from the market relations deeper into the social relations. In this context, any attempt at challenging the neoliberal order, as it happened with the protests against the IMF, is seen as a disruptive action coming from outside democratic institutions. Chapter 3 moves beyond the critique of neoliberalism to focus on “conjunctural 470 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 moments” in crises of the current hegemonic order. The authors have sought to identify points of rupture where new political and pedagogical possibilities are created. In the final chapters of the book, the authors take a closer look at the development of the “universalizing” Western liberal democracy. In their opinion, by proclaiming an end point to the ideological evolution of mankind, the neoliberal establishment wants to eliminate any other alternative while also making sure that any real opposition to this system of thinking will be marginalized. From this premise, the authors reason that the neoliberal hegemony should be considered a major threat since it can privatize democracy itself. Riedner and Mahoney offer as case studies two “rhetorical traditions” that struggle against this neoliberal hegemony: the Marxist cultural studies tradition, mostly situated in universities, and the Zapatista movement of Chiapas, Mexico, as an archetype of the “political-communities-in-struggle.” When studying the role of each one of these movements, the authors underline the necessity of these two traditions to start a dialogue because “effective political struggle, social identities, rhetorics, and structures of feeling emerge only in relation to each other” (p. 95). Democracies to Come offers several valuable insights into today's global context. One of them is stated right in the title: the authors remind us that a democracy is a continually evolving system. Once a country obtains a high rating on the Freedom House scale it does not mean that democracy has begun its never ending reign. On the contrary, citizens must continue to keep the political system under their watchful eye. Another major point of the book focuses precisely on those critical individuals in civil society who in today's world find themselves marginalized as soon as they voice their criticism against the establishment. To the current situation, the authors offer the solution of creating a “democracy-in-difference—a democracy to come [that would represent] a coming together to exchange, to learn, to expand, the available means of political/rhetorical action” (p. 94). 471 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 This view also puts under question the existing neoliberal system and its strong “force of culture” that creates the “ideological making of the individuals” taking part in today's world. Although this perspective might be rapidly dismissed by the mainstream as coming from the positions of the critical left, students of any discipline who believe in democracy should heed the warnings of Riedner and Mahoney. Reminding us that the democratic ideal is to offer all voices the possibility to express themselves in order to promote further debate and thus create the opportunity for future improvements is another important point of Democracies to Come. Useful for students of all convictions and of all disciplines, this book is valuable to the political science student as it offers a perspective rarely found in books on democracy and on alternatives to the current world system: that of analyzing the university as the locus for the creation of the democratic future, with debates within the universe of higher education as perfect examples of creating the neoliberal context. However, at points, the authors overestimate the influence of the neoliberal logic within the university context. They seem to forget that currently academia remains the most important bastion of critical thought and not just a promoter of the market-driven mentality. Also, Riedner and Mahoney suggest that universities should replace their current focus on teaching what they call the “neoliberal logic” with a pedagogy of activism, in which students should be equipped for active participation in the real world. While this argument has an obvious value, it could be better supported with more arguments than only those rising from the authors’ class practice as it makes the reader feel that there is insufficient evidence to support the final findings. Democracies to Come leaves the reader unsatisfied as the end of the book does not give the feeling of reaching a clear conclusion and answering all the questions set forth at the beginning. Probably Riedner and Mahoney plan to rectify this in their future publications in the Cultural Studies/Pedagogy/Activism series of which this is only the first book and for which the two authors are the editors. Although they may well be preparing to answer these questions in subsequent works, the current volume does not 472 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 reach it s full pot ent ial in spit e of t he above-m ent ioned cont ribut ions as it feels half- finished and incom plet e. D a r re n Lille k e r an d Rich a r d Scu llion ( eds.) , V ot e r s or Con su m er s. I m a gin in g t he Cont e m pora r y Elect or at e ( N e w cast le u pon Tyne : Ca m br idge Pu blish in g Sch ola rs, 2008) Sergiu Gherghina Leiden Universit y Com m only know n as t he fundam ent al basis for cont em porary dem ocracies, elect ions have t he double t ask of legit im izing t he polit ical system and providing representat ives to t he people. Connect ed w it h t he latt er, voters’ preferences and t he reasons behind preference form at ion becom e relevant t o underst and a certain out com e. Lilleker and Scullion’s v olum e address t he quest ion of elect oral choice from t he econom ic perspect iv e of t he v ot er as consum er. Locat ing t heir work wit hin t he polit ical m arket ing lit erat ure, t he two edit ors invest igate if polit ics is seen by t he ordinary cit izen as part of a consum pt ion diet . The pursuit of such a goal m ay shed light on t he debat ed issue of t he uniqueness and social im plicat ions of vot ing behavior. I f t he latt er appears t o be not hing m ore t han a sim ple consum erist pract ice m ot ivat ed and im peded by m arket incent ives and pract ices, t hen t he polit ical processes should change and adapt accordingly. The dilem m a of ident ifying vot ers w it h consum ers guides t his collect ion of t en chapt ers ( ex cluding t he int roduct ion and conclusion) and allows t he st ruct uring of ideas in t hree m ain t hem es, sym m et rically st ruct ured by chapt ers. Start ing from t he ground, t he first t hree chapt ers concept ualize polit ical consum erism and parallel t he relat ionships bet ween consum ers in m arket s and vot ers. The follow ing four chapt ers tackle t he polit ical m arket izat ion of polit ical part ies and t he m edia effect on t he consum erist behavior of voters. I n doing so, t he aut hors int roduce tw o relevant inst it ut ional channels in cont em porary societ ies. Am ong t heir m ult iple funct ions, polit ical part ies and m edia shape behav iors and help form ing various percept ions t hat 473 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 lead to attitudes. From this perspective, their roles become increasingly interdependent in supplying information to the electorate, being relevant if they see the latter as consumer or voter. The final three chapters emphasize the electorate’s perceptions, participation, and attitudes towards the electoral process (including campaigns). Despite the wide range of approached topics and analyzed countries, the volume is homogenous due to the basic common structure. Beyond such an easy to follow and clear format, the innovation of this book resides in the identification of new relationships between the public and politics. Political ideas are suppressed to allow image features to play a role in the electorate’s decisions with the possibility of overlap between the agenda setting and the image created to reflect the agenda (p. 236). Consequently, politics is presented to citizens by parties and media as brands are advertised to consumers. Voters lose their features of active participants in the political process, behave like consumerists and this enhances consistent approaches from institutional actors involved in elections. Despite its plausibility and parsimony, this logic is restricted solely to behavior in electoral times. Lilleker and Scullion’s book complements existing theories of voting behavior and highlight shaded areas of the broad picture. The evidence revealing the complex nature of relationships between voters and politics indicates that the economic narrow and short-term reasoning, usually at the individual level, is not the only game in town. Voters’ perceptions, cognitions, and subsequent behaviors (most of the time at polls) are fueled by the information received. With political parties as main emitters and media quite often as agenda setter, voters pick and choose between two sides of the same coin: citizens (with duties and actively involved in politics) or consumers. The adaptation strategies of political parties account for voters’ choices and future political messages reflect the electorate’s previous attitudes. A further asset of the volume is the two-sided approach of the same issues and thus providing the reader with a comprehensive 474 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 set of analytical tools. To focus solely on the key-argument of what happens with the electorate when media treats it as a consumer, there are two perspectives. On the one hand, Savigny argues for the impossibility of developing political consciousness among the voters when they are subjected to such messages. On the other hand, Scullion without accepting the exclusive dichotomy between consumer and citizen, sees the consumerist messages as a necessary condition to enhance citizenship. The market choice can be often seen as a continuous opportunity for individuals to practice, revise, and perfect their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors (p. 67). Three other chapters, authored by Lilleker, Dermody and Hanmer-Lloyd, and Dean, summarize the latter argument: a close to reality evaluation of an electorate’s consumerist or voter features is possible only by understanding its involvement in politics. The increased role of media, the diversity of chosen communication channels, and the role media plays for the political message and agenda setting comes as no surprise looking at the background of the editors. Nevertheless, as these intermediary voices filter information and display certain attitudes towards citizens, it is relevant to closely look at the effects they may cause and investigate the causes of their behavior. Political parties are put in a similar light, both as initial emitters of messages and as organizations with adaptation potential, sensitive to the electoral environment in campaign and electoral times. With a homogenous structure, clear writing style, logical and empirical connections between chapters, and with a systematic approach of the triadic relationship of voter-citizen-consumer, this book addresses relevant issues in the literature of voting behavior and challenges existing beliefs. By doing so, it provides a broader picture that makes political science students and scholars further delve into the topic. Although the inclusion of the few case studies used in the book deserves more attention in order to eliminate any suspicion of biased selection, the numerous merits of the volume transform it into a relevant contribution to existing research. 475 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post - Com m un ist EU M e m be r St at e s: Part ie s a n d Pa rt y Syst e m s (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). Penny Pardoe State University of New York-Delhi Ashgate’s 2006 publication, Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems, edited and compiled by Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders, is compelling and should prove well received. One of the more intriguing subfields of comparative politics is post-communist studies and one of the more cuttingedge is EU studies; since this work contributes to both, though more to the former than the latter, it is bound to find its way into the hands of many graduate students and professors. More importantly, this volume has much to contribute to the more general study of party systems, a field that is perhaps not as popular as others, but could become so if endowed with the kind of fresh perspective this book provides. While this work presents information of some merit to EU studies, it does little to answer any question of great significance to “Project Europe;” a point that would prove no sin if it were not for its title. Its main aim is to survey the development of parties and party systems in post-communist countries, which it does by focusing on only eight countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia), each specifically chosen because of their EU membership credentials (they have all been members since the 2004 enlargement, and therefore are rapidly approaching the hurdles of the Copenhagen criteria). This particular choice of case studies, and the work itself, does serve to contribute to EU studies because it helps build a foundation of knowledge about how the newly established political systems of these countries work. As noted in the introduction of this book, understanding this is necessary in order to answer any of the bigger questions about the future of the European integration project, because without doing so it would be impossible to “figure out in detail what position new member states in the long run will take in the EU— and what kind of EU they will be willing to build…” (p. xi). 476 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 However, the title of the work really should be reversed and read as The Parties and Party Systems of Post-Communist EU Member States, for its contents are clearly more about the former than the latter. Moreover, it is in the area of post-communist studies and the general nature of parties and party systems that the book proves most compelling. Via ten chapters, eight of which are contributed by different authors providing in depth case studies, and two of which serve to bind the volume together with an introduction and conclusion by Jungerstam-Mulders, this work proves essential reading for students of post-communist regional studies and general party systems studies, alike. Organized in a manner concentrating on three themes: ideological cleavages, party system competition, and party organization, each case study serves to throw a wrench into most of the predictions made in the 1990s about what would happen to post-communist party systems in their post-transition phase, as well as most of the classical thought about party systems dynamics. In reference to the former, many predicted that once the Baltic and Central European countries moved through the initial stages toward democracy and liberal economy their party systems would begin to stabilize into forms that, as Jungerstam-Mulders puts it, “largely resemble those of Western Europe” (p. 248). By this it was meant that they would become less fragmented, less plagued by volatility, include more well disciplined and socially connected parties, as well as show signs of being founded on a clear socioeconomic ideological cleavage. However, this book provides evidence to show that this may not be true even in the most promising of cases (Hungary), something which is well demonstrated by Zsolt Enyedi in what is probably the best written essay in the book. Enyedi observes that Hungary has without a doubt “produced one of the most consolidated party systems in the post-communist world” (p. 177). Fragmentation and volatility rates are on the decline, and it is also one of the few countries to observe higher voter turn out rates (p. 190). However, Hungary’s parties are not strongly connected to society; party memberships are low and so is party identification (p. 189). Furthermore, Enyedi reveals that not only is the socio-economic cleavage 477 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 secondary within Hungarian politics, but the communist/anticommunist cleavage appears to be growing in importance, rather than shrinking as was predicted by some (p. 181). In reference to the aforementioned classical theories, it has been generally accepted within political science that Western European party systems have been mostly stable and frozen along the socio-economic cleavage since just after WWI; a proposition emanating from Lipset and Rokkan’s 1967 study.2 However as is brought up several times in this book, this may not be true any longer. If post-communist EU member states continue to exhibit great party system instability, this may say more about what is happening to party systems both east and west, than it does about these countries specifically; particularly since recent studies have pointed toward similar destabilizing trends in Western Europe, where party identification, party membership, and voter turnout rates are all falling.3 Moreover, volatility is also on the rise in the West, while the supposed clear cut socioeconomic cleavage appears to be weakening.4 As is noted by Andrew Drummond in a recent article about traditional party decline in the West, New Politics parties have had some “success running on issues that cut across traditional political cleavages.”5 Additionally, those traditional parties that fall along the left-right socioeconomic continuum appear to be increasingly moving to the centre; mostly because the solid electorates upon which they once relied are disappearing, or as Peter Mair comments in one of his more recent works, even though “workers are still more likely than the middle class to vote for the left of center parties…there are markedly few such citizens…”6 The contributions in this work have real value as further evidence of this possible trend. Even though in the 1990s it was 2 Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives, Free Press: New York, 1967. 3 Mair, Peter, “The Challenge to Party Government,” Western European Politics, Vol.31, Nos. 1-2, January-March 2008: 221. 4 Ibid, 221. 5 Drummond, Andrew, J., “Electoral Volatility and Party Decline in Western Democracies: 1970- 1995,” Political Studies, Vol. 54, 2006: 629. 6 478 Mair, 219. C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 fashionable to look to Western democracies in order to predict what would happen (or indeed should) in Eastern and Central Europe, this book contributes to the prospect that there is much to be gained by turning this approach around. When these countries embarked upon their transitions toward democracy they began with a fresh slate, unencumbered by old civil society networks or a history of mass political party culture (beyond that of the communist party, which did not work the same as most western mass parties and was consciously erased from popular political culture by most within post-communist EU member states), two things which probably only serve to slow any party decline in the west. In other words, the post-communist EU member states maybe leading rather than following with regard to party system dynamics, and academics would be well served to note this possibility. In conclusion, Post-Communist EU Member States: Parties and Party Systems serves as a great addition to the discipline of comparative politics. It shatters some assumptions in reference to post-communist states and poses food for thought within the study of party systems generally. Based on this, and in order to ensure notice by a great section of the academic community, a better effort should be made toward marketing it on these merits, rather than emphasizing the work's association with EU studies. Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, Valentin Yakushik (eds.), Aspe ct s of t h e Or a n ge Re volut ion I V: Fore ign Assist an ce a n d Civic Act ion in t h e 2 0 0 4 Uk r a in ia n Pr e sident ia l Ele ct ion s (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007). Svetozar A. Dimitrov Central European University Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV7 is the fourth volume of the five thematic collections of articles exploring various aspects of 7 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, Valentin Yakushik, eds., Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV: Foreign Assistance and Civic Action in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007). 479 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 the Orange Revolution, and published as part of the book series entitled “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.” As its straightforward title suggests, the book focuses on the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the wave of protests that came about as the population’s reaction to the manipulated 2004 presidential elections and the preceding campaign. The book is divided into three parts with several articles each, some being of entirely academic nature, while others being on-the-ground observations. The first part, entitled “Political Transition and External Forces in Post-Soviet Societies” contains articles that compare Western and Russian involvement in Ukrainian politics, assess the development, justification and legality of the Orange Revolution, and discuss the role of trans-national actors in democratizing states. Two of the articles, by Kempe and Solonenko, and by Brucker, are informative and the latter is also theoretical. Brucker’s article is particularly noteworthy as it offers an insightful demonstration of the theory of socialization and illustrates the additional pressure that internationally accepted democratic norms and Ukrainian norm entrepreneurs put on the governing elite before and during the Orange Revolution. In the same article, Brucker has also included an intriguing empirical study of the influence that German political foundations exerted on the development of Ukrainian civic society and indirectly on the Orange Revolution, which he assesses as a “second democratic transformation.”8 Unlike most other ones in the book, the two articles by Frolov and Yakushik are conspicuously biased, the second one being a text written for the Party of Regions. The second part of the book contains five accounts of the electoral process written (mostly) by foreign election observers, some more academic, while others trying to paint a more vivid picture of the situation they saw. Finally, the third part of the book features three articles by foreign and local election observers who describe the situation in Electoral District No. 100, Kirovohrad Oblast, which was one of the most lawless districts, 8 Matthias Brucker, “Trans-national Actors in Democratizing States: The Case of German Political Foundations in Ukraine,” In: Bredies, Umland, Yakushik, eds., Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV: Foreign Assistance and Civic Action in the 2004 Ukrainian Presidential Elections (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2007). 480 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 where the electoral fraud in favor of Viktor Yanukovich reached dimensions that cannot be qualified with a single adjective. Some of the articles in the second and especially in the third part allow the reader to really imagine the situation in Ukraine which provoked the Orange Revolution; they are not dry, but rather descriptive and enthralling. The last article, written by Volodymyr Bilyk, reads a bit like crime fiction, regardless of the real nature of the events that Bilyk describes. This last article is bound to let the reader feel the chilling atmosphere of lawlessness and thugrule that used to be, and sadly still is in some places, characteristic of practically all post-communist states. The book is aimed at a diverse but highly-educated demographic. While some of the articles are theoretical and could lead one to conclude the book is aimed entirely at the academic circles, theoretical articles constitute a minority among a number of works with empirical value. Therefore, the book can be used by students, policy makers, diplomats, and scholars alike. Two of the three editors have included one of their own articles in the book. Perhaps out of necessity, due to the editor’s visibly opposing attitudes toward the Orange Revolution (Yakushik is a supporter of the pro-Russian Party of Regions which the Orange Revolution “dethroned”), the book includes works written from both perspectives. In the introduction, the editors make it a point that this book is not supposed to stand on its own but rather serve as a continuation and supplement to discussions started in the previous volumes. While this may be largely true, this is also the most colorful and quite empiric of the volumes, which will certainly paint a picture, allowing a reader whose only interaction with post-communist societies is through books and the media, to come to a conclusion about who is right and who is wrong. After all, it is not all relative. Being a collection of articles, it is impossible to fairly assess the completeness of the book’s coverage as a whole, or likewise, to assess the quality of the methods and empirical work of the book. It is easy to say, however, that the empirical papers have been written by people commissioned by various international 481 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 organizations to write reports on their election observations, and as such they satisfy stringent criteria of objectivity. Since this is a collection of papers, rather than a monograph, there is no single main argument whose plausibility can be assessed. What can be concluded, however, is that the election observations of the second and third chapters lend stark support to the arguments proposed by Kempe, Solonenko, and Brucker, in their papers, and reject the claims Frolov and Yakushik make in the analytical first chapter. The claim that while the West intervened indirectly and helped change a system with morbid democratic deficiencies, Russia directly manipulated every aspect of Ukrainian politics and society, guided only by self-interest, is supported by most authors. Aspects of the Orange Revolution IV is an unusual combination of scholarly empirical and theoretical papers, as well as observation pieces. As the editor himself has mentioned in the introduction, many of the contributing authors felt strongly one way or the other about the political situation in Ukraine and the 2004 Orange Revolution. They have not attempted to conceal their personal feelings, which has not made the book feel less academic, but has enabled the reader to better understand the context of the events. Overall this has been one of the more readable, purposeful, and pretense-free scholarly publications I have recently come across. I can freely say that the book exceeds its editors’ modest stated goals. 482 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Janky, Béla is a professor at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Department of Sociology and Communication. E-mail: janky@eik.bme.hu. Karoly Takacs is an assistant professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy. Email: karoly.takacs@uni-corvinus.hu. Baris Cayli holds MSc in Public Administration from the University of Twente, Netherlands and is currently PhD Candidate at the Department of Law & Politics, University of Camerino Italy. E-mail: baris.cayli@unicam.it. Jaira J. Harrington is a PhD Student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago, USA. She earned her B.A. in Political Science at Spelman College, USA. Her primary research interests include Brazil, gender, race, law, labor and social movements. E-mail: jharrington@uchicago.edu. Elayne F. Fracaro is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Social Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw. Email:fracarel@lewisu.edu; sns@sns.edu.pl; efracaro@css.edu.pl. Valentin Stoian holds and M.A. in Political Science from CEU and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Bucharest. Email: stoian_valentin@ceu-budapest.edu. Nathan Andrews pursues doctoral studies at the University of Alberta in Political Science (International Relations and Comparative Politics). His research interests include African politics, globalization, development, poverty, foreign aid and corporate social responsibility policies of MNCs in developing countries. E-mail: nayak20028@hotmail.com. Monica Bucurenciu holds a Master of Science in Comparative Social Policy from Oxford University. She currently works as 483 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Project Manager at the European Commission in Brussels. E-mail: mbucurenciu@gmail.com. Monika Dąbrowska is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the University of St Andrews where she received her MLitt in International Security Studies. Her research focuses on radicalisation of European converts to Islam. E-mail: mgd2@standrews.ac.uk. Svetozar A. Dimitrov holds an MA in European Studies and International Relations from Central European University. His thesis “Integrating the Western Balkans into the EU: Croatia and the Republic of Macedonia” was published in 2009. E-mail: svet19@gmail.com. Paula Ganga is a graduate student at Georgetown University. She holds an M.St. in Global Governance and Diplomacy at Oxford University. She has recently published a Romanianlanguage book on the energy ties between Russia and the EU. Email: pdg23@georgetown.edu. Sergiu Gherghina is PhD researcher at the Department of Political Science, Leiden University. E-mail: sergiulor@yahoo.com. Alexander Boniface Makulilo is a PhD Candidate at University of Leipzig. E-mail: makulilo76@yahoo.co.uk. Penny Pardoe is an Assistant Professor in the Liberal Arts and Sciences Division at the State University of New York-Delhi. Dr. Pardoe teaches International Relations and Comparative Politics courses, while her research interests include the following: nationalism and conflict studies, EU studies, Eurasian studies, and Northern Irish political studies. E-mail: pardoeps@delhi.edu. Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay pursues a PhD in International Relations at Center for European Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He also works as Research Analyst at Integrated Research and Action for Development, IRADe, New Delhi. E-mail: dinojupadhyay@yahoo.com. 484 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 Yuliya Zabyelina pursues a doctoral degree in International Relations at the University of Trento, Italy. E-amil: yuliya.zabyelina@sis.unitn.it. 485 C EU Po litic al Sc ie nc e Jo urnal. Vo l. 5, No . 3 CALL FOR PAPERS Vol. 6, No. 1 February 2011 General Issue CEU PSJ accepts now submissions for its February 2011 issue. Authors should ensure that their submissions are original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time. Full guidelines for the presentation of the papers are available at the guidelines for submission section. Authors should send their articles to ceu_polsci@yahoo.com before 15 October 2010. Peer Review Process All submitted articles are subject to a rigorous peer review process, based on initial editor screening and double-blind refereeing by a minimum of two reviewers. The journal includes also a book review section. Books Available for Review: 1. John Fenwick (ed.), Public Management In The Postmodern Era. Challenges and Prospects 2. Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman, Leigh Gardner (Eds.), Our turn to Eat. Politics in Kenya Since 1950 3. William G. Roy, Reds, Whites, and Blues: Social Movements, Folk Music, and Race in the United States 4. Lena Kornyeyeva, Putins Reich. Neostalinismus auf Verlangen des Volkes If you are interested in reviewing any of these titles or becoming a book reviewer for CEU PSJ, send along a short resume (max. 2 pages) including your areas of expertise to ceu_polsci@yahoo.com. 486