Civil
Procedure
Review
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017
ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com
Civil
Procedure
Review
2017
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017
ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com
3
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4
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017
ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com
About the Authors
1
Anna Kampmann
Licenciée en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany.
Dr. Martin Zwickel
Maître en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany.
2
Dr. Abbas Mirshekari
Elm va Farhang University, Iran.
Amir Ahmadi
Student of Law, Nooretouba University, Iran.
3
Rrustem Qehaja
PhD, Professor of Civil Procedural Law at University of Prishtina, Kosovo.
4
Dr. Cristina Elena Popa
Associate Scientific Researcher at The Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy. Associate in the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators, Romania.
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Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma
LLM at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. Attorney at Law.
6
Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique
Attorney for the Catholic University of Arequipa’s Santa María, Peru.
7
Giovanni Bonato
Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, France. Visiting Professor at the Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil.
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Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017
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Summary
•
1
Zivil- und zivilprozessrechtliche Aspekte der großen Justizreform in
Frankreich (Justice du 21ème siècle)
Civil and civil procedural aspects of the french major judicial reform (Justice
du 21ème siècle – Justice of the 21st century) .................................................
13
Anna Kampmann
Dr. Martin Zwickel
A.
B.
Justizentlastung durch Aufgabenverlagerung (v. a. im Familien- und Insolvenzrecht) ............................................................................................................................................................................
I.
Einführung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung vor Notaren ..........................................
II. Auslagerung des PACS aus der gerichtlichen Sphäre ........................................................
III. Weitere justizentlastende Maßnahmen ....................................................................................
Verfahrensvereinfachung und Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht (justice plus
accessible) ..................................................................................................................................................................
I.
Förderung der einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegung .............................................................
1. Obligatorischer Schlichtungsversuch ..............................................................................
2. Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht ..........................................................................................
3. Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln..............................................
II. Einführung allgemeiner Regelungen für Gruppenklagen (actions de groupe)
in Frankreich.................................................................................................................................................
1. Anwendungsbereich der Neuregelungen ....................................................................
2. Allgemeine Regelung der Voraussetzungen für actions de groupe .............
a. Parteibezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen:...................................................
b. Prozessbezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen ................................................
3. „Rechtsfolgen“ der actions de groupe ................................................................................
4. Bewertung .........................................................................................................................................
14
14
17
18
19
20
20
21
22
23
23
24
25
26
27
28
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III.
C.
D.
E.
Änderungen des Verfahrens vor der Cour de Cassation ....................................................
1. Vorlagefragen (demandes d’avis) ........................................................................................
2. Die Cour de Cassation als Hauptsacherichter (juge du fond)..............................
3. Überprüfung von Urteilen im Bereich des Zivilrechts nach Entscheidung
des EGMR ...........................................................................................................................................
Einrichtung einer einheitlichen Anlaufstelle (Rechtsantragsstelle) bei den Gerichten..................................................................................................................................................................................
Stärkung der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit ......................................................................................
I.
Transparenz ..................................................................................................................................................
II. Statusrechtliche Änderungen .........................................................................................................
1. Schaffung eines eigenen Status für Haftrichter .........................................................
2. Schaffung einer berufsethischen Kommission...........................................................
3. Abschaffung der Laiengerichte (juridiction de proximité) .....................................
Gesamtbewertung ..............................................................................................................................................
Literatur ......................................................................................................................................................................
• 2
Comparative Study of Sources and General Content of Moral Damages in
Iranian Civil Liability Law and International Human Rights Instruments .......
29
29
30
31
32
33
33
34
34
34
35
35
37
41
Dr. Abbas Mirshekari
Amir Ahmadi
12345-
6-
7-
8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................
The Concept of Loss (Damage) ..................................................................................................................
Moral (Non-material) damage and its definition ............................................................................
Civil liability conception...................................................................................................................................
Conditions of realization of civil responsibility .................................................................................
5-1- Harmful action ............................................................................................................................................
5-2-Illegal action ..................................................................................................................................................
5-3- Existence of damage ..............................................................................................................................
5-4-Undoubtedness of the loss .................................................................................................................
5-5-Directness of the loss ..............................................................................................................................
5-6-The loss should not be compensated ..........................................................................................
Jurisprudential foundations of civil liability ........................................................................................
6-1- The rule of causality ................................................................................................................................
6-2- Negligence ...................................................................................................................................................
6-3- The causal relationship and negligence .....................................................................................
The civil liability theories .................................................................................................................................
7-1-Fault theory ...................................................................................................................................................
7-2- Endangering theory ................................................................................................................................
7-3-The middle theory ......................................................................................................................................
7-4-Loss separation theory ...........................................................................................................................
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43
44
46
48
48
48
48
49
49
49
49
50
51
51
52
52
53
54
55
SUMMARY
891011-
Causation relation between the harmful act and the loss entry ..........................................
The History of Moral Damage in Civil Liability Law of Iran.........................................................
Compensation of losses and other ways of property damage reimbursement ..........
International Law: Authority and Instruments ..................................................................................
11-1- Regional treaties ......................................................................................................................................
11-2-The European Convention on Human Rights ........................................................................
12- Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................
13-References ....................................................................................................................................................................
•
55
56
61
66
72
72
74
75
3
Procedural actions concerning appeal in civil dispute under Kosovo
legislation .........................................................................................................
79
Rrustem Qehaja
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
•
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................
Legal remedies and their meaning ...........................................................................................................
2.1. Use of legal remedies, as a basic right .........................................................................................
2.2. Legal remedies in contested procedure ....................................................................................
Procedure according to appeal against judgment .........................................................................
3.1. Procedure at the first instance court ............................................................................................
3.2. Procedure at the second instance court....................................................................................
Boundaries of examining the attacked decision ..............................................................................
Decisions of the second instance court according to appeal .................................................
5.1. Dismissal of appeal ..................................................................................................................................
5.2. The annulment of judgment and its return to retrial.........................................................
5.3. Annulment of judgment and dismissal of indictment .....................................................
5.4. Rejection of appeal and confirmation of judgment...........................................................
5.5. Amendment of judgment ..................................................................................................................
Reasoning of the second instance court decision ..........................................................................
Returning file to the first instance court................................................................................................
80
80
81
82
84
84
85
87
87
88
88
89
89
89
90
90
4
The obsolescence of the court, the evolutions of its application in the new
civil procedure code and the shortcomings of the law, pending the reform ..
93
Dr. Cristina Elena Popa
1.
The special obsolescence of the court and the provisions of art. 46 comma 1 of
Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of some immovable properties which
have been abusively taken over during the period March 6, 1945-December 22,
1989 ..............................................................................................................................................................................
96
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2.
3.
4.
•
Unconstitutionality related issues or shortcomings of the law? ............................................
Practical applications .........................................................................................................................................
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................
97
99
102
5
The luid recovery in class actions executions in Brazil and the Difuse Rights
Defense Fund (FDD) ..........................................................................................
105
Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma
1.
2.
3.
4.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................
Executions of class actions in Brazil and the allocation to funds ...........................................
Paradigm for analysis: the FDD ....................................................................................................................
Resources and their destination: the problem of the FDD’s subordination to The
Annual Budget Act ..............................................................................................................................................
5. Fluid recovery? .......................................................................................................................................................
6. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................................
References............................................................................................................................................................................
•
106
107
109
114
117
118
119
6
Relexiones acerca de la interferencia del control administrativo en la
independencia jurisdiccional
Relections on the interference of administrative control in jurisdictional
independence ...................................................................................................
121
Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.
10
A modo de introducción.- ..............................................................................................................................
En relación a la garantía constitucional de competencia de la judicatura.-....................
Acerca de la independencia judicial y el control administrativo de la ocma.- ..............
Tutela procesal efectiva.- .................................................................................................................................
Sobre la motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.- .........................................................
Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas...................................
Convencionalidad.- .............................................................................................................................................
Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad.- ...................................................................
Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.-..........................................................................................
Tetra análisis jurígeno.- .....................................................................................................................................
Breve resumen de la resolución de la jefatura suprema de la ocma.- ...............................
Analizando la misma.- .......................................................................................................................................
12.1. Competencia de la judicatura.-........................................................................................................
12.2. Independencia judicial y control administrativo. ................................................................
12.3. Tutela procesal efectiva. .......................................................................................................................
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123
124
128
130
131
133
135
136
137
138
140
140
140
142
SUMMARY
12.4. Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. ...................................................................
12.5. Tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas. ....................................................
12.6. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad. ..........................................................
12.7. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. ................................................................................
12.8. Tetra análisis jurígeno.............................................................................................................................
XIII. Conclusiones.- ........................................................................................................................................................
XIV. Sugerencias.- ...........................................................................................................................................................
XV. Referencias bibliográficas.- .............................................................................................................................
•
143
143
144
144
144
146
148
148
7
La riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato
The arbitration reform in Brazilian law ............................................................
151
Giovanni Bonato
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Introduzione. ...........................................................................................................................................................
L’evoluzione normativa del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. .......................................................
Struttura e caratteristiche essenziali del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. ...........................
Le disposizioni sui rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. ..............................
Il veto presidenziale sulle clausola compromissorie stipulate in contratti per adesione, in contratti per adesione in rapporti di consumo e in contratti individuali
di lavoro......................................................................................................................................................................
La convenzione di arbitrato contenuta nello statuto di una società per azioni. ..........
Le innovazioni rispetto alla nomina degli arbitri. .............................................................................
Le modifiche relative al procedimento arbitrale. .............................................................................
Le nuove disposizioni su arbitrato e tutela cautelare. ...................................................................
La carta arbitrale e il sistema della cooperazione tra giudici statali e arbitri...................
Le novità relative al lodo arbitrale..............................................................................................................
Le novità in materia di impugnazione del lodo. ...............................................................................
Le disposizioni del c.p.c. del 2015 in materia di arbitrato............................................................
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154
160
162
167
170
174
180
183
187
188
191
198
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1
Zivil- und zivilprozessrechtliche Aspekte
der großen Justizreform in Frankreich
(Justice du 21ème siècle)
Civil and civil procedural aspects of the french major judicial
reform (Justice du 21ème siècle –
Justice of the 21st century)
Anna Kampmann
Licenciée en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Dr. Martin Zwickel
Maître en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Abstract
By two laws issued on 8 August 2016 and 18 November 2016, the French legislator
has undertaken extensive reforms of the civil and the civil procedure law, called
“Justice of the 21st century” (Justice du 21ème siècle). These laws aim at setting up
the judiciary for the 21st century by making it more efficient, transparent and easily
accessible. The propositions have been discussed since 2014 and include several sets of
measures. With the key issue of an efficient judicial system, justice shall be relieved by
transferring several competences to other public authorities. The judicial organization
shall be simplified and more easily accessible.
For this reason, the laws “for a justice of the 21st century” contain instruments
for procedural simplification and facilitating access to the courts.
Finally, the independence of judiciary shall be guaranteed. By different measures,
the judicial independence is being strengthened.
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
Zusammenfassung
Durch zwei Gesetze vom 8. August 2016 und vom 18. November 2016, betreffend
„Die Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ (Justice du 21ème siècle), hat der französische
Gesetzgeber umfassende Reformen des Zivil- und Zivilprozessrechts vorgenommen.
Ziel dieses Gesetzes ist es, die Justiz auf das 21. Jahrhundert vorzubereiten und die
Justiz effizienter, transparenter und leichter zugänglich zu machen. Die seit 2014
diskutierten Vorschläge zur Ausgestaltung der Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts umfassen
mehrere Maßnahmenpakete. Unter dem Stichwort einer effizienteren Justiz soll
zunächst eine Justizentlastung durch Verlagerung bestimmter bisher von der Justiz
erledigter Aufgaben auf andere staatliche Stellen erreicht werden. Die Justiz soll zudem
einfacher ausgestaltet werden und leichter zugänglich sein. Die Gesetze zur Justiz des
21. Jahrhunderts enthalten daher auch Instrumente der Verfahrensvereinfachung
und zur Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht. Diskutiert werden diese Maßnahmen
unter dem Stichwort einer leichter zugänglichen Justiz. Schließlich soll die Justiz auch
unabhängiger werden. Durch verschiedene, in den Gesetzen enthaltene Maßnahmen
soll die richterliche Unabhängigkeit gestärkt werden.
Schlagwörter: Frankreich, Justizreform, Streitbeilegung, Gruppenklagen, Justiz des
21. Jahrhunderts
Keywords: France, Judicial Reform, Dispute Settlement, Class Actions, Justice of the
21st century
Die Maßnahmen der großen französischen Justizreform aus dem Jahr 2016
betreffen Schritte zur Justizentlastung durch Aufgabenverlagerung von den Richtern
auf andere Organe (A), Maßnahmen zur Verfahrensvereinfachung und zur Erleichterung
des Zugangs zu Gericht (B) sowie die Schaffung neuer (C) und die Stärkung der
Unabhängigkeit bestehender Justizorgane (D).
A.
JUSTIZENTLASTUNG DURCH AUFGABENVERLAGERUNG (V. A. IM
FAMILIEN- UND INSOLVENZRECHT)
Eine der wichtigsten Maßnahmen der großen französischen Justizreform ist
die Auslagerung gerichtlicher Aufgaben an außergerichtliche Akteure, insbesondere
Notare. Dies betrifft in erster Linie das Familienrecht, nämlich Scheidungen und
Lebenspartnerschaften (PACS), sowie das Erb- und Insolvenzrecht.
I.
Einführung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung vor Notaren
Seit dem 1. Januar 2017 gibt es in Frankreich mit dem sog. divorce par consentement
mutuel, d. h. der einvernehmlichen Scheidung, ein komplett außergerichtliches
Scheidungsverfahren. Dieses außergerichtliche Scheidungsverfahren wurde in
14
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Frankreich bereits seit längerer Zeit diskutiert1 und nun durch das Gesetz vom 18.
November 2016 realisiert. Der französische Conseil Constitutionnel hat entschieden,
dass das Gesetz nicht in Widerspruch zu dem Gleichheitsgrundsatz und anderen
zentralen Grundprinzipien des französischen Familienrechts steht.2 Durch dieses Gesetz
wird das gerichtliche Scheidungsurteil zum absoluten Ausnahmefall. Sind sich nämlich
die Eheleute über ihre Scheidung und auch über deren Folgen einig, so kann künftig
die Scheidung durch eine von den Anwälten beider Parteien unterzeichnete Urkunde
nach Art. 229-1 ff. des französischen Code Civil (C. Civ.) erfolgen. Diese Urkunde wird
nach den Vorgaben des Art. 1374 C. civ. erstellt und bei einem Notar in Verwahrung
gegeben. Durch diese Übermittlung der Urkunde an einen Notar erhält die Urkunde
ein eindeutiges Wirksamkeitsdatum und wird zur vollstreckbaren Urkunde (Art.
229-1 C. Civ.). Die Hauptaufgabe in diesem neuen Scheidungsverfahren kommt den
Rechtsanwälten zu. Beide Parteien müssen von Rechtsanwälten vertreten sein und die
Rechtsanwälte handeln dann für ihren jeweiligen Mandanten einen zivilrechtlichen
Vertrag aus. Den Anwälten kommt also die Aufgabe zu, sich der Rechtswirksamkeit
der Vereinbarung zu versichern und ihren Mandanten gegebenenfalls ein anderes
Scheidungsverfahren anzuraten. Die Notare haben nur die Aufgabe, eine formale
Prüfung der Vereinbarung vorzunehmen: Sie prüfen nur die formalen Voraussetzungen
der Urkunde nach Art. 229-3 C. Civ. In der Urkunde müssen Angaben zur Identität
der Ehegatten, den Kindern und zu den Anwälten enthalten sein. Zudem muss die
Einigung der Ehegatten – sowohl im Hinblick auf die Trennung als auch auf deren
Folgen – klar dokumentiert sein. Darüber hinaus müssen in der Urkunde Angaben zu
den Modalitäten der Scheidungsfolgenregelung sowie zur Beendigung des ehelichen
Güterstandes enthalten sein. In die Urkunde aufzunehmen ist ferner ein Vermerk
darüber, dass eventuelle minderjährige Kinder des Paares über ihr Recht auf richterliche
Anhörung informiert wurden, welches ihnen auch im Fall der einvernehmlichen
Scheidung zusteht. Verzichten sie auf dieses Recht, so ist dies ebenso in die Urkunde
einzutragen. Schließlich hat sich der Notar zu versichern, dass der Urkundenentwurf
nicht vor Ablauf einer Überlegungsfrist von 15 Tagen nach Zugang des ersten Entwurfs
unterzeichnet wurde. Der problematischste Punkt an diesem neuen französischen
System der einvernehmlichen Scheidung ist, dass der französische Gesetzgeber die
einvernehmliche Scheidung auch ermöglicht, wenn die Interessen minderjähriger
Kinder betroffen sein können.3 Dieser Aspekt des neuen Scheidungsrechts hat zum
Teil harsche Kritik hervorgerufen.
1.
2.
3.
Sh. hierzu bereits die Berichte der Kommissionen Guinchard (ablehnend; Bericht „L’ ambition
raisonnée d’une justice apaisée“, 2008, ab S. 87, insb. S. 98 f.) und Delmas-Goyon (befürwortend;
B-ericht „Le juge du 21ème siècle – Un citoyen acteur, une équipe de justice“, 2013, S. 107).
Conseil Constitutionnel, Entscheidung n° 2016-739 DC vom 17.11.2016, Rn. 34 ff.
So besagt Art. 229-2 n° 1 C. Civ., das minderjährige Kind müsse von seinen Eltern über die Scheidung
informiert werden und könne das außergerichtliche Verfahren ablehnen. Die außergerichtliche
Scheidung ist also auch bei Beteiligung von Kindern grundsätzlich möglich.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
Kritiker bemängeln einen unzureichenden Schutz beteiligter Kinder, der sogar
im Widerspruch zu internationalen Kinderrechtsabkommen stehe.4 Das Kind müsse
schriftlich seinen Widerspruch zur außergerichtlichen Scheidung erklären. Dies
widerspreche dem erklärten Ziel, Loyalitätskonflikte der Kinder in der belastenden
Situation des Scheidungsverfahrens zu vermeiden.5 Auch sei gerade bei jüngeren
Kindern fraglich, wann denn tatsächlich Einsichts- und Urteilsfähigkeit (discernement)
gegeben seien.6
Zwar habe ein minderjähriges Kind nach Art. 388-1 C. Civ. die Möglichkeit,
eine Anhörung durch den Richter zu verlangen. Insgesamt sei jedoch nicht
sichergestellt, dass minderjährige Kinder die für die Ausübung dieses Rechts
erforderliche Einsichtsfähigkeit besitzen oder eine ausreichende charakterliche
Stärke aufweisen, um dem Elternwillen entgegenzutreten. Es muss hier auch
bedacht werden, dass die Kinder als Dritte im Scheidungsverfahren keinen eigenen
anwaltlichen Beistand haben.
Es bestehe aber auch eine erhöhte Gefahr der Übervorteilung eines Ehepartners.
Ohne Hinzuziehung eines Richters seien die Parteien allein auf das Geschick und die
Weitsichtigkeit der Anwälte angewiesen.7 Die Pflicht der Anwälte, den tatsächlichen
Mandantenwillen zu prüfen und gegebenenfalls ein gerichtliches Scheidungsverfahren
zu empfehlen, ist also von größter Wichtigkeit.
Das Scheidungsverfahren kann aber auch wieder vor den Richter getragen werden.
Die wohl relevanteste Möglichkeit ist gemäß Art. 1148-2 Abs. 2 der französischen
Zivilprozessordnung (Code de Procédure Civile) die Anrufung des Gerichts durch
die Ehegatten mit dem Antrag auf gerichtliche Scheidung.8 Diese Möglichkeit des
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
16
Das Verfahren sei unzureichend, da die Kinder bei entgegenstehenden Interessen der Eltern nur in der
Theorie ihren Anspruch auf richterliche Anhörung geltend machen könnten. Das Verfahren verstoße
daher gegen Art. 12 der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention über die Berücksichtigung des Kindeswillens
(Gautier, Critique de la déjudiciarisation à marche forcée: l’exemple du divorce par consentement
mutuel devant le notaire dans la loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, LPA n° 232,
21.11.2016, S. 7).
Widerspruchsformular gemäß Erlass vom 28.12.2016 (Arrêté du 28 décembre 2016 fixant le modèle
de l’information délivrée aux enfants mineurs capables de discernement dans le cadre d’une procédure
de divorce par consentement mutuel par acte sous signature privée contresigné par avocats, déposé
au rang des minutes d’un notaire). Es enthält die Formel „Ich verstehe, dass infolge meines Antrags
ein Richter zur Scheidung meiner Eltern angerufen wird“.
Bogucki, Le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel, attention danger, Village de la Justice,
10.1.2017.
Bogucki, Le rôle de l’avocat dans le divorce par consentement mutuel, Village de la Justice, 22.5.2017.
Art. 1148-2 Abs. 2 Code de Procédure Civile: „Les époux peuvent également, jusqu’au dépôt de
la convention de divorce au rang des minutes d’un notaire, saisir la juridiction d’une demande de
séparation de corps ou de divorce judiciaire dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1106 et 1107“.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
nachträglichen Verzichts auf außergerichtliche Scheidung besteht bis zur Übermittlung
der Urkunde an den Notar.9
Daneben sind auch die Rechtsbehelfe des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts nicht
ausgeschlossen. Mit der Umstellung des französischen Scheidungsverfahrens auf eine
vertragliche Regelung richtet sich diese nämlich nicht (mehr) nach familienrechtlichen
Spezialregeln, sondern erfolgt auf dem Wege des Vertragsrechts. So wurde bereits
zu Bedenken gegeben, dass unter Anwendung des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts eine
Anfechtung durch einen der Ehegatten nach Art. 2224 C. Civ. denkbar sei. Dabei
befürchten Kritiker aufgrund der fünfjährigen Verjährungsfrist des Anfechtungsrechts
eine Rechtsunsicherheit im Scheidungsrecht. Dem steuert der Gesetzgeber mit der
Begleitung durch zwei Anwälte entgegen, um so die Wahrung der beiderseitigen
Interessen zu gewährleisten.10 Zudem könnten auch Dritte gerichtlich gegen die
Scheidungsvereinbarung vorgehen, sofern sie ihren Interessen zuwiderläuft, etwa
mittels der action paulienne (Gläubigeranfechtungsklage, Art. 1341-2 C. Civ.).11 Die
Reform wird daher wohl nicht verhindern können, dass eine gewisse Anzahl an
Scheidungen früher oder später doch noch vor dem Richter landet. Gleichzeitig dienen
die allgemeinen Vertragsrechtsbestimmungen auch der Wahrung der Interessen beider
Teile, selbst wenn bei der Scheidung selbst kein Richter mehr als „ausgleichende
Instanz“ eingeschaltet wird.
II.
Auslagerung des PACS aus der gerichtlichen Sphäre
Für die pactes civiles de solidarité (PACS) sind nun nicht mehr die erstinstanzlichen
Gerichte, die tribunaux d’instance, sondern die Gemeindeverwaltungen zuständig.12
Diese grob mit der deutschen eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft vergleichbaren
Verträge13 werden künftig vor den Standesbeamten geschlossen. Die nunmehr
vollzogene Änderung war in der Vergangenheit, trotz entsprechender Vorschläge in
den Berichten von Guinchard und Delmas-Goyon,14 am Widerstand der Vereinigung
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Gueguen-Caroll, Peut-on contester un divorce par consentement mutuel ?, Village de la Justice,
21.6.2017.
Égéa, Déjudiciarisation du divorce : brèves observations relatives à l’acte d’avocat, Dr.fam. n° 7-8,
Juillet 2016, dossier 29.
Thouret, Divorce – Quelles voies de recours dans le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel ?,
Dr. fam., n° 7-8, Juillet 2016, dossier 30.
Art. 515-3 C. Civ.: „Les personnes qui concluent un pacte civil de solidarité en font la déclaration
conjointe devant l’officier de l’état civil de la commune dans laquelle elles fixent leur résidence
commune ou, en cas d’empêchement grave à la fixation de celle-ci, devant l’officier de l’état civil de
la commune où se trouve la résidence de l’une des parties“.
Genauer zum PACS: Sh. etwa Ferrand/Francoz-Terminal, Entwicklungen im französischen Familienrecht
2006-2007, FamRZ 2007, S. 1501.
Kommission Guinchard, S. 59 („La commission considère que l’enregistrement des PACS ne relève pas
d’attributions judiciaires et devrait dès lors être transféré aux officiers d’état civil, sous réserve des
adaptations rendues nécessaires par la nature des missions exercées par ces derniers.“); Kommission
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
der französischen Bürgermeister gescheitert, die zweierlei Befürchtungen hegten:
eine Vermischung mit der Eheschließung (mariage) und eine finanzielle Belastung
der Gebietskörperschaften.
Mit Décret vom 6. Mai 2017 ist diese Neuerung umgesetzt worden. Die Auslagerung
des PACS an die Gemeindeverwaltungen erfolgt zum 1. November 2017.15
III.
Weitere justizentlastende Maßnahmen
Im Bereich des Erbrechts sind einige justizentlastende Maßnahmen
hinzugekommen, insbesondere durch eine Auslagerung bisher richterlicher
Aufgaben an die Notare. Bislang musste im Fall des Nichtvorhandenseins von
pflichtteilsberechtigten Erben, und, sofern kein notariell beurkundetes Testament
vorlag, der Präsident des tribunal de grande instance (entspricht dem Landgericht)
den eingesetzten Alleinerben (légataire universel) durch Verfügung zum Erbantritt
berechtigen (envoi en possession). Im Zuge dieses Verfahrens wurden insbesondere
die Gültigkeit der letztwilligen Verfügung sowie die tatsächliche Abwesenheit
pflichtteilsberechtigter Erben geprüft.
Mit Inkrafttreten von Art. 44 der Gesetzesreform vom 18. November 2016
reicht es nun aus, wenn der Alleinerbe das Testament einem Notar zur Eröffnung
und Aufbewahrung vorlegt.16 Dieser übernimmt nun die Überprüfungspflichten
hinsichtlich des Universalerbrechts des Bedachten. Nur wenn innerhalb eines Monats
ein Widerspruch bezüglich der Universalsukzession eingeht, muss der Alleinerbe wie
bislang eine Verfügung des Gerichtspräsidenten beantragen.17 Diese Reform ist nicht
ohne Kritik geblieben; insbesondere wird eingewandt, ein Notar verfüge, anders
als ein Richter, gar nicht über die Möglichkeiten der umfassenden Überprüfung des
Testaments.18
15.
16.
17.
18.
18
Delmas-Goyon, S. 39 („L’argument ne peut emporter la conviction, alors que la portée symbolique
du PACS a été nécessairement atténuée par l’entrée en vigueur de la loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013
ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe.“).
Décret relatif au transfert aux officiers de l’état civil de l’enregistrement des déclarations, des
modifications et des dissolutions des pactes civils de solidarité, n° 2017-889, 6.5.2017.
Art. 1007 C. Civ. (ab 1.11.2017): „Tout testament olographe ou mystique sera, avant d’être mis
à exécution, déposé entre les mains d’un notaire. Le testament sera ouvert s’il est cacheté. Le
notaire dressera sur-le-champ procès-verbal de l’ouverture et de l’état du testament, en précisant
les circonstances du dépôt. Dans le cas prévu à l’article 1006, le notaire vérifiera les conditions de
la saisine du légataire au regard du caractère universel de sa vocation et de l’absence d’héritiers
réservataires. Il portera mention de ces vérifications sur le procès-verbal. Le testament ainsi que le
procès-verbal seront conservés au rang des minutes du dépositaire“.
Mayer, Les déjudiciarisations opérées par la loi du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice
du XXIe siècle, Gazette du Palais n° 5, S. 59.
Letellier, La réforme de l’envoi en possession du légataire universel et de l’exécuteur testamentaire,
JCP éd. G., n° 49, 9.12. 2016, S. 1337: Der Notar könne zwar die formelle Korrektheit des Testaments
feststellen; das tatsächliche Bestehen des Erbrechts erfordere aber eine Auslegung des Testaments,
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Weiterhin kann mit Art. 45 der Gesetzesreform ein Erbverzicht bzw. eine
eingeschränkte Erbannahme ebenfalls bei einem Notar erklärt werden. Dieser muss
die Entscheidung des Erben innerhalb eines Monats dem zuständigen Gericht durch
Übermittlung einer Kopie des Erklärungsaktes bekannt geben.19 Es handelt sich hier
aber um eine zusätzliche Möglichkeit. Der Erbe kann seine Erklärung auch weiterhin
direkt bei Gericht abgeben.20
Eine weitere Maßnahme der Justizentlastung betrifft das französische
Insolvenzverfahren. Das Insolvenzverfahren spielt sich künftig bei Verbraucherinsolvenzen
ausschließlich im außergerichtlichen Bereich ab. Ein Richter muss nicht mehr zwingend
intervenieren. Kommt die Überschuldungskommission (commission de surendettement)21
zu dem Ergebnis, der Schuldner befinde sich in einer „unwiederbringlich beeinträchtigten
Situation“ (situation irrémédiablement compromise) verpflichtet sie ihn zum
außergerichtlichen Privatinsolvenzverfahren. Nur im Fall von Anfechtungsverfahren
ist noch ein gerichtlicher Prozess erforderlich. Findet keine Anfechtung statt, führt
das Verfahren zur Löschung sämtlicher privater Schulden, mit Ausnahme von
Unterhaltsschulden und Zahlungsverpflichtungen aufgrund strafrechtlicher Verurteilung
(Art. L. 711-4 und L. 711-5 des Code de la Consommation).22
B.
VERFAHRENSVEREINFACHUNG UND ERLEICHTERUNG DES ZUGANGS
ZU GERICHT (JUSTICE PLUS ACCESSIBLE)
Das Gesetz zur „Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ enthält auch mehrere Maßnahmen
zur Verfahrensvereinfachung sowie zur Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht.
die dem Richter vorbehalten sein müsse. Zudem könne die Abwesenheit pflichtteilsberechtigter
Erben mit den dem Notar zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln nicht ohne weiteres festgestellt werden.
19. Art. 804 Abs. 2 C. Civ.: „Pour être opposable aux tiers, la renonciation opérée par l’héritier universel
ou à titre universel doit être adressée ou déposée au tribunal dans le ressort duquel la succession
s’est ouverte ou faite devant notaire“.
Abs. 3 (ab 1.11.2017): „Dans le mois suivant la renonciation, le notaire qui l’a reçue en adresse copie au
tribunal dans le ressort duquel la succession s’est ouverte“.
20. Auf diese Weise wird die Möglichkeit gewahrt, den Erbverzicht ohne Entstehung von Kosten erklären
zu können.
21. Gemäß Art. L.331-1ff. Code de la Consommation ist die Commission de surendettement eine Behörde
bestehend aus Vertretern des Staates auf Département-Ebene und des örtlichen Vertreters der
Banque de France sowie Rechnungsführern und andere Vertreter (vgl. Art. L. 331-1 Abs. 2). Sie ist
zuständig für Anträge auf Verbraucherinsolvenz. Nach Antrag des Verbrauchers untersucht sie, ob
die Voraussetzungen für das Insolvenzverfahren gegeben sind, stellt die Zahlungsunfähigkeit fest und
hört Schuldner, Gläubiger und andere Beteiligte an. Nach dieser Untersuchung ordnet sie, je nach
Situation, einen Zahlungsaufschub von bis zu zwei Jahren oder einen teilweisen Schuldenerlass an.
22. Die Anfechtungsfrist wurde im Zuge der Reform verlängert. Sie beträgt nun 30 Tage und muss per
Einschreiben mit Rückschein bei der Commission erklärt werden (Décret n° 2017-896 du 9 mai 2017
relatif aux procédures de traitement des situations de surendettement des particuliers pris pour
l’application de l’article 58 de la loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la
justice du XXIe siècle).
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
I.
Förderung der einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegung
Titel II des Gesetzes vom 18.11.2016, überschrieben mit „Förderung von
alternativen Streitbeilegungsmethoden“, umfasst diverse Regelungen mit dem Zweck,
die außergerichtliche einvernehmliche Streitbeilegung zu begünstigen und so die
Justiz zu entlasten. Die Reform umfasst dabei drei Hauptfelder, nämlich die Einführung
eines obligatorischen Schlichtungsversuchs (i), der Möglichkeit zur Mediation im
Verwaltungsrecht (ii) sowie eine Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln (iii).
1.
Obligatorischer Schlichtungsversuch
Art. 4 der Reform23 schreibt die Pflicht fest, einen Schlichtungsversuch vor
Einschaltung des Gerichts zu unternehmen. Die Verpflichtung betrifft dabei alle
Streitigkeiten, in denen das Gericht durch einfache Erklärung bei der Geschäftsstelle
angerufen wird (sogenannte „saisine par déclaration au greffe“, Art. 843 f. Code de
Procédure Civile).24 Die obligatorische Schlichtung gilt dagegen nicht bei einer Ladung
des Beklagten mit gleichzeitiger Zustellung der Klageschrift, sogenannte „assignation“.
Das französische Recht sieht diese Möglichkeiten für Klagen mit einem Streitwert von
bis zu 4.000 € vor, die in die Zuständigkeit des tribunal d’instance (Amtsgericht) und
der juges de proximité (ehrenamtliche Richter) fallen: Bei dieser vereinfachten Klageart
reicht der Kläger das vollständige Klagedossier bei Gericht ein. Dieses übernimmt die
Ladung des Beklagten, für die sonst der Kläger zuständig ist.
Die „saisine par déclaration au greffe“ wurde in jüngerer Zeit für 59 % der
Streitigkeiten vor den juridictions de proximité und 18 % der Streitigkeiten vor den
tribunaux d´instance gewählt.25 Durch die Reform soll an dieser Stelle eine Entlastung
vorgenommen werden. Der Richter kann (!) die Klage nunmehr als unzulässig abweisen,
wenn kein Schlichtungsversuch bei einem durch das Gericht bestellten Schlichter
(conciliateur de justice) unternommen wurde.26
23. Art. 4 des Gesetzes lautet wie folgt:
«A peine d’irrecevabilité que le juge peut prononcer d’office, la saisine du tribunal d’instance par
déclaration au greffe doit être précédée d’une tentative de conciliation menée par un conciliateur
de justice, sauf :
1° Si l’une des parties au moins sollicite l’homologation d’un accord;
2° Si les parties justifient d’autres diligences entreprises en vue de parvenir à une résolution amiable
de leur litige;
3° Si l’absence de recours à la conciliation est justifiée par un motif légitime.»
24. Sh. hierzu im Einzelnen Zwickel, Die Einführung der obligatorischen Schlichtung in Frankreich, im
Erscheinen in: ZKM.
25. Étude d’impact, „Projet de loi portant application des mesures relatives à la justice du XXIème siècle“,
31.7.2015, S. 46.
26. Die Schlichter (conciliateurs de justice) sind ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter der Justiz. Sie dürfen daneben
keine gerichtlichen Tätigkeiten ausüben, müssen aber mindestens drei Jahre Berufserfahrung im
juristischen Bereich vorweisen können. Nach ihrer Auswahl und einer Vorbereitung durch die École
20
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Art. 4 enthält weiterhin einige Ausnahmen von dieser Verpflichtung. Eine erste
Ausnahme ist die Anrufung des Gerichts zur Beglaubigung einer außergerichtlichen
Übereinkunft. Weiterhin haben die Parteien die Möglichkeit, einen Nachweis über
bereits unternommene Bemühungen zur Streitbeilegung zu erbringen (Nr. 2). Schließlich
ist in Art. 4 Nr. 3 generalklauselartig ein „legitimes Motiv“ genannt, welches ebenfalls
die Verpflichtung zum außergerichtlichen Schlichtungsversuch aufheben kann. Hierunter
fallen insbesondere Fälle von besonderer Eilbedürftigkeit, in denen ein außergerichtliches
Schlichtungsverfahren eine unzumutbare Verzögerung darstellen würde.
Die Reform hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Justiz leichter zugänglich und effizienter zu
gestalten. Nun wird mit der „Schlichtungsverpflichtung“ aber ein zusätzliches Hindernis
der Klagezulässigkeit geschaffen. Auch hat die Schlichtungskultur ihren Ursprung
im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtsraum; Kritiker bemängeln daher, das Instrument
der Schlichtung stehe nicht in der französischen Rechtstradition, die vielmehr auf
Konfrontation und klärendem Richterspruch basiere.27 Zudem sei die Verpflichtung
konträr zum Prinzip der Freiwilligkeit einer Schlichtung.28 Gleichzeitig stellt eine höhere
Zahl an einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegungen aber eine Entlastung der Justiz dar und
kann so zur gewünschten Effizienzsteigerung beitragen. Außerdem ist eine gelungene
außergerichtliche Einigung durchaus ein wirksames Mittel, einen dauerhaften
Rechtsfrieden zu schaffen.29 Es bleibt daher abzuwarten, wie der neu eingeführte
obligatorische Schlichtungsversuch in der gerichtlichen Praxis angenommen wird.
2.
Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht
Auch im Verwaltungsrecht wird die Mediation im Zuge der großen Justizreform
ausgeweitet. Bislang war in der französischen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit der Begriff
der Mediation nur im Zusammenhang mit grenzüberschreitenden Streitigkeiten
geläufig. Diese Begrifflichkeit wurde mit der Reform vollständig aufgehoben und eine
neue Definition der Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht geschaffen, die auf alle Arten
verwaltungsrechtlicher Streitigkeiten anzuwenden ist.30 Dabei wird im Verwaltungsrecht
27.
28.
29.
30.
Nationale de la Magistrature werden sie auf ein Jahr ernannt. Aufgrund dieser Anforderungen
haben viele conciliateurs einen ähnlichen Hintergrund; die weit überwiegende Mehrheit (2012:
94%) sind Rentner. Auch die territoriale Verteilung ist aktuell noch unzureichend. (Bericht der
Inspection Générale des Services Judiciaires, „Le développement des modes amiables de règlement
des différends“, April 2015, n° 22-15, S. 27).
Gautier, Le renforcement des modes de règlement amiables des litiges civils après la loi de
modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle : évolution forte ou arlésienne ?, LPA n° 256, 23.12.2016,
S. 5.
Mollard-Courtau, La tentative de conciliation obligatoire préalable à la saisine du tribunal d’instance
adoptée par le Parlement : enjeux et limites, LPA n° 237, 28.11.2016, S. 12.
Amrani-Mekki, Les modes amiables de résolution des différends dans la loi de modernisation de la
justice du XXIe siècle, Gaz. Pal.n° 5, 31.1.2017, S. 46.
Zignani, Projet de loi J21 : des changements à venir dans le contentieux des collectivités, Gaz. Comm.,
28.7.2016.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
unterschieden zwischen der Schlichtung („conciliation“) vor dem Verwaltungsrichter
und der Mediation unter Rückgriff auf einen Dritten.
Das Gesetz zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts sieht zwei Fälle der Mediation vor:
Diese kann auf Initiative der Parteien oder aber des Richters stattfinden.
Die Mediation auf Eigeninitiative der Parteien kann gemäß Artikel L. 213-5 des
Code de justice administrative (frz. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) außerhalb jedes
gerichtlichen Verfahrens erfolgen. Weiterhin können die Parteien den Präsidenten des
örtlich zuständigen Verwaltungsgerichts auffordern, einen Mediator zu beauftragen
sowie die Mediation zu organisieren.
Daneben kann der Richter gemäß Art. L. 213-7 des Code de justice administrative,
unter Zustimmung der Parteien, eine Mediation anordnen. Gegen diese Anordnung
kann kein Rechtsbehelf eingelegt werden. Im Anschluss an das außergerichtliche
Verfahren teilt der Mediator dem Richter mit, ob die Parteien zu einer Einigung gelangt
sind. Dabei kann die Einigung nur solche Rechtsgüter umfassen, über die die Parteien
verfügen können. Ausgenommen sind insbesondere Angelegenheiten des öffentlichen
Interesses und der öffentlichen Ordnung, beispielsweise Verwaltungsakte, deren Erlass
eine Anhörung der Öffentlichkeit voraussetzt (wie etwa städteplanerische Akte) und
die somit eine Vielzahl von Individualinteressen betreffen.31
3.
Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln
Eine weitere Entlastung der Justiz soll über eine Ausweitung der Geltung von
Schiedsklauseln erreicht werden. Dazu wurde eine Neufassung des Art. 2061 C.
Civ. vorgenommen: Bis zum Inkrafttreten der Reform waren Schiedsklauseln auf
Unternehmerverträge beschränkt. Der Vertrag musste im Zusammenhang mit einer
(beruflichen) Tätigkeit stehen, ansonsten war eine etwaige Schiedsklausel nichtig.32
Gemäß der Neufassung des Art. 2061 Abs. 2 C. Civ. kann einer Vertragspartei,
die nicht als Unternehmer gehandelt hat, eine Schiedsklausel nicht entgegengehalten
werden (sog. inopposabilité, Art. 2061 Abs. 2 C. Civ.).
Diese Formulierung, die auf den ersten Blick mehr wie eine Umformulierung denn
wie eine tatsächliche Neufassung erscheint, bildet die entscheidende Liberalisierung
im Umgang mit Schiedsklauseln. Auch ein Vertrag zwischen Verbrauchern, oder
zwischen Unternehmer und Verbraucher, kann nunmehr eine solche Klausel
enthalten. Es steht dem Verbraucher frei, sich für die Anwendung der Klausel zu
entscheiden. Er hat die Wahl, den Rechtsstreit vor einem Schiedsrichter zu lösen
31. Zignani, Projet de loi J21 : des changements à venir dans le contentieux des collectivités, Gaz. Comm.,
28.7.2016.
32. Sh. etwa Cass. 1re civ., 29.2.2012, n° 11-12.782; Cass. 1re civ, 22.10.2014, n° 13-11.568.
22
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
oder ihn, wie sonst auch, durch ein nationales Gericht entscheiden zu lassen.33 Der
Verbraucherschutz ist – nach Ansicht des Gesetzgebers – auch mit der erweiterten
Klausel gesichert. Die Gültigkeit einer Schiedsklausel setzt die ausdrückliche
Zustimmung beider Vertragsparteien voraus; zudem hat der Verbraucher die Wahl,
sich die Schiedsklausel nicht entgegen halten zu lassen, sondern die klassische
Gerichtsbarkeit zu wählen. Nach dem Bericht des Referenten des französischen
Senats soll der Rückgriff auf die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit zudem mit geringeren Kosten
für den Verbraucher verbunden sein.34
Auch hier zeigt sich der Wille, den Gang zum Gericht zum sprichwörtlich „letzten
Mittel“ zu machen. Zivil- und auch verwaltungsrechtliche Streitigkeiten sollen nach
Möglichkeit durch Schlichtung, Mediation und Schiedsverfahren beigelegt werden. Die
Zivilgerichte sollen nicht mehr als erste, sondern vielmehr letzte Anlaufstelle dienen,
sollte ein Konflikt auf andere Weise nicht lösbar erscheinen.
II.
Einführung allgemeiner Regelungen für Gruppenklagen (actions de
groupe) in Frankreich
Durch das Gesetz vom 18.11.2016 führte der französische Gesetzgeber
allgemeingültige Regelungen für sogenannte Gruppenklagen (actions de groupe)
ein. Ursprünglich war das französische Zivilprozessrecht nicht in der Lage, mit
Massenphänomenen umzugehen. Im Fall von Massenschäden trat daher das Problem
der notwendigen Bündelung einer Vielzahl von einzelnen Verfahren auf. Erstmals im
Jahre 2014 hat der französische Gesetzgeber daher ausschließlich für den Bereich
des Verbraucherschutzrechts eine sogenannte Gruppenklage eingeführt.35
Durch ein Gesetz vom 26.1.2016 wurde dieses Gruppenklageinstrument
um ein weiteres Anwendungsfeld im Bereich des Gesundheitssystems (santé)
ergänzt.36 Mit dem Gesetz zur Modernisierung der Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts
geht der französische Gesetzgeber nunmehr einen Schritt weiter, indem er ein
allgemeingültiges Regelwerk für alle Arten der Gruppenklagen schafft.
1.
Anwendungsbereich der Neuregelungen
Der französische Gesetzgeber unterscheidet zwar generell zwischen Gruppen- und
Kollektivklagen, hält diese Unterscheidung aber selbst nicht ganz konsequent durch.
33. Pellerin, Commentaire de l’article 11 de la loi Justice du XXIe siècle : les nouvelles dispositions sur
l’arbitrage, Gaz. Pal. n° 05, 31.1.2017, S. 54.
34. Rouzet, Libéralisation de la clause compromissoire, Defrénois, n° 24, 30.12.2016, S. 1299.
35. Sh. Véricel, Les recours collectifs en droit francais, in: Cottin/Ferrand/Zwickel (Hrsg.), Die prozessuale
Modernisierung der Ziviljustiz in Deutschland und Frankreich, 2016, S. 145 ff., insb. ab S. 151.
36. Loi n° 2016-41 du 26 janvier 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé; Kommentar: Une
action de groupe santé est créée, RGDA, 01.03.2016, n° 03, S. 117.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
Gruppenklagen stellen einen Unterfall der Kollektivklage dar.37 Bei Gruppenklagen
ist es stets erforderlich, eine bestimmte Gruppe an Geschädigten namentlich zu
identifizieren und diese Gruppe auch zu benennen. Bei Kollektivklagen hingegen ist es
ausreichend, auf ein bestimmtes Fehlverhalten abzustellen. Die genaue Identifizierung
der geschädigten Gruppe kann entfallen.
Auch für Unterlassungsklagen, bei denen eigentlich keine Kenntnis der
Betroffenen erforderlich ist, bringt der französische Gesetzgeber aber nunmehr
(wie auch für Klagen auf Schadensersatz) das Instrument der Gruppenklage
(action de groupe) in Ansatz. Die gewählte Benennung ist insofern nicht ganz
stimmig. Wenngleich es Ziel des neuen Gesetzes sein sollte, einen allgemeinen
Teil für Gruppenklagen zu schaffen, so gelten die neuen Regelungen dennoch
nicht allgemein. Ihr Anwendungsbereich ist vielmehr relativ eng abgesteckt.
Gruppenklagen kommen nach neuem französischem Zivilprozessrecht nur
für bestimmte Streitgegenstände in Betracht. Im Bereich der ordentlichen
Gerichtsbarkeit sind Gruppenklagen künftig nur hinsichtlich folgender
Streitgegenstände denkbar: Diskriminierung im Arbeitsverhältnis, Diskriminierung
außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen, Umweltschutz, Gesundheitsschutz und
Datenschutz. Für all diese Bereiche sieht das neue Regelwerk zunächst einen
übergreifend gültigen allgemeinen Teil vor. Für die einzelnen Streitgegenstände
folgen dann jeweils Präzisierungen und Detaillierungen.
Gänzlich außerhalb des neuen Anwendungsbereichs des Regimes für
Gruppenklagen steht das Verbraucherschutzrecht. Für das Verbraucherschutzrecht
bleibt es bei den bisher bestehenden Regelungen.38
Der Anwendungsbereich der generellen Regelung von Gruppenklagen ist
abschließend geregelt. Selbstverständlich ist aber eine gesetzgeberische Intervention
hinsichtlich einer Ausweitung der Streitgegenstände, für die Gruppenklagen in Betracht
kommen, jederzeit denkbar und möglich.
2.
Allgemeine Regelung der Voraussetzungen für actions de groupe
Hinsichtlich der Voraussetzungen für die neuen actions de groupe lassen sich zwei
Voraussetzungsarten unterscheiden. Zunächst die parteibezogenen Voraussetzungen
37. Vgl. Tilp/Schiefer, VW Dieselgate – die Notwendigkeit zur Einführung einer zivilrechtlichen Sammelklage,
NZV 2017, 14 (15), die von „Kollektivklagen in Form von Muster- oder Gruppenklagen“ sprechen.
38. Im Verbraucherschutzrecht gibt es das Gruppenklageverfahren bereits seit 17.3.2014 (vgl. Sh.
Véricel, Les recours collectifs en droit francais, in: Cottin/Ferrand/Zwickel (Hrsg.), Die prozessuale
Modernisierung der Ziviljustiz in Deutschland und Frankreich, 2016, S. 145 ff., insb. ab S. 151),
Art. 623-1ff. Code de la Consommation. Genauere Ausführungen sh. Hilt, L’action de groupe
consacrée par la loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation : peut-on s’en
satisfaire ?, Gaz. Pal., 24.4.2014. Auch hat das Institut National de la Consommation eine erste
Bilanz veröffentlicht: INC, L’action de groupe „consommation“ : 9 actions introduites en deux
ans, 29.12.2016.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
und schließlich die prozessbezogenen Voraussetzungen der neuen Verfahrensarten.
Hinsichtlich der parteibezogenen Voraussetzungen ist festzustellen, dass das Klagerecht
auf Klägerseite relativ stark beschränkt ist. Auf Beklagtenseite schließlich ist stets eine
genaue Identifizierung des Beklagten erforderlich.
a.
Parteibezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen:
Das neue Gesetz beschränkt den Bereich der Klageberechtigten auf bestimmte
Vereinigungen, die eine Gruppenklage einreichen können. Klageberechtigt sind nur
Vereinigungen, die seit mindestens fünf Jahren bestehen und deren satzungsmäßiger
Zweck es ist, bestimmte Rechte ihrer Mitglieder oder auch von Nichtmitgliedern
durchzusetzen. Für jeden der oben erwähnten Streitgegenstände finden sich nun
im neuen Gesetz detaillierte Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf die klageberechtigten
Vereinigungen. Auffällig ist dabei, dass die Anforderungen an die Klageberechtigung
teilweise sehr streng sind, so zum Beispiel im Bereich des Umweltschutzes, wo nur
zwei Arten an Verbänden die Klageberechtigung zukommt.39
Im Bereich anderer Streitgegenstände, beispielsweise bei der Diskriminierung im
Rahmen von Arbeitsverhältnissen, steht ein Klagerecht entweder Behindertenverbänden
oder aber auch Verbänden zu, die spezifisch im Bereich des verletzten rechtlichen
Interesses tätig sind. Es muss sich also nicht um Verbände handeln, deren
satzungsmäßiger Zweck die Bekämpfung von Diskriminierung ist. Ziel der strikten
Begrenzung der Klageberechtigten ist es, einen Missbrauch des Instruments
der Gruppenklage durch eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Akteure zu vermeiden.
Diesbezüglich stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich damit um ein wirksames Instrument der
Missbrauchsvermeidung handelt. Schließlich hat der französische Gesetzgeber keine
Bestimmungen dahingehend vorgesehen, Parallelverfahren mehrerer gleichermaßen
Klageberechtigter zu bündeln.
Auch auf der Beklagtenseite existieren Beschränkungen des Gruppenklagerechts.
So darf sich eine Gruppenklage nach den neuen Rechtsregeln immer nur gegen einen
einzigen Beklagten richten.
Darüber hinausgehend enthalten die auf die auf einzelne Streitgegenstände
bezogenen Regeln vielfach noch bestimmte Vorgaben im Hinblick auf die genaue
Angabe des Beklagten.
39. Klageberechtigt sind im Bereich des Umweltschutzes Verbände, die seit mindestens fünf Jahren
bestehen und deren satzungsmäßiges Ziel die Vertretung von Opfern körperlicher Schädigungen
ist, sowie eingetragene Umweltschutzvereine. Unter Berücksichtigung des Art.L. 141-1 des Code de
l’environnement müssen diese Verbände seit drei Jahren bestehen und im Bereich des Natur- und
Wildtierschutzes, der Bekämpfung von Wasser- und Luftverschmutzung oder ähnlichem aktiv sein.
(Zarka, L’action de groupe en matière environnementale dans le projet de loi de modernisation de
la justice du XXIe siècle, LPA, 20.07.2016, n° 144, S.6).
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
So ist im Fall von Diskriminierungen außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen eine
Klage gegen einen nur möglichen Schädiger grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen, was die
Klagemöglichkeit bei nicht einwandfrei geklärten Sachverhalten stark beschränkt.
Im Bereich des Gesundheitsschutzes schließlich ist eine Gruppenklage nur gegen
den Produzenten, einen Lieferanten oder einen Dienstleister eines der in Art. 5311-1
des Code de la santé publique genannten Medizinproduktes möglich.
b.
Prozessbezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen
Im Bereich der prozessbezogenen Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen enthalten die
neuen Rechtsregeln zwei zentrale Beschränkungen. Generelle Beschränkung einer
Gruppenklage ist das Vorliegen einer Mahnung (mise en demeure). Nach einer solchen
Mahnung hat der Schädiger vier Monate lang die Möglichkeit, sein Fehlverhalten
abzustellen bzw. Schadensersatz zu leisten.
Gleichwohl sind aber zwei wichtige Ausnahmen vorgesehen. Für den Bereich des
Gesundheitsschutzes ist das Einhalten einer Frist nicht erforderlich.
Bei der Diskriminierung im Bereich von Arbeitsverhältnissen sieht der französische
Gesetzgeber ein Spezialsystem vor, das es ermöglicht, Personalvertretungen vor
Einreichung einer Gruppenklage zu beteiligen. Aus diesem Grund wird auch die
Wartefrist von vier auf sechs Monate verlängert.
Des Weiteren können nur bestimmte Klagebegehren mittels der Gruppenklage
verfolgt werden.
Erstens ist eine Gruppenklage nicht für alle Schadensarten gleichermaßen
eröffnet. So ist beispielsweise im Bereich des Gesundheitsschutzes eine Gruppenklage
nur für Körperschäden, nicht aber für Vermögensschäden denkbar. Die Entschädigung
für Diskriminierungen in Arbeitsverhältnissen kann nur dann mit einer Gruppenklage
eingeklagt werden, wenn es um Schäden geht, die nach einer an den Arbeitgeber
gerichteten Aufforderung entstanden sind, die Diskriminierungen abzustellen.
Zweitens ist auch der zeitliche Anwendungsbereich der Gruppenklagen
eingeschränkt. Die neuen Gruppenklagemöglichkeiten kommen nämlich nur in
Betracht, wenn sie Rechtsverletzungen betreffen, die nach Inkrafttreten der neuen
Bestimmungen eingetreten sind. Dies gilt jedoch nicht im Bereich von Diskriminierungen
und in Umweltschutzfällen.
Drittens muss es sich um einen einheitlichen Schaden handeln. Der
Rechtsverletzung bzw. dem Schaden muss eine einheitliche Tatsachenbasis zugrunde
liegen. So müssen etwa einer Gruppenklage wegen Diskriminierung alle Fälle den
gleiche Diskriminierungsgrund zugrunde legen.
Insgesamt beschränkt also der französische Gesetzgeber den persönlichen
und sachlichen Anwendungsbereich der neuen Gruppenklagemöglichkeiten sehr
entscheidend.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
3.
„Rechtsfolgen“ der actions de groupe
Erhebt eine klageberechtigte Vereinigung die Gruppenklage, schließt sich ein
zweigliedriges Verfahren an. Zunächst wird der Haftungsgrund geklärt. Anschließend
wird die Höhe der Entschädigung ermittelt.
Im ersten Schritt erlässt das zuständige Gericht (grundsätzlich ist für alle Fälle
der Gruppenklagen das tribunal de grande instance, das Pendant des Landgerichts,
zuständig)40 ein Grundurteil. Nach den neuen Rechtsvorschriften umfasst das
Grundurteil folgende Fragen:
erstens die Frage der Haftung des Beklagten, zweitens die Feststellung der
Anspruchsberechtigten (in seinem Urteil hat das Gericht die Kriterien der Zuordnung
zu der relevanten Gruppe klarzustellen) und drittens die Bezeichnung der Schadensbzw. der Unterlassungspositionen.
Im Grundurteil wird nun eine Frist41 gesetzt, innerhalb der sich weitere betroffene
Personen der Gruppenklage anschließen können. Zum Erhalt des Schadensersatzes ist
es also nicht notwendig, von Anfang an Teil der action de groupe zu sein. Es genügt,
wenn sich der Geschädigte innerhalb der festgelegten Frist beteiligt.
Den zweiten Verfahrensschritt bildet das Entschädigungsverfahren. Für diesen
zweiten Verfahrensschritt sieht der französische Gesetzgeber zwei voneinander
abzugrenzende Verfahrensarten vor. Der Richter hat sich für eine der zwei zur Verfügung
stehenden Verfahrensarten zu entscheiden.
Bei der ersten Verfahrensart handelt es sich um das Individualverfahren (procédure
individuelle). Die zweite Verfahrensart ist das kollektive Entschädigungsverfahren
(procédure collective).
Das Individualverfahren besteht aus zwei Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt
tritt eine Einzelperson der Gruppenklage bei und erteilt auf diese Weise dem
Kläger Vollmacht, seine Interessen im Rahmen des Gruppenklageverfahrens zu
vertreten. Vom Geschädigten wird nun der gesamte Entschädigungsbetrag auf
ein staatliches Konto überwiesen, das wiederum nur mit der Entschädigung der
einzelnen Gruppenkläger belastet werden darf. Dieser Betrag wird nun auf die
Gruppenkläger verteilt.
Anders läuft das kollektive Entschädigungsverfahren ab, das nur für
Gruppenklagen betreffend Diskriminierungen außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen
und in Umweltschutzangelegenheiten in Betracht kommt. Der Unterschied zwischen
dem Individualverfahren und dem kollektiven Entschädigungsverfahren liegt darin,
40. Insbesondere gilt diese Zuständigkeit des tribunal de grande instance auch für alle arbeitsrechtlichen
Diskriminierungsfälle.
41. Die zu bestimmende Frist ist teilweise in den Spezialregelungen zu den einzelnen Streitgegenständen
der Gruppenklagen geregelt.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
dass dem Urteil über die Haftungsbegründung (Grundurteil) bei Wahl des kollektiven
Entschädigungsverfahrens zwingend eine Verhandlung zwischen Kläger und Beklagtem
vorangehen muss. In dieser Verhandlungsphase versuchen Kläger- und Beklagtenpartei,
eine Einigung herbeizuführen. Der Vergleichsvertrag, der von allen an der Gruppenklage
beteiligten Personen akzeptiert werden muss, wird dann vom Richter für vollstreckbar
erklärt (homologation). Kommt es in diesem Einigungsverfahren nicht zu einem
Vergleichsabschluss, legt der Richter die individuellen Entschädigungen wie im
Individualentschädigungsverfahren fest.
4.
Bewertung
Mit der Reform erhält die Gruppenklage also eine grundsätzlich weite Definition,
die tatsächliche Anwendbarkeit ist aber erheblich beschränkt.
Im Verfahren selbst wird eine einvernehmliche Lösung angestrebt. Der Klage muss
die mise en demeure vorausgehen, um dem Beklagten die Behebung zu ermöglichen.
Es wird also eine außergerichtliche Einigung ohne Beteiligung eines Richters privilegiert.
Dieser Ansatz steht in einem Gleichklang mit der Grundidee der Reform zur Justiz des
21. Jahrhunderts.42
Gleichwohl ist der gerichtliche Teil des Verfahrens ebenso vorgesehen. So sieht
die Gruppenklage vor, dass sich Betroffene auch noch nach Beginn des Verfahrens der
Klage anschließen können. Dieser spätere Beitritt ist eine der Besonderheiten von „optin“-Klagen wie der action de groupe. Im Gegensatz zu den im deutschen Recht bereits
existierenden Kollektivklagemöglichkeiten wie der Streitgenossenschaft (§§ 59, 60 ZPO)
und der Vertretung durch Verbraucherverbände (§ 79 I 2, II 2 Nr. 3 ZPO i.V.m. § 8 I Nr. 4
RDG) wird der Prozess gerade nicht mehr als eigenständige Schadensersatzklage jedes
Betroffenen geführt. Mit der Aufnahme in die action de groupe ist die Betroffenheit
des Einzelnen sozusagen abschließend geklärt, womit er bei Erfolg der Gruppenklage
den Schadensersatzanspruch erwirbt.43
Es ist dem Gesetzgeber damit gelungen, die Zutrittsschranken für Klageberechtige
zumindest in der Theorie niedrig zu halten. In der Praxis stellt sich, neben den
prozessualen Beschränkungen, auch die Frage nach der Finanzierung der action de
groupe. Die Regeln über die Prozesskostenhilfe lassen auch die Unterstützung von
eingetragenen Vereinen als juristischen Personen zu. Der Gesetzgeber hätte hier eine
klarere Regelung treffen können, die speziell auch die action de groupe einschließt,
die allgemeinen Regeln sind wohl aber ausreichend.
42. Sereno, Les actions de groupe issues de la loi J21 : outils de modernisation de la justice (sociale) ?,
Gaz. Pal., n° 20, S. 86.
43. Weiterführend sh. Keßler, Verbraucherschutz reloaded – Auf dem Weg zu einer deutschen
Kollektivklage?, ZRP 2016, S. 2.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Anders stellt sich die Situation bezüglich der Kostenauferlegung dar, sollte
die Klägerseite im Prozess unterliegen. Die Prozesskostenhilfe dient in erster Linie
dazu, die klägereigenen Kosten zu übernehmen. Die Kosten der Gegenseite sind
grundsätzlich vom Kläger zu tragen. Hier wäre eine Anpassung an die Besonderheiten
der Gruppenklage notwendig. So wäre es denkbar, die Kosten der action de groupe
im Fall des Unterliegens stets dem Staat aufzuerlegen. Die Beteiligten hätten so die
Absicherung, keinen Kosten ausgesetzt zu sein.44
Die allgemeinen Regeln des Gruppenklageverfahrens sind also recht eng gefasst,
aber gleichzeitig umfassend. In der Praxis bestehen noch Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere
in finanzieller Hinsicht. Inwieweit hier eine Anpassung stattfinden kann, bleibt
abzuwarten.45
III.
Änderungen des Verfahrens vor der Cour de Cassation
Das Verfahren vor dem französischen Kassationshof ist ebenfalls Gegenstand
der Reform.46 Dabei soll neben einer grundsätzlichen Vereinfachung auch die Zahl
der bestandskräftigen Entscheidungen der Untergerichte erhöht werde. Dadurch
soll die Zahl der Revisionen (pourvois en Cassation) zurückgehen. Neben solchen
„gerichtsökonomischen“ Neuerungen wurde mit der Reform auch die Möglichkeit zur
gerichtlichen Überprüfung von Urteilen geschaffen, wenn der Europäische Gerichtshof
für Menschenrechte entsprechend entschieden hat.
1.
Vorlagefragen (demandes d’avis)
Das französische Zivilprozessrecht gibt mit sog. „Vorlagefragen“ (demandes d’avis)
den unteren Gerichten die Möglichkeit, bei „Fragen von ernsthafter Schwierigkeit“, die
von Bedeutung für eine Vielzahl von Fällen sind, eine Stellungnahme des Kassationshofs
zu verlangen.47 Der Richter muss dabei die beteiligten Parteien informieren; die Vorlage
unterbricht das Hauptverfahren bis zur Stellungnahme. Der Instanzrichter ist im Übrigen
nicht verpflichtet, der Ansicht der Cour de Cassation zu folgen.48
Bislang wurden diese Fragen von einer besonderen Gerichtsbesetzung bestehend
aus dem Gerichtspräsidenten, dem Vorsitzenden sowie zwei weiteren Richtern der
jeweils betroffenen Kammer der Cour de Cassation entschieden.
44. Azar-Baud, (In)action de groupe, Gaz. Pal., n° 42, S. 52.
45. Bezüglich der 2014 geschaffenen Gruppenklage im Verbraucherschutzrecht ist dies dem Parlament
in einem ersten Bericht angezeigt worden. Daraus folgend ist eine Anpassung zu erwarten. Sh.
Commission des affaires économiques, Rapport d’information sur la mise en application de la loi n°
2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, 19.10.2016.
46. Vgl. Art. 38 bis Art. 43 des Gesetzes n° 2016-1547 vom 18.11.2016.
47. Sh. Art. L 441-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire.
48. Guinchard/Montagnier, Institutions juridictionnelles, 11e édition, 2011, Rn. 680.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
Mit der Reform soll auch dieses Verfahren vereinfacht werden. Für die Entscheidung
ist nun allein die Kammer (ohne Beteiligung des Gerichtspräsidenten) zuständig, die bei
einer Revision angerufen werden würde. Sofern die Vorlagefrage die Zuständigkeit von
zwei oder mehreren Kammern berührt, wird ein gemischter Ausschuss gebildet. Ist eine
Grundsatzfrage betroffen, wird im gerichtlichen Plenum entschieden. Der gemischte
Ausschuss und das Plenum entscheiden unter Vorsitz des Gerichtspräsidenten. Dieser
entscheidet auch über die Einberufung des Ausschusses bzw. Plenums.
Durch die Reform soll das Verfahren nicht nur vereinfacht werden; der Gesetzgeber
verspricht sich auch einen Rückgang der Revisionen (pourvois en Cassation), da die
Vorlagefragen in gleicher Besetzung wie eine eventuelle Revision entschieden
werden. Gleichzeitig ist auch ein Anstieg der Vorlagefragen zu erwarten: Zwar ist
der Instanzrichter auch weiterhin nicht an die Stellungnahme gebunden; da eine
gleichlautende Entscheidung auch in der Revision zu erwarten ist, erhalten die avis
aber einen urteilsähnlichen Charakter.49 Bislang ist die Anzahl an Vorlagefragen
(durchschnittlich etwa zehn Entscheidungen pro Jahr) verschwindend gering.50 Die
Vorlagefragen müssen aber binnen zwei Monaten entschieden werden und betreffen
eine durch den Instanzrichter klar definierte Frage. Trotz des zu erwartenden Anstiegs
der demandes d’avis erhofft sich der Gesetzgeber so eine Vereinfachung und Entlastung
der Prozessführung.
2.
Die Cour de Cassation als Hauptsacherichter (juge du fond)
Die Kompetenz der Cour de Cassation, bei einer stattgegebenen Revision
(„cassation“) abschließend in der Hauptsache („au fond“) – ohne Rückverweisung an
die unteren Gerichte – zu urteilen, wird ebenfalls erweitert.
Bislang war die Entscheidung ohne Rückverweisung nur in zwei Fällen möglich:
Sofern in der Revision die Unzulässigkeit der Klage oder die Unzuständigkeit des
angerufenen Gerichts festgestellt wurde oder aber wenn die Tatsachenbeweise durch
die Instanzgerichte in der Weise festgestellt worden waren, dass nur noch die korrekte
Anwendung der verwendeten Rechtsnorm in Frage stand.
Im Zivilrecht (nicht jedoch im Strafrecht) soll die Cour de Cassation gemäß dem neuen
Art. 411-3 Code de l’organisation judiciaire (französisches Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz)
nunmehr die Hauptsacheentscheidung treffen können, wenn dies „im Interesse
einer geordneten Rechtspflege liegt“ („Elle peut aussi, en matière civile, statuer
au fond lorsque l‘intérêt d‘une bonne administration de la justice le justifie“).
Hinsichtlich der genauen Ausgestaltung ist aber eine weitere Präzisierung, durch
49. Piwnica, Commentaire des dispositions de la loi J21 relatives à la Cour de cassation, Gaz. Pal. n° 5,
S. 77.
50. Cour de Cassation, Avis classés par date (1992-2017), Stand: 29.6.2017.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Verordnung (Décret), notwendig.51 So sehen einige Autoren die Möglichkeit, der
Cour de Cassation könnten künftig weitreichende Kompetenzen über den üblichen
Rahmen eines Revisionsverfahrens hinaus zugesprochen werden, beispielsweise
auch neue Tatsachenbeweise zuzulassen oder sogar ein Beweiserhebungsverfahren
durchzuführen. In ähnlicher Weise wurden auch bereits bestehende Praktiken zur
Einschaltung von Sachverständigen und Zeugen im Revisionsverfahren kodifiziert.52
Denkbar wäre auch eine weniger weitreichende Änderung, bei der sich die
Entscheidung der Cour de Cassation ausschließlich auf die bereits in den unteren
Instanzen erhobenen Beweise und Rechtsmittel stützen darf.
Der Grundsatz, dass die Cour de Cassation nur hinsichtlich der Rechts-, nicht
aber der Tatsachenlage entscheidet, soll dennoch weiterhin bestehen: Art. 411-2
des Code de l‘organisation judiciaire wurde nicht angetastet. Der neue Art. 411-3
stellt also eine weitere Ausnahme und nicht die neue Regel dar. Die Rechtsnatur der
Kassationsbeschwerde sowie der gerichtlichen Kontrolle sollen nicht berührt werden.
Erst nachdem eine Entscheidung hinsichtlich der Rechtslage vorliegt, kann die Cour
de Cassation von ihrer neuen Letztentscheidungskompetenz Gebrauch machen.53
3.
Überprüfung von Urteilen im Bereich des Zivilrechts nach Entscheidung des
EGMR
Neben diesen Elementen, die vorrangig der Vereinfachung des Verfahrens und
der Entlastung der Gerichte dienen, wird mit der Reform auch die Möglichkeit eröffnet,
eine im Grunde endgültige Entscheidung in einer Zivilsache dem Kassationshof zur
Überprüfung vorzulegen.
Dazu muss eine Entscheidung des EGMR vorliegen, der zufolge das Urteil unter
Verletzung der Grundrechte aus der EMRK zustande gekommen ist. Bislang existierte
51. Eine erste Präzisierung hinsichtlich der Parteibeteiligung im Verfahren der „cassation sans renvoi“
hat mit dem „Décret n° 2017-396 du 24 mars 2017 portant diverses dispositions relatives à la Cour
de cassation“ stattgefunden: Die Parteien können durch den Vorsitzenden aufgefordert werden,
Beweismittel im Hinblick auf ein Endurteil vorzulegen.
52. Durch die Reform wird die Rolle des Staatsanwalts (procureur général) näher definiert. Gemäß Art. L.
432-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire soll er nunmehr seine Auffassung hinsichtlich rechtlicher
Gegebenheiten sowie hinsichtlich des öffentlichen Wohls abgeben. Dies stellt keine tatsächliche
Neuerung dar, sondern ist vielmehr die gesetzliche Verankerung der bereits bestehenden Praxis.
Daneben wurde die Möglichkeit des Kassationshofs kodifiziert, sachverständige Dritte zur Aufklärung
des Sachverhaltes hinzuziehen. Dies ist ebenfalls in der Vergangenheit bereits geschehen. Der neue
Art. L. 431-3-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire übernimmt den fast gleichlautenden Art. R.
625-3 des Code de justice administrative, der in dieser Form bereits seit 2010 eine entsprechende
Vorschrift für die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit bis hin zum Conseil d’Etat („Staatsrat“), dem obersten
Verwaltungsgericht Frankreichs, vorsah.
53. Piwnica, Commentaire des dispositions de la loi J21 relatives à la Cour de cassation, Gaz. Pal. n° 5,
S. 77.
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diese Möglichkeit nur im Strafrecht. Die Überprüfungsmöglichkeit im Zivilrecht ist an das
Verfahren im Strafrecht angelehnt. Sie ist gemäß Art. L. 452-1 des Code de l’organisation
judiciaire jedoch auf personenstandsrechtliche Entscheidungen beschränkt, in
denen der Einzelne aufgrund der Verletzung in seinen persönlichen Rechten derart
betroffen ist, dass die durch den EGMR angeordnete Entschädigungszahlung nicht zur
Wiederherstellung seines betroffenen Rechts ausreicht. Dies ist beispielsweise der Fall,
wenn der Richter die Anerkennung der Abstammung (lien de filiation) verweigert hat.54
Die Überprüfung wird durch eine eigene Kammer der Cour de Cassation
vorgenommen. Diese besteht aus 13 Richtern der verschiedenen Kammern, darunter
dem dienstältesten Kammervorsitzenden (doyen). Ausgeschlossen sind diejenigen
Richter, die an der Ursprungsentscheidung mitgewirkt haben.
C.
EINRICHTUNG EINER EINHEITLICHEN
(RECHTSANTRAGSSTELLE) BEI DEN GERICHTEN
ANL AUFSTELLE
In seinem Art. 2 Abs. 1 sieht das Gesetz n° 2016-1547 vom 18.11.2016 die
Einrichtung einer einheitlichen Anlaufstelle bei den tribunaux d’instance vor. Schon
1997 war die Einrichtung einer solchen Stelle in einem Bericht gefordert worden.55 So
soll der Zugang zum Gericht vereinfacht und ein besseres Verständnis des Justizsystems
erreicht werden.56
Durch Art. 2 des Gesetzesprojekts zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts wird das
französische Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Code de l’organisation judiciaire) um einen
Art. L. 123-3 ergänzt. Nach dieser Vorschrift ist die Einrichtung einer einheitlichen
Anlaufstelle, eines sog. service d’accueil unique du justiciable vorgesehen. Der
Aufgabenbereich dieser Anlauf- und Informationsstelle, die grob mit den deutschen
Rechtsantragsstellen57 verglichen werden kann, erstreckt sich ausdrücklich über den
örtlichen Bereich des Gerichts, an dem sie ihren Sitz hat, hinaus. Aufgabe der Anlaufund Informationsstelle des service d’accueil unique du justiciable ist es, alle Personen
zu den sie betreffenden Verfahren zu informieren und Anträge entgegen zu nehmen.
Die Besonderheit liegt dabei darin, dass die Anlaufstellen alle Gerichtsbarkeiten
innerhalb eines bestimmten Gerichtsbezirks betreuen. So können beispielsweise bei
der Antrags- und Informationsstelle des tribunal d’instance auch Anträge zu Verfahren
bei einem Arbeitsgericht im gleichen Gerichtsbezirk eingereicht werden.
54. Raoul-Cormeil, La procédure de réexamen en matière civile après une décision de la CEDH, EDFP n°
1, 01.01.2017, S. 6.
55. Casorla, Réflexions sur l’amélioration de l’accès à la justice par la mise en place d’un guichet unique
de greffe et la simplification de juridictions de première instance : rapport à M. le garde des sceaux,
Ministre de la justice, Mai 1997.
56. Raschel, Loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 : quelle modernisation du service public de la
justice ?, Gaz. Pal., n° 5, S. 68.
57. Wittschier, in: Musielak/Voit (Hrsg.), ZPO, 14. Aufl. 2017, ZPO § 496 Rn. 1-3.
32
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
D.
STÄRKUNG DER RICHTERLICHEN UNABHÄNGIGKEIT
Das Vertrauen der Bürger in die Justiz sollte durch die Reform J21 gestärkt werden.
Mit dem Ziel der Korruptionsbekämpfung hat der Gesetzgeber die Justizbeamten
verpflichtet, Nebentätigkeiten und Privatvermögen gegenüber dem Arbeitgeber
offenzulegen. Daneben sollten durch weitere statusrechtliche Änderungen die
Arbeitsethik und juristische Kontinuität betont werden.
I.
Transparenz
Im Zuge der Justizreform hat der Gesetzgeber mit der Loi Organique
(Grundlagengesetz) n° 2016-1090 vom 8. August 201658 weitreichende Verpflichtungen
der höheren Justizbeamten geschaffen, um mehr Transparenz zu gewährleisten und
Interessenkonflikte zu vermeiden.
Die Richter und Staatsanwälte müssen binnen zwei Monaten nach ihrer Ernennung
eine Interessenserklärung abliefern. Sie enthält Informationen zu aktuell ausgeübten
beruflichen (Neben-)Tätigkeiten, Unternehmensbeteiligungen und Teilhabe in
Direktionsgremien von öffentlich- oder privatrechtlichen Körperschaften. Auch
diesbezügliche Aktivitäten des Lebenspartners sind in die Erklärung aufzunehmen.
Die Erklärung muss „vollständig, korrekt und wahrheitsgemäß“ sein, wobei politische,
religiöse oder gewerkschaftliche Aktivitäten zu verschweigen sind. Auf Grundlage
dieser Erklärung kann der jeweilige Gerichtspräsident (bzw. der Oberstaatsanwalt)
die berufsethische Kommission bezüglich eventueller Interessenkonflikte anrufen. In
jedem Fall folgt eine Unterredung des betroffenen Richters mit der zuständigen Stelle,
um eine Ausräumung der Interessenkonflikte zu besprechen und vorzubereiten.
Weiterhin hatte der Gesetzgeber ursprünglich vorgesehen, alle Gerichtspräsidenten
einschließlich der Kammervorsitzenden der Cour de Cassation sowie die
Oberstaatsanwälte zu einer Vermögenserklärung zu verpflichten. Auch substantielle
Vermögensänderungen sollten angezeigt werden.
Der Verfassungsrat hat die entsprechenden Passagen des Gesetzes jedoch aufgrund
der Ungleichbehandlung im Vergleich zu den übrigen Richtern und Staatsanwälten als
verfassungswidrig eingestuft.59
Die Pflicht wurde daher auf die Angehörigen des obersten Justizrats (Conseil
supérieur de la magistrature, CSM) beschränkt. Aufgrund des besonderen Status der
Mitglieder des CSM ist diese Einschränkung verfassungskonform und verstößt nicht
gegen den Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz. Tatsächlich hätte der Gesetzgeber auch die
Möglichkeit gehabt, die Verpflichtung nicht zu beschränken, sondern auf sämtliche
58. Loi organique n° 2016-1090 du 8 août 2016 relative aux garanties statutaires, aux obligations
déontologiques et au recrutement des magistrats ainsi qu’au Conseil supérieur de la magistrature.
59. C. Const., Décision n° 2016-732 DC, 28. Juli 2016, Rn. 57.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
französische Richter und Staatsanwälte auszuweiten: Der Verfassungsrat hat die
Offenlegungspflicht im Grundsatz nämlich als der Korruptionsbekämpfung dienend
und somit im Interesse der Allgemeinheit stehend betrachtet.
Wohl auch aus Gründen der Praktikabilität – aufgrund der hohen Anzahl an
betroffenen Beamten, und der Auslastung der berufsethischen Kommission durch
die Interessenerklärung – hat der Gesetzgeber sich jedoch gegen die Ausweitung auf
alle Beamten entschieden.60
II.
Statusrechtliche Änderungen
Schließlich umfasst die Reform einige statusrechtliche Änderungen für die
Haftrichter (juge des libertés et de la détention) und besiegelt das Ende der juges de
proximité.
1.
Schaffung eines eigenen Status für Haftrichter
In Bezug auf die Stellung der Haftrichter (juge des libertés et de la détention,
JLD) trägt das Gesetz zur „Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ einer bereits begonnenen
funktionellen Umstrukturierung Rechnung.
Die Haftrichter erhalten ihren eigenen Status und werden so zu „Spezialrichtern“,
ähnlich wie bereits die Ermittlungsrichter, was nicht nur neue Fortbildungsmöglichkeiten,
sondern auch eine Erhöhung der Beamtenzulagen mit sich bringt. So soll ihrem
stetig wachsenden Aufgabenbereich Rechnung getragen werden. Die „JLD“
waren ursprünglich dazu berufen, über die Anordnung von Untersuchungshaft zu
entscheiden, heute kontrollieren sie in größerem Umfang die Verhältnismäßigkeit
grundrechtsbeschränkender Maßnahmen.61
2.
Schaffung einer berufsethischen Kommission
Weiterhin wird eine berufsethische Kommission (collège de déontologie) für
die Richter der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit geschaffen. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, etwaige
Interessenskonflikte der Richter zu überwachen und Stellungnahmen zu berufsethischen
Anliegen zu geben. Dies soll ebenfalls zu einer größeren Unabhängigkeit der Richter
beitragen.
60. Letteron, Déclaration de patrimoine : ça n’arrive qu’aux autres, Blog: Liberté, Libertés chéries,
7.8.2016, (Stand: 27.4.2017).
61. Die JLD entscheiden heute über die Verlängerung von Polizeigewahrsam (garde à vue), über
Durchsuchungen und Abhöraktionen. Zum „juge des libertés“ sh. Urvoas, Je découvre presque
chaque jour un peu plus l’ampleur des difficultés, Gaz. Pal. n° 33, 27.9.2016.
34
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
3.
Abschaffung der Laiengerichte (juridiction de proximité)
Mit der Loi Organique n° 2016-1090 vom 8. August 2016 ist auch die Abschaffung
der Laiengerichte (juges de proximité) zum 1. Juli 2017 besiegelt worden. Diese
Gerichte waren im Jahr 2002 zur Entlastung der Amtsgerichte und mit dem Zweck,
eine höhere Bürgernähe der Gerichte zu erreichen, geschaffen worden. Es handelte
sich um Laienrichter, die in Zivilsachen bis zu einem Streitwert von 4.000 € sowie in
Strafsachen für kleine Delikte als Einzelrichter entschieden.
Kritisiert wurde, nach anfänglichen Bedenken, eine „Zusammenhanglosigkeit“
der Rechtsprechung der Laienrichter. Insbesondere Richterverbände kritisierten
eine „Verkomplizierung“ der Justiz und forderten, dass die Rechtsprechung wieder
ausschließlich in die Hände von Richtern gelegt werden solle, die sich vollständig einer
solchen Karriere verschrieben hätten.
Die Abschaffung der Laiengerichte war daher bereits seit mehreren Jahren
vorgesehen, wurde jedoch aufgrund der Überlastung der Amtsgerichte (tribunaux
d’instance) noch nicht verwirklicht.62 Mit der großen Justizreform wurde dies nun
abgeschlossen. Die Amtsgerichte wurden zum Stichtag 1. Juli 2017 in ihre Struktur aus
dem Jahr 2002 zurückversetzt. Die zu diesem Zeitpunkt anhängigen Verfahren wurden
von den juridictions de proximité an die Amtsgerichte übergeben.
Gleichzeitig haben die bisherigen juges de proximité die Möglichkeit, in die
Funktion eines vorübergehend tätigen Richters (sog. magistrats à titre temporaire, kurz
MTT) überzugehen. Diese MTT wurden bereits im Jahr 1995 geschaffen und werden
etwa als Beisitzer den Gerichten zugeordnet. Bislang ist die Zahl der MTT jedoch sehr
gering. Durch die Fusion mit den juges de proximité soll ihre Zahl nun steigen.63
Kritiker der aktuellen Justizreform befürchten nun eine Überlastung der Gerichte
aufgrund der vielen zusätzlichen Verfahren. Zudem bestünden nicht abschließend
geklärte Fragen bezüglich des Verbleibs der amtierenden Laienrichter sowie der Rolle
von Laien in der französischen Gerichtsbarkeit im Allgemeinen. Dennoch erhoffen
sich die Befürworter der Reform eine Vereinfachung und bessere Verständlichkeit
der Zivilgerichtsbarkeit.64
E.
GESAMTBEWERTUNG
Der ehemalige französische Justizminister, Jean-Jacques Urvoas, hatte bei
Vorstellung der vorliegend beschriebenen Reform als Zielsetzung vorangestellt: „Die
Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts muss eine für den Menschen gemachte Justiz sein. Dies
62. Bléry, 1er juillet 2017 : l’adieu aux juges de proximité (?), Gaz. Pal., 30.8.2016, n° 29, S. 40.
63. Zum Ende der juridiction de proximité: Zwickel, Das Ende der französischen juridictions und juges
de proximité am 1. Juli 2017, RohR 2017, S. 58.
64. Marque, La réforme des juges de proximité, D. Actualité, 16.9.2016.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
ist die ganze Zielsetzung dieses Gesetzes: Verbesserung der alltäglichen Justiz und der
juristischen Dienstleistung für die Bürger.65
Das Gesetz zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts war die letzte große Reform in der
Amtszeit von François Hollande. In Umfragen hatten große Teile der französischen
Bevölkerung ihre Unzufriedenheit hinsichtlich Effizienz und Unübersichtlichkeit des
Justizsystems zum Ausdruck gebracht.66 Unter dem Vorzeichen der bevorstehenden
Wahlen ist die Reform mittels eines beschleunigten Verfahrens noch auf den Weg
gebracht worden. Bis Januar 2018 werden die Maßnahmen mittels mehrerer Dekrete
noch umgesetzt.
An vorderster Stelle der Reform steht der Wille, die Gerichte zu entlasten.
Streitigkeiten sollen, wenn möglich, mit Hilfe eines conciliateur oder médiateur durch
die Parteien selbst gelöst werden. Die Parteien sollen so schneller zu einem beidseitig
zufriedenstellenden Ergebnis gelangen. Dabei hat sich der Gesetzgeber nicht nur auf
den Zivilprozess beschränkt. Auch verwaltungsrechtliche Streitigkeiten sollen künftig
durch Mediation gelöst werden. Gleichzeitig wird ein geringerer Zulauf zu Gericht
erwartet. Fälle, die einen Richterspruch erfordern, sollen so schneller bearbeitet
werden.
Auch der Zugang zum Gericht wird erleichtert. Die Gerichte bleiben zentraler
Ansprechpartner bei der Vermittlung von Mediatoren und Schlichtern. Mithilfe der
zentralen Rechtsantragsstelle soll zudem auch für Kläger ohne anwaltliche Beratung die
Stellung von Klageanträgen und der Zugang zu gesicherten Informationen erleichtert
werden.
Nicht alle Fragen sind gelöst: Die außergerichtliche, einvernehmliche Scheidung
vor den Notaren hat in Frankreich eine rege Debatte angestoßen und ist verschiedentlich
kritisiert worden. So wird insbesondere ein unzureichender Schutz der Kinder des
scheidungswilligen Paares befürchtet. Auch wird befürchtet, in Situationen mit einem
starken Gefälle (etwa hinsichtlich Finanzen oder Bildung) zwischen den Partnern
könnten ohne den Einfluss eines Richters einer der Parteien nachteilige Bedingungen
auferlegt werden. Die Verantwortung der Anwälte ist hier noch größer als im bisherigen
Verfahren.
Auch ansonsten lässt sich feststellen, dass durch die Auslagerung ehemals
gerichtlicher Aufgaben die Verantwortlichkeit außergerichtlicher (auch nichtstaatlicher)
Akteure beträchtlich steigt. Die Anwalts- und Notarverbände stehen dieser Entwicklung
zwiespältig gegenüber. Ob die Auslagerung in die nichtstaatliche Sphäre den
gewünschten Erfolg bringt, wird die Zukunft zeigen.
65. Urvoas, Dossier de présentation de la loi J21, Ministère de la justice: „La justice du 21e siècle doit être
une justice faite pour l’homme. C’est toute l’ambition de cette loi: améliorer la justice du quotidien,
le service public rendu au justiciable“.
66. Dossier de présentation de la loi J21, Ministère de la justice, S. 2.
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ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE)
Die juridictions de proximité wurden zum 1. Juli 2017 abgeschafft. Ihre Einsetzung
im Jahr 2002 sollte nicht nur zur Entlastung der Richter, sondern auch zur Schaffung
einer bürgernahen Justiz beitragen. Das Wegfallen dieser Instanz soll kompensiert
werden durch eine Verstärkung der „vorübergehend tätigen Richter“. Inwieweit
dadurch eine drohende Überlastung der Amtsgerichte vermieden werden kann, bleibt
abzuwarten.
Schlussendlich enthält die Reform weitreichende Neuerungen hinsichtlich
Transparenz und Überprüfung der „Arbeitsethik“ von Richtern. Diese Neuerungen,
wiewohl sie nicht unmittelbar im Zusammenhang mit dem primären Ziel der
Effizienzsteigerung stehen, sollen das Vertrauen der Bürger in die richterliche
Unabhängigkeit stärken. Unter dem Schlagwort der „Moralisierung des öffentlichen
Lebens“ (moralisation de la vie publique) handelt es sich um eine hochpolitische
Angelegenheit, die bei weitem nicht nur die Richter betrifft und die durch die
verschiedenen Skandale um Scheinbeschäftigungen Familien- und Parteiangehöriger
im Wahlkampf besondere Brisanz erlangt hat.
Der neue französische Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat auch für diesen Bereich der
Justiz weitreichende Reformen angekündigt.67 Im juristischen Bereich ist etwa denkbar,
dass Transparenzpflichten, wie vom Conseil Constitutionnel bereits abgesegnet, auf alle
amtierenden Richter und Staatsanwälte ausgeweitet werden. Daneben soll weiter an
einer Verfahrensbeschleunigung und Digitalisierung des Gerichtsprozesses gearbeitet
werden. Inwieweit diese Pläne umgesetzt werden können, wird sich im Laufe der
nächsten Monate und Jahre zeigen.
Die bereits erfolgten und möglicherweise noch anstehenden Reformen können
jedenfalls, nach Praxiserprobung, durchaus auch für den deutschen und EU-weiten
Rechtsraum als Inspiration dienen. Die Entwicklung im Frankreich in den kommenden
Monaten und Jahren darf mit Interesse verfolgt werden.
Literatur:
Amrani-Mekki, Soraya, Les modes amiables de résolution des différends dans la loi de
modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, Gazette du Palais n° 5, 31.1.2017, S. 46
Azar-Baud, Maria José, (In)action de groupe, Gazette du Palais, n° 42, S. 52
Bléry, Corinne, 1er juillet 2017 : l’adieu aux juges de proximité (?), Gazette du Palais, 30.8.2016,
n° 29, S. 40
Bogucki, Brigitte, Le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel, attention danger, Village
de la Justice, 10.1.2017, http://www.village-justice.com/articles/nouveau-divorce-parconsentement-mutuel-attention-danger,23928.html (Stand: 29.6.2017)
Bogucki, Brigitte, Le rôle de l’avocat dans le divorce par consentement mutuel, Village de la
Justice, 22.5.2017, http://www.village-justice.com/articles/role-avocat-dans-divorce-parconsentement-mutuel,25050.html (Stand: 29.6.2017)
67. Macron, Une justice pour notre temps, Gaz. Pal., n° 11, 14.3.2017, S. 16.
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ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL
Bundesamt für Justiz, Geschäftsentwicklung der Zivilsachen in der Eingangs- und
Rechtsmittelinstanz, Stand: 26. Oktober 2016, https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/
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Casorla, Francis, Réflexions sur l’amélioration de l’accès à la justice par la mise en place d’un
guichet unique de greffe et la simplification de juridictions de première instance: rapport
à M. le garde des sceaux, Ministre de la justice, Mai 1997
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la loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, 19.10.2016, http://www.
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Commission Delmas-Goyon, Bericht „Le juge du 21ème siècle - Un citoyen acteur, une équipe
de justice“, 2013
Commission Guinchard, Bericht „L’ ambition raisonnée d’une justice apaisée“, 2008
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Gueguen-Caroll, Julien, Peut-on contester un divorce par consentement mutuel ?, Village de
la Justice, 21.6.2017, http://www.village-justice.com/articles/Peut-contester-divorce-parconsentement-mutuel,25291.html (Stand: 29.6.2017)
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2
Comparative Study of Sources and General
Content of Moral Damages in Iranian Civil
Liability Law and International Human
Rights Instruments
Dr. Abbas Mirshekari
Email:Mirshekariabbas1@yahoo.com
Elm va Farhang University
Amir Ahmadi
Student of Law , Nooretouba University,Tehran, Iran
Email:Amir.Ahmadi.law@gmail.com
Abstract:
In the Iranian Law, since many legal rules comply with Shiite jurisprudence,
compensation is justified by “principle of no harm”. The subject of civil liability is
compensation for losses caused by fault or risky activities of a person.
In the present study, we have tried to explain and analyze the place for moral
damages, in Iran’s rights compared to International Human Rights of Conventions as
one of the most important rules in this field. The results suggest the Iranian legal system compared to International Human Rights of Conventions legal systems, despite
the fact that, in various rules, moral damage is referred scatter, but no certain legal
system can be considered for it.
Therefore, nowadays damage, as an important topic in law, holds a special place
in the legal system of the developed countries. Thus, not only restitution could be
sought for any physical damage, but also claims could be made to be reimbursed for
any moral damages suffered. In this paper, it is tried to show that any moral damages
suffered, if the necessary conditions of certainty, legitimacy, directness and other
criteria are met, claims for compensation and restitution could be made.
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
Keyword: Moral damage, Iranian Civil Liability Law, European Union, Compensation,
International Conventions of Human Rights
1-
INTRODUCTION
The aim of civil liability rule is the compensation of loss. The loss and damage
that due to being destructive harms another individual, which may be moral or Material/financial damage and the Material damage is reduction of personal wealth of
the individual and preventing its increase and moral/spiritual damage is the damage
to moral wealth and not financial thing like the damage to reputation and feelings.
After in case all the conditions of civil liability are gathered, the factors of the damage should be compensated and the individual who is affected is the worthy of it. As
it is relation creates between the loss bearer and damager who should be assessed
for to pay that damage and drop out of the obligor from the responsibility. Matters
on compensation of moral damage are one of the most controversial and topical in
enforcement practice for today, especially in developing countries, such as Iran. This
is because the matters of protection of the individual, his moral rights and benefits
are the same priority as the protection of property rights.
Compensation for such damages is not only in accordance with the holy laws
of Islam, but also justice and social security are guaranteed by its complete implementation. The objective of the religious law makers from enacting laws and rules
is protecting religion, wisdom, race, property and self. Protecting self includes two
aspects: physical and moral.
From the Islamic jurisprudence point of view, the main and widely accepted by
the law experts source, which seeking compensation for any moral damages could be
based on is the principle Islamic law of, ‘no harm and no person who harms is allowed
in Islam’. This principle is accepted by all the Islamic Law experts. In the holy Quran,
gossip, nitpicking, and unreasonable search in others’ affairs is condemned in verse
12 of the holy book of Hajarat. Moreover, in verses 19 and 20 of the holy book of
Noor false accusation and vilification is strongly prohibited. The rules of waste, Tasbib,
Laharaj and Banayeoghala and the rule of almaghrooryarjeoela men ghorreh ( one
who has misplaced pride could seek restitution from the one who has induced this
pride in him, are what could be referred to in the Islamic Jurisprudence when seeking
compensation.(Khoeeni, Mahdavi, Koroghli, & Zaher Mohammadi, 2014)
Establishment of Islamic Republic system in Iran provided again an opportunity
where Islamic jurisprudence may retrieve its prior role in managing the society and
government.
Formation of a system based on guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and emphasis of
Constitutional Law on the point that “all civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, etc. rules must be based on Islamic principles” (Fourth
principle of Constitutional Law) make Shiite jurisprudence areas to be engaged in the
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sophisticated political matters and remedy management of this newly established
government.(Zakeri, 2015)
Although Imam Khomeini tried in exile and after victory of Islamic revolution to
explain theoretical bases of Islamic government thought and response to the challenges
of this thought, it must be confessed that abundant problems of the first decade of
Islamic republic system sovereignty did not permit him to elaborate all he had in the
mind. Albeit Imam continually sought to provide proper mechanisms for managing
the society based on Islam until the last years of his life, and his messages and statements during 1987–1989 regarding authorities of Islamic ruler, guardianship of the
Islamic Jurist, and formation of Expediency Discernment Council confirm this matter.
However, many researches have been done in moral damages, in the rights of
Iran, but so far, no independent research has been done in the field of comparative
study between rights in Iran and International Human Rights of Conventions , in the
field of moral damage and this research tries to do this important work. The basic
question, which is raised in this context, is that, what is the position of moral damages,
in Iran and International Human Rights of Conventions and what are the manners to
compensate moral damages in the rights of the two cases? Research Hypothesis can
also be raised in this way, that in the legal systems of the two cases, moral damage
has been accepted, with the exception that in the rights of the International Human
Rights of Conventions, it is made clear, while in Iran’s rights, in different laws, the
moral damage is noted. in Iranian law, no certain way is mentioned explicitly, but we
can refer to different ways, such as an apology and rehabilitation. This paper tries,
using analytical, descriptive methods and library studies to examine the question
and hypotheses. In this regard, first the concept of damages and moral damages is
explained, then, the status of moral damages is explained in Iran and International
Human Rights of Conventions, and in continuing the way of compensation for moral
damages are explained in two legal systems, and eventually, results have been raised.
The legal research was primarily based on literature and documents extracted from
studies on the legislation, books on pertinent legal sciences, besides court decisions.
Such contributions were mainly originated from the study of civil rights books,
besides the decisions from the Iranian Courts of Law, or jurisprudence.
In the legal field, the literature review is the method of choice available for the
researchers, considering that a study approaching legal issues cannot be developed
without mentioning the laws which regulate the theme, or the Court decisions that
applied such laws to the conflicts of interest existing in society .
2- THE CONCEPT OF LOSS (DAMAGE)
About Hadith of la Zarar, Akhund Khurasani writes in investigating the cause:
“Loss is what is against the interests, that is, harm to the life or property or part of
the body or reputation or property”. (Khorasani, 2004)
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
Loss is loss of what is owned by the human, including life, reputation or property
or limbs and body parts. So if a person’s property or body parlor life is lost through
the loss or partial loss or if he dies, or his reputation is harmed, whether intentional
or unintentionally, then he is called as harmed. However, according to customary law,
loss of profit is also loss in case it should be obtained. He explicitly stated that criterion
of loss is customary law . (Katouzian, 2008)
According to the Iranians lawyers definition, damage means the property which
should pay by a person who causes financial loss to loser.(Jafari Langeroudi, 1999)
Others have said that, if a defect, creates in property or a certain benefits loss or if
indemnify insert to health, prestige and feeling of a person, in this time, damage has
been occurred, reducing of person property and prevention of its excess in any situation, is his/her infliction . (Katouzian, 2008)
According to other definitions, the damage is a detriment for financial or nonfinancial benefits of loss and the word of damage or loss which is a condition of civil
responsibility creation have same meanings.(Jurdan, 2006) Law doesn’t define the
term of damage, but mentions various examples of damage under this title or other
names such as loss, detriment and tort. For example; trial compensation, delayed
compensation payment the compensation resulting from lack of commitment, delay in
commitment compensation (art.515-522 of civil procedure code 2000). also, legislator
doesn’t present the precise definition for material and moral damage.
But The Law of Civil Liability Act 1960, Code of Criminal Procedure(1999) has
pointed to instances of it. What it is concerned in this research is common meaning
of damage which consists incurring of damage that in non-financial damage usually
uses the term of loss the damage that can be direct on un-direct. Which divided in 2
general sections: Material damage and moral damage.(Eyvazi, 2013)
3-
MORAL (NON-MATERIAL) DAMAGE AND ITS DEFINITION
The notion of ‘moral damages’ derives from the French concept of ‘le préjudice
moral’, which refers to a wrong to an individual’s emotions, honour or reputation.(Jagusch & Sebastian, 2013) Moral damages are thus, in the civil law tradition, compensatory – they are claimed pursuant to the principle of full reparation in the French Civil
Code.(“French Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber,” 15 May 2012) The right to
recover moral damages as compensation is explicitly set out under several civil codes
in the Middle East, including most notably the Egyptian, Libyan and Lebanese civil
codes.(M; Shahidi, 2003) The assessment of moral damages, including the quantum
of such damages, in France is subject to the court’s discretion. (Mehmannavazan,
2010)As the conduct of the defaulting party will not, in principle, be relevant to the
court’s assessment, an award of moral damages cannot, therefore, be characterized
as punitive.(Mohtashami , Holland , & El-Hosseny, 18 November 2016)
English law imported this terminology from EU intellectual property law. Moral
damages equate to non-pecuniary loss, which English courts can compensate, including
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in contractual and commercial matters. These particularly cover physical inconvenience
or discomfort, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, mental distress and social
discredit.(Mohtashami et al., 18 November 2016)
Notwithstanding that moral damages are considered as compensatory in both the
civil and common law systems (as well as in international law), they stand distinct to
monetary damages. Moreover, certain recent investment treaty awards demonstrate
that moral damages are beginning to be understood as having a punitive (and therefore non-compensatory) function. We explore this development in the section ‘Noncompensatory damages awarded in investment treaty arbitration’ below.(Mohtashami
et al., 18 November 2016)
The book of Legal Terminology defines moral damage as follows: any reputation
or dignity loss on the part of a person or his/her relatives is considered moral damage
.(Jaafari Langeroodi, 1994) Doctor Shahidi defines moral damage as follows: moral damage refers to any non-financial damages inflicted upon a person’s psyche, reputation
and body. Moreover, those moral damages for which a person could seek compensation
are the damages inflicted upon a person’s reputation, character, body, soul, freedom,
and, as the article one of the laws governing civil responsibility states, any other rights a
person holds.(M; Shahidi, 1988) on the contrary to what some believe that non-financial
and moral rights are the same, these two differ from one another. Moral right is a type
of financial rights, but non-financial rights, according to its definition in the book of
Legal Terminology, is a right which doesn’t have any economic value, such as spousal
right, rights which a father and son have with respect to one another.(Parvin, 2000)
Moral rights are sometimes associated with the non-financial rights and not only
the financial effects of the non-financial rights bring these two together, but also with
respect to some rights, they are mixed, such as the right of an author .(Katozian, 1996)
Moral damage is any sort of damage upon one’s personality as well as any physical or motional Harm . In other words, Moral damages can be concisely defined as
“damages on emotional and non-financial interests” . Moreover, many Islamic texts
have mentioned moral damages saying that “loss” includes the destruction of anything
that a person has the right to have it whether in a person, honor, mental or a part of
body .(Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016)
Non-material damage includes damage to non-financial benefits such as emotional and physical pain and suffering, feelings, loss of reputation and freedom and
with respect to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
last part of article one civil liability Act, the source of non-material detriment is harm
to the rights and freedoms of the individual character and honor, or is the result of
trauma. (Katouzian, 2008) Also in this regard, detriment to credits dignity of persons
or trauma and in other words, moral damage or loss to prestige and emotions of
persons are non-financial rights (non-material) loss, even hurting sense of friendship,
family and religious as well as the suffering that occurs as a result of an accident can
be claimed today as moral damages .(Safai, 1976)
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
Another author writes: “The non-financial damage includes physical injury like
assault and battery, full and partial disability and losses caused by deprivation of liberty
of the individual such as imprisonment, detention, deportation, unlawful deportation
and finally non-material damage caused by bearing the suffering that and hurts the
feelings of human spirituality” .(Fuyuzi, 1977)
What all these definitions show is definition by example rather than the concept
and definition of rules for finding the instances. But all these definitions are an expression
of the moral damages, whether to natural or legal person. Moreover, the damage has
not a financial aspect unlike financial losses that apply to property with property rights.
By paying attention to principle of 177 from constitutional law and article 1 civil liability
act, Moral damage is: “damage to reputation or credibility and character, body and spirit,
and freedom and every legal right that is no material.” With consideration of these principles We find that moral damage is the spiritual aspect and is not material. (Eyvazi, 2013)
4-
CIVIL LIABILITY CONCEPTION
In law, liable means “responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated.”(H. C.
Black, Garner, & McDaniel, 2014) Legal liability is following the engagement party with
answering to destructive behavior applied to meet the people.
The diagnostic criteria of legal responsibility, external appearance and behavior
that it is causing harm to another. Responsibility means being responsible and being
obliged to do what is and who is responsible if it does not fulfill the obligation of the
obligation, will be held accountable.(Shahroodi, 2015)
Legal liability concerns both civil law and criminal law and can arise from various areas of law, such as contracts, torts, taxes, or fines given by government agencies. The claimant is the one who seeks to establish, or prove, liability. Claimants can
prove liability through a myriad of different theories, known as theories of liability.
Which theories of liability are available in a given case depends on nature of the law
in question. For example, in case involving a contractual dispute, one available theory
of liability is breach of contract; or in the tort context, negligence, negligence per se,
respondent superior, vicarious liability, strict liability, or intentional conduct are all
valid theories of liability.(O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003)
Liability means legal obligations of individuals to compensate another for harm
caused by the former, whether caused by negligence of his or due to his/her act. (Jafari
Langeroudi, 1999) Within Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia, liability is synonyms with
the guarantee and one who is responsible for the obligation is called responsible or
guarantor.(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016)
The need to compensate for losses suffered by a person is called civil liability. And
such liability that is mainly borne by one who inflicts harm and negligence is sometimes used in broad sense where a person is held liable for breaking a law, promise
and inflicts losses.
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In most cases, the civil liability is used in narrow sense in contrast with liabilities
arising from breach of contract or delay in its implementation (contractual liability).
(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016) The civil liability in specific sense is when an individual
is held liable for causing injury suffered by others without any contract being signed
between the two. Such responsibilities that is referred to in general rules and the
general principles of civil law under the heading of “extra contractual requirements”
is also called extra contractual liability. Liability may be moral or legal.
The idea of civil liability is connected with the existence of a wrongful conduct,
which is configured whenever imprudence, malpractice or neglect are present.
In order to achieve a comprehension of the civil liability concept, one should
refer to the teachings by Pontes de Miranda:“Whenever we do what we do not have
the right to do, it is certain that we commit an injurious act, as we reduce, against
one’s will, the assets represented by one’s rights, or increase one’s liabilities, which
generally means the same”.(Oliveira, Fonseca, & Koch, 2011)
Indeed, in most of cases, the legal duty of responsibility arises from a contract,
a fact or omission, originating from the agreement between the parties or from the
rule of Law. Therefore, civil liability can be simply defined as the obligation to repair
the damage caused to someone.
In this sense, the understanding and conceptualization of civil liability from Maria
Helena Diniz is very helpful: “Civil liability is the application of measures that oblige
a person to repair moral or patrimonial damage caused to third parties, on account
of one’s actions, or actions by persons one is responsible for, by something that one
owns, or simply by the rule of Law”.(Oliveira et al., 2011)
There is no identical definition for civil liability in legal texts. Sometimes the
phrase has generally utilized as “legal liability” against “criminal responsibility” and
“moral responsibility”. In this sense, all the following requirements out of contract titles
are the subset of “civil liability”: confiscation, loss, indirect causation, demand, inappropriate use, managing the other properties and damages resulting from the failure
to perform the obligation and the harm caused by crime. But, some individuals also
consider the “civil liability” more limited and have proposed independent discussion
of some requirements out of contract such as confiscation, demand, inappropriate
use, and managing the other’s property. There is no definition for “civil liability” in
law.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
However, it has been proposed in article 1 of the law on civil liability Act 1339.
Everyone who does the damages to the life, health, property, freedom, reputation, or
commercial reputation deliberately without legal license or as a result of recklessness,
or according to any other right which has been provided by law, cause the damages
which result in other material or moral harm is responsible for compensation. The
definition is so general that include all the requirements alternative of the contract,
sub-contract, crime, and tort. But, in the paper more attention has been paid to cases
where the government has done damages to natural or legal persons out of requireCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
ments of contract, regardless of the issues exist in presenting a comprehensive definition for “civil liability”.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
According to Mabsout, civil liability has two meaning in the terminology of rights:
1. The losses caused by crime which should be asked the court through lawsuit.
2. The responsibility of other action out of criminal cases like father responsibility for his children action.
Generally, when a person is assigned to compensate for the effects and results
of damages done to others, he is deemed to be in charge based on civil law. The civil
liability is either due to contract or non-contract which the harm is caused due to
violation of general duty. In the former, if a person does the damage, he has to compensate for.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
5-
CONDITIONS OF REALIZATION OF CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY
5-1- Harmful action
The existence of harmful action is of the columns of civil responsibility and when
the harmful action is assigned to the agent he should be known as the one who is
responsible for compensating the damage. So wherever a person is charged with
doing something because of contraction and law and convention and refuse doing
that and therefore causes damages to another person, so he will be responsible for
it.(Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016)
5-2-Illegal action
In addition to the necessity of doing harmful action from the person, the mentioned
action should be done in an illegal and illicit way; it means that the action has made
damages should be considered inelegant in the case of discipline and morality so that
it is possible to assume civil responsibility for the person. In spite of the fact that this
principle is obvious the substance no. 1 of civil responsibility to demystification and
necessitate this condition expresses that: “everybody who causes injuries to life or health
or property or freedom of reputation or business fame or any other right that is known
for the people by law and makes spiritual and financial damages to them is responsible
for compensating the damage resulted from his action.” (Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016)
5-3- Existence of damage
The first column of claims of civil responsibility whether it is conventional or
compulsory, is the damage. Loss means damage to the person or his properties and
one of the most important columns of civil responsibility is the loss. Generally, loss
is divided into two groups of material and spiritual (virtual). By material or monetary
loss it means the loss to the material benefits that are in the domain of the proper48
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ties of the person who is having lost and includes deficit, extinct, waste or deformed
owning and hurts to the human’s health. Spiritual loss is to the virtual rights of the
human that has to do with the individual personality of the person such as freedom
of speech or freedom of action.(Abbasloo, 2011)
5-4-Undoubtedness of the loss
One of the conditions of compensable loss is that the mentioned loss is certain
and definite.(M; Shahidi, 2003) It means that the loss claimant should prove definitely and certainly that he has received a loss. This is a crucial term in compensation
of conventional or compulsory damage because basically, compensating the loss is
impossible unless with certainty about happening of the damage. So, it is mentioned
in the provision 728 of trail custom law legislated in 1318 that, “the court gives the
verdict of damage if the claimant proves that he has received a loss.” Regarding the
verb used here in this phrase it can be said that the loss should be happened (in the
past) and on the other hand, the claimant should prove it based on this verdict and
what that has happened is lawfully a definite issue .(Mehmannavazan, 2010)
5-5-Directness of the loss
The second term of the compensable loss is that the loss is resulted directly and
without mediators from the called person action. In the case that the loss does not
have direct causal relationship with the harmful action compensation of such action
is not demanding and the agent if the harmful action cannot be sentenced.
There is no verdict about this term in the law of civil responsibility and civil law
of Iran. But as it is mentioned in the start of provision 728 in the law of previous trial
custom, the loss should be without mediator. (Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016)
5-6-The loss should not be compensated
Another term of the compensable loss is that the loss is not compensated at the
time of demand and request in any way. This condition in necessary because the issue of civil responsibility is to compensate the damage and if the loss and damage is
compensated in any way, so the issue of civil responsibility that includes the necessity
of compensation of the damage to the damaged person will be eliminated and therefore the verdict to compensate the loss will not be valuable anymore .(Barikloo, 2008)
6-
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL LIABILITY
1400-year history of relation of law and Islamic jurisprudential justifies inevitable
relation of law and jurisprudence in Islamic states; however, new law doesn’t accept many
discussions of jurisprudential books, many issues discussed in jurisprudence are inspired
by customs and can fertilize the new law and enrich it .(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016)
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
Each theory of liability has certain conditions, or elements, that must be proven by
the claimant before liability will be established. For example, the theory of negligence
requires the claimant to prove that (1) the defendant had a duty; (2) the defendant
breached that duty; (3) the defendant’s breach caused the injury; and (4) that injury
resulted in recoverable damages. Theories of liability can also be created by legislation.
For example, under English law, with the passing of the Theft Act 1978, it is an offense
to evade a liability dishonestly. Payment of damages usually resolves the liability. A
given liability may be covered by insurance. In general, however, insurance providers
only cover liabilities arising from negligent torts rather than intentional wrongs or
breach of contract.
In commercial law, limited liability is a business form that shields its owners from
certain types of liability and that amount a given owner will be liable for. A limited
liability form separates the owner(s) from the business. This means that when a business is found liable in case, the owners are not themselves liable; rather, the business
is. Thus, only the funds or property the owner(s) have invested into the business are
subject to that liability. If, for example, a limited liability business goes bankrupt, then
the owner(s) will not lose unrelated assets such as a personal residence (assuming they
do not give personal guarantees). This is the standard model for larger businesses,
in which a shareholder will only lose the amount invested (in the form of stock value
decreasing). There is an exception to this rule that allows a claimant to go after the
owners of a limited liability business where the owners have engaged in conduct that
justifies the claimant’s recovery from the owners. This is known as “piercing the veil.”
Manufacturer’s liability (product liability), a legal concept in most countries,
reflects the fact that producers have a responsibility not to sell a defective product.
Economists use the term “legal liability” to describe the legal-bound obligation
to pay debts.
6-1- The rule of causality
This is a legislative rule of Islamic jurisprudence, and is unquestionable, stating
that everybody who causes loss is liable even if he doesn’t know it is harmful and
shall compensate for it, and civil liability is borne by the cause, for example one who
constructs foundation of a several-story building and damages the neighboring house
is liable and shall pay damages even if such damage is causes negligently. Causality is
not subject to abetting while rule of loss is subject to it, causality has conditions and
grounds, it has four grounds in Islamic jurisprudence including reasoning, consensus,
Qur’an and hadith . (Jafari Langeroudi, 1999)
Holy Quran verses have numerous references to the rule of causality and responsibility such as Sura An’am (verses 164 and 104) and Surah Saba (verses 24 and 41)
and Az-Zumar (verse 9) Ma’idan (verse 104) and Israel (16, 106 and 77) and (verses
51, 52, 53), referring to liability and liability of the cause, but the Hadiths also have
the numerous references to this, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Conditions of causality in jurisprudence: In jurisprudence, terms of causality are
the same as stipulated in the Civil Code and are summarized as follows:
1. Emergence of loss from positive or negative action of the cause
2. Capacity of the cause
3. Loss must be caused by fault of the cause (the relationship between loss and
action)
4. The cause must not have mens rea.
5. Cause must not be perpetration in creating the loss.
The fifth term of causality is non-perpetration because if the cause perpetrates
the harm then the cause doesn’t match causality but matches the rule of loss, which is
the case in which positive act of a person causes loss to another directly, for example,
a driver hits his car to a shop recklessly and breaks the window of the shop, while in
causality, positive or negative act causes loss to another with mediation. The act of
the cause may be positive or negative: positive act is for example when someone put
in the passage melon skin and passersby who carries his china and crystal with slides
over it and breaks his china and crystal. The cause of negative act is for example when
the guardian withholds from leasing property of his ward and withholds from the
trading with the extra money of the minor. (Jafari Langeroudi, 1999)
6-2- Negligence
Known lawyers so far have offered various definitions of negligence; some have
considered it as a violation of previous commitments. Infringement of cautious behavior
or usual behavior, failing an assignment, violation of behavior whose observance is
required for protection of others, violation of reasonable behavior are among famous
definition. In all cases brought based on negligence, the burden of proof is on plaintiff.
(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016)
6-3- The causal relationship and negligence
Iranian Civil Code Article 334 states: “The owner or possessor of the animal is
not responsible for damages caused by that animal unless he is negligent in keeping
the animal, but in any case if the animal causes loss by any man’s act, the source of
losses will be responsible for damages .(Mohaqeq Damad, 2008)
Existence of negligence is necessary for establishing causal relationship, and
without that, harmful act will not be capable of attribution to the cause. In other
words, without infringing (fault), there is no causal relationship between the damage
and the act committed.
No responsibility for the transmission can be established for person not involved
in such transmission. But it should be noted that there is distinction and differentiation
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between causal relationship and negligence. The causal relationship means the relationship between language and act of the subject, whether this relationship is distant
or close. Mere establishment of causal relationship, especially a distant relation, for
example, the causal relationship of carries of blood with the Blood Center cannot be
accurate basis and unique basis of liability, but common practice recognize and assign
the responsibility of compensation to the cause. In the examples of jurisprudence, all
efforts are made to create a causal relationship and attribute losses the cause, while
this causal relationship, in other cases, doesn’t lead to responsibility without element
of negligence.(Mohaqeq Damad, 2008)
On the other hand, it should be noted that choice of negligent cause and holding
the latter liable doesn’t result in disconnection of other cause with loss, but they are
related to loss, as track carrying contaminated blood of hospital or veterinarians secretary who turned on sterilizing device for surgical instruments, etc. all are transmissionrelated, but only relationship that doesn’t seem to create responsibility and liability.
Thus, contrary to the above, some jurists believe negligence is not the causal
relationship, but there is a separate element whose existence at least in some cases
is necessary to establish responsibility. So when several causes cause damage, the
negligence element by being attached to one of them determines responsible cause.
Yes, we may say that the customary law only consider causal relationship between the
negligence and the loss as established and ignores the other causes, but this doesn’t
mean that element of negligence and the causality are one and same in causal relationship. (Mohaqeq Damad, 2008)
7-
THE CIVIL LIABILITY THEORIES
The various theories and standpoints have been introduced about civil liability
and its principle by scholars. Each of the theories has had some proponents at a period time of the history and has been accomplished. The main ideas are as follows:
7-1-Fault theory
The first question comes to the mind after a harmful event—especially if it is
widespread and done numerous damages—is that who is at fault and responsible
for? In case the accident is happened by a particular person and the damages have
been done to a given individual/individuals, the subject is not so much ambiguous.
However, in case the accident is not imputed to a given factor and the maximum
thing can be said is that the accident has happened due to legal person indifference,
a legal person of public law—like the government and the institute related to it. In
the case, the investigation is more intricate. As the point is proposed in various cases
including bridge collapse, not having installed the guard and safety signs on the roadside and bridge, continuous malfunction lights, drilling the street without installing
warning signs and cutting off the power continuously and frequently which all cause
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the abundant losses and damages. The point is proposed in factories explosion and
fire, oil and gas refineries, educational and fun centers, etc. thus, according to fault
theory the only reason can justify the responsibility of a person for compensation the
damages is the causality relation between the fault and the loss. In other words, the
first thing comes to the mind of a person seeking for the responsible for a harmful
event is who the damages is done due to his/her fault. Accordingly, the lost person
should prove the loss factor fault as a claimant. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
The question is being raised is that if it is necessary to seek for the main person
who is at fault or it suffices to prove the responsibility and accountability of a legal
or natural person. In such cases, if finding the guilty and proving his/her guilt is not
impossible, there will exist a great hardship and consequently according to the view
the right of claimant to compensation for the damages done unintentionally would
be wasted and insisting to prove the guilt and finding the guilty doesn’t permit us to
achieve our main goal which is proving the civil liability of the cause of loss. Therefore,
it seems it suffices the person to be accountable for and it is not necessary to find the
guilty of an accident. On the other hand, the easy way to achieve the goal is to expand
the concept of guilty and guilt is attributed to the legal person who is supporting the
main reason instead of the direct and main reason.
As we observe, the votes manifest the fact that purpose and fault are not only
the reasons of conscience guarantee, but also is its main and basic reason. So it can
be said: wasting the others property is primarily the effect and purpose of the loss’s
causes and if the scholars don’t explain the absence of difference between purpose
cases and fault cases, the conception which express that civil liability is followed by
the fault theory based on juridical, it was right and proper.
According to the fault theory, the only reason can justify a person’s responsibility
for compensation is the existence of causality relation between the fault and the damage has been done. The civil liability in the Europe and the other parts of the world was
based on the fault up to 18 century, except for the article 1382 of French civil liability
which had accepted the absolute and unlimited responsibility and the responsibility
was radically based on the person’s fault. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
7-2- Endangering theory
According to the theory, it suffices the causality relation to be in existence
between the loss and action in order to the loss cause’s responsibility determined.
In other words, the action and activity of each natural or legal person endanger
without existing the guilt or crime and should undergo its results. It means because
the employers benefit from the job, the losses should be undertaken by him as well.
For instance, if a company or factory takes an action to produce various products
or a bureau is in charge of some social and economical affairs which benefit them,
they should be responsible for the damages are done to individuals by their actions
and their activities.
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Apparently the theory has been emerged in response to the fault theory and
indeed it accepts the responsibility without fault and it deems every harmful action
to be guaranteed and it consider any activity which is generating interest to create
the responsibility. Thus, in addition to the many criticisms, it is an optimal approach
toward civil liability according to some scholars. There are some cases of acceptance
this theory in religious texts:
If a person has been invited to another’s house and he/she enters with the
permission of host and in the meanwhile the dog of host hurts him/her, the host is
responsible.
A person who is riding a horse or is dragging it, is responsible for the damages
done to the properties by the animal.
A person who put the animal on the way of people is responsible for the damages
done to individuals by the animal.
If a person dig a well on his/her land and cover it, but do not inform the others
and somebody or something fall in it and lost, that person is responsible.
If a person drop the water on his property and another person’s property is
drowned due to that or fire in his property and is informed or suspicious of the harm,
is responsible.
If a person’s wall collapse due to the exhaustion and cause the human or animal
to die or cause the financial loss, the owner of the wall is responsible in case he is
aware of exhaustion.
As it is observed, according to jurisprudence the existence of causal relation
between action and loss result in responsibility and it means that endangering theory
is also has been accepted in jurisprudence.
7-3-The middle theory
According to the theory, the activity which is exotic and unusual results in responsibility. This view emphasizes on individual liberty and doesn’t consider dangerous all
their actions and activities but it only considers responsibility for those actions which
are exotic and irregular.
While this theory supports the agent of loss and devise of harm, it is a criterion
to achieve civil liability which is an abstract and subjective concept and it seems it is
difficult to achieve and finally it will be relative.
Yet, it is evident in both religious texts and narrative sources. The cases such as
digging wall in other’s property or on the road travelling center, irrigation or opening
the fire in one’s own property to excessive necessity, riding the rental animal in an
unusual way, and so on emphasize that performing the exotic and unusual action result
in responsibility, because these actions are highly due to the fault of the agent or at
least the role of fault is more prominent than the other factors. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
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7-4-Loss separation theory
Based on this theory, the physical and financial damages and moral and economical damages have been separated and it has been predicted the responsibility without fault for the first time and the responsibility based on fault for the second type,
because according to this conception financial and physical damages mean the loss
insertion but moral and economical damages is to foreclose the interest. Therefore,
if the damages are done to a person due to the other one’s actions, the principle of
liability is without the governor fault, but where one activity leads to interest insertion, the basic condition of responsibility is to take the blame.
What expressed about the theoretical principle of civil liability result us in coming
to the conclusion that none of the theories can be accepted as the mere principle of
civil liability and establish a justly system based on. On the other hand, the reality which
is in existence within them cannot be denied. What is significant is to do the justice to
the society and this logical goal is the only way to achieve the goal. It probably can be
said: it’s because of this consideration that no definite theory has been presented in
jurisprudence regarding the civil liability. Sometimes it has been emphasized on the
cause of fault, sometimes on the risk factor, and sometimes on violation the conventional and in some cases all the factors have been considered.
Therefore, the fundamental strategies on civil liability are to provide the justice
and defend the rights of those who have been hurt by the actions and activities of
natural and legal persons. In fact, what is important in this regard is the presence of
the direct causality relationship between the loss and the doer of the action so that
we can say: typically, in terms of feature the loss is necessary and judgment is the
best criterion to distinguish between the overseer and those who have caused the
damages. None of the triple titles, stewardship, causation, and creating the context
has been presented in narrative texts. Apply the law as a loss title—intentionally or
unintentionally—has the pivotal role and the particular texts apparently doesn’t implicate beyond the conventional verity. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014)
8-
CAUSATION RELATION BETWEEN THE HARMFUL ACT AND THE LOSS
ENTRY
To fulfill responsibility should be established that there is a causation relationship
between Loss and the harmful act i.e. the loss was caused by the action. Of course,
if to cause an accident, the event must be one of the necessary conditions to realize
loss, it was proven that the loss is not made actually. In this case, this is a loser who
should prove that causality relationship exists between the harmful act and the harm,
and until causality cannot be established, it cannot say that it is a harmful act.
To establish the causation relationship between the fault and a loss led to make
the complex issues that cannot be found the solution for them except by the talent
sense and evidences in every case. In the cases that, responsibility is due to the PerCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017
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sonal action, it must confirmed causation relationship between the defendant fault
and Loss entry. On the contrary, in an assumption, there is responsibility due to others
action, thus, it is not necessary to establish. However, it must be proved that between
the act and fault of the person who his acts responsibility is on defendant and loss
entry, there is causality. For example, it is claimed that worker has damaged to another when working and the employer must compensate that. In this case, causation
relationship between the fault of the employer and the Loss entry does not need to
prove. But it must be established that the loss is resulting from the action of labor. It
is also correct about the responsibility of the guardian of minors and the insane on
his actions and so .(Katoozian, 2012)
9-
THE HISTORY OF MORAL DAMAGE IN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW OF IRAN
The legal state of moral damages as mentioned above, among fund mental
principles accepted by jurists and legal systems is the fact that moral damages are
compensable, this is also accepted in the Islamic jurisprudence according to some
Islamic rules .(Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016)
Moral damages have been raised in the current Iranian laws and one of the most
important laws in this regard is Civil Liability Law.
The history of moral damage in Iranian legal system can be traced back to 90
years ago in the former Criminal Code. Later the Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil
Liability Code affirmed the statement of the Criminal Code on recognition of moral
damage in the Iranian legal system.
Specifically, the provisions that are based on the compensation of damages is
enacted Civil Liability Act 1950. Article 1 of this law provides that:
“Anyone who intentionally or as a result of recklessness without legal authorization to life or health or property or freedom or dignity or business reputation or
to any other right that is established by law for persons, material or moral prejudice
that causes harm to another, is liable to compensate for damage caused by their actions. “ The theme of the material taken from Germanic law and the text of the first
paragraph of Article 823 of the German Civil Code is very close. Another object of
the law of civil liability for material damage is reparable article 6 of the cost of treatment and the patient’s disability, in the event of the death and burial expenses paid
pension necessary alimony people died during or afterwards; articles 8, 9 and 10 on
the material and moral damage caused by the deficit of credibility, reputation and
credibility. (Shahroodi, 2015)
As is seen, the law of civil liability recognized compensate for the loss in the
range of losses and the compensation of damages to dramatically compared to the
social development, but the main question the civil liability provisions of the plan:
first, despite the extent of the damage is repairable-the need to compensate for
all losses this is recognized in law? Secondly, if principally in our legal regime appli56
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cable provisions of the act are and reflect the real situation of human rights in Iran?
(Shahroodi, 2015)
The answer is yes to both questions is the difficulty and uncertainty. Civil liability
act no way against all losses there. When damage Iranian lawyers have frequently been
the subject of discussion, but the law does not mention the ability to repay them; including a range of moral damage suffered as a result of losing yakhsart severe physical
and Johnny’s soul, and mental shock, do not operate and enjoy a healthy environment
and environmental degradation There are also some financial losses however, the
disadvantage is that the common law, but the law does not mention the responsibility
and ability to repay them; including the loss of financial position that actually exists,
but not on the right, and lack of benefit chances. (Shahroodi, 2015)
Perhaps may be assumed that the damage is mentioned in the law of civil liability
not imitative aspects, especially the last part of the rule, due to the popularity of all
the damage has been compensated, but the letter of the law and accept the terms
and-drop development compensation for damages due to the need to the reason
for this has been provided. Also refer to the principle of the rule of law are taken (as
specified by law in Germany and Switzerland) prove the opposite impression. As we
shall see, the German law - the source of one of our civic responsibility to seems - not
recognized compensation for all losses Lawyers and the courts of this country very
carefully implemented article 823 of the civil code stipulates in article with the concept of opposition, much of the damage is not clear, it considered irrecoverable. In
conclusion, it can be said that even the civil liability act 1950 and the compensation all
damages not recognize the reference to the law in this regard, it is a misunderstanding. (Mazaheri Tehrani, 05.07.2013)
But the more fundamental question of law, civil liability, Iran’s position in the
current law and the validity and necessity of implementing it. This rule is derived from
the German and Swiss law and many the exact translation of the items in the laws of
the two countries. Many of the provisions of this law and the principles recognized in
particular civil liability are totally alien to the Iranian law, the fundamental differences
between civil law and legal history of Iran these conflicts and Islamic jurisprudence so
that some lawyers after the enactment of this act, according to the prescriptions of
the law about civic responsibility were civil.(Ghaemmaghami 1968)
Furthermore, the liability under this Act, the said Article is a fault and error, while
Iran’s rights, unlike typical western countries, never blame as the responsibility is unknown, but what is a civil rights law, landlord responsibilities, damage to the harmful
act is only causality relation and in case of damage due to fault only used to establish
causality. Another fundamental difference in how physical and human damage is
calculated. Islamic jurisprudence and the laws of the revolution, with regard to the
payment of a certain sum as compensation for physical damage and soul irrespective
of social status and economic injured or responsible for the accident are determined
and paid, while the civil liability act physical damage and life is determined accordCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017
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ing to the above considerations it can be quite different from one person to another.
There are also concepts and considerations in civil liability law that is totally alien to
our principles and legal views and the new facility is about obvious ones this sentence
articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the terms of fairness, the social and moral responsibility for
the incident, how responsible and the injured party, and the consequences of physical
and social cognition liability for damage assessment is responsible for the accident.
(Shahroodi, 2015)
A system established by this law, even before the result of fundamental changes
result of the Islamic Revolution in 1978, has been a major problem for transplant the
body of our law, which was watered during the centuries of Islamic jurisprudence-in
is included.
After the adoption of the constitution and the emphasis on Islamic Republic the
implementation of Islamic law, particularly the legal rights of Iran, relies on the legal
system, which in many cases in conflict with the principles of civil law jurisprudence and
Islamic tradition and Iranian legal culture, it seems very difficult. Although the provisions
of the civil liability act explicitly are not abrogated by the new rules, however, many of
the provisions of this act and referred to the courts is not being practically abandoned.
Including the rules and regulations of the abandoned much of the damage is that
the law has been introduced as compensation for damages. Insurances law and the
penal provisions of the law that is also capable of compensating for physical damage
and life is very difficult, or is unknown.
However, this insurance observation does not mean that the civil liability act 1970
is quite outdated and is not applicable in any part. (Shahroodi, 2015)
Article 9 of the criminal procedure act of 1956 had stated with total clarity that
one could not only seek compensation for the physical damages suffered as the result
of a crime committed but also do so for the moral damages inflicted and the profits
lost. (Khoeeni et al., 2014)
In 1960, the criminal procedure clearly stated the fact that moral damages could
be compensated for, and section 2 of the article 9 defined moral losses as harming
one’s dignity, credibility and any spiritual damage. However, despite all this clarity
there still existed a major doubt on whether moral damage is open to compensation
only when it is the result of a criminal act or compensation could be sought for damages suffered through acts which are not of criminal nature? (Khoeeni et al., 2014)
With enactment of the laws of civil responsibility, the rules in this area became
more comprehensive and any type of moral damage became claimable in the common
law of the Iranian courts, and even, article 8 of the laws governing the civil responsibility is solely about false publications which harm anyone’s dignity, position and
credibility. (Khoeeni et al., 2014)
Civil Liability Law had been enacted in May 6, 1960 was mainly derived from
Swiss Obligations Law and German Civil Law and included 16 articles. When the bill
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related to this Law was passing through the enactment process, deputy Minister of
Justice declared in a speech in the auditoriums of this Ministry that, the main reason
of preparing this bill was that the laws were not adequate for compensation based
on current economic and social circumstances. So it can be stated that legislators of
Civil Liability Law sought to complete Civil Law 1928 as regards “automatic liability”
(Articles 307-337 of Civil Law). Civil Liability Law 1960 is the most important legal
reference regarding compensation in a broad sense and moral damages. Article 1
of the mentioned Law provided that, Anyone who causes damages for life, health,
property, freedom, dignity, business reputation or any other right of recognized
for persons by law, without legal authority, intentionally or due to imprudence
and bring about material or moral losses for another person will be responsible for
compensation.
Article 2 has provided that claims for moral damages, whether associated with
material damages or independently, may be investigated.So, one can state that according to “Civil Liability Law”, anyone who causes material and moral losses is bound
to compensate them.
According to Article 5, if physical injuries or damages to health of a person cause
civil deficiency, the causer is responsible for all compensation of all damages. However it must be noted that compensation of moral damages will be based on conditions and features of claims for damages. That is, damages must be obvious, direct,
uncompensated, and predictable and mere claim of a person cannot be heard. It is
concluded that moral damages have an important position in Islamic legal issues and
Civil Law, particularly in civil liability and have various examples. They are not confined
to damages to dignity and personal and social reputation; rather they include physical
injuries, disability of working, mental health, and beauty.
According to Articles 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Civil Liability Law, any of below losses could
be requested in body injuries. Treatment costs, Disability compensation, Increase in
living expenses, Moral damages.
In article 9 of this law, the possibility of seeking restitution by a girl who is forced
to have an adulterous affair with another either through force, threat or just being a
subordinate and fear of losing her job is mentioned. Moreover, article 10 of the same
law gives the right to a person whose individual or family’s dignity and credibility has
suffered to seek restitution.
Naturally, here, as with the physical damage, presence of a harmful illegal act,
and as interpreted in the article 1 of the civil responsibility laws, without a legal
permit, the causal relationship between the harmful act and the damage, existence
of loss and damage, certainty of harm, violation one’s legal rights and legality of the
claim are necessary to seek compensation. Furthermore, any form of justifiable acts
such as self-defense nullifies this responsibility. It is because of the fact that the mere
reason of harming another by an act committed does not makes the acting party
responsible. The act must have been found illegal by the law and ethics must find it
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undue. Furthermore, it should include both an act or an inaction, because inaction
could equally cause moral damages. (Khoeeni et al., 2014)
If the injury led to death of the injured person, “all costs particularly cost of
burial” must be paid, and if death was not immediate, “treatment costs and losses
arising from inability to work in the illness period are regarded as among damages”.
Moreover, there are some forms of compensations, though very weak, for moral
damages in other laws such as the business law with regard to inappropriate use of
trademarks, …, or in laws protecting the rights of the authors, poets and artists and
the laws governing the right of the press. The legal office of the justice department in
a unified opinion, no. 136/10/30-7/5947, states as follows: The rules associated with
seeking compensation for physical and moral damages, including the article 9 of the
criminal procedure of 1960 still is in effect.
After the revolution 1979, the Constitution Act stipulated moral damage in principle 171.Article 171 of the constitution has also clearly talked about such claims, thus,
seeking compensation for any damages is considered legal. According to the article
171, whenever, as the result of a mistake or a fault on the judge’s part, a person suffers a physical or a moral loss, the guilty party is obligated; otherwise, the government
must take the necessary steps to compensate the harmed and no matter what and
how the restitution must be made.
For the first time, in the article 212 of the general penal law has predicted restitution for moral damages. According to this article, anyone who has committed one of
the crimes mentioned in articles 2077, 208, and 209, beside the punishment assigned
for the crime he/she must make payment of not less than 500 Rials to the plaintiff.
After the 1978 victorious Islamic Revolution of Iran, establishment of the rule of
Islamic Laws, and the consequent enactment of the laws of retaliation, hodud, atonement and taazirat along with the silence of the procedural Law, a misunderstanding
was formed in the minds of the judges. They thought that the only compensation
which should be paid to the plaintiff for the purpose of restitution for the crime committed against him/her was a certain sum of money the physical damages suffered.
Furthermore, they didn’t believe that, from the legal standpoint, any compensation
was due to the plaintiff for the moral damages suffered as the result of the crime
committed against him/her.
According to clarification 3 of the article 24 of 1979 law of the press, a plaintiff
could seek compensation for physical and moral damages suffered as the result of a
crime committed, but since this law is nullified by the press law of 1985, and in article
30 of his law, which has replaced the article 24 of the previous law, the clarification 1
is omitted, one could not to this law when seeking restitution for any moral damages.
In their interpretation of article 30 (1) of the press Act (1364), the Islamic jurisprudents of the Guardian Council declared that, the mentioned article- under which moral
damage was recognized- is contrary to Sharia. Thus, the legislature in the amendment
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of the Criminal Procedure Code eliminated moral damage from section 2 of article 9
of the criminal procedure code (1378).
By the elimination of moral damage from the Criminal Procedure Code (1378), some
judges changed their approach and are reluctant to consider moral damage as a compensable
damage; whereas, the existence of article 171 of the Constitution and the applicability of the
Civil Liability Code leave no doubt over the recognition of moral damage under Iranian law.
The criticism of some judges about the lack of any criterion for measuring moral damages is rejected by reference to article 3 and 5 of the Civil Liability Code. According to
the stated articles, the amount of moral damages depends on the circumstances and
should be decided by judges on a case by case basis.
Apart from criminal law, moral damage is not mentioned in civil law, but in some
instances, the existence of intellectual damage is observed while its compensation
is not discussed. For example article 1130 of the civil law (amendment,1991) states:
“If the continuity of marriage causes a disability for a wife, she can refer to the judge
for divorce; if the disability is proved in the court, the court can have the husband
divorce, and if the husband disobeys, the religious judge will divorce his wife”. (Raouf
& Angurajtaghavi, 2016)The note to this article (approved in 2000) states the condition which continuously of a conjugal life inflicts an intellectual damage on a wife.
In addition, articles 130, 132, 133, 1035, 1037, 1041, 1043, 1056, 1103, 1115, 1117,
1173 and 1191 of the civil law also states instances of obligation in the civil law concerning intellectual damages.(Afshar, 2015) The civil procedure code dominating civil
proceedings and procedure, includes all the legal proceedings and procedures (articles
47-66), and defines damage and its instances in article 515 and 519. Although the
above articles do not directly mention the concept “intellectual damage”, they can
guarantee the accomplishment of articles 3, 40, 169 and 171 of the constitution to
follow legal fairness and justice. The law of the inspecting the behavior of judges was
ratified in 2001 .(Walidi, 1996)
10- COMPENSATION OF LOSSES AND OTHER WAYS OF PROPERTY DAMAGE
REIMBURSEMENT
A person, who has incurred the losses as a result of the violation of his (her) civil
rights, is entitled to their compensation. Damages are: - losses, which are incurred by a
person due to the destruction or impairment of the something, as well as expenses that
person made or have to make to restore his violated right (actual damages); - income
that person would really get under the normal circumstances, if his (her) rights had
not been violated (lost profits). Damages are compensated in full, unless the contract
or the law provides reimbursement in a smaller or larger size.
If the person, who has violated law, received because of this the revenue, the
amount of lost profit, which must be reimbursed to the person whose rights were
violated, can not be less than the income that is received by a person who has violated
the law. At the request of the person who has suffered, and according to the circumCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017
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stances of the case, the property damages could be compensated in other ways, the
nuisance of property may be compensated in kind (transfer of the same kind thing
and of the same quality or correction of damaged thing etc.).
The most important legal topics are considered compensation for moral damage. In Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 declared that:”
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”
And with due regard to the rights enumerated in the Declaration of most spiritual and
financial compensation for this loss has been emphasized.(H. Black, 2004)Theoretical
Foundations of the claim moral damage is theories that discussed on material damage, such as the fault theory, Direct responsibility is based on the theory of risk and
benefit or guaranteed the right. However, considering the above theories of damage should be compensated, through the appropriate method of compensation and
non-cash compensation is primarily. But, there is difference of opinion on the issue
of compensation for moral damages and the possibility of financial compensation is
faced with doubt. Because these losses are immaterial. And there may be pricing of
some suffering unacceptable and an insult to the realm of emotions is a person. Brief
reasons for opposition include:
•
Inability to assess moral losses
•
Impossibility of making Equivalent of moral damage to money
•
Unable to return to the former position with payment of money
•
Impossibility of eliminating the harmful effects of the practice and the lack
of congruity between the harm inflicted and the similarity of its financial And
the other reasons for such. (Eyvazi, 2013)
One major issue in this regard is whether compensation includes a financial
damage, or an intellectual one, too?
Some legal theorists believe compensation should be financial, but this theory is
questionable because first, as the time goes on, the same mulct does not fit the pattern.
Second, moral damage has historically included physical damage along with
financial loss instead of bloody revenges while financial compensation cannot rebuild every loss. Moreover, an intellectual compensation is the only solution when
a judge neglects financial compensation for it.(S; Hedayatollah, 2001) Although this
issue has not been clearly considered, these kinds of studies can help it forward.
Moreover, reasons such as chapter Nesa (Verse 58): “When judging between people,
be fair”, fig rules considering loss, disability, and rules including civil liability code
infer that any loss - intellectual, or financial - has to be compensated. (Raouf &
Angurajtaghavi, 2016)
Those who believe in restitution for moral damages, despite the fact that they
have pointed out to problems when trying to measure the damage in terms of money,
overall find it just to seek compensation for moral damages.
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They reason that the causal relationship between the action and the damage exists. Moreover, it is not possible to ignore the suffered damages and a form
of restitution must be made. Therefore, a judge must base the extent of the moral
damage, in terms of money, based on his judgment, the evidence and the expert’s
recommendation .(Katozian, 1985) The law experts do not hold different opinions on
the principle of compensation for moral damages. What they differ in is possibility of
monetary compensation for these moral damages. The main reasoning of those opposing financial restitution for moral damages is the difference in nature of physical
damage with moral damage, ethical aspect of it, immeasurability of moral damage
and disproportionality of compensation with respect to the damage.
Those who favor monetary compensation, do accept the problems and the fact
that the judge must not issue a ruling on making financial compensation for certain
moral damages, but claim that the justification for their belief is the monetary compensation is for partial carriage of justice and restitution for the moral damage which
somewhat pleases the harmed. Furthermore, they believe that the disproportionality
exists when dealing with crimes which harm the entire body, such as murder .(Mahdavi, 2006) In such cases, first of all, paying certain sum of money to the harmed
isn’t the only way of making restitution considered by the lawmakers. Most often,
the lawmakers have considered other measures as well. Second of all, the goal of
restitution is not returning the conditions to their original states. It is only a way to
sooth the pain and suffering of the harmed, and undoubtedly, paying certain sum of
money will make it easier for the plaintiff to deal with the losses. To this end, those
who favor monetary compensation, point to the laws of the Islamic Jurisprudence.
Iering, German lawyer, states that not compensating for moral damages and not holding the criminal responsible for the moral damages is far worse and inhumane than
monetary compensation.(Akhundi, 2006)
The criminal courts, even after the Islamic Revolution, have accepted compensation claims for moral damages. Petition number 1984/4/30-251-252 in the criminal
court number 2, branch 181 could be used as an example. This petition was about a
husband who falsely accused his wife of not being a virgin at the time of marriage. The
court ordered compensation of 300,000 Rials to be paid to the wife by the husband
to compensate for the moral damage suffered by the wife .(M;, 1985)
Ways of compensating for moral damages suffered as the result of a crime committed Methods of compensation for moral damages are not limitative, because in
compensation for such damages the important factor is restitutions not the method,
which is just a mean. In some cases, money may do the trick, and in some others, a
simple apology may be more effective than any amount of money.
Thus, even though the civil responsibility law in article 2 obligates the courts to
pass ruling in favor of compensating for the moral damages suffered, in article 3, it
states that the court shall decide on the degree of harm and the method of restitution
on a case by case basis.
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The prosecution will assign and expert to estimate the damage financially and
convict the offender. The court has the power to convict the offender to pay a certain
sum of money, restore the damaged property, pay its profit or accept the plaintiff’s
victory .(S; Hedayatollah, 1997)
The restoration made must be the same as what is damaged i.e. there has to be a
conventional relation between what is damaged and is given in return .(Hamid, 2011)
The purpose is not to rebuild the thing damaged, but to compensate it as much as
possible.(Fattah N, 2004) In fact, since the offender’s conviction reduces the victim’s
pain, and castigates the offender, social logic accepts it . (Hasan, 1977)
Therefore, the method of restitution is divided into two groups, financial and
non-financial. In the financial method, judge orders for a sum of money to be paid
to the plaintiff.
Generally, money payment is the most common way to redress and today judicial
bias is based on money payment for damage the judge by referring to article 3 of civil
liability and available option, can determine the way of redress, but there are some
rules that must be regarded such as:
The amount of money that pay for redress is equal to the amount of loss not the
degree and manner of fault and it is possible a simple fault leads to heavy loss and was
forced guilty to redress. Sometimes it is possible there isn’t any error but because of
special reason, law recognize the responsible (loss doer) as a sponsor. (Eyvazi, 2013)
In the non-financial method, different means such as making an apology, terminating the harmful act, publishing the crime in the press and/or a promise to stop an
act or to do something. .(Parvin, 2000)
The recreation of a reputation is the non-financial method for compensating
a damage stated in the Islamic criminal law, article 1 of the civil liability code, and
article 171 of the Iranian constitution. It can be accomplished in different ways including apology, announcement in mass media, etc. According to article 1 of the civil
liability code, a victim can claim financial and intellectual compensation against the
party inflicting the damage. The court can sentence the offender to announcement in
mass media or an apology. There is no limitation in this article, and the decision is on
the court. For example, if a person is brought to a court on the basis of a false report
regard illegitimate adultery, and his innocence is proved, he can claim for compensation against the court. The court will sentence the reporter to announce the victim’s
innocence in public. Article 19 of computer crimes also includes this.
The ruling to compensate for moral damages is complementary to the punishment sentence, and even in a ruling for Hadd to be carried out, the defendant could
be ordered to make monetary or non-monetary compensation for the moral damages
suffered. In case of Dieh, since it is not a punishment but a form of restitution for any
physical and moral damages, further monetary compensation could not be sought.
In such cases, non-monetary compensation is allowed. In cases where the amount of
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Dieh is not known, the courts must take the moral damages in consideration. Restitution for moral damages is not allowed in retaliation cases .(Parvin, 2000)
One kind of intellectual damage clearly mentioned in the Iranian criminal proceeding law (Art. 9, par.2) is mental damage .(S; Hedayatollah, 2014) One case is the
detention of an innocent person who has to request compensation within 6 month
after the final decision of the court.
The provincial commission including 3 members will confirm the compensation
based on the conditions in the law. The person can announce his protest against it to
the commission within 20 days after the decision on the basis of article 258.
The six-month term for protest is allocated because most decisions are protested in the first instance, but in the appeal the final decisions are made. It is
worth to note that a 20 day or 2 month term is set for the decisions made in the
first stance, and not protested within 6 months (article 431) . In conjugal relations,
the case may include misbehavior, yet, it is an offence, and penal liability relating to
assault and battery, but other cases lead to compensation in the way to prove the
offence. There is another instance in which the victim is not the offence’s spouse
but indirectly affected by the offence including the spouse’s addiction to drugs, or
his detention .(Homa, 2011)
Among instances of conjugal intellectual damages is violating certain agreements
including a negative social relation .The rights and responsibilities between spouses
need a positive relation between them, and the violation of the relation is an instance
of negative relation . Another instance is violating the marriage preconditions. Trickery,
avoiding sexual intercourse, and apostasy are the instances.
Another kind of conjugal damage is made by the husband confining his wife at
home, having her take care of his parents, and violating the legal number of wives
[38]. To compensate a conjugal damage considering the spouse’s negative relation’
the case should be considered different with intellectual damages outside conjugal
relation. The civil liability code (article 3) suggests that that kind of damage, family
condition, and the couple’s decision is effective in allocating compensation. The
damage may be compensating by a sum of money, or redempting some responsibilities from the wife, etc., but it might not work for a couple from a high social
class and need compensations including an apology, attending training classes etc.
(Mazaheri, 2013)
Another instance of compensation is legal divorce if the methods above do not
work. According to the civil law (Art.1130), if any problem from the husband’s side
enables the wife’s conjugal life troublesome, and impossible, she can request divorce,
and if the case is approved by the court, the husband is bound to divorce her . Sometimes living together with the wife makes intellectual damages for the husband; the
civil law does not consider the case. The quality of the couple’s rights enables the
husband request the court for a decision on temporary separation of the domiciles .
(Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016)
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Another method of compensating husband’s intellectual damages according to
the civil law (art.1108) is depriving the wife of her expenditure if she avoids living in the
same domicile with her husband. Besides the above methods, the prosecution can have
either of the spouses compensate damages according to the civil liability code (art.10) in
a nominal or non-financial method such as an apology. (Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016)
11- INTERNATIONAL LAW: AUTHORITY AND INSTRUMENTS
The fundamental norms of international law are contained in customary international law, and reflect widely accepted basic ideas about the nature of law, its elation
to legal wrongs, and the duty to provide recompense. The Permanent Court of Justice,
set up after World War I, gave the most authoritative renderings of his foundation
for the legal obligation to provide reparations. This most general international law
imperative was set forth most authoritatively, although without any equally general
prospect of implementation, in the Chorzow Factory (Jurisdictions) Case: ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation in an adequate form.’(Du Plessis, 2003)
The Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice involving the Israeli
Security Wall reaffirmed this cardinal principle in ruling that Israel was under an obligation to provide reparations to the Palestinians for damages sustained due to the
illegal wall built on their territory.(Scobbie, 2005)
A second equally important idea embodied in customary international law had
to do with the nationality of claims associated with wrongs done to individuals. In essence, this norm expressed the prevailing understanding that only states were subjects
within the international legal order, and that wrongs done to foreign individuals were
in actuality inflicted upon their state of nationality. Accordingly, if the individual was
stateless, a national of the wrongdoing state, or a national of a state unwilling to support the claim for reparations, there was no basis on which to proceed. This limiting
notion was expressed succinctly by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the Mavrommatis Palestine Case: ‘[b]y taking up the case of one of its subjects and
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a state is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’(Brownlie, 1990) It is important to
appreciate that these formulations were made before there existed any pretense of
internationally protected human rights.
A third important idea in customary international law, that has persisted, forbids
a state to invoke national law as a legal defense in an international dispute involving
allegations of wrongdoing by the injured state. Such a principle pertains to the setting of international disputes, which is where the main precedents and doctrines of
international law relative to reparations are fashioned.
Somewhat surprisingly, the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State
Responsibility, despite years of work, clarified to some extent this earlier teaching,
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refining and codifying it conceptually more than changing it substantively.(Crawford,
2002; Shelton, 2002) The ILC approach to remedial or corrective justice was based
on distinguishing between restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. Restitution is
defined in Article 35 as the effort ‘to re-establish the situation which existed before
the wrongful act was committed’. Such a remedy is rather exceptional. It is usually
illustrated by reference to the Temple case before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in which Thailand was ordered to return religious relics taken from a Buddhist
temple located in Cambodia.(Oliver, 1962) This primary reliance on restitution where
practicable has been recently reaffirmed by the ICJ in its ruling on Israel’s security
wall, an important restatement of international law although contained in an advisory
opinion, because it was endorsed by fourteen of the fifteen judges. The language of
the Advisory Opinion expresses this viewpoint with clarity in paragraph 153: ‘Israel is
accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other
immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution
should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the
persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has
an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international
law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result
of the wall’s construction.’ (Oliver, 1962)
Article 35(a) and (b) of the ILC Draft Articles indicates that restitution is not the
appropriate form of reparations in circumstances where it is ‘materially impossible’ or
would ‘involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation’.
Compensation, resting on the fungibility of money, is more widely used to overcome the adverse consequences caused by illegal acts. In the Chorzow case it was
declared that where restitution cannot be provided to the wronged state, then the
wrongdoer should be required to compensate up to the level of the value attributed
to whatever was lost, including loss of profits. Articles 36 and 37 go along with this
approach of full reimbursement, without qualifications based on capacity to pay.
Satisfaction is the third, and lesser known, manner of providing reparations. The
ILC Articles make it a residual category in relation to restitution and compensation.
As explained by du Plessis, ‘[s]atisfaction provides reparation in particular for moral
damage such as emotional injury, mental suffering, injury to reputation and similar
damage suffered by nationals of the injured state’.(Oliver, 1962)
Customary international law, as well as the ILC Draft Articles of State Responsibility,
impose an undifferentiated burden, as stated in Article 37, on the wrong-doing state ‘to
make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’. As such,
it gives very little guidance in specific situations where a variety of considerations may
make the grant of full reparation undesirable for various reasons, although commentary by the ILC on each article does go well beyond the statement of the abstract rule.
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International treaty law does no more than to restate these very general legal
ideas in a variety of instruments, and without the benefit of commentary attached to
the ILC articles. Because property rights are of paramount concern, the language of
reparation is not used, and the more common formulations emphasize compensation
for the wrongs suffered. The basic direction of these treaty norms also derives from
international customary law, especially legal doctrine associated with the confiscation of foreign-owned property. The legal formula for overcoming the legal wrong accepted in international law involved ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’.
Discussion of ‘restitution’ and ‘satisfaction’ is abandoned as the wrongdoing states
are acknowledged by the United Nations to possess ‘permanent sovereignty’ over
natural resources.(UN General Assembly, 2014b)
The United Nations Charter does not define the term ‘human rights’, although it
contains a clear prohibition of discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion.
The absence of a human rights catalogue in the Charter led to a continuing effort to
define and codify human rights, beginning with the adoption, on 10 December 1948,
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.(Shelton, 2015)
The codification effort in the United Nations and its specialized agencies has
resulted in a vast body of international human rights law including on the right to a
remedy.(Shelton, 2015)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights shifts the locus of relief to national
arenas and away from international disputes between sovereign states.
Individuals are endowed with competence, and the notion of wrongdoing is generalized to encompass the entirety of human rights. Article 8 reads: ‘Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental human rights granted him by the constitution or by the law.’ Of course,
such a right tends to be unavailable where it is needed most, although the existence
of the right does provide a legal foundation for reparation in future circumstances
when political conditions have changed.(Shelton, 2015)
The Universal Declaration was followed, in 1965, by the United Nations Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Schwelb, 1966) and, in
1966, by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)(Hoag, 2011) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).(Craven, 1995)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains three separate
articles on remedies. According to Article 2(3):
Each State Party to the . . . Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as . . . recognized [in the
Covenant] are violated shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have the right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities,
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or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.(Craven, 1995)
Articles 9(5) and 14(6) add specific guarantees that anyone unlawfully arrested,
detained, or convicted shall have an enforceable right to compensation or be compensated according to law.(Craven, 1995)
The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Article 6, also contains
broad guarantees of an effective remedy including ‘protection’ by national tribunals
and other state institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination, as well as the
right to seek from such tribunals ‘just and adequate reparation or satisfaction’ for any
damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.(Page, 2006)
The treaty leaves open the question of what forms of reparation or satisfaction
are required, as well as the question of how broadly the term ‘victim’ should be interpreted and who is liable for reparation or satisfaction.(Lerner, 1980)
Upon signing ICERD, six states made declarations regarding Article 6, including
the UK, which said it interpreted the requirement in Article 6 concerning ‘reparation
or satisfaction’ as being fulfilled if either of these forms of redress is made available.
It further interpreted ‘satisfaction’ as ‘including any form of redress effective to bring
the discriminatory conduct to an end’.
The reference to ‘protection’ in CERD Article 6 seems to anticipate the use of
injunctive or other preventive measures against discrimination, as well as compensation or other remedies for consequential damages. A similar provision is found in the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, whereby
the states parties undertake to establish ‘legal protection of the rights of women on an
equal basis with men’ and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other
public institutions ‘the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination’.(UN General Assembly, 1979)
Article 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1978) particularizes a
‘Right of Compensation’ in a limited and overly specific manner: ‘Every person has
the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event that he has
been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice.’ It seems to
refer exclusively to improper behavior of the state associated with criminal prosecution and punishment within the judicial system. It is available only on the basis of an
individual initiative.
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Other
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) imposes on parties the obligation to ‘ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible’. Again, the emphasis is on the legal duty of the state to provide
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individuals who are victims with a remedy within the domestic system of laws. That
is, victims are not dependent on governments of their nationality pursuing claims on
their behalf, nor are nationals barred from relief by the obstacle of sovereign immunity.
Unusually, the provision also explicitly guarantees remedies to ‘dependents’ of
those who die from torture.
A combination of criminal prosecution and civil redress appears in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,(Faso,
2014) as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.(Dennis, 2000)
The remedies of Article 24 of the Disappearances Convention extend for the benefit of anyone forcibly disappeared and ‘any individual who has suffered harm as the
direct result of an enforced disappearance’ (Art. 24(1). Each such victim has the right
to know the truth, the progress and results of the investigation into the disappearance
and the fate of the missing person. Article 24(3) requires each state party to ‘take all
appropriate measures to search for, locate and release disappeared persons and, in the
event of death, to locate, respect and return their remains’. The legal system of each
state party is to ensure that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to
obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation. Article 24 goes on to
specify that reparations include ‘material and moral damages and, where appropriate,
other forms of reparation, such as: restitution; rehabilitation; satisfaction, including
restoration of dignity and reputation; and guarantees of non-repetition’.(Faso, 2014)
Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) refers to specific
forms of reparations for children that should aim to promote their physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration. ‘Such recovery and reintegration shall
take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the
child’.(UN General Assembly, 2014a)
The CRC Protocol adds that states parties must ensure that the acts referred to in
the Convention are made criminal offences punishable by ‘appropriate penalties that
take into account their grave nature’ and take measures of forfeiture against proceeds
and assets involved in such offences. It also provides a lengthy list of measures on
behalf of the victims, detailed in Articles 8 and 9, that include informing children of
their rights, providing support services to them, protecting their privacy and identity
during criminal proceedings, protecting the victims and their families, avoiding unnecessary delay in prosecutions and awards of compensation to child victims, and
taking ‘all feasible measures with the aim of ensuring all appropriate assistance to
victims of such offences, including their full social reintegration and their full physical and psychological recovery’. States parties are to ensure that there are adequate
procedures in place for child victims to seek, without discrimination, compensation
for damages from those legally responsible.
The UN Convention on Migrant Workers has several specific provisions on remedies, guaranteeing the right to fair and adequate compensation for expropriated
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property (Art. 15), an enforceable right to compensation for unlawful arrest and
detention or miscarriage of justice (Arts. 16(9), 18(6)), equality of treatment before
courts and tribunals and the right to a fair and public hearing before a competent,
independent, and impartial tribunal (Art. 18), the right to seek compensation for
an expulsion order carried out before all appeals are exhausted (if the decision is
subsequently annulled), and the right to consular or diplomatic assistance to assist
with remedies. In addition, Article 83 generally provides that each state party undertakes to ensure effective remedies to anyone whose rights or freedoms guaranteed
by the treaty are violated, a fair hearing on claimed violations, and enforcement of
any remedies granted.
Several International treaties refer to the right to legal protection for attacks on
privacy, family, home or correspondence, or attacks on honour and reputation.(UN
General Assembly, 1948; Unicef, 1989; United Nations, 1988; Wojcik, 1994)
Other specific remedies are explicitly guaranteed in the law on indigenous rights,
which has developed significantly in the last three decades.(Wiessner, 2011)
ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries(Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, 1989) refers to ‘fair compensation for damages’ (Art. 15(2)), ‘compensation
in money’ (Art. 16(4)) and full compensation for ‘any loss or injury’ (Art. 16(5)). Article
15 refers to the common situation of states owning or claiming mineral or sub-surface
resources or rights to other resources on indigenous lands.(Pasqualucci, 2009)
Before exploring or extracting such resources, states ‘shall consult these
peoples’;(Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005) the communities concerned also ‘shall wherever
possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages’.(Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005)
Article 16 concerns another frequent scenario: when indigenous peoples have
been evicted or displaced from their lands. It guarantees a right to return to their
traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. In the event
such return is not possible ‘… these peoples shall be provided in all possible cases
with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development’.
(Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005)
If communities prefer ‘compensation in money or in kind’, they may exercise that
option. (Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005)
In sum, International instruments generally include provisions requiring domestic
remedies and often specify preventive measures as well as types of remedies that
must be provided.
Certain treaties, like the Convention against Torture and the Convention on
Forced Disappearances, also require investigation, prosecution and punishment of
perpetrators.
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
11-1- Regional treaties
Regional human rights systems differ from the International ones in establishing courts and other tribunals to hear complaints from those claiming to be victims
of human rights violations committed by a member state.(Shelton & Carozza, 2013)
However, the systems emphasize the duty of states to provide domestic remedies.
International procedures are subsidiary and only available if domestic remedies fail
or are exhausted.
Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985)
similarly obligates parties to ‘undertake to incorporate into their national laws regulations guaranteeing suitable compensation for victims of torture’. In the absence of
case law it is difficult to know what this standard might mean in practice, and whether
it is purely aspirational or represents a genuine effort to acknowledge the full spectrum of injury that often results from torture and severe abuse. Beyond this duty of
the state, Article 8 allows persons alleging torture to internationalize their claims for
relief ‘[a]fter all the domestic legal procedures of the respective State . . . have been
exhausted’ by submitting their case ‘to the international fora whose competence has
been recognized by that State’. (Kaplan, 1989)
11-2- The European Convention on Human Rights
Within the European regional system there is a right of an individual in Article
50 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950) to seek ‘just satisfaction’ in the event that national law provides
‘partial reparation’ due to injury sustained as a result of a violation of the Convention.
A proceeding of this nature would fall within the authority of the European Court of
Human Rights. Here, too, the idea is to provide individuals with a remedy at the regional level beyond what is available within the national legal system.
The Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted by Western European nations in
1949, provides that every member must accept the principles of the rule of law and of
the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Its system for the protection of human rights is based on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and its protocols, plus the
European Social Charter. Council membership is de facto conditioned upon adherence
to the European Convention.
The ECHR, signed 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953.249
As originally adopted, it guaranteed a limited number of civil and political rights,
considerably expanded by the adoption of later Additional Protocols to the Convention. The European Convention was the first treaty to create an international court
for the protection of human rights and to create a procedure for individual denuncia72
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tions of human rights violations in addition to inter-state complaints. The European
Court of Human Rights (European Court) issues judgments in which it may afford ‘just
satisfaction’ to the injured party, including compensation for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.(Coblentz & Warshaw, 1956)
The ECHR declares that ‘the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the
decisions of the Court in any case to which they are parties’ (Convention, Art. 46(1)).
The Committee of Ministers supervises compliance with the judgments.
The ECHR contains several provisions on national remedies. The first provision,
Article 6, guarantees access to justice and the right to a fair hearing.(Buergenthal, 1977)
Article 13 provides ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity’. In addition to these general provisions, Article 5(4) guarantees a right of
habeas corpus and Article 5(5) requires compensation be afforded for unlawful arrest.
Article 13 has been referred to as ‘the most obscure’ provision in the
Convention(Arai, 1998) because of its seeming suggestion that access to a remedy is
required only after a violation has been demonstrated—proof of which would require
access to a remedial authority.
This circularity was noted in early decisions of the European Court. In Klass and
others v. Germany(Mowbray, 2004) the Court noted that Article 13, read literally, seems
to say that a person is entitled to a national remedy only if a ‘violation’ has occurred;
but a person cannot establish a violation before a national authority unless he or she
is first able to lodge with such an authority a complaint to that effect. Thus, according
to the Court, Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy ‘to everyone who claims that
his rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated’,(Mowbray, 2004) a
ruling that the Court repeated in Silver v. United Kingdom, one of the few early cases
where the Court found a violation of Article 13.(Gomien & Eide, 1993)
The Court said that ‘[a] n individual who has an arguable claim to be the victim
of a violation of one of the rights in the Convention is entitled to a national remedy
in order to have his claim decided and if appropriate to obtain redress’.(Janis, Kay, &
Bradley, 2008)
The Committee of Ministers sought to reinforce Article 13 and uphold the system
with a recommendation adopted in 1984 that calls on all Council of Europe member
states to provide remedies for governmental wrongs.(Green & Barav, 1986)
Principle I of the recommendation says:
Reparation should be ensured for damage caused by an act due to a failure of
a public authority to conduct itself in a way which can be expected from it in law in
relation to the injured person. Such a failure is presumed in case of transgression of
an established legal rule.
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DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI
Principle V adds that reparation under Principle I should be made in full. The Commentary indicates that the victim must be compensated for all the damage resulting
from the wrongful act that can be assessed in terms of money.
12- CONCLUSION
Trespass against the physical wholeness and the moral reputation of others is
considered to be a crime and requires punishment. Trespass to the moral aspect of
the self is considered as moral damage. This includes non-monetary damages such
as spiritual losses, defamation of character, and profanity against the sacred religious
and national values.
Moral harm is compensated with cash, other property or by other ways. The size of
monetary compensation for moral damage is defined by court decision, which depend
on the nature of the offense, the depth of physical and mental suffering, deterioration
of the victim skills or his (her) deprivation of feasibility for their use. Also the size of
compensation depends on the degree of guilt of the person which caused the moral
damages, if guilt is the basis for reimbursement, as well as on other circumstances
which are significant. In determining the amount of reimbursement, court take into
account the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. Moral harm is compensated
regardless of the property damage, which is refundable, and is not associated with the
size of this reimbursement. Moral harm is compensated only once, unless otherwise
is stipulated by contract or law.
The necessity of paying attention to moral damages is clearly mentioned in the
laws governing civil liability, constitution, Islamic punishment and the press. It is hoped
that the judicial trend in Iran start paying more practical attention to this crucial issue,
and the regulating agencies remove any forms of ambiguity and pass necessary laws
that fill the legal loop holes pertaining to the issue of moral damages.
Based on what was said, both in Iran and in Human Rights Conventions, moral
damages have been accepted. The obligation to provide effective remedies is an essential component of international human rights law. A state that fails to fully protect
individuals against human rights violations or that denies remedial rights commits an
independent, further breach of law. International instruments do not clarify, however,
what are considered to be ‘effective’ remedies. Nor do they indicate what remedies
should be made available through international procedures in the event a state fails to
afford the necessary redress. It is thus necessary to look at the theory and practice of
national and international tribunals to determine what constitutes an effective remedy.
In the past, international tribunals seemed unwilling to recognize the importance
of their decisions, not only in providing a remedy for past abuse, but in persuading
those in power to comply with human rights norms in the future. Now they seem
more convinced that effective enforcement of norms can influence the incidence of
violations.
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Municipal legal concepts and the law of state responsibility influence remedies for
international law violations and there has been considerable expansion of the scope of
redress afforded during the past decade. Consistency and principled decision-making
can help avoid forum shopping, provide remedies for victims, incite national action
to bring wrongdoers to justice, and enhance the legitimacy of international tribunals.
It seems, common methods of compensation for moral damages, according to
legal texts in Iranian law are stopping or eliminating the source of losses, oral apologizing from the injured party, practical or written apologizing, or printing apology in
the press, rehabilitation of the injured in any other way, paying property or money for
the injured. In whole, it seems moral damages, in Iran laws and especially in Iranian
courts are very obsolete.
According to the above explanation, it is suggested to the Parliament that in
legal texts related to special review and approval of the Civil procedure bill, which
is the original position of moral damages principles, it should predict illustrated and
comprehensive Articles, and fill the vacuum available and establish an important law
in the Principle 171 of the constitution, develop it and present the issue, clearly. The
judiciary and the courts of the country are considered the second valid source of the
laws of the country.
By establishing firm and strong approaches, they should welcome demands
about moral damages and try to provide the rights of good people, in this territory.
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3
Procedural actions concerning appeal in
civil dispute under Kosovo legislation
Rrustem Qehaja
Professor of Civil Procedural Law at the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina” PhD
Prof. Dr. Rrustem QEHAJA, has completed basic and postgraduate studies at
the Faculty of Law, University of Pristina, in the Republic of Kosovo. Whereas, he is
doctorated in civil legal sciences at the University of Tirana in Albania. At the beginning
he used to work as an assistant, later as a lecturer, and now is in Advanced Prof. Asoc.
at the Faculty of Law at the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina” in Prishtina,
Republic of Kosova. He lectures contested civil procedure, noncontested civil procedure
and insurance law. He has published several scientific articles in several national and
international journals, and has also been part and he is acting as an expert in several
vital projects in Kosovo legal system.
rrqehaja@yahoo.com
rrustem.qehaja@uni-pr.edu
Abstract
In this scientific paper shall be handled the description of undertaking procedural
actions on the purpose of conducting procedure according to appeal against civil
judgment.
Appeal represents a regular legal remedy with suspensive effect in comparison to
extraordinary legal remedies of attacking civil decisions which do not have suspensive
effect.
Therefore, a special attention shall be paid to the handling of appeal in procedural
terms as well actions concerning the appeal, but not to causes from which the appeal
may be submitted as a regular legal remedy, deadlines and decisions rendered by a higher
degree court, and not only regarding local level how this issue is regulated by our legislation
respectively by the Law on Contested Procedure (LCP) provisions, but also broader.
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RRUSTEM QEHAJA
Keywords: Appeal, Court, Civil procedure, Contest, Law on Contested Procedure
1.
INTRODUCTION
Based on the fact that one of the fundamental rights of every citizen is his right to
attack a decision of any state body in cases when he does not agree with that decision
and claims that by that decision it has been made any injustice to him, hence due
to this intention the legislator has foreseen legal remedies with special importance
within this group takes the appeal.
Conducting procedure according to appeal in legal-civil context is preceded by
the submission of appeal from the dissatisfied party with the court decision which
may act within legal deadlines and only if it comes to the fulfillment of at least one of
determined causes by provisions of the Law on Contested Procedure (hereinafter LCP).
2.
LEGAL REMEDIES AND THEIR MEANING
Legal remedy is one of the most important legal instruments in contemporary
countries through which to every individual is guaranteed the protection of rights and
freedoms known by national and international legal acts.
A court decision, like any human act, may be flawed and with errors.1 Therefore,
legal remedies represent instruments through which a party who is not satisfied by a
rendered court decision in a particular procedure in which it was subject to it, to attack
that decision and by that to request that decision to be reviewed or to be annulled in
order to recognize its right. For correction of decisions’ errors, it is accepted by different
procedural systems the reviewing of case by another court through attacking these
decisions with special legal remedies called means of attacking decisions.2
By this is created the possibility through submitting legal remedies, to be rendered
a fairer court decision, where a new decision shall be rendered as a consequence of
control and critical review of a decision rendered in the previous trial and that a new
trial shall be conducted by a higher court, whose judicial panel consists of judges
supposed to be more qualified than judges of the first instance.3
By means of attack is implied the procedural remedy through which a party or
any other authorized person from a competent court requires to annul or change the
decision he claims to prove that is unfavorable, unfair and unlawful to him.4 Thus, by
this procedural remedy this party expresses its dissatisfaction to the rendered decision
in a particular procedure. Appeal is a legal remedy which the law makes available to
1.
2.
3.
4.
80
Brati, Alban A.; Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2008, pg. 435.
Brestovci, Faik; Civil Procedural Law II, (Fourth reprint) Prishtina, (2006), pg. 62.
Brati, Alban A.; Op.cit., pg. 435.
Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 62.
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PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION
the parties in order to provoke a new trial, through which is hoped to regulate flaws
and errors of a previous rendered court decision.5
Due to this reason, from the subjective point of view, the means of attack represent
the power and right known by the law to a subject, in order to request for a new
reviewing of case and rendering a new court decision by a higher court. Whereas from
the objective point of view, it represents the act by means of which is exercised this
power and this right, by including also the internal procedure initiated by this act. 6
Appeal is an act through which parties or other participants to the process submit
before of the Court of Appeals their objections against a final decision of the district
court.7
2.1. Use of legal remedies, as a basic right
The right to appeal by using legal remedies of attacking decisions is a basic human
right guaranteed by Declarations and International Conventions, as well as by Constitution
and national laws. This right is protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
under articles 88 and 10.9 Likewise, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms foresees and guarantees this right under Articles 610
and 13.11 This right is also a constitutional category, where the Constitution of the Republic
of Kosovo as a contemporary document that meets the parameters of a democratic
state, based on the principles of liberty, peace, democracy, equality, respect for human
rights and freedoms , the rule of law, non-discrimination, property rights, environmental
5.
6.
7.
8.
Brati, Alban A.; Op.cit.,, pg. 435.
Ibid., pg. 436.
Terihati, Franc: Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2015, pg. 237.
Article 8: “Everyone has the right to an effective recourse before competent national jurisdictions
for acts that violate the fundamental rights recognized to him by the constitution or law.”
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly by its 217A (III) resolution of 10 December, 1948.
9. Article 10: Everyone has the right, in full equality, to have his case handled fairly and publicly by an
independent and impartial tribunal, which has to decide in terms of his rights and obligations, as
well as concerning any accusations in the criminal court directed against him. “
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly by its 217A (III) resolution of 10 December 1948.
10. Article 6: “Everyone has the right to be heard fairly, publicly and within a reasonable time by a legally
established independent and impartial tribunal that decides either on claims that may arise against his
rights and obligations of a civil character, whether to determine if any charges of a criminal nature directed
against him are grounded” (Parts from Paragraph 1 of this Article).
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950.
11. Article 13: “Any person to whom the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention have been violated
shall be entitled to submit an effective remedy before a national instance, even where such offense may
be committed by persons acting while exercising their official functions “.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950.
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RRUSTEM QEHAJA
protection, social justice, pluralism, state power sharing and market economy,12 foresees
this right under Article 32,13 Article 5414 and Article 102, paragraph 515.16
Such decision is also accepted and proclaimed by the European Court of Human
Rights: “Anyone in criminal process, whether in civil process, should have the possibility
to present to the court rightfully, his case, under conditions that do not set him in a
significantly disadvantaged situation in relation to the opposing party.” 17
2.2. Legal remedies in contested procedure
Legal remedies bearing in mind the fact that are procedural actions by means of
which parties and other authorized persons in procedure attack the decision which
they consider to be unlawful and unfair and request to the court of legal remedy after
verifying merits of their claims to change or annul it by its own decision, these attacking
legal remedies have been foreseen in all procedural law areas: In civil proceedings
(contested, non-contentious and execution proceedings) in criminal proceedings and
in administrative proceedings.18
Based on this, is implied that also in contested procedure as one of the main
civil procedures are allowed legal remedies in terms of attacking rendered decisions
in this procedure, by providing in this manner the maximum protection of human
rights. When it comes to procedure it is necessary to make a distinction between legal
remedy in broad aspect and legal remedy in narrow aspect.
Legal remedies in broad aspect include in addition to legal remedies in narrow
aspect also several other legal remedies allowed by law, but in systematic terms the
legislator does not regulate them as in sections where are regulated regular legal
remedies of attacking decisions. As such is rejection according to payment order
(according to the provision of Article 497 of LCP), and the request for returning to
12. Omari, Luan; The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in a comparative observation, Tirana, 2009,
pg. 7.
13. Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies): “Everyone has the right to use legal remedies against judicial and
administrative decisions that violate his / her rights and interests in the manner determined by law.”
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008.
14. Article 54 [Judicial Protection of Rights]: “Everyone has the right to judicial protection in the case of
violation or denial of any rights guaranteed by this Constitution or by law, as well as the right to effective
legal remedies if it is found that such a right has been violated.”
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008.
15. Article 102, paragraph 2 (General Principles of the Judicial System): “The judicial power is unique,
independent, fair, apolitical and impartial and provides equal access to the courts.”
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008.
16. Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Commentary, The Law on Contested Procedure, (LCP - Edition I), Pristina,
2012, pg. 346.
17. Cited by: Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Albania (Enriched with Judicial Practice), 1996, pg. 267.
18. Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 62.
82
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previous situation (Article 129 of the LCP). As such legal remedy could be considered
also the request to change a court decision under Article 141 of LCP. Hence, these
legal remedies are legal remedies in a broad aspect by means of which the appellant
aims to change or even abrogate a court decision.19
Legal remedies in narrow aspect are considered to be all legal remedies by means
of which is attacked a court decision. Legal remedies in narrow aspect may be listed
according to different criteria. They are divided into legal remedies (ordinary) and
irregular legal remedies (extraordinary). 20
In the Law on Kosovo Contested Procedure, 21 in Chapters XIII and XIV, are
foreseen rules concerning means of attacking decisions. The Law itself legally foresees
the distinction between legal remedies (ordinary) and irregular legal remedies
(extraordinary) of attacking decisions.
In Chapter XIII, articles 176 up to 210 of the LCP are foreseen rules concerning
regular legal remedies of attacking decisions. Whereas in Chapter XIV, articles 211 up
to 251 of the LCP, are regulated in detail the so-called extraordinary legal remedies.22
By ordinary legal remedy of attacking decision is implied that legal remedy which
is allowed up to the moment when a decision becomes final in formal terms. Which
means such legal remedy is filed against a decision which did not yet become final and
as such obstructs the finalization of the decision, while the second instance court (and
in some cases the third instance court) render a decision about it. As a legal remedy
(ordinary) under this law is the appeal against judgment and appeal against a ruling.23
Whereas as extraordinary legal remedies of attacking decisions are those legal
remedies which can be submitted after the decision has become final in formal terms.
Consequently against the same decision at the same time cannot be submitted the
regular legal remedy and extraordinary legal remedy. As extraordinary legal remedies
of attacking decisions are: Revision, request for Protection of Legality and proposal
for Repetition of Procedure.24
Legal remedies are divided also into evolutive and devolutive remedies. By
devolutive character of a legal remedy is implied the fact that in relation to a submitted
legal remedy shall be decided by court of a higher instance from the one who has
rendered the attacked decision.25
19. Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Commentary, Law on Contested Procedure, (LCP - Edition I), Pristina,
2012, pg. 346.
20. Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63.
21. Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted on
30 June, 2008.
22. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345.
23. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63.
24. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345-346. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63.
25. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 64.
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There is also a division into suspensive and non-suspensive legal remedies. Legal
remedies have a suspensive character when they suspend the execution of a court
decision, whereas lack this feature when they do not stop the execution of a court
decision. Appeal against judgment is always of a suspensive character, whereas appeal
against a ruling in principle has this characteristic, but to several rulings the appeal
does not have a suspensive character. Extraordinary legal remedies do not have a
suspensive character, although, according to circumstances of a concrete case, court
may decide to suspend the execution of a decision until proceedings related to that
legal remedy comes to an end.26
There is also a division into unilateral and bilateral legal remedies. A legal
remedy is unilateral if a court decides upon it without having the need to give the
possibility to the opposing party to declare concerning its content. On the contrary
a legal remedy is bilateral if to the opposing party should be given the possibility
to declare concerning claims that the complainer filed. Unilateral means of attack
is solely appeal against ruling. All other legal remedies of attacking decisions are
bilateral.27
There is also a division into independent and dependent legal remedies. Means
of attacking decisions are usually independent, and by using them independently may
be attacked all court decisions. There are few exceptions to this rule, and they have
to do with appeal against several rulings of the first instance court.28
3.
PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO APPEAL AGAINST JUDGMENT
In the procedure initiated according to appeal acting the court of the first instance
which rendered the attacked decision, (judex a quo), as well as the court of the second
instance, which is competent to decide on merits concerning appeal (judex ad quem).29
Procedure according to appeal against judgment is conducted into two sections: In
the first one acts the court of the first instance whereas in the second one acts the
court of the second instance.
3.1. Procedure at the first instance court
The appeal shall be submitted in sufficient copies to the first degree court which
rendered the attacked decision (Article 185 of LCP). All this procedure is conducted
by the presiding judge who also finds that appeal is filed on time under the law and
whether it is complete or permissible. If the appeal is flawed, then the appeal is
26.
27.
28.
29.
84
Ibid., pg. 63-64.
Ibid., pg. 64.
Ibid., pg. 64-65.
Brestovci. Faik, Morina, Iset & Qehaja, Rrustem, Civil Procedure Law, Contested procedure, Prishtina,
2017, pg. 420.
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returned to the appellant to complete it. The appeal presented after the deadline
foreseeable by the court, the incomplete one, or the illegal one the court can reject
with a decision of the first degree without setting a court session.
A sample of the appeal presented timely, legally and complete, is sent within
seven days to the opposing party by the court of the first degree complain, that can
be replied with presentation of an appeal within seven days (Article 187).
After this, the first instance court within seven days, prepares the complete file
of case concerning appeal and reply to appeal and sends it to the second instance
court. If the appellant claims that in first instance court procedure have been violated
provisions of contested procedure, then court should give explanations concerning
appellant’s claims (Article 188 of the LCP).30
3.2. Procedure at the second instance court
In the second instance court, is assigned a relevant judge by the president of
the judicial panel based on the internal regulation on courts. The rapporteur judge
plays a decisive role in a concrete process and is obliged to actively deal with the
submitted appeal. In Albania, the rapporteur is appointed by lot.31 He is entitled to
request for additional explanations from the court first instance, which was competent
regarding the concrete case. The law does not set a deadline within which the court
of first instance should give explanations. Whereas by bearing in mind the principle of
efficiency in the procedure as a fundamental principle in the judicial civil proceedings,
then the first instance court must give clarifications within a reasonable period of time
(Article 189 of LCP).32
Concerning the appeal, the second instance court decides either at the main
trial hearing or at the judicial panel hearing. In principle, it reviews the case only
at the judicial panel hearing. Exceptionally, the appeal is reviewed at the main trial
hearing.
New facts cannot be presented through the appeal, or new proof, except when
the appellant presents new proofs which couldn’t be presented by no fault of the
appellant, specifically they should be presented until the main hearing of the first
instance court. For discussion, the court of second instance shall determine a direct
examination for the case even if the verdict of the first instance court was twice
annulled, and in the case when court evaluates that the verdict against which an appeal
is filed was based on essential violation of provisions of contestation procedure, or
when the factual state was evaluated wrongly or incompletely. The court of second
instance can determine evaluation of the case when it estimates that for a rightful
30. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 366-372. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 83-85.
31. Tafaj, Kola, Flutura & Vokshi, Asim: Civil Procedure, Part II, Tirana, 2014, pg. 295.
32. See: Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 372-373. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 85.
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factual state is to be determined and all or partial proofs administered in the court of
first instance should be considered (Article 190 of LCP).33
In cases when the court determines a hearing for the main trial, then general rules
are applicable, which are also applicable concerning procedure before the first instance
court. However, certain rules are applicable only to the court of second instance.
The court will summon parties and their representatives for the main trial hearing.
All rules are applicable as in the court of first instance. The court may summon as well
as witnesses and experts if necessary. In this case it is more expressed the principle
of investigation rather than the principle of reviewing.
In case of appellant or the opposing party absence, cannot be rendered a judgment
because of disobedience or absence, which would be conducted in the procedure of
the first instance, where would be concluded that party either waived or the appellant
has withdrawn the appeal. In case of one or both parties are absent court acts based
on these documents: appeal and the reply to appeal. As a matter of fact the procedure
is conducted by acting on the basis of the documentation contained in the case file
from the content of which depend decision-making concerning the appeal.
Court on summons shall notify the parties about legal procedural consequences
of not attending the hearing. This procedural legal consequence consists in the fact
that the court shall decide regardless whether the parties will reply to the summons
or not (Article 191 of LCP). 34
The court hearing for the main trial is conducted in accordance with the rules
as in procedure of first instance court. Hearing is conducted with the presentation
of case by a relevant judge, which has no right to express his opinion on the merits
of the appeal. After the rapporteur’s report, the verdict is read, or its attacking part.
After this, the verdict is read or just the part involving the appeal and when needed
the record in the final hearing in front of the court of first instance is read. Than, the
appellant justifies its appeal, while the opposing party responds to the appeal.
Primarily in civil judicial procedure the administration of evidence is made
directly, as it is in the first instance court, but there are also exceptions. Therefore
also in the second instance court, if there is a proof that can’t be used directly, the
court decides to read the record covering the part of that specific proof (Article 192
of the LCP).35
Everything determined by this law regarding to the first instance court procedure
adequately can be implemented in the procedures of the second instance court (Article
193 of LCP).36
33.
34.
35.
36.
86
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 373-374. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 85-86.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 375-376. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 86.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 376-377. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 86.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 378.
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4.
BOUNDARIES OF EXAMINING THE ATTACKED DECISION
The second instance court acts only within limits of what was required by an
appeal. Otherwise it would commit a violation of procedural provisions. Likewise,
the appellant cannot be put in a worse legal position with the decision of the second
instance court, than it was with the decision of first instance court (Article 203 LCP).
The second instance court shall only deal with that part of judgment for which
was filed an appeal. The other part of judgment which was not attacked by appeal
cannot be subject of review by the second instance court due to the fact that part has
become final in formal and material meaning.
The second instance court is limited also concerning causes of appeal, so shall deal
only with those causes that were submitted by the party in appeal. However, court ex
officio shall consider essential the violations of absolute importance and whether the
substantive law was properly applicable. Of course the court shall not deal with these
issues by its own initiative, but only after the appeal has been submitted against the
verdict of the first instance court.
The Law by article 194 of the LCP is limited to several essential causes of procedural
provisions. Thus, the second instance court shall consider ex officio essential violations
of absolute importance according to provision of the article 182, par. 2 sub. b), g),
j), k) and m) of the LCP. Which implies for other violations of procedural provisions
according to the provision of Article 182, par. 2 of the LCP, the law does not provide
any clarification. Therefore, from the provision of Article 194 of the LCP it appears that
the court of second instance shall not be able to deal ex officio with essential violations
of absolute importance, according to article 182, paragraph. 2 subparagraph. a), c),
d), e), f), h), i), l), n) and o) of the LCP.
The same applies also concerning essential violations of relative importance,
since with these violations shall deal solely the second instance court if the appellant
has requested such a thing (Article 194 LCP).37
5.
DECISIONS OF THE SECOND INSTANCE COURT ACCORDING TO APPEAL
Article 195 of the LCP also provides that the second instance court shall examine
the appeal either at the panel of judges hearing or at the main trial hearing, in detail
and specifically by law determines how this court shall act. These decisions are defined
in detail due to the fact by these provisions are foreseen all possible decisions of the
second instance court:
a) Dismiss the appeal that arrives after the deadline, it’s incomplete or illegal;
b) Annul the attacked judgment and reject the indictment;
37. Ibid., pg. 378-379.
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c) Annul the attacked judgment and return case for re-trial at the court of the
first instance;
d) Reject the appeal as unfounded and verify the attacked decision;
e) Change the decision of the first instance court.
Concerning these, the court of second instance decides either by a ruling or by
a judgment.38 The law does not require that a party in its appeal to propose to the
second instance court what decision should be render according to its opinion. If a
party does such a thing this is not binding to the court. But the second instance court
may annul the attacked judgment although a party has proposed its amendment and
vice versa (Article 195 LCP).39
5.1. Dismissal of appeal
The appeal presented after the deadline foreseeable by the court, the incomplete
one, or the illegal one the court can reject with a decision of the first degree without
setting a court session. According to Article 196 of the LCP, the appeal that is delayed,
incomplete or not allowed can be dismissed by the second instance court with a verdict,
if it wasn’t done initially by the court of the first instance. 40
5.2. The annulment of judgment and its return to retrial
The second instance court decides by ruling to annul the decision of the first
instance court and returning the case for retrial at the first instance court. The LCP
in Article 197 explicitly provides cases in which the court acts in this manner, the
following cases are:
a) If in opposition with provisions of this law, the court has rendered a decision
based on confession or the decision was rendered based on withdrawal from
the lawsuit;
b) If any of the opposing parties with an illegal act, especially due to the irregular
summon the party was not given the opportunity to attend the hearing and
this act had influenced in rendering of legal and rightful decision;
c) If the court has brought a decision without conducting a main trial of legal
case;
d) If a judge who according to the law should be excluded from the trial
participated in bringing the decision.41
38.
39.
40.
41.
88
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 380-381.
See: Brestovci, Faik; Op. cit., pg. 87.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 381. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 88.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 382. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89.
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When the second instance court revokes the decision of the first instance court
and the case is sent to the same for retrial, the court can decide that another judge
resides over the case. The second instance court may decide that the case to be retried
by another court with the same subject matter jurisdiction if there is no other judge
in the competent court which could be dealing with the retrial of the case (Article
198, par. 3 of the LCP).42
LCP by the article 199 referring to articles 197 and 198 LCP provides that
immediately upon arrival of the case from the second instance, the court of the case
should set a preliminary session or trial session for the main hearing, which should
take place within thirty (30) days of the decision arriving from the second instance
court, the court should also conduct all procedural actions, re-examine all contesting
issues offered by the court of the second instance in their verdict.43
5.3. Annulment of judgment and dismissal of indictment
The second instance court by its ruling annuls the judgment and dismisses the
indictment as inadmissible in all cases in which such a thing should have been made
by the first instance court. The court acts like this when it concludes that the legal case
submitted by an indictment does not fall within the judicial jurisdiction (Article 198
paragraph 1 of the LCP), when it concludes there is a negative procedural presumption
(Article 198 paragraph 2), or when it concludes the absence dealing with the capacity
to be a party, with procedural capacity and with the representation of a party, cannot
be avoided even in a retrial by the court of first instance (Article 198 of the LCP). 44
5.4. Rejection of appeal and confirmation of judgment
The court of the second instance through a decision will reject the appeal as
ungrounded, thus verifies the decision of the first instance court if it decides that
there are no causes that affects the decision, nor causes for which is entitled to deal
according to the official task. In these two cases, this second instance court judgment
becomes final in both formal and material meaning at the moment of delivery of the
verdict to the parties (Article 200 LCP). 45
5.5. Amendment of judgment
The second instance court by judgment changes the attacked verdict, deciding
on the object of the dispute. According to article 201 of the LCP the second instance
42.
43.
44.
45.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 383-384. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 384. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89.
See: Brestovci, Faik; Op. cit., pg. 89-90.
See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 385. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 88-89.
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court can change the decision of the first instance court in the college session, or on
the basis of examination of the main issue directly through a decision, if it decides
that one of the under mentioned causes are presenting the appeal:
a) If it considers that there is a violation of the provisions of the contestation
procedures expect the ones mentioned in the article 197 of this law;
b) If in the college session through a different evaluation of the file and proofs
received indirectly, it ascertains different factual circumstances from the ones
in the decision of the first instance court;
c) After direct examination of the case, based on new proofs, or based on
newly possessed proofs administered by the first instance court, it ascertains
different factual circumstances from the ones in the decision of the first
instance court;
d) If it considers that the factual state in decision of the first instance court is
rightly ascertained but substantive law has been applicable wrongly from the
court of first instance;
e) If it has found that with the judgment of the first instance it is over passed
the claim so that it is accepted more than what has been requested by the
claim.46
The amendment of judgment by the second instance court decision cannot be
done in disadvantage of the appellant, if it is the only one who appeals (Article 203
and LCP).
6.
REASONING OF THE SECOND INSTANCE COURT DECISION
The LCP, by Article 204, dismisses the second instance court from the obligation
to give a general reasoning of its decision. So this decision should not contain the
reasoning part as it is the case with the decision of the first instance court. But in
certain cases it must present the decisive facts on the basis of which the decision
was rendered, as if it was the rendering of a judgment on the merits of the appeal.
After all, any eventual violation of this provision can not constitute grounds for filing
a revision because of the violation of procedural provisions.47
7.
RETURNING FILE TO THE FIRST INSTANCE COURT
The second instance court returns all writs related to the case to the first instance
court with a considerable amount of samples of its decisions to be sent to the parties
and other interested parties, as well as a sample for the first instance court. The second
46. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 385-386. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 90.
47. Ibid., pg. 388. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 91.
90
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instance court shall do this in a period of thirty (30) days from the day the verdict was
rendered. This administrative judicial matter for sending the case to the first instance
court is regulated by the provision of Article 205 of the Law on Contested Procedure.48
Conclusion
Conducting the contested procedure is characterized by a series of actions related
to the procedural actions of disputable parties during the development of the first
and second instance court proceedings.
It is the right of parties included to civil contest not to be satisfied by the first
instance court decision, therefore, the plaintiff the respondent or both parties are
entitled to attack the respective decision by appeal, which represents a regular legal
remedy.
By appeal within determined legal deadline may be attacked all types of civil
judgments regardless of whether the party participated during conducting contested
civil procedure or not, respectively the court has ruled by judgment on the absence.
This circumstance is of special importance due to the fact it determines timelines
to file an appeal which in principle is 15 days, with certain exceptions.
Maintaining legal deadline for submitting the appeal constitutes a fundamental
and formal issue whether the court shall examine the appeal or the same will be
rejected as delayed.
Court actions concerning the appeal are categorized into two groups, in those
undertaken by the first and second instance courts. These actions should be welldefined so the appellant shall not be damaged concerning time aspect in terms of
waiting for the appeal to be reviewed by the Court of Appeals that in judicial practice
unfortunately occurs many times, this due to the fact that delayed justice is not any
type justice.
References
Brestovci, Faik; Civil Procedure Law II, (Fourth Reprint) Prishtina, 2006.
Brestovci, Faik, Morina, Iset and Qehaja, Rrustem: Civil procedural law, contested procedure,
Pristina, 2017.
Brati, Alban A .; Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2008.
Grupa autora, Komentari Zakona o Parnicnom Postupku u Federaciji BH i RS, Sarajevo, 2005.
Jaksiq, Aleksandar: Gradjansko procesno pravo, Beograd, 2013.
Morina, Iset - Nikci, Selim; Commentary, Law on Contested Procedure, (LPK – First Edition)
Prishtina, 2012.
Ristic, Vukasin dhe Ristic, Millosin: Praktikum za parnicu, Beograd, 2000
Omari, Luan; Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in a comparative observation, Tirana, 2009.
48. Ibid., pg. 388-389. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 91.
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Qehaja, Rrustem: Appeal against the judgment in civil contested procedure, “Jeta juridike”,
No. 1/2013, Tirana, 2013.
Tafaj, Kola, Flutura and Vokshi, Asim: Civil Procedure, Part II, Tirana, 2014.
Terihati, Franc: Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2015.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General
Assembly by its resolution 217A (III) on December 10, 1948.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November
4, 1950.
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on
June 15, 2008.
Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted
on June 30, 2008.
Law no. 04 / L-118 on Amending and Supplementing the Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested
Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted on September 13, 2012.
Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Albania (Enriched with Judicial Practice), 1996.
92
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4
Translation from Romanian
The obsolescence of the court,
the evolutions of its application
in the new civil procedure code and the
shortcomings of the law,
pending the reform1
Dr. Cristina Elena Popa2
Associate scientific researcher - the Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy,
Associate in the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators,
Arbiter and mediator in Vienna International Arbitral Centre,
Member of Arbitral Women
Abstract
The respect of the equality of rights, and of the non-discrimination liability,
involves taking into account the treatment provided by the law for the ones to which
it is applied, throughout the period while its regulations are effective, legal treatment
that cannot be different. The present paper brings into debate a very serious problem,
the settlement of which consists of the analysis of the constitutionality and/or
of the shortcomings of the law by reference to art. 3 of Law no. 76/2012 for the
1.
2.
This paper is written during the susteinability stage of the project entitled „Horizon 2020 - Doctoral
and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness
and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”, contract
number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through
Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in
people!
e-mail: cristina@adrlegal.ro
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017
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93
DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA
enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, in the context
of the special obsolescence of the court, considering the provisions of art. 46 comma
(1) of Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of certain immovable properties
which had been abusively taken over during the period March 6 1945-December
22, 1989 (by which the suspension cannot last for an unlimited period of time,
without the obsolescence to operate, according to the regulations provided by the
old Civil procedure code). It shall be further checked whether the principle of nonretroactivity of the civil procedural law – in terms of the obsolescence of the civil
action – is compatible with art. 6 of the CEDO convention which guarantees the
right to an equitable trial, but also if the litigants who are parties to proceedings
under the old law are somehow discriminated compared to those who are parties
to proceedings under the new law and to whom is applied the privilege of special
obsolescence within 10 years.
Results from this study that Romanian law is located on a transition phase. Reform
of areas of law becomes imperative.
Keywords: reform, transition law, obsolescence, Civil procedure code, constitutionality.
Preliminaries
Pursuant to the provisions of art. 248 comma (1) of the Civ. Pr. Code since 1865, any
sue petition, contestation, appeal, recourse, review, shall become obsolete by law within
one year, if they have remained not worked by the party’s fault. The institution of the
obsolescence of the court did not exist in the regulation of the Civ. Proc. C. 1865, but this
type of obsolescence was somehow provided by art. 1891 of the Civ. code of 18643. We
must specify the following: The civil procedure code of 1865, in its initial form, provided,
at art. 257, a term of obsolescence of 2 years, and further on, through the amendments
made in the year 1948 (assigning the texts a new re-numbering, so that art. 257 became
art. 248 )- the term was reduced to 1 year in civil matters and to 6 months in „commercial”
matters and in forced execution matters (art. 389 of the Civ. Pr. c. of 1865).
3.
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The Civil Code was decreed on November 26,1864 enacted on December 4, 1864 and enforced on
December 1, 1865. Art. 1891 provided that: The courts initiated and slacked shall be obsoleted,
in the absence of a request for pre-emption, by 30 years calculated since the latest procedural
deed, whichever the prescription term of the actions following which those instances may have
been initiated might be. Law no. 394/1943 for the acceleration of the judgements in civil and
commercial matters, effective since15.09.1943 until 01.03.1948, which had been abrogated by
Law no. 18/1948 and replaced by the Civil Procedure Code of 1865, enshrined at art. 64: The
obsolescence under the conditions provided by art. 257 of the civil procedure, operates by full
law. Following the expiry of the obsolescence term, any procedural deed remains inoperative.
The obsolescence may be ascertained upon request made by the party concerned or of the own
motion. It may be proposed also by way of exception. The obsolescence operates also in the
processes in which the procedure is made of the own motion, unless it has been insisted on the
establishment of the hearing.
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The new Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code, was
republished in the Official Gazette, Part I no. 247 as of April 10, 2015, pursuant to
art. XIV of Law no. 138 as of 2014 for the amendment and supplementation of Law
no. 134 of 2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, and for the amendment and
supplementation of certain connected normative deeds, published in the Official
Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 753 as of October 16, 2014, assigning to the texts a
new numbering. Among the aims of the4 elaboration of the Code have been both the
modernization of the regulation of the civil legal relations and the organic and detailed
regulation of the rights of the persons and of the related defence and of the matters
of liabilities according to the European trends in the contracts field.
In the New Civil Procedure Code was introduced art. 423 according to which
any request addressed to a court and which has remained un-processed for 10 years
shall be obsolete by law, even in the absence of reasons attributable to the party. The
provisions of art. 420 apply accordingly.
The sanction of obsolescence of the court ensures the final closure of the requests
over which the courts have acquired jurisdiction and which have unreasonably
remained in the records of the later for longer periods of time, without the plaintiff to
have performed any step (procedural action) in order to settle the case or without the
plaintiff to have shown any kind of interest as far as stage of the later is concerned.
Has been established therefore, a special obsolescence - the obsolescence of
the court, which is different respect to the obsolescence of the request, due to the
fact that: the obsolescence of the court intervenes as a sanction no matter which
the cases which have determined the trial to remain not worked might have been,
without any relation to any fault of the party; this type of obsolescence regards all
the requests addressed to the court, and the term of obsolescence is of 10 years
due to a more permitting system of penalties; upon the expiry of the 10 years
term, the special obsolescence of the court, intervenes even in the cases when the
obsolescence of the request was unable to produce effects. The institution of the
special obsolescence of the court is governed by the same procedural rules regarding
the invocation, the settlement and the generation of the effects as in the case of
the obsolescence of the request.
4.
These aspirations are included, in addition, in the explanatory memorandum which laid at
the basis of the draft of this normative deed, point 1.1. specifying very clearly that :„ The New
Civil Procedure Code represents the natural continuation of the reform of the Romanian judicial
system, a rational consequence of the entry into force of the new Civil Code. The procedural-civil
legislation creates the framework for capitalization by way of justice of the new substantive legal
rules, setting-out the bodies, the forms and the procedural means necessary for their enforcement.
The substantive reform of the substantive law and the organic inter-dependency between the
substantive rule and the procedural one, rendered necessary the elaboration of an appropriate legal
instrument in the procedural field - the new Civil procedure code - which might assign efficiency
to this reform, introducing standards which fulfil the requirements of a modern, fast, close to the
litigants institution.”
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1.
THE SPECIAL OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT AND THE PROVISIONS OF
ART. 46 COMMA 1 OF LAW NO. 10/2001 REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME
OF SOME IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ABUSIVELY TAKEN
OVER DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 6, 1945-DECEMBER 22, 19895
The High Court of Cassation and Justice has decided 6 that the suspension of the
judgement of the case pursuant to art. 47 comma (1)7 of Law no. 10/2001, in view of
the administrative settlement of the notification, shall produce its effects by the time
the decision issued for the enforcement of such law remains irrevocable, being not
contested by the party entitled to the return. From now on, the suspension ceases, and
the obsolescence term regains its proper course, the parties involved in the judgement
of the trial being bound, within the term of one year enshrined by art. 248 comma (1)
of the old Civ. proc. code, to communicate to the court the res judicata of the decision
by which the request for return of the immovable property in kind was settled. The
Decision no. 5632 as of December 4, 2013 delivered in the appeal by the 1st Civil Section
of the High Court of Cassation and Justice having as an object the obsolescence of the
appeal. The full text of this decision may be read on the official online page dedicated
to the case law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice: http://www.scj.ro/1258/
Jurisprudenta, link last accessed on 04.03.2017.
Pursuant to the provisions of art. 248 comma (1) of the Civ. Pr. Code since 1865,
any sue petition, contestation, appeal, recourse, review, shall become obsolete
by law within one year, if they had remained unprocessed by the party’s fault. We
acknowledge that, pursuant to art. 250 comma (1) of the Civ. pr. c., the course of the
obsolescence is suspended as long as endures the judgement suspension, ruled by
the court in the cases enshrined at art. 244, and in other cases established by law,
unless the suspension was not caused by the lack of insistence by the parties to the
judgement. It may be asserted that the suspension has been disposed in one of the
cases contemplated by the law, respectively by Law no. 10/2001, and that the existence
of a reason contemplated by law is not nevertheless sufficient to suspend the course
5.
6.
7.
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Art. 46. - (1) The provisions of this law are enforceable also in the case of the actions in course of
judgement, the person entitled being able to choose the way of this law, waiving the judgement of
the case or requesting the suspension of the case. (2) In the case of the actions formulated pursuant
to art. 45 and 47, the return procedure which has been initiated under the hereby law is suspended
until the settlement of those actions through a final and irrevocable judicial decision. The entitled
person shall notify immediately the notified person, pursuant to art. 22 comma (1). (3) If to the entitled
person has been rejected, through a final and irrevocable judicial decision, the action regarding the
return in kind of the requested asset, the notification term provided at art. 22 comma (1) shall run
from the date when the judicial decision remains final and irrevocable.
The Decision no. 5632 as of December 4, 2013 delivered in the appeal by the 1st Civil Section of the
High Court of Cassation and Justice having as an object the obsolescence of the appeal. The full text
of this decision may be read on the official online page dedicated to the case law of the High Court
of Cassation and Justice: http://www.scj.ro/1258/Jurisprudenta, link last accessed on 04.03.2017.
Currently, this article became, by re-numbering, art.46 of Law no. 10/2001.
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of the obsolescence. According to the afore-mentioned provisions, it is moreover
necessary that this suspension – although enshrined by the law – be not generated
by the lack of insistence by the parties to the proceedings.
Not for last, must be taken into account also the circumstance that there are
pending with the courts of law cases suspended during the years 2001-2002, which
are, therefore, in suspension for over fifteen years, obviously with the infringement
of the principle of celerity, a general principle regulated also by the old civil procedure
code, regulation which does not include nevertheless a maximal rigorous delimited
term. These situations in which are actually about 10,000 litigants are obviously,
unrelated to the judgement of the case with celerity, the later having as an aim the
very removal of the uncertainty in which the parties are, through the restoring as soon
as possible, of the infringed rights and through the reinstatement of the lawfulness
which must govern all the legal relationships in a rule of law state, which represents
the guarantee of a fair trial.
2.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY RELATED ISSUES OR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
LAW?
Under the afore-described conditions, it is brought into debate a very serious
problem, the settlement of which consists of the analysis of the constitutionality of
art. 3 of Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the Civil
procedure code, according to which (1) The dispositions of the Civil procedure code
apply only to the trials and to the forced executions initiated following the entry into
force of the later. (2) The trials initiated through requests submitted, under the law,
at the post office, at military units or at penitentiaries before the entry into force of
the Civil procedure code remain subjected to the old law, even if they are registered at
the court of law after such date. It shall be further checked whether the principle of
non-retroactivity of the civil procedural law – in terms of the obsolescence of the civil
action – is compatible with art. 6 of the CEDO convention 8 which guarantees the right
8.
The Convention for the defence of human rights and of fundamental freedoms, elaborated in
the European Council, opened for signing in Rome, on November 4, 1950, became effective on
September 1953. In the spirit of its authors, it is about adopting the first measures meant to ensure
the collective guarantee of some of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948. The Convention enshrines, on the one hand, a series of civil and political rights and freedoms
and establishes, on the other hand, a system which aims the guarantee and the compliance by the
contracting states with the liabilities taken by them. By Law no.30 as of May 18, 1994, published in the
Official Gazette no.135 on May 31, 1994, Romania ratified the European Convention for the defence
of the Human Rights (C.E.D.O.), as well as the additional Protocols to the later no. 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10.
According to the provisions of art.11 and 20 of the Constitution, the Convention and its additional
Protocols have become an integrant part of the national law, having priority compared to the later,
in other words, C.E.D.O. and the additional protocols have become a compulsory and priority source
of national law, which, on a national level, has as an immediate consequence the enforcement of
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to an equitable trial9, but also if the litigants who are parties to proceedings under the
old law are somehow discriminated compared to those who are parties to proceedings
under the new law and to whom is applied the privilege of special obsolescence within
10 years. Pursuant to art. 21 of the Romanian Constitution, any person may address
to justice in order to defend its legitimate rights, freedoms and interests, the parties
being entitled to a fair trial and to the settlement of the cases within a reasonable time
period. Introduced by the Law for the revising of the Constitution no. 429/2003, the
provisions regarding the reasonable term for case settlement represents a rule which
has been directly taken over from the European Convention of Human Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms, which, as the very authors of the revising law have indicated
at that time, was intended to represent a guarantee of the ”fact that the justice, as
a public service, ensures the defence of the rights and freedoms of the citizens, with
the removal of any vexatious means and of any tergiversations (...), means by which
are infringed the rights of the litigant and is compromised the quality of the act of
justice”. Similar provisions are contemplated also in Law no. 304/2004 regarding the
judiciary organization, with further amendments and supplementations, which at art.
10 enshrines that all the persons are entitled to a fair trial and to the settlement of the
cases within a reasonable term, by an impartial and independent court, established
under the law.
The result obtained from the enforcement strict sensu of the legislation in force,
shows a different situation in which the citizens are, according to the regulation
enforceable according to the tempus regit actum principle, as it cannot be regarded
by the courts as an infringement of the constitutional dispositions, the judges often
invoking it, an example in this sense being the Constitutional Court Decision no.
1541/201010 which invokes the Decision no.820 of November 9, 2006, published in the
the convention and of the protocols by the Romanian courts of law, and on an international level,
the acceptance of the control provided by C.E.D.O. with regard to the national judicial decisions.
9. The judgement of the trial within a reasonable term aims at removing the uncertainty in which
the parties are, through the restoring as soon as possible, of the infringed rights and through the
reinstatement of the lawfulness, which must govern all the legal relationships in a rule of law state,
which represents a guarantee of a fair trial. For instance, CEDO has ascertained in the case Corabian
against Romania , the infringement of article 6 comma (1) - the right to a fair trial - from the Convention
and, respectively, of art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol (the right to the peaceful enjoyment of
the property) to the Convention. Another case in which has been ascertained such an infringement
has been the case Abramiuc against Romania.
10. DECISION No.1.541 of November 25, 2010 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the
provisions of art. II comma (4) of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 209/2008 for the
amendment of Law no.19/2000 regarding the public system of pensions and other social security
rights, published in the Official Gazette no. 30 as of 13.01.2011 includes in its considerations the
reference to the Decision no. 820/2006, the full text of both decisions being available on the official
internet site of the Romanian Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/
SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on 04.03.2017.
../../../../Documents and Settings/user/Sintact 2.0/cache/Legislatie/temp/00137381.HTM - #
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Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 39 of January 18, 2007,which established that
“the different situation in which the citizens are according to the regulation enforceable
under the tempus regit actum principle cannot be regarded as an infringement of the
constitutional dispositions which enshrine the equality before law and before public
authorities, without privileges and discriminations”. It is worth noticing that in this
argumentation are motivated judicial decisions, even if the afore-mentioned decision
precedes the Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2000 regarding
the Civil procedure code.
The respect of the equality of rights, and of the non-discrimination liability,
involves taking into account the treatment provided by the law for the ones to which
it is applied, throughout the period while its regulations are effective, legal treatment
which cannot be different.
Basically, the unconstitutionality of a text of law cannot be claimed through the
bare comparison between the old regulation and the new one, nor can it apply to any
kind of cases. Another decision of the Constitutional Court which is often claimed when
debating the unconstitutionality of the text of law to which we are referring, is the
Decision no. 1038/201011, but we must underline again both the fact that the decision
is earlier to Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the
Civil procedure code, and the fact that such decision has a different scope and refers
to a case which is different in terms of the legal ground.
3.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Pending with the Bucharest Court of Law, IVth Civil Section, has been identified
the case file no. 730/3/2001 (96/2001), having as a scope real estate claim, suspended
upon the plaintiffs’ request on 29.11.2002 pursuant to art 47 (1) of Law no. 10/2001. The
defendant has repeatedly attempted, the re- docketing of the case 12, facing repeated
11. The DECISION no.1.038 of September 14, 2010 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the
provisions of art. 44 comma(1) lett.a) of Law no.303/2004 regarding the statute of judges and of
prosecutors, published in the Official Gazette no. 742 as of 05.11.2010, in which case the Court has
established on the grounds of the rejection of the exception, that: ”The principle of equal treatment
does not mean uniformity, so that, if to equal situations must correspond an equal treatment, in the
case of different situations, the legal treatment cannot be otherwise but different. The infringement
of the equal treatment and of non-discrimination principle occurs when to equal cases is applied
a differentiated treatment, without an objective and reasonable motivation. ”This is nevertheless
the very argument which lays at the basis of the lacuna existent in the law which regulates the new
special obsolescence; the full text of the decision is available on the official website of the Romanian
Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on
04.03.2017.
12. In support of the assertion that leaving the case unprocessed since 29.11.2002 until now (for
over 13 years) is completely unrelated to the aspiration regarding the celerity of the civil trial
and moreover to the right to a fair trial, we acknowledge inclusively the provisions of art. 423
of the New Civil Procedure Code. Thus, under these legal provisions, the obsolescence of the
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solutions of rejection, insufficiently motivated, especially against the background of
certain suspicions that currently, most likely, the plaintiffs might be no longer alive,
that their proxy has died, this being a certain fact, etc.
In the case, it has been ascertained that the plaintiffs have initiated the proceedings
for the recovery of their asset by formulating a notification during the year 2001, and the
relevant authority in the field of restitution has replied through a circular letter, saying
that the real estate property could not be returned in kind, and that the complainants
shall be issued instead a decision for the granting of the relative compensations. The
plaintiffs did not complete other formalities, showing passivity and lack of insistence
in the exercise of their legal rights, although they would have had available against the
relevant authority, as the case might have been and according to the moment of the
action, both an action in administrative contentious, having as a scope the binding for
the issuance of the administrative deed, and an action for the binding of the authority
to reply to the notification. Accordingly, the plaintiffs, throughout the case suspension
term (currently the case having been suspended for 15 years), did not submit other
documents on the file the settlement of which has been suspended by law. Of course,
they could have filed an action in administrative contentious, pursuant to the provisions
of art. 16 of Law no. 247/2005, as such provisions were effective on that date, and an
action (according to their effective situation) pursuant to art. 25 comma (1) of Law no.
10/2001, under the form in which the later has been amended, provision in the sense
that to the General Mayor of the Bucharest Municipality, as a representative of the
unit holding the afore-mentioned real estate property, devolves the liability to express
an opinion with regard to the notification, within 60 days since its registration or, as
the case may be, since the date of submittal of the documents in proof, it had been
taken into account that the authority did not express itself with regard to the relevant
notification. This term may be calculated starting from two reference dates, according to
the peculiarity of each and every case, respectively, either from the date of registration
of the notification (in the situation in which all the documents-in-proof necessary to
settle the notification had been submitted along with it), or from the date on which all
the documents-in-proof have been submitted.
The defendant, taking into consideration the possibilities expressed by the applicable
texts of law, has repeatedly formulated requests for re- docketing, for the verification of
the actual situation both regarding the court file, and regarding the administrative file, all
court operates in the case of any request which has remained unprocessed for 10 years, with
the consequence of the obsolescence by law even in the absence of reasons attributable to the
party. It is certain that such provisions do not apply to the current litigation, but the intention
of the legislator to establish a special obsolescence (called by the legislator the obsolescence
of the court) with a 10 years term, is a further argument in support of the idea that leaving the
current case unprocessed for over 13 years is inacceptable and contrary to the principle of legal
certainty. Practically, if we accepted a contrary thesis, it would mean that this case might remain
pending forever.
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of them having been rejected by the court, which preferred to maintain the suspension,
without performing other checking in terms of aspects which might have been directly
related to the insistence of the plaintiffs, considering that the suspension was that type
of suspension which operated by law, under the afore-mentioned conditions.
On the other hand, as we have mentioned, one of the guarantees enshrined by art.
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is the principle of celerity of the judicial
proceedings; the reasonable term imposed by art. 6 includes, within its meaning, also
the length of the preliminary administrative proceedings, especially when the possibility
to refer to a jurisdiction is obviously conditioned by the internal law rules and by the
compulsory running of such a proceeding, as in the present case. In order to meet the
reasonable deadline, the state must organize the system of its own powers, so as to
answer to this requirement, despite the difficulties generated by various factors which
might delay proceedings, the administrative proceedings included. Nevertheless, the
parties concerned do not obtain a justification or an excuse for the lack of insistence
in exercising their rights.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that this case file falls for certain, under the scope
of the Report issued by the Judicial Inspection regarding the result of the activity for the
monitoring of the files older than 10 years and pending on the dockets of the courts of
law during the 1st semester of the year 201513”, approved during the meeting of the
Section for Judges of the Superior Council of Magistracy, held on January 21, 201614. The
13. According to the communicate issued by the Superior Council of Magistracy on 22.01.2016, document
which may be viewed by accessing the official website of the Superior Council of Magistracy: http://
www.csm1909.ro/csm/linkuri/22_01_2016__78538_ro.htm, last accessed on 04.03.2017, among
the reasons which have determined the excessive extension of the term for the settlement of the
cases, is also the change along the time of the composition of the panels of judges, the taking of
several procedural cycles, the submission with delay of the technical expert reports or of a complex
evidentiary basis, disclaimers of competence, changes of venue of some case files, the suspension
of the judgement for extensive periods of time, the admission of the extraordinary remedies at law
at a big interval of time from the date of the initial settlement of the case, the failure to perform
the checking regarding the suspended files, the lack of the active role of the courts, the assignment
of hearings with a long duration or with an inadequate duration considering the delay reasons, the
subsequent delay of the ruling, as well as the motivation with delay of the judge decisions.”The
Section for Judges considers that an excessive duration of the judicial proceeding may undermine
the right to a fair trial of the parties. Accordingly, these cases must benefit from greater attention
by the judges, through the assignment of short terms and through the disposal of all the procedural
measures which might contribute to accelerating the judgement. Starting 2012, the activity for the
monitoring of the case files which are in the judicial system for over 10 years, has represented a
permanent activity of the Judicial Inspection. The monitoring regards the compliance with the legal
provisions regarding the settlement with celerity of the cases, in order to increase the degree of
accountability of the judges”, has specified the representative of the Superior Council of Magistracy.
14. The content of this Report may be viewed online on the official website of the Judicial Inspection
of the Superior Council of Magistracy: http://www.inspectiajudiciara.ro/News.aspx, at page no.3 of
the box reserved to news, last accessed on 04.03.2017.
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monitoring regards the compliance with the legal provisions regarding the settlement
with celerity of the cases, in order to increase the degree of accountability of the judges.
We consider that the solution of keeping the case on the docket is contrary
inclusively to art. 6 of the CEDO convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial.
These dispositions with value of a principle guarantee to any of the parties - therefore
also to the defendant and to the intervener - and not only to the plaintiff, the right
to a fair trial. But, in this case, leaving the case unprocessed for such a long period of
time has actually nothing to do with the fair character of the trial, since it prejudices
the sub-acquirer of the claimed asset, by the fact that the existence of the controversy
pending is practically equivalent to the removal of the asset from the civil registry. As
long as the ownership title upon the real estate is a litigious right, any act of disposition
upon the same real estate is paralyzed.
4.
CONCLUSIONS
Is it possible that the issue which makes the scope of the debate in this study, more
precisely this difference of juridical treatment resulted following the modification of the
civil procedure code, might not represent a constitutionality-related problem, but one
of succession in time of the law which applies only for the future15? Is it possible that
the same procedural exception might have a different legal regime of implementation?
Thus, each time a new law brings modifications to the previous legal dispositions in
terms of certain social relationships, all the effects generated before its entry into force
can no longer be modified following the adoption of the new regulation16.
Is has been noticed moreover also an inefficiency of the direct applicability/
implementation of the CEDO conventional provisions and case law, in the absence of
15. If the answer is yes, why did the legislator, for instance, through Law no. 202/2010 regarding
certain measures for trials settlement acceleration, provide at Art. XXVI the following”
The provisions of art. 26 comma (3) of Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of some real
estate property which had been abusively taken over during the period March 6, 1945—December
22, 1989, republished, further amended and supplemented, as well as with those brought through
this law, by art. 132 comma (9) of Law no. 31/1990regarding trade companies, republished, further
amended and supplemented, and with the ones made through this law and the ones of art. 4 comma
(6) and of art. 5 commas (1) and (2) of Law no. 221/2009 regarding political convictions and the
administrative measures assimilated to the later, ruled during the period March 6, 1945—December
22, 1989,further amended and supplemented, and with the ones made through this law, apply also
to the trials pending at the court of first instance, unless a decision has been ruled in the case by the
date of entrance into force of the hereby law?
16. The DECISION no.1.105 of September 8, 2011 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the
provisions of art. I point 46 of title I of Law no. 247/2005 regarding the reformation in the field of
property and justice, as well as some accompanying measures, published in the Official Gazette no.
783 as of 04.11.2011; the full text of the decision is available on the official website of the Romanian
Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on
04.03.2017.
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an express regulation in the case of the un-reasonability of the term for the settlement
of the proceedings, argument which leads us to consider that the aspects related to
the litigants’ actions in the case of the excessive extension of the case settlements, is
a fundamental problem of the Romanian legal system, and the problem referred to
in this study, brings into the attention a requirement which is mandatory in order to
guarantee the right to a fair trial.
Under this circumstance, to the extent in which the old regulation did not establish
a deadline which might interrupt the effects of the obsolescence, we consider that it is
both a liability of the courts of law (which must assume the important role of improving
and unifying the juridical practice), and the liability of the legislator, to regulate this
shortcoming of the new Civil procedure code. The legal problem results from the
legislative enforcement process (being still uncertain whether by this, the equality
of rights of the citizens was infringed or not), shortcoming which is self-evident, with
regard to which the relevant courts have proven their inability, although, generally
speaking, the judicial practice has the role to solve even such situations.
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5
The fluid recovery in class actions
executions in Brazil and the Diffuse Rights
Defense Fund (FDD)
Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma
LLM in Law at the Federal University of Paraná. Member of the Comparative Civil Procedure Law
Nucleum at the Federal University of Paraná. Lawyer.
fernanda.fujiwara@gmail.com
Abstract:
In the execution of class actions in Brazil, something that is especially important
is the administrative funds for being the current destination of the pecuniary damages.
It is an institute that, supposedly, has as main function to operate the fluid recovery.
It seeks to repair the legal asset in the best possible way, when a specific injunction is
impracticable. However, at the same time, it moves away from the idea of an execution
connected to the jurisdiction and the potential of the injunctions determined to operate
in the case. Thus, based in an analytical methodology, we seek to study the configuration
and performance of the main fund in Brazil, which is Diffuse Rights Defense Fund
(FDD). From the origin of its resources to the problem of their proper destination we
seek, above all, to highlight the conflict of the need to repair the originally harmed
legal asset in the best possible way, with the way the funds operate, that is openly
disconnected from the adjudicative process.
Keywords: pecuniary executions; class actions; administrative funds; fluid
recovery
Resumo:
Na execução dos processos coletivos no Brasil uma figura que ganha especial
importância é a dos fundos administrativos, o atual destino das condenações
pecuniárias. É instituto que, supostamente, tem como principal função operar a
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
reparação fluida e buscar reparar o bem jurídico da melhor maneira possível quando
uma tutela específica torna-se inviável. Entretanto, ao mesmo tempo, afasta-se de
uma execução ligada a jurisdição e das potencialidades dos provimentos executivos do
juiz. Assim, a partir de uma metodologia analítica, busca-se o estudo da configuração
e atuação do principal fundo no Brasil, que é o Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos
(FDD). Da origem de seus recursos ao problema de sua adequada destinação, buscase, sobretudo, atentar ao conflito da tentativa de reparar o melhor possível o bem
jurídico originalmente lesado com o funcionamento dos fundos, que é abertamente
desvinculado do processo.
Palavras-chave: execução pecuniária; processos coletivos; FDD; reparação fluida
Summary: 1. Introduction 2. Executions of class actions in Brazil and the
designation to funds 3. Paradigm for analysis: the FDD 4. Resources and their
destination: the problem of the subordination to the LOA 5. Fluid recovery? 6.
Conclusion
1.
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the execution is extremely relevant within the class action
system, although it has been left a little aside by the doctrine. Nevertheless, it is
a fundamental part of the procedure and it is crucial to keep in mind that it is the
execution that makes it possible to verify the effects that the class action can operate
in the real world.
It is mainly under this approach that the study of execution must be developed: as
something that is organic to the jurisdiction and connected to a procedure committed
to protect rights.
Thus, this study begins with a panoramic view of the execution of class actions
in Brazil. Especially, we analyze how its configuration gave rise to the fluid recovery,
because of a legal prediction that allocates the class actions’ residual damages to a
fund.
Next, we analyze the Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD), a federal fund that can
be considered the main one in the Brazilian system because of its organization and
bulky resources – therefore a paradigm for the analysis of the others. In addition,
it is fundamental to face one of the main problems that the use of the funds
involve: its submission to the Annual Budget Act and its connection with the State’s
administration.
Finally, we analyze its function in contrast to the fluid recovery that was originally
drawn in the US legal system and we try to question whether or not the Brazilian
institute can be considered a fluid recovery.
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
2.
EXECUTIONS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE ALLOCATION TO
FUNDS
In general, the execution of class actions in Brazil unfolds in one way for diffuse
and collective rights and in another for individual homogeneous rights; it is a division
due to the similarity of the procedures to be adopted in each case.
The diffuse and collective rights strictu sensu have a transindividual character,
distinguished, mainly, by their indivisibility, their unavailability and their non-patrimonial
essence that reflect immensely in the form of their execution. The best form of
protection is the preventive one, that acts in a way to avoid the injury to happen; and
specific: in case it happens it should be repaired in natura and as a fully as possible,
so as to preserve the nature of the right and keep it whole for all its owners.1
Moreover, a fundamental characteristic of the execution of diffuse and collective
rights is their mandatoriness, which is to say that the plaintiff’s representative cannot
give up executing a favorable decision for the represented ones.2 So that, in cases of
their omission, there is a legal provision3 deliberately enforcing this special: in these
cases, the execution must be promoted by a representative of the Public Prosecution
Service.
Thus, in the protection of collective assets, the judicial measures adopted must
maintain or restore their fundamental characteristics and guarantee their use in
equal conditions of quality and quantity, for all holders. The maintenance of these
characteristics can only be done through the complete recomposition of the damaged
asset; otherwise, it will not contemplate the plurality of interests connected to it.4
In attention to that, there are the provisions on specific injunctions, obligations to
do and not to do, both in the Consumer Defense Code (Act n. 8.078/1990), especially
in article 84 and in the Civil Procedure Code (Act n. 13.105/2015), in articles 536 to
538.5 Because of that, there is the possibility to use all sorts of injunctions, aiming at
more adequate provisions to protect the rights.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000. p. 94.
VENTURI, E. Idem, p. 106.
It is stated in the Popular Action Atc: BRASIL. Lei n.º 4717/1965. Art. 16. Caso decorridos 60 (sessenta)
dias da publicação da sentença condenatória de segunda instância, sem que o autor ou terceiro
promova a respectiva execução, o representante do Ministério Público a promoverá nos 30 (trinta)
dias seguintes, sob pena de falta grave. And in the Public Civil Action Act: BRASIL. Lei 7347/1985. Art.
15. Decorridos sessenta dias do trânsito em julgado da sentença condenatória, sem que a associação
autora lhe promova a execução, deverá fazê-lo o Ministério Público, facultada igual iniciativa aos
demais legitimados.
SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução específica e a Ação Civil Pública. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.). A
Ação Civil Pública após 20 anos: efetividade e desafios. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais,
2005. p. 86.
About that: MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Tutela Específica (arts. 461, CPC e 84, CDC). São Paulo:
Editora: Revista dos Tribunais, 2000 and TALAMINI, Eduardo. Tutela relativa aos deveres de fazer e
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
Regarding the execution of homogeneous individual rights, the system currently
adopted is specified in Articles 95 to 100 of the Consumer Defense Code. The standard
procedure is that the sentence must generically establish the liability of the defendants
for the damages caused. Then, the victims, their successors or others legally legitimated
may promote the liquidation and execution of this sentence.
Contrary to what happens in the execution of diffuse and collective rights, the
protection of homogeneous individual interests tends to be compensatory, aimed at
the payment of a certain amount, instead of a specific protection. Nevertheless, there
is still the possibility to use injunctions, such as in cases involving the recall.6
However, even with the possibility of promoting a collective execution, usually
there is a preference for this biphasic procedure, in which the case is collective only
in the beginning. It dies with a sentence and leaves the execution to the individuals.
Such option ends up taking away much of the strength and effectiveness of the class
action, undermining the collective technique, precisely because it contradicts its
aptitude for molecularizing the demands.7
Thus, part of the doctrine claims there is a “pulverization of rights”8 to refer to
this individualized analysis of interests or issues that is done by the Courts and whose
assessment should have occurred jointly.9
This spraying is heavily criticized as it opposes to an effective jurisdictional
performance by generating thousands of cases instead of only one. The Courts loose
economic and human resources and go against a more practical and efficiency-oriented
management. This ends up contributing to an overwhelming workload of the Courts.10
In this sense, there is a tendency to choose techniques that seek to promote a
procedure that is more aligned with the fundamental objectives of the homogeneous
individual rights. Incentives are given for the defendants themselves to take the
necessary measures to repair the injured individuals when they are easily identifiable.11
não fazer: e sua extensão aos deveres de entrega de coisa (CPC, arts. 461 e 461-A; CDC, art.84). 2.
ed. rev., atual. ampl. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2003.
6. ALMEIDA, Gustavo Milaré. Execução de Interesses Individuais Homogêneos: Análise crítica e propostas.
São Paulo, 2012. 247 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo. f. 112.
7. GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos.
Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015. p. 224.
8. This term is especially used and justified by Professors Aluísio Gonçalves Castro Mendes, Gustavo
Osna and Sergio Cruz Arenhart in: MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART,
Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento de sentenças coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de
Processo, v. 222, p. 41-64, 2013.
9. MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART, Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento de sentenças
coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de Processo, v. 222, p. 41-64, 2013. p. 44.
10. MENDES, A. G. C.; OSNA, G.; ARENHART, S. C. Idem, p. 47.
11. This option is openly raised by Luciano Picoli Gagno em: GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental
e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos. Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015.
108
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
In cases of injury to bank customers, for example, the financial institution itself should
make the deposits into their customers’ accounts.
It is about using techniques that do not require an individual action of the injured
party. Although being the easiest alternative within the current system, it is by far the
most inefficient and distant to the fundamental objectives of the Brazilian class action.
In summary, we can perceive that, in general, in order to repair injuries to diffuse,
collective and individual homogeneous rights, techniques that have the ability to
reconstitute as much as possible the damaged legal asset are privileged, drifting away
from the techniques applied on individual claims.
However, if this is not possible, the only alternative is to resort to an ordinary
technique that is not always efficient, either due to the very nature of the damaged
property or due to flaws that are inherent of the judicial system. Considering that, the
legislation itself sought to create a safeguard so that, even in this situation, there could
be an attempt to hold responsible the ones who caused the injury and also to try to
recover the legal asset as much as possible. We refer to the provisions of article 13 of
the Public Civil Action Act (Act n. 7.347/1985) that brought the so-called fluid recovery,
allocating this money to funds that, in turn, will try to perform this recomposition.
3.
PARADIGM FOR ANALYSIS: THE FDD
The Public Civil Action Act, might not be the first legislation on collective rights, but
was the first one that predicted the possibility of allocating the amount from pecuniary
damages in collective cases to a fund, due to the impossibility of full compensation.
On federal level, this fund was initially regulated by Decree n. 92.302/1986,
subsequently repealed by Decree n. 407 of 1991, which was again repealed by Decree
n. 1.306/1994, which is currently valid, with some amendments from Decree n. 96.617
/1988. The fund is denominated Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD). The Consumer
Protection Code, in turn, made reference to the fund that was created by the Public Civil
Action Act as the recipient of any amount that might be residual in consumer class actions.
The FDD was chosen as paradigm for this analysis not only because of its detailed
regulation, but also for being the most relevant and resourceful fund. In addition to
that, there is a serious issue regarding the lack of standardization of the states’ funds
in terms of regulation.12
12. A major problem to study the state funds is the lack of their implementation by many federated
states. Also because of the federative system, it is difficult to verify their operation. Only to have
a parameter: in a survey carried out by the State Public Prosecutor’s Office of Goiânia in 2013, on
the situation of the state funds of the Environment, Diffuse Rights and Forests, it can be seen that
the states of Alagoas, Amazonas and Espírito Santo, did not have any funds for this area. The other
states, mostly adopted the Special Fund for the Envirolment (FEMA). Survey available at: <http://
www.mpgo.mp. br/portal/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwMTMvMDQvMTYvMTJfMDNfMjRfOTlfZ
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
Even so, many questions remained about the operation of the FDD, especially
regarding the duties of its management council. Therefore it was edited the Act n.
9.008/1995, which created the Federal Board of the Diffuse Rights Defense Fund
(CFDD) inside the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice. It was established
the main rules regarding its purpose, the origins of its resources and their application.
Act n. 9.008/1995, already in its article 1, section 2, brings the resources that can
integrate the FDD. Basically, they are the judicial damages from class actions that seek
to protect the environment, consumers, legal assets or rights of artistic, aesthetic or
historical value and other diffuse or collective interests. In addition, FDD funds include
fines and damages resulting from the protection of people with disabilities and fines
against violations of the economic order.
Although being created in 1985, at least until 2005, the FDD had a negligible
revenue level, considering the demands involving damages on collective rights. This
may be due to not only the lack of adequate regulation of the origins of the resources,
but also due to the lack of knowledge about how the FDD operated.13 However, there
has been a gradual increase in its revenue over the last 11 years.
In addition, it is important to consider the percentage that each of the categories
contribute to the revenue of the fund. In this sense, data survey conducted by Professor
Albano Francisco Schmidt14 and complemented in this study seems fundamental.
Table 1. Total revenue of the FDD (per year)
YEAR
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
REVENUE
R$4.534.793,04
R$11.682.120,87
R$30.038.220,75
R$73.139.111,42
R$52.196.887,98
R$31.161.751,83
R$44.240.709,38
R$58.128.704,71
R$121.870.115,27
R$192.354.624,49
% OF REVENUE
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
nVuZG9zX2VzdGFkdWFpc19kZV9tZWlvX2FtYmllbnRlX2VfZGlyZWl0b3NfZGlmdXNvcy5wZGYiXV0/
fundos_estaduais_de_meio_ambiente_e_direitos_difusos.pdf>
13. SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Os primeiros 30 Anos do Fundo De Defesa De Direitos Difusos sob a luz
da Análise Econômica Do Direito: “contribuintes”, projetos apoiados e novas perspectivas sociais.
Argumentum Revista de Direito, n. 15, p. 201-226, 2014. p. 216.
14. The reserach originally made by professor Albano Schmidt brings data from the last 10 years of the FDD
revenue, from 2005 until half of 2014. Based on the data already collected by the author we use the same
methodology of cataloging and organizing it, completing it with the data of the end of 2014 and 2015.
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
YEAR
2015
TOTAL
REVENUE
R$564.272.628,92
R$1.183.619.668,66
% OF REVENUE
100%
100%
It is possible to verify that the FDD resources from fines and damages on cases
that involve the environmental protection represented only 0.83% of the fund’s total
revenues in recent years. This raises many to questions related to whether the amounts
collected adequately mirror the reality in Courts:15 either the injunctions on the cases are
being highly efficient and providing an in natura reparation; or actions are not moving
forward due to the complexity and high costs that this kind of case usually involves.
Table 2. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Environmental Protection (per year)
ENVIRONMENT
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
TOTAL
FINES + DAMAGES
R$43.840,00
R$29.288,36
R$840.120,92
R$1.788.225,28
R$1.106.917,53
R$620.694,33
R$3.445.073,02
R$679.571,20
R$1.008.904,22
R$152.226,27
R$192.407,34
R$9.907.268,58
% OF REVENUE
1,04%
0,26%
2,80%
2,46%
2,23%
2,01%
8,31%
1,19%
0,84%
0,08%
0,03%
0,83%
Fines and damages related to Consumer protection represent approximately 1.25%
of total revenue since 2005. It is known that consumer actions are thousands in the
Brazilian judiciary, which again leads us to inquire if the execution is being so effective
that there is no need to direct residual values to the fund, or it is the opposite: if there
is a fundamental problem and the class actions are not even making to this stage.16
Table 3. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Consumer Protection (per year)
CONSUMER
2005
2006
2007
2008
FINES + DAMAGES
R$1.144.097,23
R$245.206,03
R$713.451,71
R$3.801.021,17
% OF REVENUE
27%
2,16%
2,38%
5,22%
15. SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Op. Cit., p. 217.
16. SCHMIDT, A. F. Idem, p. 218.
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
CONSUMER
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
TOTAL
FINES + DAMAGES
R$202.142,85
R$305.572,89
R$315.978,33
R$3.767.691,26
R$1.546.523,04
R$2.101.163,13
R$760.596,32
R$14.903.443,96
% OF REVENUE
4,01%
1%
2,1%
6,71%
1,2%
0,45%
0,12%
1,25%
On the other hand, the reports consulted – available on the Ministry of Justice website
– show that 6.95% of the total amount collected, almost fifty million Brazillian Reais that are
about 16 million US dollars, and are under the caption “other collective and diffuse interests”.
Professor Schmidt criticizes the fact that such a large amount is under a vague
caption. This would contradict the FDD guidelines, that determines the injured rights
to be clearly revealed, in order to make it possible to direct the resources for their
proper reparation. In addition, this generic figure jeopardizes the transparency of the
fund and also the analysis of the compatibility of what has been developed by the
CFDD and the objectives of its creation.17
Table 4. Fines and damages of the FDD in other Collective and Difuse Interests Protection (per year)
OTHER INTERESTS
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
FINES + DAMAGES
R$443.548,76
R$366.219,35
R$683.975,15
R$2.595.334,85
R$1.854.965,82
R$5.486.265,20
.
2012
2013
2014
2015
TOTAL
R$6.420.152,64
R$17.037.216,16
R$11.287.502,51
R$29.737.931,18
R$82.312.451,33
% OF REVENUE
10,5%
3,22%
2,28%
3,57%
3,73%
17,80%
15,42%
11,26%
14,16%
5,87%
5,28%
6,95%
Finally, the data collection from offenses that involve the economic order show
that in the last years, their protection represented at least 87.53% of the FDD revenues.
We highlight that, in the year of 2015, it reached the percentage of 93.02%.
17. SCHMIDT, A. F. Idem, p. 218.
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
Table 5. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Economic Order Protection (per year)
ECONOMIC ORDER
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
TOTAL
FINES + DAMAGES
R$2.530.573,64
R$10.715.548,85
R$27.693.861,48
R$64.114.659,78
R$46.026.106,42
R$23.863.448,07
R$30.536.112,68
R$45.642.670,28
R$91.857.098,46
R$169.098.785,48
R$524.027.225,58
R$1.036.106.090,72
% OF REVENUE
59,92%
94,18%
92,42%
88,12%
92,58%
77,44%
73,65%
80,06%
76,36%
87,91%
93,02%
87,53%
Therefore, it is possible to state that the overwhelming source of revenue of the
FDD comes not from judicial convictions in class action, according to the provisions
of the Public Civil Action ACt, but from administrative infractions determined by the
Administrative Council of Economic Defense (CADE), which is responsible for this kind
of control. This is related to, above all, the high specialization and expertise of this
instance that makes its decisions extremely difficult to change in the adjudication.18
In addition, it seems important to take into consideration how this impact, or should
impact, on the performance of fund managers, especially the CFDD.
It is also worth noting the inclusion of the § 2o in article 13 of the Public Civil
Action Act, by Act n. 12.288/2010. It states need for the allocation of resources for
damages on cases involving ethnic discrimination, according to the guidelines of
the National Council for the Promotion of Racial Equality or the local Racial Equality
Promotion Councils, depending on the extension of the damages.19
Regarding the allocation of resources, it usually occurs through agreements or
specific transfer contracts with public agencies, at federal, state or municipal level and
with nonprofit organizations.20 These partnerships are regulated by administrative acts
18. About CADE’s work on the economic order’s defense: FORGIONI, Paula. Os Fundamentos do Antitruste.
8. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2015.
19. BRASIL. Lei n.º 7.347/1985. Art. 13. § 2o Havendo acordo ou condenação com fundamento em dano
causado por ato de discriminação étnica nos termos do disposto no art. 1o desta Lei, a prestação em
dinheiro reverterá diretamente ao fundo de que trata o caput e será utilizada para ações de promoção
da igualdade étnica, conforme definição do Conselho Nacional de Promoção da Igualdade Racial,
na hipótese de extensão nacional, ou dos Conselhos de Promoção de Igualdade Racial estaduais ou
locais, nas hipóteses de danos com extensão regional ou local, respectivamente.
20. A celebração dos convênios é regulada, principalmente, por meio da Portaria Interministerial nº 507,
de 24 de novembro de 2011 do Conselho Federal Gestor do Fundo de Defesa dos Direitos Difusos.
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
such as resolutions that establish the general guidelines for their signing, execution,
supervision and accountability.
For the selection, the interested parties must submit to the CFDD projects that
are related to the criteria and requirements established by the decrees. The project
must include all the basic data of the recipient and the project that will be financed,
especially: (i) the description of the project; (ii) the justification with the link between
the proposal and the guidelines of the fund’s program with the expected results; (iii)
an estimative of the necessary financial resources; (iv) a prediction of the deadline
for completion; (v) and information about the technical capacity of the proposer to
conduct the project.
However, before allocating revenues for projects, it is fundamental that the fund
has its resources secured in the annual Budget Act.
4.
RESOURCES AND THEIR DESTINATION: THE PROBLEM OF THE FDD’S
SUBORDINATION TO THE ANNUAL BUDGET ACT
The FDD’s resources depend a great deal of the Annual Budget Act, since it
integrates the public administration, with its management council, the CFDD, linked
to the Ministry of Justice. Thus, the doctrine heavily criticizes this subordination that
could deplete its purposes, since because of a political decision not to grant budgetary
credits to the fund, its performance would be compromised. This concern is plausible,
especially since it indeed happens quite usually. An analysis carried out by Arthur
Badin shows that, from 2000 to 2007, budgetary credits approved for the FDD were
significantly lower than the revenues:
Source: BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano 17, n. 67, p. 6299, 2008. p. 85. Author’s formatting.
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The logical option would be the full availability of what was collected in a year, for the
next year, since it is an amount with a specific purpose. However, it is not what happens
when we analyze the resources available to be used in projects by CFDD. This situation
becomes even more problematic when we verify that the State is also one of the biggest
defendants in the Judiciary.21 However, the funds and their configuration were a choice
made by the legislator. Much censurable it might be, it seems difficult to be ignored by
the Courts.
Another major concern of the doctrine is the proper application of the amount
available in the fund considering the original plaintiffs. Professor Elton Venturi, for example,
defends that even after integrating the fund, the values must be directed to the benefit
of the injured members of the class action – specifically aiming to satisfy their common
interests.22 Therefore, there is an undoubtful link between the origin and application of
the resources, even though the legislation has left a wide margin of discretion for the fund
management council.
However, the only parameter established by the legislation is article 7 of Decree n.
1.306/1994 that determines that the use of the resources should be, as much as possible,
related to the nature of the infraction or damage caused. Thus, values from pecuniary
convictions in the consumer protection must be applied in this area, instead of in the
environmental area, for example.
The doctrine also defends the importance of the use of the revenues in the same
geographic area where the damage occurred. Although there is no specific rule that
determines so, it seems a logical alternative considering the best protection of those who
were more directly harmed.23
The use of the fund’s resources in an attempt to repair the damaged legal asset does
not surprise considering its own purpose. On the other hand, its use in the promotion of
educational and scientific events and in the edition of informational material specifically
related to the offense or damage caused also appears to be justifiable, from a prospective
idea of protection and considering that many damages will not allow any kind of reparation.24
This seems to be the case predicted by § 2 of article 13 of the Public Civil Action Act
regarding the promotion of programs related to ethnic equality and diversity, on damages
resulting from ethnic discrimination actions.
21. On this matter see: BRASIIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. 100 Maiores Litigantes. Brasília, 2011.
And: FONSECA, Juliana Pondé. O (Des)controle do Estado no Judiciário brasileiro: direito e política
em processo. Curitiba, 2015. 274 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Paraná.
22. VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000. p. 158.
23. LEITE, José Rubens Morato; DANTAS, Marcelo Buzaglo. Algumas considerações acerca do Fundo para
reconstituição dos bens lesados. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 726, p. 71-82, 1996. p. 81.
24. MACEDO JÚNIOR, Ronaldo Porto. Propostas para a reformulação da Lei que criou o Fundo de
Reparação de Interesses Difusos Lesados. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.) Ação Civil Pública: Lei 7.347/1985
– 15 anos. 2. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2002. p. 814.
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
A more controversial issue refers to the use of fund’s resources in the modernization,
acquisition and improvement of the equipment of the State agencies responsible for
activities related to the protection of diffuse and collective interests. Such an extension
is dangerous and undesirable, since it opens the possibility to use resources in activities
that are completely diverted from the class action’s purpose.25
Although some authors, such as Arthur Badin, defend this initiative stating that
it was attentive to the scarcity of public resources26 others – rightly – claim that this
possibility would not be justifiable, since it would go against the original intention of
the legislator.27
In addition, there is a large gap on the supervision of how the fund’s resources are
being used. The process of selecting proposals is relatively well defined and objective.
However, there is a great margin of discretion for the fund’s council in this choice,
especially since the establishment of priority areas is defined by administrative act.
Thus, there is a very strong criticism for the fact that the use of the resources from
the funds is limited to the simple presentation of projects by the interested parties
with the approval, or not, by the members of the CFDD.28
When analyzing the Public Calls of the CFDD, in particular the last one published,
the n. 01/2015, we can see that there is a thematic division between five main areas,
each with its own Call: (i) environment, (ii) consumer (iii) antitrust (iv) historic patrimony
and (v) other diffuse rights.
The Call I, for the environment, has prioritized projects involving sustainable
actions, promotion of traditional practices in rural communities, protection of the
environment through the sustainable use of natural resources. The selected projects
for Calls II (consumer) and III (competition) focused on projects that involved the
conscious consuming and the promotion of an antitrust culture focusing on the more
needing communities.
Projects selected for Calls IV (historic patrimony) and V (other diffuse and collective
rights) involve valuing linguistic diversity – in particular, projects that focused on the
Brazilian Language of Signs (LIBRAS), the fight against child labor and the promotion of
racial equality. Also, preserving the historic patrimony from the human, environmental
and architectural points of view.
25. MACEDO JÚNIOR, R. P. Idem, p. 814.
26. BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano 17, n.
67, p. 62-99, 2008. p. 81.
27. MILARÉ, Édis. SETZER, Joana. CASTANHO, Renata. O compromisso de ajustamento de conduta e o
fundo de defesa de direitos difusos: relação entre os instrumentos alternativos de defesa ambiental
da Lei 7.347/1985. Revista de Direito Ambiental, n. 38, p. 9-22, 2005. p. 9.
28. DELLORE, Luiz Guilherme Pennachi. Fundo federal de Reparação de Direitos Difusos (FDD): aspectos
atuais e análise comparativa com institutos norte-americanos. Revista de Direito Ambiental, vol. 38,
p. 124-139, 2005. p. 131.
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
A huge number of projects are presented every year, and it keeps increasing. It is
mainly due to a better knowledge about the FDD. Just to illustrate the point, in 2014,
526 working proposals were sent to the CFDD (257 in the environment area, 213 in
historical and other diffuse rights’ area and 56 in the consumer area). Of those, 29
were selected as priority, but only 11 projects received resources in 2015.29
Source: BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do Exercício de 2015.
Brasília, 2016. p. 29. Author’s formatting.
Although FDD’s revenue collection has increased in recent years, the number of
projects supported has been decreasing, and is well below expectations, considering
the relation between resources available and the reversions to the Fund.
In addition, it should be noted that although the supported projects are
undoubtedly deserving of this funding, many doubts remain about their connection
with those who were plaintiffs of the action that originated these resources. Also,
it should be noticed that there aren’t any public reports detailing these projects’
performance and results. This, in a certain way, harms the accountability on the
allocation of the values that have originated from an injury to the community.
5.
FLUID RECOVERY?
As previously noted, there would be a fluid recovery system in Brazil because
of the allocation of the residual resources of class actions to a fund. This fund would
be entrusted to perform the reparation of the damaged legal assets in an indirect
manner, in the best possible way.
Such technique would be inspired by the fluid recovery in the US system, which
takes place, precisely, in an attempt to offer a suitable allocation to the residual amount
left in the class actions’ damages.
It is above all a recognition of the influence that the US class action had on
the Brazilian system, since it comes from it - albeit indirectly, through the Italian
29. BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do Exercício
de 2015. Brasília, 2016. p. 28.
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
doctrine; also, it’s justifies the US class action to be the most important source in the
interpretation and application of our collective procedural law.
However, in a more detailed analysis it is possible to verify several points in which
the fluid recovery of the Brazilian system differs from the institute in US system. Mainly,
because of the technique of the funds used in Brazil. So, it is not only an ontological
difference, but also the very framework that its application in both systems ended up
getting.30
Above all, the fluid recovery in the United States is jurisdictional. That is to say,
the institution that determines how to apply the residual amount are the Courts,
unlike the Brazilian system in which the application of resources is given by the fund’s
management council linked to the Public Administration.
In this sense, some authors claim that in order to carry out a comparative study of
the fluid recovery between the Brazilian system and the US legal system, considering
the FDD, it would be better to compare it to the fund created by the US environmental
legislation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA).
Professor Carlos Alberto de Salles defends this position saying that the similarity
comes mainly from the fact that CERCLA Superfund is also an administrative fund, linked
to a government agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that determines
the destination of its resources.31
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the CERCLA Superfund has a very
complex mechanism that involves funding not only through class action damages, but
mostly through taxation on the chemical and petroleum industries as well as a very
strict liability system.32
6.
CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the analysis carried out in this research paper, several questions
remain, especially since fluid recovery in Brazil does not match any other institute in
comparative law; neither it’s compatible with the system of collective procedure that
we hope to have.
30. GIDI, Antonio. A Class Action como instrumento de tutela coletiva: As ações coletivas em uma
perspectiva comparada. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2007. p. 17.
31. SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução Judicial em Matéria Ambiental. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais,
1998. p. 309-315.
32. To start a study about the CERCLA Superfund see: HIRD, John A. Superfund: The Political Economy of
Environmental Risk. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 and JUDY, Martha L. PROBST,
Katherine N. Superfund at 30. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 11, p. 191-247, 2009.
118
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THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD)
The Brazillian system cannot be considered a fluid recovery as proposed by US
system. It is not a mechanism linked to the Courts, nor is it connected to the case that
originated the resources.
However, it is also not possible to compare it bluntly to other institutes like the
CERCLA Superfund, only because they both are administrative funds. Their purpose,
in essence, is completely different, especially considering the destination of resources
in both cases.
In addition, the fluid recovery through funds that was developed in Brazil has
several inconsistencies with an execution that is effectively linked to the jurisdiction.
Its current configuration demands an urgent reflection on this matter and in the way
we want to develop our collective procedure.
REFERENCES:
ALMEIDA, Gustavo Milaré. Execução de Interesses Individuais Homogêneos: Análise crítica e
propostas. São Paulo, 2012. 247 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo.
BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano
17, n. 67, p. 62-99, 2008.
BRASIIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. 100 Maiores Litigantes. Brasília, 2011.
BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do
Exercício de 2015. Brasília, 2016.
DELLORE, Luiz Guilherme Pennachi. Fundo federal de Reparação de Direitos Difusos (FDD):
aspectos atuais e análise comparativa com institutos norte-americanos. Revista de Direito
Ambiental, vol. 38, p. 124-139, 2005.
FONSECA, Juliana Pondé. O (Des)controle do Estado no Judiciário brasileiro: direito e política
em processo. Curitiba, 2015. 274 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Paraná.
FORGIONI, Paula. Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. 8. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Revista dos
Tribunais, 2015.
GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos.
Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015.
GIDI, Antonio. A Class Action como instrumento de tutela coletiva: As ações coletivas em uma
perspectiva comparada. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2007.
HIRD, John A. Superfund: The Political Economy of Environmental Risk. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994.
JUDY, Martha L. PROBST, Katherine N. Superfund at 30. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law,
vol. 11, p. 191-247, 2009.
LEITE, José Rubens Morato; DANTAS, Marcelo Buzaglo. Algumas considerações acerca do
Fundo para reconstituição dos bens lesados. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 726, p. 71-82, 1996.
MACEDO JÚNIOR, Ronaldo Porto. Propostas para a reformulação da Lei que criou o Fundo de
Reparação de Interesses Difusos Lesados. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.) Ação Civil Pública: Lei
7.347/1985 – 15 anos. 2. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2002.
MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Tutela Específica (arts. 461, CPC e 84, CDC). São Paulo: Editora:
Revista dos Tribunais, 2000.
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ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com
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FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA
MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART, Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento
de sentenças coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de Processo, v. 222,
p. 41-64, 2013.
MILARÉ, Édis. SETZER, Joana. CASTANHO, Renata. O compromisso de ajustamento de conduta
e o fundo de defesa de direitos difusos: relação entre os instrumentos alternativos de
defesa ambiental da Lei 7.347/1985. Revista de Direito Ambiental, n. 38, p. 9-22, 2005.
SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução específica e a Ação Civil Pública. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.).
A Ação Civil Pública após 20 anos: efetividade e desafios. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos
Tribunais, 2005.
SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução Judicial em Matéria Ambiental. São Paulo: Revista dos
Tribunais, 1998.
SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Os primeiros 30 Anos do Fundo De Defesa De Direitos Difusos
sob a luz da Análise Econômica Do Direito: “contribuintes”, projetos apoiados e novas
perspectivas sociais. Argumentum Revista de Direito, n. 15, p. 201-226, 2014.
TALAMINI, Eduardo. Tutela relativa aos deveres de fazer e não fazer: e sua extensão aos deveres
de entrega de coisa (CPC, arts. 461 e 461-A; CDC, art.84). 2. ed. rev., atual. ampl. São Paulo:
Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2003.
VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000.
120
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6
Reflexiones acerca de la interferencia del
control administrativo en la independencia
jurisdiccional
Reflections on the interference of administrative control in
jurisdictional independence
Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique1
Resumen:
En la presente entrega, el autor analiza los alcances de la temática de la independencia jurisdiccional y el control administrativo disciplinario de la Oficina de Control
de la Magistratura. Ello, a propósito de la expedición de una resolución de sanción
por parte de la mencionada Oficina.
Palabras claves: Independencia judicial, control administrativo, debido proceso,
tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, tutela procesal efectiva.
1.
Consultor Jurídico. Abogado por la Universidad Católica de Santa María (Arequipa). Egresado de los Doctorados en Derecho y Administración, y de las Maestrías en Derecho Empresarial y Derecho Penal, por
la Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal (Lima). Columnista de la Asociación Civil El-terno.com (Perú).
Miembro del Comité Científico Internacional del Instituto Jurídico Internacional de Torino (Italia). Miembro
Asociado de E-Justicia Latinoamérica (Argentina). Experto en Derecho Empresarial y Administrativo, en
Avalón, la Red de Expertos de España, Portugal y Latinoamérica (España). Miembro, par académico evaluador, corresponsal e investigador externo adscrito al Instituto Vasco de Derecho Procesal (País Vasco).
Par académico evaluador de la Revista Misión Jurídica, de la Universidad Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca
(Colombia). Investigador Externo de la Universidad Global (Honduras). Miembro Consultivo Nacional y
Director de Investigaciones de la Revista de Actualidad Jurídica Essentia Juris (Perú). Director, Traductor,
Autor y Coautor de diversos libros Derecho Constitucional, Procesal Constitucional, Derechos Fundamentales, Garantías Constitucionales y Justicia Restaurativa. Autor de diversos artículos de carácter jurídico y
de administración, en importantes medios físicos y virtuales de más de veinte países. Ponente nacional
e internacional en diversos eventos académicos de carácter jurídico. kimblellmen@outlook.com.
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JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE
Abstract:
In this presentation, the author analyzes the scope of jurisdictional independence
and administrative disciplinary control of the Office of Judicial Control. This, with regard
to the issuance of a sanction resolution by the aforementioned Office.
Keywords: Judicial independence, administrative control, due process, effective
judicial protection, effective procedural protection.
Sumario: I. A modo de introducción.- II. En relación a la garantía constitucional de
competencia de la judicatura.- III. Acerca de la independencia judicial y el control administrativo de la OCMA.- IV. Tutela procesal efectiva.- V. Sobre la motivación de las
resoluciones administrativas.- VI. Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones
administrativas.- VII. Convencionalidad.- VIII. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad.- IX. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.- X. Tetra análisis jurígeno.- XI.
Breve resumen de la Resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de
la Magistratura del Poder Judicial.- XII. Analizando la misma.- XIII. Conclusiones.- XIV.
Sugerencias.- XV. Referencias bibliográficas.
I.
A MODO DE INTRODUCCIÓN.-
En no pocas oportunidades, se observa con aceptación inobjetable el que el ente
administrativo controle la labor judicial. Sin embargo, ciertamente ello corresponde
a un tema espinoso, nada pacífico, muy relevante, insoslayable como trascendente.
En principio, corresponde dejar constancia que el control administrativo disciplinario de los jueces, comporta un origen ciertamente administrativo. Allende de ello,
no debe perderse de vista que dicha naturaleza sancionadora no solamente debe
abrazar lo abrazado por los predios administrativos sancionatorios, sino también, los
constitucionales, convencionales y también, legítimos.
Luego, es verse que la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura (OCMA), es el órgano
disciplinario del Poder Judicial, goza de autonomía funcional, tiene competencia nacional y desarrolla actividades de control preventivo, concurrente y posterior; respecto
de todos los magistrados del Poder Judicial con excepción de los vocales de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la República. Asimismo, su actividad contralora comprende
a todos los auxiliares jurisdiccionales de éste poder del Estado. La OCMA, desarrolla
sus actividades con sujeción a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, a su Reglamento de
Organización y Funciones y supletoriamente, por el Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley
de Normas Generales y Procedimientos Administrativos y los Códigos Adjetivos en
materia Civil y Penal, en cuanto le sean aplicables.
Además, los objetivos institucionales de la OCMA son: i) Emprender políticas de
prevención, que fomenten la lucha contra la corrupción, ii) Identificación de las áreas
críticas y erradicación de malas prácticas en el servicio de justicia, iii) Descentralización
de las políticas de Control del Poder Judicial, iv) Coadyuvar a que el Poder Judicial se
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REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL
desarrolle en observancia a los principios de la administración de justicia y los valores
éticos de la función judicial, v) Establecer mecanismos de transparencia y publicidad
sobre las acciones de control judicial, vi) Constituirse en un instrumento fundamental
para el estricto cumplimiento de las acciones de control orientadas a la permanente
evaluación de la conducta funcional de magistrados y auxiliares jurisdiccionales del Poder
Judicial, y vii) Establecer mecanismos premiales a las buenas practicas judiciales, incentivando el trabajo honesto e independiente de magistrados y auxiliares jurisdiccionales.2
Empero, consideramos que existe una situación problemática, cuando la independencia judicial se vé mellada por el control administrativo, pues este último rebasa
sus competencias e ingresa a parcelas exclusivamente de conocimiento jurisdiccional
y no administrativo sancionador.
En ese orden de ideas, en la presente entrega analizamos en primer término,
la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida en fecha
29/01/16, por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura del
Poder Judicial (en adelante, OCMA), y en segundo lugar, la legitimidad que le asiste
o no a dicho órgano contralor, para poder juzgar a los señores magistrados. Dicho de
otro modo, abordaremos la temática de la independencia jurisdiccional y el control
disciplinario administrativo del órgano mencionado.
Para la construcción de tal empresa, previamente desarrollaremos algunas instituciones jurídicas que consideramos capitales, las que empalmamos desde una óptica
(a excepción de la costumbre) de la totalidad de fuentes del derecho; las mismas que
aportarán las luces basilares suficientes. Entre ellas tenemos: i) Garantía constitucional
de competencia de la judicatura, ii) Independencia judicial y control administrativo
de la OCMA, iii) Tutela procesal efectiva, iv) Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas, v) Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas, vi)
Convencionalidad, vii) Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad, viii) Test de
razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y ix) Tetra análisis jurígeno.
Ingresemos pues amable lector, al apasionante recorrido del presente estudio,
el que consideramos que trata de unimismarse lo más cercanamente posible al valor
justicia, en parcela sancionatoria administrativa disciplinaria.
II.
EN RELACIÓN A LA GARANTÍA CONSTITUCIONAL DE COMPETENCIA DE
LA JUDICATURA.-
En principio, tenemos que3 “La competencia es la participación que un órgano
jurisdiccional tiene en el Poder Judicial, por la que queda legitimado para desarrollar la
2.
3.
S/a. ¿Qué es OCMA?. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de http://ocma.pj.gob.pe/site/portal.
aspx?view=queesocma, Lima.
PÉREZ DEL BLANCO, Gilberto. La competencia. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://
procesalciviluam.blogspot.pe/2012/02/tema-5-la-competencia.html, Madrid, 2012.
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123
JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE
función jurisdiccional respecto de un tipo concreto de conflictos/litigios determinados
por un ámbito material, funcional y territorial”.
Así también, las reglas de competencia tienen por finalidad establecer a qué juez,
entre los muchos que existen, le debe ser propuesta una litis. Por ello, la necesidad del
instituto de la competencia puede ser expresada en las siguientes palabras: “Si fuera
factible pensar, aunque fuera imaginativamente, acerca de la posibilidad de que existiera
un solo juez, no se daría el problema a exponer ahora, puesto que jurisdicción y competencia se identificarían”. Pero como ello no es posible, se hace preciso que se determinen
los ámbitos dentro de los cuales puede ser ejercida válidamente, por esos varios jueces,
la función jurisdiccional. Por ello, definimos a la competencia como la aptitud que tiene
un juez para ejercer válidamente la función jurisdiccional. De esta forma, la competencia
es un presupuesto de validez de la relación jurídica procesal. Como lógica consecuencia
de lo anterior, todo acto realizado por un juez incompetente será nulo.4
Consecuentemente, la competencia viene a ser todas las acciones procesales
que un magistrado o juzgado, puede llevar a cabo el ejercicio de su jurisdicción, las
mismas que deberán ubicarse estrictamente en los márgenes establecidos por la ley.
III. ACERCA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL Y EL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO DE LA OCMA.Ante todo, consideramos importante definir la independencia judicial, así tenemos:
“La independencia y responsabilidad en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional es un
principio –garantía constitucional– que permite a los órganos jurisdiccionales que en el
ejercicio de su función no puedan verse afectados por las decisiones o presiones extra-jurisdiccionales, ajenas a los fines del proceso. Como refiere Bernales, la independencia
del Poder Judicial no solo debe estar referida al manejo autónomo de su estructura
orgánica, sino fundamentalmente a la autonomía de la decisión de los magistrados, es
allí donde se verifica la real independencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales”.5
En primer lugar, corresponde abordar lo concerniente al principio de independencia judicial, el Inc. 2., del Art. 139°, de la Norma Fundamental, establece: “Ninguna autoridad puede avocarse a causas pendientes ante el órgano jurisdiccional ni
interferir en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Tampoco puede dejar sin efecto resoluciones
que han pasado en autoridad de cosa juzgada, ni cortar procedimientos en trámites,
ni modificar sentencias ni retardar su ejecución”.
4.
5.
124
PRIORI POSADA, Giovanni F. La competencia en el proceso civil peruano. En línea: Recuperado en
fecha 30/10/16, de http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/derysoc/2008/06/05/la-competencia-en-el-proceso-civil-peruano/, Lima, 2008.
LAMA MORE, Héctor Enrique. La independencia judicial en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional.
En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/4a082300
4cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b/D_La_Independencia_Judicial_120912.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEI
D=4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b, Lima, 2012.
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El Art. 2.-, del Decreto Supremo Nº 017-93-JUS, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial,
en relación a la autonomía e independencia del Poder Judicial, señala: “El Poder Judicial en su ejercicio funcional es autónomo en lo político, administrativo, económico,
disciplinario e independiente en lo jurisdiccional, con sujeción a la Constitución y a la
presente ley”.
Además, el Art. 16.-, del citado Decreto estipula: “Los Magistrados son independientes en su actuación jurisdiccional dentro de su competencia. Ninguna autoridad,
ni siquiera los Magistrados de instancia superior, pueden interferir en su actuación.
Están obligados a preservar esta garantía, bajo responsabilidad, pudiendo dirigirse
al Ministerio Público, con conocimiento del Consejo Ejecutivo del Poder Judicial, sin
perjuicio de ejercer directamente los derechos que les faculta la ley”.
Por su parte, el Art. I.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, en relación
a los principios rectores de la carrera judicial, respecto de la independencia e imparcialidad de la función jurisdiccional, preconiza: “Los jueces ejercen sus funciones
jurisdiccionales con independencia e imparcialidad, sujetos únicamente a la Constitución y a la ley”.
Por su parte, el Fund. 28., de la Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N°
23-2003-AI/TC, al respecto enseña: “La independencia judicial debe ser entendida
como aquella capacidad autodeterminativa para proceder a la declaración del derecho,
juzgando y haciendo ejecutar lo juzgado, dentro de los marcos que fijan la Constitución
y la Ley. En puridad, se trata de una condición de albedrío funcional”.
Otro punto que consideramos importante, es el relacionado al carácter tripartito
que presenta el principio de independencia judicial. En ese sentido, el Fund. 31., de la
Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N° 23-2003-AI/TC, juridiza: “La independencia judicial debe, pues, percibirse como la ausencia de vínculos de sujeción política
(imposición de directivas por parte de los órganos políticos) o de procedencia jerárquica
al interior de la organización judicial, en lo concerniente a la actuación judicial per se,
salvo el caso de los recursos impugnativos, aunque sujetos a las reglas de competencia.
El principio de independencia judicial debe entenderse desde tres perspectivas; a saber:
a) Como garantía del órgano que administra justicia (independencia orgánica), por
sujeción al respeto al principio de separación de poderes.
b) Como garantía operativa para la actuación del juez (independencia funcional),
por conexión con los principios de reserva y exclusividad de la jurisdicción. c) Como
capacidad subjetiva, con sujeción a la propia voluntad de ejercer y defender dicha
independencia. Cabe precisar que en este ámbito radica uno de los mayores males
de la justicia ordinaria nacional, en gran medida por la falta de convicción y energía
para hacer cumplir la garantía de independencia que desde la primera Constitución
republicana se consagra y reconoce”.
A su turno el Fund. 18., del 0004-2006-PI/TC, del Tribunal Constitucional establece
las dos dimensiones del principio de independencia de la función jurisdiccional: “a) Independencia externa. Según esta dimensión, la autoridad judicial, en el desarrollo de
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la función jurisdiccional, no puede sujetarse a ningún interés que provenga de fuera
de la organización judicial en conjunto, ni admitir presiones para resolver un caso en
un determinado sentido. Las decisiones de la autoridad judicial, ya sea que ésta se
desempeñe en la especialidad constitucional, civil, penal, penal militar, laboral, entre
otras, no pueden depender de la voluntad de otros poderes públicos (Poder Ejecutivo o
Poder Legislativo, por ejemplo), partidos políticos, medios de comunicación o particulares en general, sino tan solo de la Constitución y de la ley que sea acorde con ésta(…)
b) Independencia interna. De acuerdo con esta dimensión, la independencia judicial
implica, entre otros aspectos, que, dentro de la organización judicial: 1) la autoridad
judicial, en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, no puede sujetarse a la voluntad de
otros órganos judiciales, salvo que medie un medio impugnatorio; y, 2) que la autoridad
judicial, en el desempeño de la función jurisdiccional, no pueda sujetarse a los intereses
de órganos administrativos de gobierno que existan dentro de la organización judicial”.
Además, es de verse lo sostenido por Inc. 1., del Art. 8., de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, que en referencia a las garantías judiciales, enseña:
“Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo
razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido
con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil,
laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter”.
A propósito, nótese lo que menciona sobre ello: “(…)la línea jurisprudencial de la
Corte confirma que si bien el artículo 8 de la Convención Americana se titula ‘Garantías
Judiciales’, su aplicación no se limita a los procesos judiciales en sentido estricto, “sino
[al] conjunto de requisitos que deben observarse en las instancias procesales”, a efecto
de que las personas puedan defenderse adecuadamente ante cualquier tipo de acto
emanado del Estado que pueda afectar sus derechos. Esas otras instancias procesales
pueden comprender aquellas en las que se determinan derechos y obligaciones de
orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter. De manera que la amplitud
en el desarrollo de este artículo se justifica también en la citada interpretación del
Tribunal según la cual las garantías del artículo 8 superan los casos tradicionales de
la jurisdicción penal e incluso los procesos estrictamente judiciales.”6
En ese orden de ideas, el principio de independencia judicial, resulta ser de competencia exclusiva para el poder judicial, de por sí y ante sí, poder declarar el derecho
o avocarse a una causa, sin ser objeto de interferencia de tipo judicial o administrativo.
Además, es de considerar que el referido principio debe ser entendido desde una triple
perspectiva, esto es, ya sea, orgánica, funcional y capacidad subjetiva.
En segundo término, corresponde desarrollar el control administrativo que la
OCMA ejerce sobre los magistrados.
6.
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GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Ob. Cit., p. 211.
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En principio, es pertinente dejar constancia que la Resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, fue resuelta de conformidad a lo establecido en la R. A.
229-2012-CE-PJ, Reglamento de Organización y Funciones de la OCMA, vigente a
la fecha de la cursación del Oficio del representante de la sociedad civil, ante dicho
órgano (esto es: el 13/09/13).
Así tenemos, que el Inc. 1., del Art. 4º., del mencionado reglamento acerca de
las funciones de la OCMA, juridiza: “Las señaladas en el Art.105º del Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial”.
Y el Inc. 9., del Art 105.-, del D. S. Nº 017-93-JUS, del Texto Único Ordenado de
la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, que acerca de las funciones de la OCMA preconiza:
“Rechazar de plano las quejas manifiestamente maliciosas, o, que no sean de carácter
funcional sino jurisdiccional, aplicando al quejoso las sanciones y las multas previstas
en el artículo 297 de la presente Ley”.
Al respecto, CAVANI señala:7 “el art. 48, inciso 13, de la Ley de Carrera Judicial,
que coloca como falta grave el «No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar
inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales». Esta disposición ya
resulta problemática, pues estaría permitiendo que el órgano de control pueda controlar el íntegro de la motivación de cualquier resolución del juez y que, si hubiese
algún defecto considerable (nótese la vaguedad de esto último), podría suspenderlo
o, inclusive, destituirlo”.
Además, continúa CAVANI: “(…)los textos infraconstitucionales deben ser interpretados de conformidad con la Constitución()con las garantías de la independencia
y de la imparcialidad, en lo que atañe a la esfera de autonomía de los órganos jurisdiccionales respecto de la interpretación y aplicación del derecho y de la motivación
de sus decisiones()los criterios jurisdiccionales solamente pueden ser cuestionados
jurisdiccionalmente. No existe órgano administrativo que pueda suplantar esta tarea;
caso contrario, el funcionario que así lo hiciese violaría la Constitución y, por si fuera
poco, cometería un ilícito penal”
Agrega CAVANI: “Sería plenamente inconstitucional, por ejemplo, entender que
la Ley de Carrera Judicial facultaría al órgano de control a cuestionar la forma cómo
el juez valora los medios probatorios, cómo interpreta el Código Civil, cómo resuelve
antinomias, cómo integra lagunas o, inclusive, cómo analiza los presupuestos de una
solicitud cautelar o el monto de la caución que decide fijar. Todo esto puede ser cuestionado o atacado mediante los medios impugnatorios respectivos: para eso es que
existe la regulación pertinente en los códigos procesales y, además, la asignación de
competencias entre los órganos jurisdiccionales (y no entre órganos administrativos)”.
Y así también: “Si se entiende que la disposición normativa expresa una norma
como la señalada, entonces sería inaplicable por inconstitucional. No obstante, como se
7.
CAVANI, Renzo. Ob. Cit.
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ha advertido, es un deber de cualquier órgano estatal que haga las veces de juzgador
(como es el caso del órgano juzgador en un procedimiento administrativo sancionador), interpretar de conformidad con la Constitución. Nótese que ello no presupone
exactamente hacer un control difuso, en donde existe una auténtica inaplicación
de cualquier norma que pueda desprenderse del texto infraconstitucional para preferir
directamente, la norma constitucional. La técnica de la interpretación conforme implica
que, entre los sentidos que un texto normativo puede expresar, debe preferirse el que
sea más acorde con las normas constitucionales. Y esta técnica también está a cargo
del órgano contralor”.
En esa línea de argumentación, se aprecia los Funds. 8. y 10., respectivamente,
del voto del magistrado Álvarez Miranda, en el Exp. N.° 5765-2007-PA/TC del Tribunal
Constitucional, que refieren: “Si bien la labor de órganos como la Oficina de Control
de la Magistratura (OCMA) es la mayor relevancia, ésta no puede desarrollarse desconociendo los derechos fundamentales de quienes ejercen la función jurisdiccional,
pues más allá de los derechos fundamentales que ellos tienen dicha sede disciplinaria,
se encuentran protegidos constitucionalmente mediante la garantía institucional de
la independencia judicial” y “Sólo cuando existe una suficiente, congruente y lógica
justificación de las decisiones de los órganos de control de la magistratura respecto
de una conducta funcional irregular se logra legitimar la labor de tales órganos y
se despeja cualquier cuestionamiento respecto de afectaciones a la independencia
judicial”.
Entonces, de lo desarrolado se colige que la delgada línea que aparentemente
separa a la naturaleza funcional de la jurisdiccional, constituye en serio riesgo, debido
a que de traspasarla permite que el órgano administrativo disciplinario funcional de
la magistratura (OCMA), ingrese a controlar a la magistratura en funciones que no le
competen, por ser materia jurisdiccional y no funcional. Entonces, el reparo no es de
poco calibre.
IV. TUTELA PROCESAL EFECTIVA.Para el debido aterrizaje en el presente acápite, comporta precisar de manera
previa como ineludible, algunas instituciones jurídicas procesales. Esto es, la siguiente
triada: i) tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, ii) debido proceso y iii) tutela procesal efectiva.8
Así, tenemos que en los predios del derecho procesal, se cuenta con derechos
fundamentales y garantías procesales, los que supervigilan que el iter procesal se
lleve a cabo de manera óptima, para poder cumplir sus fines. Los mismos se hacen
presentes en los cuatro estadios que cuenta, los mismos que desarrollamos:
8.
128
TORRES MANRIQUE, Jorge Isaac. La tutela jurisdiccional laboral. Acciones esenciales en el avance
del nuevo modelo procesal. En Suplemento Jurídica del diario oficial El Peruano, N° 598, Lima, 2006,
pp. 06-07.
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En primer lugar, se encuentra la tutela jurisdiccional, la que garantiza al justiciable
que su accionar o petición judicial sea admitido y que posteriormente sea materializado
y resuelto a través de una sentencia.
Al respecto, el Tribunal Constitucional, a través del Exp. N° 010-2002-AI/TC, juridiza:
“El derecho a la tutela jurisdiccional es un atributo subjetivo que comprende una serie
de derechos, entre los que destacan el acceso a la justicia, es decir, el derecho de cualquier persona de promover la actividad jurisdiccional del Estado, sin que se le obstruya,
impida o disuada irrazonablemente; y como quedó dicho, el derecho a la efectividad
de las resoluciones judiciales. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en otras constituciones, la
nuestra no alude al derecho a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva. Sin embargo, en modo
alguno puede concebirse que nuestra Carta Fundamental tan sólo garantice un proceso
intrínsecamente correcto y leal, justo sobre el plano de las modalidades de su tránsito,
sino también (…) capaz de consentir los resultados alcanzados, con rapidez y efectividad”.9
En segundo lugar, se ubica el debido proceso, el que comporta el derecho de los
justiciables a un proceso judicial sin postergaciones, retrasos, alteraciones o deformaciones, durante el camino, devenir o desenvolvimiento lógico procesal del mismo;
que desvirtúen su finalidad que es la justicia. Consecuentemente, queda claro que,
prima facie, el derecho que tienen los justiciables a un derecho justamente debido.
Ubicándose el debido proceso, en el espacio comprendido, entre la tutela jurisdiccional
y la efectividad de la misma.
Tanto la tutela jurisdiccional, como el debido proceso, son reconocidos en el Inc.
3., del Art. 139°.-, de la Constitución Política, que señala: “Son principios y derechos de
la función jurisdiccional, la observancia del debido proceso y la tutela jurisdiccional”.
En tercer lugar, tenemos la efectividad de la tutela jurisdiccional, la que se hace
presente, cuando dicha sentencia sea oportuna y debida como efectivamente ejecutada (tutela efectiva).
Entonces, es de verse que entre el debido proceso y tutela jurisdiccional efectiva,
existe una marcada diferencia, es decir, mientras que el primero: i) se desenvuelve
en el transcurso del trayecto procesal —iter procesal, específicamente entre la tutela
jurisdiccional y la efectividad de la misma— ii) la segunda, se manifiesta al comienzo
(cuando el aparato jurisdiccional ampara la demanda del justiciable- tutela jurídica) y
final (al ejecutarse la sentencia debida y oportunamente) de dicho devenir procesal.
Ergo, existe pues entre ellos, una relación muy estrecha. Finalmente, debido proceso
y tulela referidos se complementan, pero no significan lo mismo.
En un cuarto momento, se hace presente la tutela procesal efectiva, la que comprende, tanto al acceso a la justicia, como al debido proceso. Consecuentemente, la
9.
Véase GARCÍA BELAÚNDE, Domingo. Diccionario de jurisprudencia constitucional. Definiciones y
conceptos extraídos de las resoluciones y sentencias del tribunal constitucional. Editora Jurídica
Grijley, Lima, 2009, p. 832.
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tutela procesal efectiva, abarca o engloba, tanto a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva como
al debido proceso. Así se tiene la tutela procesal efectiva, se encuentra preconizada
por el Art. 4.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional, que preconiza: “(…)Se entiende por
tutela procesal efectiva aquella situación jurídica de una persona en la que se respetan,
de modo enunciativo, sus derechos de libre acceso al órgano jurisdiccional, a probar,
de defensa, al contradictorio e igualdad sustancial en el proceso, a no ser desviado de
la jurisdicción predeterminada ni sometido a procedimientos distintos de los previstos por la ley, a la obtención de una resolución fundada en derecho, a acceder a los
medios impugnatorios regulados, a la imposibilidad de revivir procesos fenecidos, a
la actuación adecuada y temporalmente oportuna de las resoluciones judiciales y a
la observancia del principio de legalidad procesal penal”.
V.
SOBRE LA MOTIVACIÓN DE LAS RESOLUCIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS.-
En este acápite, amerita abordar el tema de la ineludible motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. En ese sentido, es de verse el Fund. 14., de la Resolución del
Tribunal Constitucional del Exp. N° 00503 2013-PA/TC, cuando al respecto establece:
“(…)un acto administrativo dictado al amparo de una potestad discrecional legalmente
establecida resulta arbitrario cuando solo expresa la apreciación individual de quien
ejerce la competencia administrativa, o cuando el órgano administrativo, al adoptar la
decisión, no motiva o expresa las razones que lo han conducido a adoptar tal decisión.
De modo que, como ya se ha dicho, motivar una decisión no solo significa expresar
únicamente al amparo de qué norma legal se expide el acto administrativo, sino, fundamentalmente, exponer en forma sucinta— pero suficiente— las razones de hecho
y el sustento jurídico que justifican la decisión tomada”.
También, el referido Colegiado Constitucional, en el Fund. 9., del Exp. N.º 00912005-PA/TC, ha señalado que: “(…)el derecho a la motivación de las resoluciones
administrativas es de especial relevancia. Consiste en el derecho a la certeza, el cual
supone la garantía de todo administrado a que las sentencias estén motivadas, es
decir, que exista un razonamiento jurídico explícito entre los hechos y las leyes que se
aplican. Cabe acotar que la Constitución no establece una determinada extensión de la
motivación, por lo que su contenido esencial se respeta siempre que exista fundamentación, congruencia entre lo pedido y lo resuelto y, por sí misma, exprese una suficiente
justificación de la decisión adoptada, aun si esta es breve o concisa o se presenta el
supuesto de motivación por remisión. La motivación de la actuación administrativa,
es decir, la fundamentación con los razonamientos en que se apoya, es una exigencia
ineludible para todo tipo de actos administrativos, imponiéndose las mismas razones
para exigirla tanto respecto de actos emanados de una potestad reglada como discrecional. El tema de la motivación del acto administrativo es una cuestión clave en
el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo, y es objeto central de control integral por el
juez constitucional de la actividad administrativa y la consiguiente supresión de los
ámbitos de inmunidad jurisdiccional. Constituye una exigencia o condición impuesta
para la vigencia efectiva del principio de legalidad, presupuesto ineludible de todo
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Estado de derecho. A ello, se debe añadir la estrecha vinculación que existe entre la
actividad administrativa y los derechos de las personas. Es indiscutible que la exigencia
de motivación suficiente de sus actos es una garantía de razonabilidad y no arbitrariedad de la decisión administrativa”.
A ello, agrega el Fund. 8., del voto del magistrado Eto Cruz, del Exp. N.º 57652007-PA/TC del Tribunal Constitucional: “En esa misma línea se ha pronunciado este
Tribunal en la STC N.º 5156-2006-PA/TC (Caso Vicente Rodolfo Walde Jáuregui) al
establecer que se vulnera el derecho a la motivación de las resoluciones cuando se
emite una resolución que impone una medida disciplinaria sustentada en argumentos
de carácter jurisdiccional, es decir, cuando los fundamentos no se encuentran dirigidos
a sustentar la sanción impuesta sino que se encuentran orientados a zanjar cuestiones
de interpretación jurídica o cuestiones de hecho relacionadas con el proceso judicial,
omitiendo examinar los presupuestos de hecho que motivan la imposición de la medida disciplinaria”.
En ese sentido, las resoluciones administrativas también deben presentar una
motivación o fundamentación suficiente y justa, que respalde su decisión. De otra
manera, se incurriría en abierta arbitrariedad, perjudicando así a los administrados,
a la vez inobservar el principio de motivación y debido proceso administrativo.
VI. PRINCIPIOS DE TIPICIDAD Y LEGALIDAD EN LAS SANCIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS.
Acerca del principio de tipicidad, el Tribunal Constitucional, en el Fund. 35., del
Exp. Nº 01873-2009-PA/TC, explica: “(…)primero, en determinar qué tipo de infracción
se ha cometido; y segundo, qué tipo de sanción corresponde. En el primer caso, el
CNM, conforme a la legislación que citó, debía determinar si el acto cometido por el
demandante importaba: a. Una irregularidad o una inconducta funcional a título doloso o culposo, b. La transgresión de los principios y deberes de los magistrados, c. La
comisión de un hecho grave que, sin ser delito o infracción constitucional, comprometa
la dignidad del cargo y la desmerezca en el concepto público, d. La contravención de
obligaciones, prohibiciones y demás normatividad sobre deberes de los servidores o
funcionarios públicos(…)”.
Por otro lado, el principio de tipicidad se torna clave en el análisis del presente
caso. Así, en el Fund. 40., de la resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N° 018732009-PA/TC, se enseña: “Este principio permite que las conductas sancionables estén
debidamente delimitadas de modo que quedan proscritas las cláusulas generales o
indeterminadas, esto es, aquellas cuyo contenido no es expreso y conocible, sino que
tiene que ser ‘llenado’ o concretizado a través de argumentos utilizados para tal efecto,
pero por ello mismo, a veces posteriores al acto que se pretende sancionar”.
Así también, en el Fund. 41., de dicha sentencia señala: “Entonces, resulta que
el tan mentado ‘conocimiento’ de las conductas prohibidas ya no es tal, dado que él
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determinados de acuerdo al hecho que pretende sancionar, dejando pues el acto de
‘completar’ el contenido de tales actos a la discrecionalidad o arbitrariedad del ente
administrativo”.
Agrega, en el Fund. 42.: “Los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados que se ha
encontrado en la resolución del CNM, son los siguientes: Conducta e idoneidad
propia de la función, Desmerecimiento en el concepto público, Desmedro de la
imagen, El Poder Judicial como fuente de inseguridad jurídica, Conducta intachable, Imagen pública, Imagen del Poder Judicial, Modelo de conducta ejemplar,
Transparencia de sus funciones públicas, Transparencia de sus funciones privadas,
Dignidad del cargo”.
Continúa el Fund. 43., señalando: “Qué es lo que se entiende por cada uno de tales
conceptos, para efectos sancionatorios, debe encontrarse previamente determinado
o establecido; lo contrario importaría que los magistrados tengan prever cuál es el
‘contenido’ que el CNM pueda darles, sobre todo cuando este contenido, de no estar
precisado normativamente, será objeto de desarrollo o complementación por parte
de la autoridad administrativa, en cada caso en que ello sea necesario, además que,
como es obvio, el resultado no necesariamente será igual en todos los casos”.
Luego, el Fund. 44., refiere: “En ese sentido, llama la atención que se requiera
un magistrado de conducta ejemplar, sin determinarse qué es lo que se entiende por
ella (no fumar, no tomar o tomar moderadamente, no drogarse, no maltratar a los
miembros de su familia, no tener multas de tránsito, etc.), de modo que no se sabe
qué es lo que está prohibido o lo que está permitido. Asimismo, ¿cómo se determina el
desmedro de la imagen propia? (porque la prensa así lo dice, por la suma de recortes
periodísticos, porque el Colegio de Abogados lo señala, porque la asociación de padres
de familia del colegio de sus hijos tiene un mal concepto del magistrado, etc.). Es más,
¿cómo afecta ello al Poder Judicial? (ello puede dar lugar entonces a que cada vez
que se evidencia que un juez ha afectado la imagen de aquel poder, ¿será pasible de
sanción?; pero previamente, ¿cómo puede o debe afectar dicha imagen? Cabe también
preguntar que en caso no se haya afectado dicha imagen, por falta de publicidad del
acto incorrecto, ¿el funcionario no será sancionado?”.
Así también, es de verse que sobre el principio de tipicidad, el segundo párrafo, del
Inc. b., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 1873-2009-PA/TC, preconiza:
“Conforme a este principio, los tipos legales genéricos deben estar proscritos y aunque la
Administración a veces se conduzca sobre la base de estándares deontológicos de
conducta, estos son insuficientes, por sí solos, para sancionar, pues aunque se pueden
interpretar como conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, la sanción debe sustentarse en
análisis concretos y pormenorizados de los hechos, desde conceptos jurídicos y no sobre
la base de juicios apodícticos o que invoquen en abstracto el honor o la dignidad de
un colectivo, puesto que los tribunales administrativos no son tribunales ‘de honor’,
y las sanciones no pueden sustentarse en una suerte de ‘responsabilidad objetiva del
administrado’, lo que nos lleva a revisar el siguiente principio”.
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Pero, “(…)no sólo la conducta prohibida debe estar determinada por ley, sino
también la sanción que le corresponde. En esa línea, tanto el principio de legalidad,
como su par, el principio de tipicidad, han sido reconocidos por la Ley del Procedimiento
Administrativo General en su artículo 230 incisos 1 y 4, respectivamente a fin de ser
aplicados en la potestad sancionadora de la Administración: ‘1. Legalidad.- Sólo por
norma con rango de ley cabe atribuir a las entidades la potestad sancionadora y la
consiguiente previsión de las consecuencias administrativas que a título de sanción
son posibles de aplicar a un administrado(…), 2. Tipicidad.- Sólo constituyen conductas
sancionables administrativamente las infracciones previstas expresamente en normas
con rango de ley mediante su tipificación como tales, sin admitir interpretación extensiva o analogía(…)’.”10
Además, sobre el principio de legalidad, el Inc. a., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 1873-2009-PA/TC, establece: “(…)conforme al cual la ley debe
preceder a la conducta sancionable, determinando el contenido de la sanción. Corresponde pues a la ley delimitar el ámbito del ilícito sancionable, por expresa prescripción constitucional (artículo 2.24.d.), de modo que no puede ser objeto de regulación
reglamentaria, ni mucho menos de precisiones ‘extranormativas’”.
En consecuencia, queda claro que para el ejercicio sancionatorio administrativo,
resulta de ineludible observancia, los principios de tipicidad y legalidad. Así, en sede
administrativa sancionadora, deberá evitarse incurrir la utilización de conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, debido a que desnaturaliza la justeza de la decisión, tornándola
en subjetiva como injusta.
VII. CONVENCIONALIDAD.En principio, respecto de la interpretación constitucional, resulta imperioso acotar
que la Cuarta Disposición Final y Transitoria, de la Constitución Política enseña: “Las
normas relativas a los derechos y a las libertades que la Constitución reconoce se interpretan de conformidad con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y con los
tratados y acuerdos internacionales sobre las mismas materias ratificados por el Perú”.
A continuación, referir que el Art. V.-, del Título Preliminar del Código Procesal
Constitucional, respecto de la Interpretación de los Derechos Constitucionales, juridiza:
“El contenido y alcances de los derechos constitucionales protegidos por los procesos
regulados en el presente Código deben interpretarse de conformidad con la Declaración
Universal de Derechos Humanos, los tratados sobre derechos humanos, así como de
las decisiones adoptadas por los tribunales internacionales sobre derechos humanos
constituidos según tratados de los que el Perú es parte”.
10. BAZÁN SEMINARIO, César. ¿Separando la paja del trigo? Destitución de jueces por el Consejo Nacional
de la Magistratura entre el 2003 y el 2007. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://www.
justiciaviva.org.pe/publica/paja_trigo.pdf. Lima, 2008, p. 59.
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En segundo lugar, respecto de la interpretación de las normas sobre derechos
humanos, de conformidad a lo establecido en la Convención Americana de Derechos
Humanos (que es un acuerdo internacional sobre derechos humanos, ratificado por
el Perú), es de resaltar que en el caso Almonacid Arellano vs. Chile, la Corte IDH ha
ido precisando el contenido y alcance del concepto de control de convencionalidad en
su jurisprudencia, para llegar a un concepto complejo que comprende los siguientes
elementos (o: las siguientes características): a) Consiste en verificar la compatibilidad
de las normas y demás prácticas internas con la CADH, la jurisprudencia de la Corte
IDH y los demás tratados interamericanos de los cuales el Estado sea parte; b) Es una
obligación que corresponde a toda autoridad pública en el ámbito de sus competencias;
c) Para efectos de determinar la compatibilidad con la CADH, no sólo se debe tomar
en consideración el tratado, sino que también la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH y los
demás tratados interamericanos de los cuales el Estado sea parte; d) Es un control
que debe ser realizado ex officio por toda autoridad pública; y e) Su ejecución puede
implicar la supresión de normas contrarias a la CADH o bien su interpretación conforme
a la CADH, dependiendo de las facultades de cada autoridad pública.11
Al respecto, en la jurisprudencia referida se aprecia: “(…)el Poder Judicial debe
ejercer una especie de “control de convencionalidad” entre las normas jurídicas internas
que aplican en los casos concretos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En esta tarea, el Poder Judicial debe tener en cuenta no solamente el tratado, sino
también la interpretación que del mismo ha hecho la Corte Interamericana, intérprete
última de la Convención Americana”.
Así tenemos, que el Inc. 1., del Art. 1., de la Convención Americana de Derechos
Humanos, respecto de la obligación de respetar los derechos, juridiza: “Los Estados
Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta
a su jurisdicción, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma,
religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición
económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social”.
GOMES y de OLIVEIRA12, sostienen que la obligación de “respeto” a los derechos
humanos previsto en este artículo, excluye la aplicación del principio de reciprocidad
consagrado en el Derecho Internacional clásico, toda vez que los Estados Parte de la
Convención tienen la obligación de respetar los derechos con independencia de que
11. S/a. Control de convencionalidad. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, del Cuadernillo de
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Nº 7 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
sitios/libros/todos/docs/controlconvencionalidad8.pdf, San José de Costa Rica, p. 06.
12. GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Comentários à Convenção Americana Sobre
Direitos Humanos. Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, 3a. ed., Sao Paulo, Editora Revista Dos Tribunais,
2010. Citado en: VV.AA. Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Comentario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38682-1522-4-30.pdf?140901164826,
2014, p. 48.
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otro Estado Parte lo realice dentro de su jurisdicción; de donde deriva la naturaleza
objetiva de las obligaciones internacionales relativas a derechos humanos.
Respecto de la “garantía” de los derechos, se debe tener en cuenta las garantías
específicas, tales como: i) La obligación del Estado de asegurar el pleno goce y ejercicio
de los derechos, ii) El deber de proteger a las personas frente a las amenazas de agentes
privados o públicos en el goce de los derechos, iii) Adoptar medidas de prevención
general frente a casos de violaciones graves de derechos, iv) Reparar a las víctimas y
v) Cooperar con los órganos internacionales para que estos puedan desarrollar sus
actividades de control.13
Por otro lado, corresponde traer a colación el principio pro personae, el que se
encuentra contenido en el Inc. 1., del Art. 29, de la Convención Americana de Derechos
Humanos, estableciendo: “Ninguna disposición del presente Pacto podrá ser interpretada en el sentido de conceder derecho alguno a un Estado, grupo o individuo para
emprender actividades o realizar actos encaminados a la destrucción de cualquiera de
los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Pacto o a su limitación en mayor medida
que la prevista en él.”.
Seguidamente, es de apreciarse lo establecido por el Inc. 2., del Art. 29, de la
misma norma, que señala: “No podrá admitirse restricción o menoscabo de ninguno
de los derechos humanos fundamentales reconocidos o vigentes en un Estado Parte en
virtud de leyes, convenciones, reglamento o costumbres, so pretexto de que el presente
Pacto no los reconoce o los reconoce en menor grado”.
Entonces, en resumidos términos el Control de la Convencionalidad, sostiene
que las legislaciones internas de cada país, deberán adecuarse a los lineamientos
establecidos en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos.
VIII. BLOQUES DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Y CONVENCIONALIDAD.Acerca del Bloque de Constitucionalidad tenemos que el Fund. 10., de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. Nº 689-2000-AA/TC, estipula: “Las normas
del bloque de constitucionalidad son aquellas que se caracterizan por desarrollar y
complementar los preceptos constitucionales relativos a los fines, estructura, organización y funciones de los órganos y organismos constitucionales, amen de desarrollar
detalladamente las competencias y deberes funcionales de los titulares de éstos, asi
como los derechos, deberes, cargas públicas y garantías básicas de los ciudadanos(…)
dicho concepto alude a la aptitud lo obrar político-jurídica o al área de facultades de
un órgano u organismo constitucional, lo cual conlleva a calificar la actuación estatal
como legítima o ilegítima en función de que el titular responsable de aquel hubiese
obrado dentro de dicho marco o fuera de él”.
13. GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Cit., pp. 49-52.
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Entonces, tenemos que el bloque de constitucionalidad, se encuentra compuesto por la Constitución Política y sus leyes de desarrollo, para cada caso concreto.
El mismo, corresponde a una expresión y extensión de un Estado constitucional de
derecho del Neoconstitucionalismo. A propósito, la constitucionalización del sistema
jurídico o derecho peruano, trajo consigo por ejemplo, la cosa juzgada constitucional,
en desmedro de la cosa juzgada legal o meramente judicial.
Luego, es de mencionar que la observancia de los preceptos contenidos en la
jurisprudencia de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, vá ganando terreno en las legislaciones internas de los Estados, lo que deviene en muy saludable, en
tanto que, ya se habla más allá del bloque de constitucionalidad, esto es, del Bloque
de la Convencionalidad.
El Bloque de la Convencionalidad, se encuentra compuesto por lo juridizado por
la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, además, de la legislación interna de
los Estados, esto es, de bloque de Constitucionalidad de cada país.
El cariz de justeza que aporta la referida Convención, corresponde a una manifestación del Derecho Global, que dio origen a la cosa juzgada internacional, en
prevalencia de la cosa juzgada constitucional, por citar un ejemplo.
IX. TEST DE RAZONABILIDAD Y PROPORCIONALIDAD.En principio, el Inc. d., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 18732009-PA/TC, establece que el: “Principio de proporcionalidad de la sanción, esto es,
que la sanción que se imponga, debe corresponderse con la conducta prohibida, de
modo que están prohibidas las medidas innecesarias o excesivas. Corresponde, pues,
que el órgano que aplica la sanción pondere la intencionalidad o reiteración del acto
así como los perjuicios causados”.
Al respecto, el Fund. 109., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 50-2004-AI/TC, establece: “El test de razonabilidad es un análisis de proporcionalidad que está directamente
vinculado con el valor superior justicia; constituye, por lo tanto, un parámetro indispensable de constitucionalidad para determinar la actuación de los poderes públicos, sobre
todo cuando ésta afecta el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales. Para que la aplicación
del test sea adecuada, corresponde utilizar los tres principios que lo integran(…)”.
Por otro lado, el Fund. 15., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. N° 2192-2004-AA/TC,
preconiza: “El principio de razonabilidad o proporcionalidad es consustancial al Estado
Social y Democrático de Derecho, y está configurado en la Constitución en sus artículos 3º y 43º, y plasmado expresamente en su artículo 200°, último párrafo. Si bien la
doctrina suele hacer distinciones entre el principio de proporcionalidad y el principio de
razonabilidad, como estrategias para resolver conflictos de principios constitucionales y
orientar al juzgador hacia una decisión que no sea arbitraria sino justa; puede establecerse, prima facie, una similitud entre ambos principios, en la medida que una decisión
que se adopta en el marco de convergencia de dos principios constitucionales, cuando no
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respeta el principio de proporcionalidad, no será razonable. En este sentido, el principio
de razonabilidad parece sugerir una valoración respecto del resultado del razonamiento
del juzgador expresado en su decisión, mientras que el procedimiento para llegar a este
resultado sería la aplicación del principio de proporcionalidad con sus tres subprincipios:
de adecuación, de necesidad y de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto o ponderación”.
Y además, el Fund. 15., de la referida jurisprudencia del TC, hace textual mención acerca de la obligatoriedad del uso del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad
en sede administrativa: “(…)es en el seno de la actuación de la Administración donde
el principio de proporcionalidad cobra especial relevancia, debido a los márgenes
de discreción con que inevitablemente actúa la Administración para atender las demandas de una sociedad en constante cambio, pero también, debido a la presencia
de cláusulas generales e indeterminadas como el interés general o el bien común,
que deben ser compatibilizados con otras cláusulas o principios igualmente abiertos
a la interpretación, como son los derechos fundamentales o la propia dignidad de las
personas. Como bien nos recuerda López González, ‘En la tensión permanente entre
Poder y Libertad que protagoniza el desenvolvimiento del Derecho Público y por ello
también el del Derecho Administrativo, el Estado de Derecho a través de la consagración que formula el principio de legalidad y de la garantía y protección de los derechos
fundamentales, exige un uso jurídico proporcionado del poder, a fin de satisfacer los
intereses generales con la menos e indispensable restricción de las libertades’”.
Precisamente, respecto de la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, el Inc. 7., del Art.
24º.-, del Reglamento del Procedimiento Administrativo Disciplinario de la Oficina de
Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial, R. Adm. Nº 243-2015-CE-PJ; establece
que en cualquier caso, la autoridad instructora del procedimiento administrativo
disciplinario deberá observar las siguientes reglas: “Criterios resolutivos.- Al resolver
los procedimientos disciplinarios iniciados, las autoridades deberán seguir los requisitos para la emisión de los actos administrativos establecidos en los artículos 3, 5 y
6 de la Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General, cuidando en todo momento de
respetar los principios de legalidad, tipicidad, debido procedimiento, razonabilidad y
proporcionalidad en la imposición de las sanciones, así como los criterios establecidos
en el artículo 51º de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, y en el artículo 13º del
Reglamento que Regula el Régimen Disciplinario de los Auxiliares Jurisdiccionales del
Poder Judicial”. (el subrayado es nuestro).
En tal sentido, queda claro lo imprescindible de fijar la vista en la inclusión y
desarrollo del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, de manera previa a una decisión judicial o administrativa, a fortiori si es como en el caso in comento, cuando la
resolución abraza una naturaleza sancionatoria.
X.
TETRA ANÁLISIS JURÍGENO.-
Como ya lo hemos mencionado en anteriores oportunidades, al presente método
de análisis, lo hemos denominado: tetra análisis jurígeno, en razón a la naturaleza
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tretafronte de los aspectos que abraza y que son: i) Legalidad.- En razón, a que toda
decisión judicial y administrativa, tiene que estar arreglada a ley, ii) Constitucionalidad.- Debido a que, en un nivel supremo, el derecho constitucional está presente
en todas las ramas del derecho, en mérito además, a su naturaleza transversal, iii)
Convencionalidad.- Ya que las normas internas de cada Estado tienen que ser compatibles con lo establecido por la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, y iv)
Legitimidad.- Porque el fin supremo de cada proceso, es resolver o tomar una decisión
que sea justa y no solamente legal o constitucional.
Es entonces, que a la luz de dicho filtro conjunto de observación, que consideramos se puede arribar a un argumento jurídico macro, micro como sólido.
A propósito, el espíritu de la estructura de las consideraciones que abordaremos, puede también ser utilizada para fundamentar por ejemplo, una demanda y su
contestación, ante el poder judicial; y a fortiori, para la expedición de sentencias. Así
como, para lo propio de las resoluciones administrativas.
Y es que, lo más común es que las fundamentaciones se lleven a cabo como
máximo a nivel de los dos primeros aspectos que explicaremos a continuación, esto
es, únicamente, la legalidad y la constitucionalidad, sobre todo, la legalidad.
En ese sentido, la aplicación del mencionado método, nos ayudará a determinar, si una decisión administrativa o judicial, se encuentra situada en los predios de
la legalidad, constitucionalidad, convencionalidad, y legitimidad; ya sea, de manera
satisfactoria o no, en alguna, algunas o en todas las etapas del referido método.
XI. BREVE RESUMEN DE LA RESOLUCIÓN DE LA JEFATURA SUPREMA DE LA
OCMA.El documento sub examine, es la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº
398-2013-LORETO, expedida en fecha 29/01/16, por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina
de Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial (en adelante, OCMA).
Por medio de la cual, se impone una medida disciplinaria de suspensión en el
ejercicio de toda función en el Poder Judicial sin goce de haber, por el plazo de cuatro
meses, al magistrado Alexander Rioja Bermúdez, en su actuación como Juez del primer
Juzgado Especializado en lo Civil de la Provincia de Maynas, de la Corte Superior de
Justicia de Loreto.
Dicha sanción fue propuesta, mediante Resolución Nº 24, de fecha 15/08/14, por
la Jefatura de la Unidad de Investigación y Anticorrupción del OCMA.
Los cargos que se le imputan son el admitir una demanda de amparo y conceder
medida cautelar (Exp. 1425-2011), por lo cual, haber infringido la regla de competencia
por razón de territorio establecida en el Art. 51.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional
(), que preconiza: “(…)Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso
de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde
se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del
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demandante(…)”. Y además, que dicha conducta que denota la infracción del deber
de observar el debido proceso previsto en el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la ley de Carrera
Judicial, Ley Nº 29277, que respecto de los deberes de los jueces establece: “Impartir
justicia con(…) respeto al debido proceso” y se subsume en la falta regulada en el Inc.
13., del Art. 48., de la citada Ley, que respecto de las faltas muy graves registra: “No
motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de
los deberes judiciales”.
Dentro de los argumentos de defensa del magistrado investigado, se aprecia
en la resolución bajo análisis: i) Vía escrito de fecha 13/11/13, señala que admitió la
demanda por una omisión involuntaria y teniendo en cuenta la tutela jurisdiccional
efectiva que es un principio constitucional contenido en el Art. 51., del Código Procesal
Constitucional, ii) Que se le pretende sancionar por una supuesta incompetencia no
advertida oportunamente, pero que no se ha tomado en cuenta que no se perjudicó
a las partes procesales, quienes no formularon queja en su contra y que tampoco se
continuó dando trámite al proceso al declarar fundada la excepción de incompetencia,
y iii) Que el Colegiado superior no advirtió conducta disfuncional en la tramitación del
proceso cuestionado y que dicha instancia declaró la nulidad de lo actuado y revocó la
medida cautelar dictada por razones distintas a la incompetencia por razón de territorio.
Luego, la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, señala que el Art. 51., del Código mencionado establece sólo dos supuestos que habilitan la competencia territorial para conocer
un proceso de amparo (Así, es de verse su contenido: “Es competente para conocer del
proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil
o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante”); los cuales no se presentaban en el caso bajo estudio.
Agregando, que mediante auto de vista de fecha 12/07/12, ello fue expresado
por la Sala Civil y Mixta de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Loreto, observándose la
competencia territorial del investigado para conocer la referida demanda de amparo
y constituyó uno de los motivos por los cuales la resolución que concedió la medida
cautelar fue revocada y reformándose dicha medida fue rechazada.
En su informe de descargo, el magistrado investigado señala que la tramitación
de las cuestionadas pretensiones obedeció a un error involuntario y a la supremacía
constitucional de la tutela procesal efectiva, frente a una norma legal, como la contenida en el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional.
Al respecto, la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, refiere también que el respeto
al debido proceso también lo es, que en el modo de logar tal cometido, debe haber
sujeción a las reglas y principios que integran nuestro sistema jurídico, entre ellos el
debido proceso, como principio de la función jurisdiccional.
Ante la alegación de absolución, por inexistencia de perjuicio a las partes y que no
formularon queja den su contra; la misma agrega que, el procedimiento administrativo
disciplinario de la OCMA, se rige por el impulso de oficio, aunque la presente investigación se desarrolló en mérito del oficio cursado por el Representante de la Sociedad Civil.
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Además, indica que habiéndose corroborado la comisión del cargo, se valorará
la medida disciplinaria a imponerse y los eventuales atenuantes y que ello se deriva
de la aplicación de la razonabilidad.
Como factores atenuantes para el magistrado investigado, menciona la revocación
de la medida cautelar y el haber declarado fundada la excepción de incompetencia
planteada, declarando nulo todo lo actuado. Y el que no se haya verificado que las
conductas disfuncionales ejecutadas respondan a un móvil lucrativo o de favorecimiento a un sujeto procesal.
Como agravantes, menciona: i) el haberse cometido dos conductas disfuncionales
conexas, esto es, admitir a trámite la demanda de amparo y el dictar medida cautelar,
ii) contar con dos medidas disciplinarias de amonestación, iii) una multa del 2% de
su haber mensual, iv) perturbación del servicio de justicia, v) haber comprometido la
dignidad del cargo del juez, vi) desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y vii) afectación
de la imagen del Poder Judicial.
XII. ANALIZANDO LA MISMA.12.1. Competencia de la judicatura.Es de verse, que el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional establece: “Es
competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del
proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o
donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante(…)”.
Por otro lado, que respecto del primer supuesto de dicha norma: “el Juez civil o
mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho”, se aprecia que el magistrado investigado
despachaba en Maynas (Loreto) y el lugar donde se habría afectado el derecho es
Lima. Acerca del segundo supuesto: “donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a
elección del demandante”, se tiene que el domicilio del afectado era la ciudad de Lima.
En consecuencia, en vista que la norma legal señalada es expresa y no presenta vacío
o deficiencia alguna, se colige que los supuestos no se presentaban favorables o habilitantes para que el magistrado investigado pueda ser competente en el caso bajo estudio.
Sin embargo, el admitir el oficio del representante de la sociedad civil, tampco
resulta ser de competencia de la OCMA. Así, dicho órgano contralor, de inicio debió
declararlo improcedente, por tratarse de un tema jurisdiccional y no funcional.
12.2. Independencia judicial y control administrativo.
Al respecto, el profesor CAVANI14 señala que el hecho que la Oficina de Control
de la Magistratura, la cual se registra en el Art. 102.- (que juridiza: “La Oficina de Con-
14. CAVANI, Renzo. ¿Juzgando a jueces?. La Ocma y las sanciones por defectos en la motivación. En
línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de https://afojascero.com/2016/04/11/juzgando-a-jueces-la-ocma-y-las-sanciones-por-defectos-en-la-motivacion/. Lima, 2016.
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trol de la Magistratura es el órgano que tiene por función investigar regularmente
la conducta funcional, la idoneidad y el desempeño de los Magistrados y auxiliares
jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial. Esta facultad no excluye la evaluación permanente
que deben ejercer los órganos jurisdiccionales al conocer de los procesos en grado.”)
en adelante, del Decreto Supremo Nº 017-93-JUS, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; no
hace más que complicar el accionar de dicho órgano contralor, en vista que el referido articulado no haría otra cosa que abrir la puerta para que el mencionado órgano
ingrese a interferir en la función jurisdiccional de los magistrados.
Además sostiene: “(…)la existencia de una Oficina de Control de la Magistratura(…)ya representa un auténtico desafío para conciliar la necesaria preservación de la
independencia e imparcialidad frente a la investigación y sanción que pueda imponerse
a los magistrados en el ejercicio de su función jurisdiccional(…)la función jurisdiccional,
cuya independencia e imparcialidad deben ser preservadas(…)cualquier tipo de procedimiento administrativo sancionador que pueda terminar en una sanción(…)existe
un deber ineludible de controlar la constitucionalidad de la legislación respecto de las
sanciones de los jueces, precisamente para que no se violente la regla constitucional
que ordena preservar la independencia e imparcialidad”.
A propósito, en la resolución bajo comentario, se sanciona al magistrado investigado por haber admitido una demanda de amparo y concedido medida cautelar, por
lo cual, infringió la regla de competencia por razón de territorio establecida en el Art.
51.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional, que preconiza: “(…)Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento
el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio
principal el afectado, a elección del demandante(…)”. Además, por incurrir en la falta
regulada en el Inc. 13., del Art. 48 de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que
establece: “Son faltas muy graves(…)No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar
inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”. Y así también, que dicha
conducta que denota la infracción del deber de observar el debido proceso previsto en
el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la ley de Carrera Judicial, Ley Nº 29277, que respecto de los
deberes de los jueces establece: “Impartir justicia con(…) respeto al debido proceso”
Sin embargo, sostenemos que dicho oficio tuvo que ser declarado improcedente,
en razón a que los argumentos que contenía el mismo eran de carácter jurisdiccional
y no funcional (el admitir una demanda de amparo y concedido medida cautelar,
corresponde a predios jurisdiccionales y no administrativos, por ello no habilita a la
OCMA para poder tomar conocimiento, y menos aun, sancionar). Ello en mérito a que
las normas legales referidas (a excepción de la de competencia territorial), debían ser
recurridas con una interpretación constitucional y no meramente legal.
Debe tenerse muy en cuenta, que: “La independencia del juez es un tema altamente vulnerable que exige de los órganos contralores garantías mínimas para la
preservación de ésta. En atención a ello, la intervención disciplinaria no es irrestricta,
todo lo contrario, su ámbito de acción sólo radica en la vulneración de los deberes
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procesales o la inconducta de un juez, de tal manera, que dicha actividad administrativa-disciplinaria no colisione con la independencia judicial que el Estado garantiza
a todos los jueces y sobre todo con la independencia de la función jurisdiccional”.15
A propósito, cabe mencionar que el tópico del control administrativo disciplinario
de los jueces, presenta una naturaleza de cuasi permanente actualidad y coyuntura
que requiere urgente atención. En esa línea de pensamiento, nótese que: “No existe
consenso respecto de si el control disciplinario de los jueces debe ser externo o interno.
Por un lado, quienes abogan por el control interno sostienen que sacar el control disciplinario fuera del ámbito del Poder Judicial menoscaba la independencia de los jueces
y pone en riesgo su autonomía al someterlos a presiones e intimidaciones generadas
por partes interesadas. De otro, quienes recusan el control interno, alegan que este es
poco transparente y se ve menoscabado por una mal entendida solidaridad entre pares.
De lo que se trata es de establecer un balance entre la protección a la independencia
de los magistrados y la responsabilidad de quienes ejercen la judicatura. En tal sentido,
partiendo de la experiencia peruana, creo que el control disciplinario debe ser externo”.16
En ese sentido, somos de la opinión que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, debió
liminarmente declarar improcedente la queja interpuesta por el representante de la
sociedad civil, en contra del magistrado investigado, en razón a que los argumentos
que contenía la misma eran argumentos de carácter jurisdiccional y no funcional.
Allende de lo señalado, se debe tener presente que las decisiones jurisdiccionales se
apelan en su propio cauce, es decir, en el jurisdiccional (y no en el administrativo),
tal y como en el presen te caso lo hizo el Procurador del Ministerio de Economía y
Finanzas cuando interpuso la excepción de incompetencia, la misma que fue declarada
fundada por el magistrado investigado.
Ergo, de lo reseñado se colige que la decisión tomada en la resolución bajo comentario, vulnera la independencia judicial, preconizada en el articulado referido de
la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y de la Ley de la Carrera Judicial. La misma que es
denominada: independencia judicial interna, por el Fund. 18., del Exp. Nº 0004-2006PI/TC del Tribunal Constitucional.
12.3. Tutela procesal efectiva.
Por otro lado, amerita dejar constancia que tanto como el magistrado investigado
como la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, yerran al utilizar como sinónimos las siguientes instituciones jurídicas: tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, debido proceso y tutela procesal efectiva.
15. LEDESMA NARVAEZ, Marianella. Independencia judicial y control disciplinario. En línea: Recuperado
en fecha 30/09/16, de http://catedrajudicial.blogspot.pe/2008/01/independencia-judicial-y-control.
html, Lima, 2008.
16. UGAZ SÁNCHEZ-MORENO, José Carlos. El control disciplinario de los jueces. En línea: Recuperado
en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/aportes_dplf_nr2_junio_2007.pdf,
Washington, 2007, p. 04.
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Ello, en vista que, a lo que refiere el referido magistrado es solamente a la tutela
jurisdiccional, cuando acoge la demanda de amparo y no a la efectividad de la misma.
Y solo es debido proceso, cuando ampara la medida cautelar. Tampoco, se refiere a
la tutela procesal efectiva, en vista que como ya hemos desarrollado y explicado in
extenso, en el acápite intitulado: tutela procesal efectiva; esta última abarca, tanto a
la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva como al debido proceso.
12.4. Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.
En relación a la motivación de la resolución bajo comentario, tenemos que en
principio ha utilizado como agravantes, términos indeterminados previamente, tal y
como se aprecia en la página 06 de la resolución in comento: 1) perturbación del servicio
de justicia, ii) haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) desacreditación
frente a la comunidad, y iv) afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial.
No obstante, al margen que los mismos vulneran el principio de tipicidad, no
existe en extremo alguno en la mencionada resolución sancionadora, la obligatoria
plasmación de la motivación para la justificación de los referidos términos indeterminados, además de la fundamentación por la cual se demuestra el incurrimiento en los
mismos, por parte del magistrado investigado. Vulnerando con ello, no solamente el
deber de motivación de las decisiones administrativas sancionadoras, sino también,
el debido proceso administrativo sancionador.
12.5. Tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas.
Otro punto importante, es el principio de tipicidad, el mismo que debió haber
observado la referida Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA. Así, incumplió con el referido
principio al no haber señalado, descrito y precisado de forma antelada y expresa, en
qué consiste y cómo es que el investigado incurrió en: i) la perturbación del servicio de
justicia, ii) el haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) la desacreditación
frente a la comunidad, y iv) la afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial.
Entonces, consideramos que los referidos términos utilizados por la Jefatura Suprema, revisten conceptos jurídicos indeterminados (al no señalar en dichos casos, el tipo de
infracción cometida, así como, la sanción correspondiente, tal y como lo preconiza el Fund.
35., ab initio, de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. Nº 01873-2009-PA/TC).
Además, se ha vulnerado lo preconizado por el Art. 44.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley
de la Carrera Judicial, que respecto del objeto de las faltas establece: “Son objeto de
control, por la función disciplinaria, aquellas conductas señaladas expresamente como
faltas en la ley (…)”.
En ese sentido, el contenido o definición de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados
expresados en la resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, no han sido precisados
previamente y no se encuentran registrados en norma legal alguna, incurriendo así la
misma en doble yerro. No alcanzando la suficiente como obligatoria justificación para
la imposición de la señalada sanción.
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A propósito, de lo establecido como sanción al magistrado, en el Inc. 13., del Art.
48, de la Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que establece como faltas muy graves: “No motivar
las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”; es preciso dejar constancia, que las sanciones administrativas a los
magistrados deben imponerse con una interpretación concordante con lo expresado
en la Constitución Política.
12.6. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad.
Se aprecia que en la resolución sub examine, no se ha hecho mención, ni desarrollado tanto el bloque de constitucionalidad, como el de convencionalidad. Aunque,
a juzgar por la naturaleza englobante de bloque de convencionalidad, por sobre el de
constitucionalidad, habría bastado que lleve a cabo el de convencionalidad.
Ello le habría proporcionado mayor amplitud de enfoque y criterio de interpretación, a la luz de parcelas constitucionales, en lugar de las meramente legales asumidas.
12.7. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.
Nos llama poderosamente la atención que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, en
primer lugar, únicamente considere la razonabilidad para ejercer el ius puniendi estatal, esto es para sancionar, cuando de manera reiterada el Tribunal Constitucional, ha
señalado que para dicho menester, tanto la razonabilidad como la proporcionalidad,
deben ir de especial importancia como de inseparable tratativa. Y que en segundo
lugar, la misma no haya llevado a cabo el obligado Test de Razonabilidad y Proporcionalidad. Solo lo hizo en cierta forma respecto de la razonabilidad. El referido test
de ambos criterios, en casos de sanción resultan inescindibles como indispensables.
Mención aparte merece, el que en la resolución sub examine, se haya puesto especial énfasis en los factores agravantes. Sin embargo, resulta preocupante que entre
los criterios atenuantes para la determinación de la sanción, no se haya considerado
por ejemplo: la diligencia, eficiencia, producción, porcentaje de carga de resolución de
expedientes, porcentaje de confirmaciones de resoluciones por la instancia superior,
ponencias en eventos académicos, publicaciones académicas, docencia universitaria,
felicitaciones institucionales públicas (incluso de la Corte Superior donde labora el
magistrado investigado) y privadas, entre otros; que eventualmente pudiera contar a
su favor.
En ese sentido, la referida Jefatura incurre en infracción a la razonabilidad y
proporcionalidad de las resoluciones de sanciones administrativas.
12.8. Tetra análisis jurígeno.
Corresponde examinar la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura
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del Poder Judicial, a través del referido método. Así, respecto del referido análisis de
sus cuatro estadíos, tenemos:
•
Legalidad. Con relación a la legalidad, resulta menester comprobar si la resolución bajo análisis, se encuentra ajustada a las normas legales.
En ese sentido, tenemos que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA ha sancionado
al investigado por haber infringido: i) la regla de competencia, contenida en
el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional, ii) Impartir justicia con(…)
respeto al debido proceso, positivisado en el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la Ley
Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, y iii) el Inc. 13., del Art. 48.-, de la citada
ley, que refiere: “Son faltas muy graves: No motivar las resoluciones judiciales
o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”.
No obstante, al haber hecho uso de conceptos indeterminados y subjetivos
—i) la perturbación del servicio de justicia, ii) el haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) la desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y iv)
la afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial— sin haber señalado, descrito
y precisado de forma antelada y expresa, en qué consiste y fundamentado
cómo es que el magistrado investigado incurrió en los mismos; y allende
de ello por haberlos utilizado como agravantes para sancionar, cuando los
mismos no se encuentran contemplados en norma legal alguna, vulnera el
principio de legalidad.
Ello no hace más que refrendar, que la mencionada resolución bajo comentario, no fue expedida acorde a la legalidad, esto es, con la legislación infraconstritucional de la materia.
•
Constitucionalidad.
En el presente punto, corresponde revisar basilarmente lo pertinente de la
Constitución Política. Así tenemos, que: el Inc. 2., del Art. 139.-, en relación a
los principios y derechos de la función jurisdiccional, sostiene: “La independencia en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. Ninguna autoridad puede
avocarse a causas pendientes ante el órgano jurisdiccional ni interferir en el
ejercicio de sus funciones(…)”.
En el presente punto, amerita traer a colación lo analizado en el acápite III.,
del presente trabajo, en el cual se fundamente cómo es que la OCMA vulnera
la independencia del magistrado investigado. Allende de lo señalado, fijando
la vista desde el derecho constitucional, ello se torna más evidente.
Al respecto, nótese que precisamente una de las normas legales utilizadas por
la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA (Inc. 13., del Art. 48.-, de la Ley Nº 29277,
Ley de la Carrera Judicial), es la que aborda en el mencionado acápite.
De conformidad a lo sostenido, es de verse que la resolución sub examine no
devendría en constitucional, en tanto que, vulnera la independencia judicial
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del magistrado investigado, registrada en el referido artículo de la Carta
Fundamental.
•
Convencionalidad.
Como habíamos señalado, la resolución bajo análisis vulnera el deber de motivación de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras. Ergo, se vulnera
a su vez, lo contenido en el Art. 8., de la Convención Americana de Derechos
Humanos, que juridiza respecto de las garantías mínimas que le asisten a toda
persona.
Sin embargo, varias de ellas no han sido observadas de conformidad a lo
estatuído en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos.
En ese orden de ideas, es de verse que lo contenido en la resolución in comento, no cumple lo sostenido por la Convención Americana de Derechos
Humanos, en lo referido a las garantías mínimas, esto es, al cumplimiento de
la motivación de las decisiones sancionatorias administrativas, independencia
judicial, tipicidad y legalidad.
•
Legitimidad.
El presente punto se encuentra relacionado a la conformidad que debe existir
con los postulados normativos, con los propios de la justicia. Esto es, con la
justeza, más que solamente con la ley o incluso, con la Constitución Política.
Así, el presente tipo de análisis se constituye en el más importante, en razón
que aterriza en el punto neurálgico de la administración de justicia, es decir,
arribar a la justicia misma.
Sostenemos que el presente cuarto estadío, al que hemos denominado: legitimidad, deviene en el más importante, debido a que en el supuesto que se
eventualmente se haya satisfecho la observación de los tres primeros (esto
es: de la legalidad, constitucionalidad y convencionalidad), pero, que sin embargo, el resultado obtenido no sea equiparable al valor justicia, entonces,
el argumento se quedará insuficiente, injusto, ilegítimo.
En consecuencia, consideramos que la resolución sub examine no se encuentra
revestida de la legitimidad esperada, esto es, que no fue interpretada a la luz
del mandato constitucional.
XIII. CONCLUSIONES.De conformidad a lo analizado, desarrollado y fundamentado, en el presente
trabajo, la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida por
la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA; vulnera abiertamente los derechos fundamentales:
al debido proceso administrativo, independencia jurisdiccional interna, tipicidad administrativa, legalidad y motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.
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Así, debió liminarmente declarar improcedente la queja interpuesta por el representante de la sociedad civil, en contra del magistrado investigado, en razón a que
los argumentos que contenía la misma eran argumentos de carácter jurisdiccional y
no funcional; vulnerando el órgano de control administrativo OCMA, la competencia
jurisdiccional mencionada. Ello se ratifica, en que para ello, esto es, que mediante el
cauce jurisdiccional correspondiente, la procuraduría del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, interpuso la excepción de incompetencia, la misma que fue declarada fundada.
Además, tampoco presenta el test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad previo a la
sanción, así también, el bloque de convencionalidad. Construir y plasmar lo señalado,
le habría las luces suficientes a la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, a efectos de realizar
una correcta graduación de la sanción impuesta, que figura excesiva, así como, para
evitar vulnerar los derechos fundamentales mencionados.
La totalidad de criterios atenuantes para la determinación de la sanción impuesta,
no habrían sido considerados en la resolución bajo comentario.
Además, la misma no guarda correlación con ninguna de las consideraciones
contenidas por nuestra propuesta, denominada: tetra análisis jurígeno. Esto es, que
es ilegal, inconstitucional, inconvencional e ilegítima.
Se tiene pues, que la mencionada resolución presenta total carencia de solidez
en su fundamentación e injusta decisión, convirtiéndola en arbitraria como injusta.
Tanto el magistrado investigado como la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, no diferencian los términos: tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, tutela procesal efectiva y debido
proceso.
Además, en la resolución bajo análisis, dejamos constancia de la configuración
de una peligrosa paradoja, a que se refiere el título de la presente entrega. Esto es,
que la sanción impuesta vulnera la independencia judicial del magistrado investigado, cuando precisamente se sustenta en el contenido del Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la
Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que establece: “Son deberes de los jueces:
Impartir justicia con independencia, prontitud, imparcialidad, razonabilidad y respeto
al debido proceso”; debido que la misma de manera coincidente preconiza que es un
deber de los jueces impartir justicia con independencia. Y sin embargo, al sancionar
al investigado, de manera contradictoria se vulnera así su independencia al cuestionar
un ente administrativo, como es la OCMA, su actuar jurisdiccional.
Amerita fijar la mirada, al ejercicio del ius puniendi por parte de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA en la resolución in comento, en razón a que si bien es cierto, que la
observancia del principio del debido proceso administrativo, reviste un estricto celo y
rigor en su manejo, a fortiori lo es en parcela sancionatoria administrativa. Ello, en vista
de las sistemáticas vulneraciones a los derechos fundamentales del magistrado investigado. En ese orden de pensamiento, dejamos constancia que el ius puniendi estatal
tiene que ser asumido de conformidad al espíritu que abraza el Estado democrático
de derecho y sobre todo, el Estado Constitucional de derecho imperantes.
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Así, como quiera que el magistrado investigado ya enmendó su error al haber
declarado fundada la excepción de incompetencia (a la luz de lo señalado por la propia Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, en los atenuantes de la resolución sancionatoria),
queda pendiente, entonces, que la misma lleve también a cabo lo propio, es decir, la
enmienda de sus errores. Ello, en tanto que el no reconocer ni corregir errores, implica
inexorablemente, volverlos a cometer.
Finalmente, en palabras de GONZÁLEZ MOORE, quien acuñó la frase: “La sanción
es parte de la formación”, sostenemos que la sanción forma y educa, empero, siempre
y cuando se encuentre en la vereda de la justeza, legitimidad, que es la quintaesencia
de la administración de justicia y en materia sancionatoria administrativa disciplinaria. De otra manera, la sanción pierde el norte y se convierte en abusivo, arbitrario,
tiranía, ajusticiamiento.
XIV. SUGERENCIAS.La Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, debería reconsiderar su decisión en la resolución
in comento y emitir una nueva, a efectos de no vulnerar los derechos fundamentales:
al debido proceso administrativo, independencia jurisdiccional interna, tipicidad administrativa, legalidad y motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.
Además, sería positivo considere también incluir en la misma, el test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad previo a la sanción, así también, el bloque de convencionalidad.
Somos de la opinión, que en la expedición de la resolución sub examine; debió
resolverse a través de sólidos argumentos, concordantes con el espíritu de los expuestos en el presente trabajo.
Al respecto, cabe resaltar que la OCMA precisa interpretar las normas de rango
legal, de conformidad a lo establecido en la Constitución Política. Cuanto más, si nos
encontramos ante un proceso constitucional, como es el de amparo, en el presente
caso.
Sugerimos la provisión de cursos de capacitación, tanto a los señores magistrados como al personal jurisdiccional, así también de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA,
respecto de la temática abordada en la presente entrega. Dicha capacitación, deberá
ser abordada desde una óptica constitucional, en vista a la naturaleza trasversal del
derecho constitucional.
XV. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS.-
-
148
BAZÁN SEMINARIO, César. ¿Separando la paja del trigo? Destitución de jueces por el Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura entre el 2003 y el 2007. En línea: Recuperado en fecha
30/10/16, de http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/publica/paja_trigo.pdf. Lima, 2008.
CAVANI, Renzo. ¿Juzgando a jueces?. La Ocma y las sanciones por defectos en la motivación. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de https://afojascero.com/2016/04/11/
juzgando-a-jueces-la-ocma-y-las-sanciones-por-defectos-en-la-motivacion/. Lima, 2016.
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017
ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com
REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL
-
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-
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GARCÍA BELAÚNDE, Domingo. Diccionario de jurisprudencia constitucional. Definiciones
y conceptos extraídos de las resoluciones y sentencias del tribunal constitucional. Editora
Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2009.
GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Comentários à Convenção Americana Sobre Direitos Humanos. Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, 3a. ed., Sao Paulo, Editora
Revista Dos Tribunais, 2010. Citado en: VV.AA. Convención Americana sobre Derechos
Humanos. Comentario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.kas.de/
wf/doc/kas_38682-1522-4-30.pdf?140901164826, 2014.
LAMA MORE, Héctor Enrique. La independencia judicial en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/
connect/4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b/D_La_Independencia_Judicial_120912.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b, Lima, 2012.
LEDESMA NARVAEZ, Marianella. Independencia judicial y control disciplinario. En línea:
Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://catedrajudicial.blogspot.pe/2008/01/independencia-judicial-y-control.html, Lima, 2008.
PÉREZ DEL BLANCO, Gilberto. La competencia. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16,
de http://procesalciviluam.blogspot.pe/2012/02/tema-5-la-competencia.html, Madrid,
2012.
PRIORI POSADA, Giovanni F. La competencia en el proceso civil peruano. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/derysoc/2008/06/05/
la-competencia-en-el-proceso-civil-peruano/, Lima, 2008.
S/a. Control de convencionalidad. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, del Cuadernillo
de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Nº 7 http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/sitios/libros/todos/docs/controlconvencionalidad8.pdf, San José de Costa
Rica.
S/a. ¿Qué es OCMA?. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de http://ocma.pj.gob.pe/
site/portal.aspx?view=queesocma, Lima.
TORRES MANRIQUE, Jorge Isaac. La tutela jurisdiccional laboral. Acciones esenciales en el
avance del nuevo modelo procesal. En Suplemento Jurídica del diario oficial El Peruano,
N° 598, Lima, 2006.
UGAZ SÁNCHEZ-MORENO, José Carlos. El control disciplinario de los jueces. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/aportes_dplf_nr2_junio_2007.pdf, Washington, 2007.
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017
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7
La riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato
The arbitration reform in Brazilian law
Giovanni Bonato
Professor at the Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil. Doctor
(University of Rome – “La Sapienza”). Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, France.
Riassunto
L’autore analizza la riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato, approvata con la Legge n.
13.129/2015 del 26 maggio 2015 ed entrata in vigore il 27 luglio 2015. La riforma del
2015 non comporta un radicale cambiamento della struttra della Legge brasiliana
dell’arbitrato del 1996, consagrando alcune soluzioni elaborate dalla giurisprudenza.
L’articolo tratta, in particolare, della disposizione che ammette l’arbitrabilità delle
controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, diretta e indiretta. Successivamente,
l’autore si sofferma sui seguenti aspetti: la creazione della carta arbitrale; i poteri
cautelari degli arbitri; la disposizione sulla lista degli arbitri; la possibilità di emanare
lodi parziali.
Parole-chiavi: Arbitrato – Brasile – Riforma – Convenzione di arbitrato – Nomina
arbitri – Lodo arbitrale.
Abstract
The Author examines the new Brazilian law on arbitration, which is set out in a Law
n. 13,129/2015 dated May 26th, 2015 and came into force on 27 July 2015. The reform
of 2015 does not bring any radical change to the main orientations of the Brazilian
Arbitration Act of 1996, in particular by incorporting a number of solutions inspired by
case law. The article discusses about the inclusion of an express provision authorizing
the direct and indirect Public Administration to have recourse to arbitration to resolve
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151
GIOVANNI BONATO
disputes related to disposable patrimonial rights. In turn, the article examines: the
creation of the arbitral letter; the inclusion of a specific provision dealing with the
provisional remedies; the possibility for the parties to appoint as arbitrator someone
who is not part of the list of arbitrators; the inclusion of an express provision authorizing
the arbitrators to issue partial arbitral awards.
Keywords: Arbitration – Brazil – Reform – Arbitration Agreement – Appointment of
Arbitrators – Arbitral Award.
Sommario: 1. Introduzione. 2. L’evoluzione normativa del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato.
3. Struttura e caratteristiche essenziali del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. 4. Le
disposizioni sui rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. 5. Il veto presidenziale
sulle clausola compromissorie stipulate in contratti per adesione, in contratti per
adesione in rapporti di consumo e in contratti individuali di lavoro. 6. La convenzione
di arbitrato contenuta nello statuto di una società per azioni. 7. Le innovazioni rispetto
alla nomina degli arbitri. 8. Le modifiche relative al procedimento arbitrale. 9 Le nuove
disposizioni su arbitrato e tutela cautelare. 10 La carta arbitrale e il sistema della
cooperazione tra giudici statali e arbitri. 11. Le novità relative al lodo arbitrale. 12. Le
novità in materia di impugnazione del lodo. 13. Le disposizioni del c.p.c. del 2015 in
materia di arbitrato.
1.
INTRODUZIONE.
La legge n. 13.129 del 26 maggio 2015 (entrata in vigore il 27 luglio 2015) ha
introdotto in Brasile alcune modifiche alla «Legge sull’arbitrato», n. 9.307 del 23
settembre 1996 (in seguito indicata con l’acronimo LA)1.
1.
152
Ricordiamo che il progetto di riforma della legge n. 9.307 del 1996 risale all’ottobre del 2013 ed è
stato elaborato da una commissione di giuristi, presieduta da Luis Felipe Salomão (giudice presso il
Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia) e nominata nel 2012 con atto del Presidente del Senato Federale.
Il testo di riforma elaborato dalla citata commissione di giuristi è stato successivamente presentato
come progetto di legge (n. 406 del 2013) dal Presidente del Senato e, dopo alcune discussioni in
seno alla Camera dei Deputati, è stato inviato alla Presidenza della Repubblica che ha promulgato
il progetto di legge, ponendo, tuttavia, tre veti presidenziali sui paragrafi 2°, 3° e 4° dell’art. 4 della
legge n. 13.129 del 2015.
Sulla riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato del 2015, si vedano: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e
spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del
2015, in questa Rivista, 2016, 33; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade, Brasilia,
2016, spec. 63 ss.; Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di
C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, San Paolo, 2015; Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De
Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, Rio de Janeiro, 2016; Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei
n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, San Paolo, 2016; A. Wald, A
reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 40,
17 ss.; Id., A reforma da lei de arbitragem, in Revista dos tribunais, 2015, n. 962, 95 ss.; G.E. Nanni,
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017
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LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO
Come già sottolineato dalla dottrina italiana, siamo in presenza di una «significativa
risistemazione» della materia2, la quale non va, tuttavia, a sovvertire l’assetto generale
dell’istituto. Restano, infatti, immutate le scelte di fondo della LA del 1996, la cui
struttura rimane sostanzialmente inalterata3, venendo solo arricchita di due nuovi
capitoli (IV-A e IV-B), di alcuni nuovi articoli (22-A, 22-B, 22-C), nonché di nuovi paragrafi
in articoli già esistenti. La riforma del 2015 incide, infatti, solo su alcuni aspetti del
diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, apportando novità in materia di: partecipazione della
pubblica amministrazione ad un giudizio arbitrale; convenzione arbitrale statutaria;
lista di arbitri; rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrato; cooperazione tra giustizia
statale e giustizia arbitrale; interruzione della prescrizione; questioni pregiudiziali non
compromettibili; lodi parziali; impugnazione del lodo. Alcune innovazioni relative alla
convenzione di arbitrato sono “morte sul nascere”, in ragione del veto della Presidenza
della Repubblica (su vedi infra § 5).
Oltre alla richiamata riforma del diritto dell’arbitrato del 2015, anche il nuovo
codice di procedura civile (approvato con la Legge n. 13.105 del 16 marzo 2015
ed entrato in vigore il 18 marzo del 20164) contiene alcune disposizioni inerenti,
2.
3.
4.
P. Guilhardi, Medidas cautelares depois de instituída a arbitragem: reflexões à luz da reforma da
lei de arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 45, 125 ss.; S.M. Ferreira Lemes,
Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 47, 37
ss.; M.R. Mannheimer, Mudanças na lei de arbitragem (Lei 9.307, de 23.09.1996). Observações
sobre a Lei 13.129, de 26.05.2015. Visão de um antigo magistrado, in Revista de arbitragem e
mediação, 2015, n. 47, 45 ss.; E.A. Cambler, R.F. Krüger Thamay, Jurisdição e arbitragem e o Código
de Processo Civil de 2015, in AA.VV., O Novo Código de Processo Civil brasileiro. Estudos dirigidos:
sistematização e procedimentos, a cura di T. Alvim, L.H. Volpe Camargo, L. Ziesemer Schmitz, N.G.
De Macedo Carvalho, Rio de Janeiro, 2015, 103 ss. Tra i principali manuali di diritto brasiliano
dell’arbitrato segnaliamo: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, 3° ed., San Paolo, 2009; C.R.
Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, San Paolo, 2013; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de
arbitragem, San Paolo, 2014; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, 5° ed., San Paolo, 2015. Segnaliamo
anche il volume di E.F. Ricci, Lei de arbitragem brasileira, San Paolo, 2004, in cui sono raccolti i vari
saggi pubblicati dall’A. in Brasile sul diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. Sulla legge n. 9.307 del 1996,
ricordiamo, infine, il commento in lingua italiana di J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana
sull’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 1997, 1 ss.
In questo senso, si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la
“legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 1.
In questo senso, si vedano: A. Wald, A reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), cit.,
secondo cui la riforma «soube manter a estrutura e a substância da lei vigente»; F.L. Yarshell, L.
Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, in
AA.VV., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho,
A. Freire, 237 ss., spec. 246, che parlano di modificazioni «puntuali», apportate alla legge del
1996.
Sul nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano la letteratura è sterminata, ci limitiamo a ricordare le opere della
manualistica di diritto processuale civile, tra cui: H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, 50°
ed., Rio de Janeiro, 2016; L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil,
vol. 3, 2° ed., San Paolo, 2016; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, 18° ed., vol. 1, Salvador,
2016; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de direito processual civil, 8° ed., vol. I, San Paolo, 2016; C.R.
Dinamarco, B. Vasconcelos Carrilho Lopes, Teoria geral do novo processo civil, San Paolo, 2016.
Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017
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GIOVANNI BONATO
«indirettamente o direttamente», l’arbitrato, anche se «in modo tutto sommato
marginale»5. Menzioneremo, ad ogni modo, tali novità codicistiche al termine del
presente scritto.
Nel corso della nostra indagine, avremo modo di constatare come alcune
delle nuove disposizione si limitano esclusivamente a consacrare normativamente
delle soluzioni elaborate dalla giurisprudenza (risolvendo, anche, dei contrasti sorti
all’interno di quest’ultima); altre disposizioni introducono delle innovazione di rilievo
e sono finalizzate a migliorare il funzionamento dell’istituto in esame; altre, ancora,
abrogano alcuni articoli della LA o semplicemente la attualizzano alla luce delle
modifiche legislative intervenute tra il 1996 e il 20156.
Prima di analizzare le novità introdotte dalla riforma del 2015, ritieniamo
opportuno ricordare, a grandi linee, l’evoluzione normativa dell’istituto arbitrale in
Brasile e tratteggiare i suoi aspetti essenziali.
2.
L’EVOLUZIONE NORMATIVA DEL DIRITTO BRASILIANO DELL’ARBITRATO.
Solo da pochi anni (dal 2002 in poi), l’arbitrato in Brasile cessa di essere oggetto
di analisi teoriche e diviene un efficace ed importante strumento di risoluzione delle
controversie7.
Il cammino che conduce al concreto utilizzo dell’istituto inizia nel 1991 con la
c.d. «Operação Arbiter»: l’allora senatore Petronio Muniz dà l’incarico a tre eminenti
giuristi (Selma Ferreira Lemes, Carlos Alberto Carmona e Pedro Batista Martins) di
elaborare un progetto di legge in materia di arbitrato che andrà poi a costituire il testo
della menzionata LA, approvato nel settembre del 19968. Tale cammino prosegue,
successivamente, con la pronuncia del Supremo Tribunale Federale di dicembre del
5.
6.
7.
8.
154
A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato”
brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 1.
Nello stesso senso si veda S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 37 ss.
In questo senso, si veda H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. II, cit., 566: «Até data
recente, o juízo arbitral praticamente não existia no Brasil, a não ser como assento de especulação
teórica em doutrina, visto que na experiência concreta não se tinha notícia de qualquer compromisso».
Naturalmente l’effettivo utilizzo nella pratica dell’istituto, viene accompagnato dal fiorire di studi
teorici.
Sull’evoluzione storica dell’arbitrato in Brasile, si vedano, tra gli altri: R. de Carvalho Aprigliano,
Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura
di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 233 ss.; A. Pereira Gaio Jr., Lei n. 9.307/96: natureza,
historicidade e constitucionalidade da arbitragem no Brasil, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. 15 anos da Lei
n. 9.307/96, a cura di A. Pereira Gaio Jr., R. Almeira Magalhães, Belo Horizonte, 2012, 1 ss., spec. 9
ss.; E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, Rio de Janeiro, 2016,
9 ss.
Sulla «operação arbiter» si rinvia a C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 5 ss., e G. Giusti, Os
vinte anos da lei 9.307/1996, cit., 3 ss.
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LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO
2001, per poi concludersi nel luglio del 2002 con la ratificazione della Convenzione di
New York sul riconoscimento ed esecuzione dei lodi stranieri del 1958.
Alla LA n. 9.307 del 1996 si deve il merito di aver dotato il Brasile di una disciplina
dell’arbitrato moderna e funzionale9. La LA ha, infatti, proceduto ad abrogare le
disposizioni contenute nel codice civile del 1916 e nel codice di procedura civile del
1973 (all’epoca vigenti), contenenti i due principali ostacoli che si erano, fino ad allora,
frapposti all’uso dell’arbitrato: l’impossibilità di instaurare un procedimento arbitrale
sulla base di una clausola compromissoria; l’omologazione obbligatoria del lodo, a
pena di nullità dell’atto. Sui due richiamati ostacoli è necessario soffermarsi10.
In primo luogo, la legislazione anteriore alla LA del 1996 si caratterizzava per
l’assenza di una disciplina normativa sulla clausola compromissoria, in quanto il
c.c. del 1916 (art. 1039), il c.p.c. del 1939 (art. 1031) e il c.p.c. del 1973 (art. 1074)
contemplavano il compromesso, quale unico tipo di convenzione di arbitrato.
La giurisprudenza brasiliana permetteva, quindi, l’instaurazione unilaterale del
procedimento arbitrale solo sulla base di un compromesso, unica forma di convenzione
che poteva dar luogo ad una valida proposizione dell’eccezione di patto compromissorio
davanti al giudice statale. Mentre in caso di violazione di una clausola compromissoria
alla controparte spettava solo un risarcimento per equivalente, il cui ammontare era
di difficilmente determinabile11.
In secondo luogo, sia il c.p.c. del 1939 (art. 1043) che il c.p.c. del 1973 (art. 1097)
imponevano, a pena di nullità, il deposito obbligatorio del lodo presso la cancelleria
del giudice statale: il provvedimento statale di omologazione attribuiva alla decisione
degli arbitri l’efficacia della sentenza giudiziale12.
9. Così R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 239.
10. Si rinvia anche a: J. Dolinger, C. Tiburcio, Direito international privado, Direito international privado
(parte especial). Arbitragem comercial international, Rio de janeiro, 2003, p. 21 ss., ai quali si rinvia
anche per maggiori informazioni in proposito; C. Tiburcio, Cláusula compromissória em contrato
internacional: interpretação, validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, in Revista de processo, 2015, n.
241, 521 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 22; Id., A arbitragem no Brasil: em busca
de uma nova lei, in Revista de processo, 1993, n. 72, 53 ss. Sulla sfiducia e sull’ostilità di cui è stato
oggetto l’istituto dell’arbitrato nel XIX° secolo e in buona parte del XX° secolo, sia permesso di rinviare
a G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália. Perspectiva de direito comparado com
o sistema brasileiro, in Revista brasileira de arbitragem, 2014, n. 43, 59 ss.
11. Prima dell’avvento della LA del 1996, la clausola compromissoria in Brasile era, in sostanza, solo una
vaga promessa di affidare la soluzione della controversia ad arbitri, come viene ricordato in dottrina
da: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 4 e 94; C. Tiburcio, Cláusula compromissória em
contrato internacional: interpretação, validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, cit., 523 ss.; A. Briguglio,
Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche
dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5.
12. Sull’evoluzione storica della disciplina del lodo arbitrale e dei suoi rapporti con il provvedimento
statale di omologazione, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale.
Studio di diritto italiano e comparato, Napoli, 2012, 156 ss. Sul punto si veda, nuovamente, C.A.
Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 5 e 271, il quale, in senso critico rispetto alla legislazione vigente
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GIOVANNI BONATO
I due descritti fattori, che impedirono l’utilizzo dell’arbitrato in Brasile, sono
stati eliminati dalla LA n. 9.307 del 1996. La Legge sull’arbitrato del 1996 ha, infatti,
l’incontestabile merito di aver introdotto un’esaustiva regolamentazione normativa
sulla clausola compromissoria, oggetto degli artt. da 4 a 8 della LA13. Una disciplina che,
tuttavia, all’art. 7 della LA prevede la c.d. «formalizzazione giudiziale del compromesso».
Qualora una parte non rispetti la clausola compromissoria, è necessario, infatti, rivolgersi
al giudice per ottenere, attraverso un procedimento sommario, la conclusione giudiziale
del compromesso14. Così descritto, il procedimento brasiliano, di cui all’art. 7 della LA,
appare «sulla carta» chiaramente «più farraginoso e meno favorevole all’arbitrato»
rispetto a quei sistemi che ammettono la possibilità di instaurare l’arbitrato sulla base
della sola clausola compromissoria15. Fortunatamente, dottrina e giurisprudenza hanno
ridotto l’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 7 della LA ad ipotesi marginali, quali quella della
clausola compromissoria c.d. «bianca» o «vuota» (quella che non contiene le modalità
di nomina degli arbitri), nonché all’ipotesi della clausola patologica (di dubbia validità
ed efficacia)16. Il procedimento di formalizzazione giudiziale del compromesso, di cui
all’art. 7, è visto, quindi, come una «ultima ratio»17 e, per tale motivo, i casi giudiziari
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
156
prima della LA del 1996, ricorda che l’obbligo di assoggettare il lodo al successivo provvedimento di
omologazione impediva l’utilizzo dell’istituto nella pratica, in quanto faceva perdere i vantaggi della
riservatezza e della celerità dell’arbitrato.
La clausola compromissoria, insieme al compromesso, fa parte della più ampia categoria della
convenzione di arbitrato (art. 3 della LA). Sulla disciplina della convenzione di arbitrato in Brasile si
vedano, in generale: C. Tiburcio, Claúsula compromissória em contrato internacional: interpretação,
validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, cit., 521 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 77; C.R.
Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 73; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem,
cit., 157; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 153 ss.; G.E. Nanni, Direito civil e arbitragem, San
Paolo, 2014, 9 ss.
Sul procedimento di cui all’art. 7 LA, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit, 154,
anche in riferimento alle ragioni storiche che hanno dato origine alla disposizione; C.R. Dinamarco,
A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 218; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit.,
199 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 167 ss.
Per queste considerazioni, si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici
considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5. E.F. Ricci,
Presente e futuro da cláusula compromissória e da sua atuação, in Revista de processo, 2000, n.
100, 88, ss., § 5, che aveva qualificato il procedimento di formazione giudiziale del compromesso, di
cui all’art. 7 LA, come un sistema intermedio, tra quello antico (che conosceva solo il compromesso)
e quello moderno (che conferisce autosufficienza alla clausola compromissoria); l’A. aveva, quindi,
auspicato l’accoglimento anche in Brasile del sistema moderno, giungendo, di fatto, a eliminare l’art.
7.
Per alcuni esempi di clausole patologiche, definite anche «problematiche», si veda G.E. Nanni, Direito
civil e arbitragem, cit., 86 ss., nonché L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 179 ss.
In questo senso, si veda: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 219, il
quale ricorda che non è necessario ricorrere all’intervento del giudice statale, ai sensi dell’art. 7 LA,
«quando, apesar da negativa ou omissão da contraparte em assinar o compromisso, houver outros
meios disponíveis pelos quais também seja possível instaurar a arbitragem». Per l’interpreazione
riduttiva dell’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 7 LA, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo,
cit, 156, secondo cui il procedimento in analisi si riferisce solo alle clausola compromissorie che
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in cui si applica l’art. 7 in Brasile sono numericamente ridotti18. Grazie alla riferita
interpretazione dottrinale e giurisprudenziale, l’art. 7 è stato, quindi, trasformato «da
strumento di ausilio giudiziario farraginoso ed interferente (…) a strumento di utile
salvataggio di clausole compromissorie patologiche»19.
Inoltre, si deve alla LA del 1996 il merito di aver conferito vita autonoma al lodo
arbitrale (denominato dalla LA come «sentença arbitral»20). Tra l’altro, spingendosi più
avanti rispetto a quanto previsto nel sistema italiano, il legislatore brasiliano decide
«não contenham o elemento mínimo para que se possa instituir o tribunal arbitral (ou seja, o modo
de nomear as árbitros). Se tal elemento mínimo (modo de nomear os árbitros) estiver presente,
a instituição da arbitragem não dependerá de intervenção judicial»; A. Braghetta, Cláusula
compromissória – autosuficiência da cláusula cheia, in Revista dos tribunais, 2002, n. 137, 800 ss.,
§ 2, che parla della «auto-suficiência da cláusula compromissória cheia»; A. Wald, O régime da
cláusula compromissória na jurisprudência recente, in Aa. Vv., Aspectos atuais da arbitragem, a cura
di A.N. Pucci, San Paolo, 2001, 34 ss. In giurisprudenza, si vedano: Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de
São Paulo, 16 settembre 1999, ricorso n.124.217.4/0, in Revista de direito bancário, do mercado de
capitais e da arbitragem, n. 7, 336 ss.
18. Per rispondere all’interrogativo posto da A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici
considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5, sull’effettivo
utilizzo del procedimento di esecuzione in forma specifica della clausola compromissoria, ai sensi
dell’art. 7 LA, è interessante citare l’analisi empirica, effettuata congiuntamente dalla Escola
de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas (DIREITOGV) e dal Comitê Brasileiro de
Arbitragem, sul tema «Ação de Execução Específica da Cláusula Compromissória (“Ação do art.
7º”)», la cui relazione è pubblicata nel sito del citato Comitê all’indirizzo http://cbar.org.br/PDF/
Acao_de_Execucao_Especifica_da_Clausula_Compromissoria.pdf). L’analisi si riferisce ad un periodo
temporale che va dal 1996 al 2008 e prendere in considerazione le decisione emanate dai Tribunais
de Justiça (organi di secondo grado) e dai Superior Tribunal de Justiça e dal Supremo Tribunal
Federal (Corti di vertice), escludendo, quindi, le decisioni di primo grado. Nella richiamata relazione
vengono identificati trentaquattro casi di applicazione dell’art. 7 LA e l’analisi viene conclusa con la
constatazione di un ridotto numero di sentenze statali pronunciate in materia. Tale circostanza viene
attribuita a diversi fattori, tra cui: la prevalenza nella pratica di clausole compromissorie valide ed
efficaci rispetto alle clausole compromissorie bianche o patologiche; la conclusione di un accordo
tra le parti per stipulare un compromesso, in caso di clausola compromissoria difettosa; la mancata
proposizione dell’impugnazione nei confronti della decisione di primo grado, emanata a conclusione
del procedimento di cui all’art. 7 LA.
Nel 2014 è iniziata una seconda ricerca empirica in materia di arbitrato che riguarda anche
l’utilizzazione del procedimento, di cui all’art. 7 LA. Tuttavia, ancora non sono stati pubblicati i risultati
di questa ultima ricerca http://cbar.org.br/site/pesquisa-cbar-abearb-2014.
19. Richiamando quanto scritto da A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando
la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., nota 6.
20. Come indicato nel testo, la vigente legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato utilizza esclusivamente l’espressione
«sentença arbitral» per denominare la decisione degli arbitri e non quella di «laudo» (mentre il c.p.c.
del 1939 e il c.p.c. del 1973 contenevano entrambi i vocaboli in questione). Solo l’art. 33, § 2, inciso
II, LA, nella sua versione originaria del 1996, conteneva la parola laudo, ma la riforma dell’arbitrato
del 2015 ha sostituito, all’interno di tale dispozione, tale vocabolo con quello di sentença arbitral. Si
vedano C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 271, e L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem,
cit., 417, quanto all’opportunità di utilizzare il termine sentenza arbitrale nella LA. In ogni caso, nel
presente scritto utilizzeremo l’espressione lodo arbitrale per trattare della decisione degli arbitri
anche in relazione al diritto brasiliano, poiché riteniamo che sia irrilevante per la determinazione del
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di mettere completamente fine al provvedimento statale di omologazione, come
specificato dall’art. 18 della LA21. Ai sensi dell’art. 31 della LA, il lodo arbitrale produce,
tra le parti e i suoi successori22, gli stessi effetti prodotti dalla sentenza togata ed è
titolo esecutivo giudiziale23, nonché titolo per l’iscrizione di ipoteca giuziale24.
La LA n. 9.307 del 1996 è stata, tuttavia, un presupposto necessario, ma non
sufficiente allo sviluppo concreto dell’arbitrato25. Infatti, l’istituto ha iniziato ad
essere concretamente utilizzato nella pratica solo in seguito alla pronuncia (del 12
dicembre 2001) del Supremo Tribunale Federale, con cui è stata dichiarata la legittimità
costituzionale dell’arbitrato, posta in dubbio in riferimento all’art. 5, inciso XXXV, Cost.,
sul c.d. principio di «inafastabilidade da tutela jurisdicional»26.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
158
regime di tale atto l’una o l’altra denominazione normativa, come anche afferma C.R. Dinamarco, A
arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, 175.
Art. 18 LA dispone che: «O árbitro é juiz de fato e de direito, e a sentença que proferir não fica sujeita
a recurso ou a homologação pelo Poder Judiciário». Si deve notare che su questo punto, il diritto
brasiliano si presenta più moderno di quello italiano, in cui, come noto, l’omologazione è ancora
necessaria per conferire al lodo l’efficacia esecutiva, oltre alla trascrizione nei pubblici registri e
all’iscrizione di ipoteca giudiziale (art. 825 c.p.c.). Sull’ordinamento italiano rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi,
Arbitrato, Bologna, 2014, 815, e C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, 2° ed., Padova, 2012,
440 ss.
Oltre agli effetti della sentenza giudiziale, la dottrina (nettamente maggioritaria) ritiene che il lodo
arbitrale produca la cosa giudicata materiale, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre
l’impugnazione per nullità. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria
geral do processo, cit., 202; Id., Instituições de direito processual civil, I, cit., 211; C.A. Carmona,
Arbitragem e processo, cit., 274 e 390 ss.; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, cit., 173;
H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 2, cit., 565 ss. Ma, in senso, contrario, si pone A.
de Assis, Processo civil brasileiro, vol. I, San Paolo, 2015, 130 ss., il quale dubita che il lodo sia rivestito
della «autêntica autoridade de coisa julgada», negando che il lodo possa produrre la «coisa julgada
típica». Inoltre, alcuni autori (E. Parente, Processo arbitral e sistema, San Paolo, 2012, 303 ss.; F. Scripes
Wladeck, Impugnação da sentença arbitral, Salvador, 2014, 91 ss.) sottolineano le particolarità della
cosa giudicata prodotta dal lodo rispetto a quella prodotta dalla sentenza giudiziale. Per altri riferimenti,
sia permesso si rinviare nuovamente a G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale, cit., 159 ss.
In tal senso dispone l’art. 515, inciso VII, del c.p.c. del 2015 che include il lodo arbitrale nell’elenco
dei titoli esecutivi giudiziali, come, d’altra parte, già prevedeva il c.p.c. del 1973 all’art. 475-N, inciso
IV. Sul punto si veda: M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Princípios do processo no novo Código de Processo
Civil, San Paolo, 2016, p. 234.
Come disposto dall’art. 495 del c.p.c. del 2015 e, prima, dall’art. 466 del c.p.c. del 1973.
Vale la pena ricordare l’insegnamento di R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no
novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., p. 239; Id., Aspectos contratuais da cláusula compromissória, in
Revista do advogado. AASP, 2012, n. 116, 174 ss., secondo cui i pilastri fondamentali della LA che
hanno permesso lo sviluppo concreto dell’arbitrato in Brasile sono: l’efficacia della convenzione di
arbitrato che permette l’instaurazione dell’arbitrato, nonostante la resistenza di una delle parti;
l’autonomia della convenzione di arbitrato; l’abrogazione dell’istituto della omologazione del lodo e
l’attribuzione a quest’ultimo della qualità di titolo esecutivo giudiziale; l’impossibilità di ridiscutere
davanti al giudice statale quanto è stato deciso nel merito dagli arbitri.
L’art. 5, inciso XXXV, dispone che: «a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou
ameaça a direito». Per ulteriori riferimenti alla decisione del Supremo Tribunale Federale citata
nel testo, si veda L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 5 ss. In ogni caso, già prima di tale
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Infine, come già indicato, altro fattore rilevante che ha permesso lo sviluppo
pratico dell’arbitrato in Brasile è stato il recepimento – con decreto del governo federale
n. 4.311 del 23 luglio 2002 – della Convenzione di New York sul riconoscimento ed
esecuzione dei lodi arbitrali stranieri del 195827.
I tre fattori precedentemente descritti (una nuova e moderna legge sull’arbitrato,
la pronuncia del Supremo Tribunale Federale e la ratificazione della Convenzione di
New York del 1958), insieme ad una giurisprudenza favorevole del Superior Tribunal
de Justiça28, hanno permesso uno sviluppo notevole e progressivo dell’arbitrato in
Brasile, come risulta dai dati forniti dalle principali istituzioni arbitrali che operano
nel territorio brasiliano29.
Possiamo, quindi, senza dubbio, affermare che attualmente il Brasile appartiene, a
pieno titolo, a quel gruppo di paesi in cui si incentiva e valorizza l’arbitrato, considerando
tale strumento di soluzione delle controversie di pari dignità rispetto al processo
statale30.
27.
28.
29.
30.
pronuncia, la dottrina dominante si era schierata in favore della costituzionalità dell’arbitrato, si
vedano: J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 12 s.; E.F. Ricci, Il problema
della legittimità costituzionale dell’arbitrato in Brasile, in questa Rivista, 1999, 49 ss.; A. Wald, Da
constitucionalidade da Lei 9.307/96, in Revista de direito bancário e do mercado de capitais, 2000,
n. 7, 323 ss.
Sul tema, si veda A. Wald, La ratification de la Convention de New York par le Brésil, in Revue de
l’arbitrage, 2003, 91 ss.
Sulla posizione favorevole della giurisprudenza brasiliana in materia di arbitrato, si vedano le
considerazioni di: A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, M. De Melo Vieira, A posição dos tribunais brasileiros
em matéria de arbitragem no último biênio (2011-2012), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação,
2012, n. 35, 15 ss., cui si rinvia anche per l’analisi di alcuni casi giurisprudenziali recenti in tema di
arbitrato; C.A. Carmona, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, segurança jurídica e arbitragem, in Revista de
arbitragem e mediação, 2012, n. 34, 97 ss.
In questo senso, si veda G. Giusti, Os vinte anos da lei 9.307/1996, Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem,
a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 3 ss., spec. 7 ss. A questo proposito, ricordano
A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Ano foi marcado pela democratização da arbitragem e 2015 promete boa
safra, in www.conjur.com.br (2015), che, sulla base dei dati forniti dalle principali istituzioni arbitrali
che operano nel territorio brasiliano, «nel 2014 sono stati instaurati 310 nuovi casi di arbitrato, rispetto
ai 170 circa del 2008; ciò che corrisponde ad un aumento che supera l’80% in numero di arbitrati nel
periodo indicato». Sul punto, ricorda anche S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Pesquisa: Arbitragem em Números
e Valores, 2015, in http://selmalemes.adv.br/noticias/An%C3%A1lise%20da%20pesquisa%20
arbitragens%20em%20n%C3%BAmeros%202010%20a%202015.pdf, che nell’arco di sei anni (tra
il 2010 e il 2015), il numero totale dei procedimenti arbitrali instaurati è stato di 1043, il cui valore
complessivo è stato all’incirca di 38 miliardi di Reais. L’analisi empirica dell’A. è stata effettuata nelle
sei principali istituzioni brasiliane: Centro de Arbitragem da AMCHAM – Brasil (AMCHAM); Centro
de Arbitragem da Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canadá ( CCBC); Câmara de Mediação, Conciliação
e Arbitragem de São Paulo - CIESP/FIESP (CIESP/FIESP); Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado (CAM);
Câmara de Arbitragem da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CAM/FGV); Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial
- Brasil (CAMARB).
Sulla piena parità tra arbitrato e processo statale, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo,
cit., 5 ss.; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade, cit., 63; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições
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GIOVANNI BONATO
3.
STRUTTURA E CARATTERISTICHE ESSENZIALI DEL DIRITTO BRASILIANO
DELL’ARBITRATO.
In relazione alla sistematica, la LA si compone attualmente di nove titoli: I –
«disposizioni generali»; II – «della convenzione di arbitrato e dei suoi effetti»; III –
«degli arbitri»; IV – «del procedimento arbitrale»; IV-A – «della tutela cautelare e della
tutela di urgenza»; IV-B – «della carta arbitrale»; V – «del lodo arbitrale»; VI – «del
riconoscimento e dell’esecuzione dei lodi stranieri»; VII – «disposizioni finali». Ai sette
capitoli, inizialmente contenuti nella LA, si sono aggiunti, per effetto della riforma del
2015, i due capitoli IV-A e IV-B.
Tra le caratteristiche essenziali dell’arbitrato brasiliano, dobbiamo ricordare
l’adozione di un modello puramente monista31. L’unica distizione giuridica che si
rinviene all’interno della LA è tra è tra lodo arbitrale brasiliano e lodo arbitrale straniero,
differenziati secondo un criterio di tipo geografico: il primo è quello emanato all’interno
del territorio della Repubblica Federale del Brasile; il secondo è quello pronunciato
all’estero e che, pertanto, viene riconosciuto e dotato di esecutorietà attraverso il
procedimento di omologazione che si svolge davanti al Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia
(artt. 34 e ss. LA)32. Il modello monista non viene messo in discussione dalla riforma del
de direito processual civil, I, cit., 214.
Non è questa la sede per entrare nel dibattito sulla natura dell’arbitrato, possiamo solo ricordare che
la dottrina nettamente maggioritaria propende per la natura giurisdizionale dell’istituto, si vedano:
C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 278; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 417;
C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 5 ss.; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano,
Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 247, che parla di una «natureza
claramente jurisdicional da arbitragem»; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, cit., 173,
secondo cui «a arbitragem, no Brasil, não é equivalente jurisdicional: é propriamente jurisdição»; H.
Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. I, cit., 593 ss., secondo cui il «procedimento arbitral,
uma vez instaurado, em tudo se equipara à jurisdição oficial». Ma in senso contrario, ricordiamo
l’autorevole opinione di L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil,
cit., vol. 3, 484, che escludono il carattere giurisdizionale dell’arbitrato. Mentre accoglie la tesi della
natura ibrida dell’arbitrato, L. Britto Mejias, Controle da atividade do árbitro, San Paolo, 2015, 30.
Quanto al dibattito nell’ordinamento italiano, rinviamo, tra gli altri, a: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico
dell’arbitrato, vol. I, cit., 110 ss.; Id., Le nuove frontiere dell’arbitrato, in Riv. dir. proc., 2015, p. 4 ss.;
L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 790 ss.; G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale, cit., passim.
31. Sull’arbitrato internazionale, sui modelli monista, dualista e intermediario, si vedano: A. Briguglio,
La dimensione transnazionale dell’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 2005, 679 ss.; P. Biavati, Arbitrato
internazionale, in Aa. Vv., Arbitrati speciali, a cura di F. Carpi, Bologna, 2008, 391 ss.; A. Bonomi,
Monisme et dualisme, in Aa. Vv., Arbitrage interne et international, a cura di A. Bonomi, D. Bochatay,
Ginevra, 2010, 167 ss.; G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália, cit., §§ 4 ss.; F.J.
Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 452 ss.
32. L’art. 34, § unico, LA, dispone: «Considera-se sentença arbitral estrangeira a que tenha sido proferida
fora do território nacional». Sul criterio geografico per determinare la nazionalità del lodo arbitrale
in Brasile, si rinvia a: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 439, il quale ricorda che si tratta di
una definizione «più obiettiva, più semplice» che permette di superare le difficoltà di qualificazione,
nonostante sia «tecnicamente criticabile»; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 445 ss. Ma in senso
critico con la scelta del legislatore brasiliano, si veda C. de Melo Valença Filho, Poder judiciário e
160
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2015. Ricordiamo che una parte minoritaria della dottrina ha espresso la preferenza per
l’adozione di un modello dualista e, quindi, per l’introduzione di un regime differenziato
per l’arbitrato internazionale33.
Altro tratto saliente del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato è il principio di non
interferenza34. Infatti, come recentemente notato dalla dottrina italiana, una volta
avviato l’arbitrato, «il giudice brasiliano scompare o quasi»35. Lo dimostrano, tra le
altre cose: la disciplina della ricusazione degli arbitri, che viene proposta dinanzi agli
stessi arbitri o agli organi dell’istituzione arbitrale (in caso di arbitrato amministrato)
e non dinanzi al giudice statale36; l’adozione della regola della priorità temporale della
competenza degli arbitri nel controllo validità della convenzione di arbitrato, che
esclude il sistema delle vie parallele37; la completa soppressione dell’omologazione del
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
sentença arbitral, Curitiba, 2002, 189 ss. Nel panorama comparatistico, pare essere prevalente il
criterio della sede dell’arbitrato per determinare la nazionalità del lodo arbitrale. Sul lodo straniero
in generale e per riferimenti al sistema italiano, si vedano, tra gli altri: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico
dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 297 ss.; E.F. Ricci, La nozione di lodo straniero dopo la legge n. 25/1994, in
Riv. dir. proc., 1995, 331 ss.; A. Briguglio, L’arbitrato estero. Il sistema delle convenzioni internazionali,
Padova, 1999, 17 ss.; G. Ruffini, Sede dell’arbitrato e nazionalità del lodo, in Corr. giur., 2000, 1500
ss.; G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália, cit., § 5; R. Maruffi, Sede e nazionalità
dell’arbitrato, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 2012, 627 ss.; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 988 ss.; C.A.
da Silvera Lobo, A definição de sentença arbitral estrangeira, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação,
2006, n. 9, 62 ss. Sulle conseguenze che derivano dall’applicazione concorrente di differenti criteri di
nazionalità, si veda: E.F. Ricci, Il lodo arbitrale con nazionalità plurima: un utile strumento nei rapporti
tra Brasile e stati europei, in questa Rivista, 1999, 643 ss.; Id., Lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 217 ss.
Per l’opportunità di adottare un modello dualista in Brasile, si vedano: F. Verçosa, Arbitragem interna
v. arbitragem internacional: breves contornos da distinção e sua repercussão no ordenamento
jurídico brasileiro face ao princípio da autonomia da vontade, in Aa.Vv., O direito internacional
contemporâneo. Estudos em homenagem ao Professor Jacob Dolinger, a cura di C. Tiburcio, L.R.
Barroso, Rio de Janeiro, 2006, p. 421 ss.; L. Tripodi, Arbitragem doméstica e internacional: o que
significam monismo e dualismo no terreno da arbitragem?, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a
lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 329 ss., spec. 335. In
senso critico con il sistema dualista, si pone C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 438 ss.
Come nota, giustamente, A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la
“legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5, il quale sottolinea come il
principio ispiratore del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato sia «meno intromissione possibile del giudice
statuale; ‘assistenza non interferenza’ secondo un efficace slogan» (citando in proposito un conosciuto
lavoro di G. Tarzia, Assistenza e non interferenza giudiziaria nell’arbitrato internazionale, in questa
Rivista, 1996, 473 ss.). Sul principio di non interferenza e sull’autonomia dell’arbitrato in Brasile,
si vedano: F.L. Yarshell, Caráter subsidiário da ação anulatória de sentença arbitral, in Revista de
Processo, 2012, n. 207, 13 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 210.
A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato”
brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 6.
Sulla disciplina della ricusazione degli arbitri, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit.;
F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 244 ss.
Almeno, secondo l’opinione di una parte della dottrina in Brasile, in tema di rapporti tra arbitri e
giudici statali si applicherebbe la regola della priorità temporale della competenza degli arbitri nel
controllo della validità della convenzione di arbitrato, con la conseguenza che una volta sollevata
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lodo, che, come precedentemente indicato, è titolo esecutivo giudiziale fin dalla sua
emanazione38. Solo nell’ambito dell’impugnazione del lodo, il giudice statale “torna
di scena”, tra l’altro con poteri limitati alla sola fase rescindente, non potendo mai
passare alla fare rescissoria (vedi infra n. 12).
Delineato il contesto in cui si inserisce la legge n. 13.129 del 2015, possiamo
iniziare a commentare il contenuto della riforma del 2015.
4.
LE DISPOSIZIONI SUI RAPPORTI TRA ARBITRATO E PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE.
La legge n. 13.129 del 2015 inserisce tre nuovi commi al fine di disciplinare i
rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione39. Si tratta dei §§ 1° e 2° dell’art. 1,
nonché del § 3° dell’art. 2 LA.
l’eccezione di patto compromossorio i giudici statali dovrebbero chiudere il processo in rito, senza
poter effettuare alcuna analisi sulla validità della convenzione. Le contestazioni sulla validità del
patto compromissorio potrebbero, quindi, essere fatte valere con l’impugnazione del lodo. In
questo senso, si vedano: E. Coelho Pitombo, Os efeitos da convenção de arbitragem. Adoção do
princípio Kompetenz-Kompetenz no Brasil, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof.
Soares, a cura di C.A. Carmona, S.M. Ferreira Lemes, P.A. Batista Martins, 2007, 326 ss.; R.F. Alves, A
inadmissibilidade das medidas anti-arbitragem no direito brasileiro, San Paolo, 2009, 184; F. Didier,
Curso de direito processual civil, I, cit., 645. In realtà, la legge brasiliana non è chiarissima sul punto
e, infatti, altri autori sostengono una tesi diversa, secondo cui i giudici statali – una volta sollevata
l’eccezione di patto compromissorio – avrebbero il potere di verificare prima facie la validità della
convenzione di arbitrato, così: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 177 ss.; R. Resende Beneduzi,
Premilinar de arbitragem no novo CPC, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos
Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 285 ss. Quanto al diritto italiano, è interpretazione assolutamente
dominante, quella secondo cui l’art. 819 ter abbia voluto dettare la regola delle «vie parallele», si
veda, per tutti, L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 579 ss. e 677.
38. Sul punto, si veda, nuovamente C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 210
ss.
39. Sul tema dell’arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione, la letteratura è molto ampia, segnaliamo: A.
Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Arbitragem envolvendo entes estatais: a evolução da jurisprudência e
a Lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015,
a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 105 ss.; A. Chateaubriand Martins, Arbitragem e
administração pública, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di
F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 67 ss.; H.V. Mendonça Sica, Arbitragem e Fazenda Pública, in
Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho,
A. Freire, cit., 273 ss.; E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública,
cit.; M.V. Armani Alves, A fazenda pública na arbitragem, dissertação de mestrado (tesi di master),
Università di San Paolo (USP), 2016; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma
da Lei nº 9.307/1996, in Revista brasileira de arbitragem, 2016, n. 49, 7 ss.; G.H. Justino De Oliveira,
G.B. Schwarstmann, Arbitragem público-privada no Brasil: a especialidade do litígio administrativo
e as especificidades do procedimento arbitral, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 44,
150 ss.; Aa.Vv., Arbitragem e Poder Público, a cura di C.A. Guimarães Pereira, E. Talamini, San
Paolo, 2010; P. Osternack Amaral, Arbitragem e administração pública, Belo Horizonte, 2012; M.J.
Magalhães Bonicio, Breve análise sobre a arbitragem em conflitos que envolvem o Estado, in Revista
da Procuradoria Geral do Estado de São Paulo, 2012, n. 75, 13 ss.; Id., Arbitragem e estado: ensaio
162
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In primo luogo, per fare chiarezza sul tema della compromettibilità delle
controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, la riforma introduce, all’art. 1, § 1°,
la disposizione secondo cui: «La pubblica amministrazione diretta ed indiretta può
ricorrere all’arbitrato per dirimere i conflitti relativi a diritti patrimoniali disponibili».
Viene, in tal modo, legislativamente confermata la soluzione elaborata da una parte
della giurisprudenza (in particolare del Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia) e sostenuta da
parte autorevole della dottrina, secondo cui già in riferimento alla versione originaria
della LA del 1996 potevano essere considerate valide – alla luce all’art. 1, caput40, LA –
le convenzioni di arbitrato stipulate dalla pubblica amministrazione, purché aventi ad
oggetto diritti patrimoniali disponibili41. Comunque, nel fugare ogni dubbio in proposito,
sobre o litígio adequado, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 45, 155 ss.; C.A. de Salles,
A arbitragem em contratos administrativos, Rio de Janeiro, 2011; S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Arbitragem
na administração pública. Fundamentos jurídicos e eficiência econômica, San Paolo, 2007.
40. Come ricorda C. R. Dinamarco, Vocabulário do processo civil, San Paolo, 2009, p. 313, il caput è la
«testa» dell’articolo, la sua prima parte, in cui si trova la «disposizione centrale», che viene seguita
da incisi e paragrafi in cui si trovano «disposizioni complementari».
41. L’art. 1, caput, LA dispone (fin dalla sua versione originale del 1996) che: «Le persone capaci di
contrattare potranno ricorrere all’arbitrato per dirimere liti relative a diritti patrimoniali disponibili».
Come indicato nel testo, sulla base di tale previsione normativa, alcune sentenze del Superiore
Tribunale di Giustizia avevano ritenuto legittima l’utilizzazione dell’arbitrato da parte della pubblica
amministrazione, tra le varie decisioni segnaliamo: 25 ottobre 2005, sezione 2°, recurso especial
n. 612.439/RS; 17 luglio 2007, sezione 2°, recurso especial nº 606.345; 28 giugno 2006, sezione 1°,
mandado de segurança n. 11.308/DF; 20 ottobre 2011, sezione 3°, recurso especial n. 904.813/PR.
Giova ricordare che anche prima dell’entrata in vigore della LA del 1996, il Supremo Tribunale Federale
nel celebre caso “Lage” aveva ammesso la legittimità del ricorso all’arbitrato in una controversia
vertente tra l’amministrazione pubblica federale brasiliana e un soggetto privato, ma in tal caso
sussisteva un’espressa autorizzazione legale. Si tratta della decisione emanata nell’ambito dell’agravo
de instrumento n. 52.181, del 14 novembre 1973, publicata in Revista trimestral de jurisprudência,
1974, n. 68, 382 ss. Per l’analisi delle citate decisioni rinviamo a: E.B. Baraldi, Arbitragem e contratos
com a administração pública, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R.
Resende Beneduzi, cit., 30 ss.; A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Arbitragem envolvendo entes estatais: a
evolução da jurisprudência e a Lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, cit., 113 ss.
Tra gli autori favorevoli alla compromettibilità delle controversie con la pubblica amministrazione,
anche prima della riforma del 2015, si vedano: S.M. Ferreira Lemes, A arbitragem e os novos rumos
empreendidos na administração pública: a empresa estatal, o Estado e a concessão de serviço público,
in Aa.Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da Lei de Arbitragem, a cura di P.A. Batista Martins, S.M. Ferreira
Lemes, C.A. Carmona, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 175 ss.; C. De Melo Valença Filho, Arbitragem e contratos
administrativos, in Revista de direito bancário do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, 2000, n. 8,
359 ss.; A. Wald, A arbitragem e as sociedades de economia mista, in Revista de direito bancário
do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, 2003, n. 19, 283 ss.; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Arbitragem e
prestação de serviços públicos, in Revista de direito administrativo, 2003, n. 233, 377 ss.; J.E. Nunes
Pinto, A arbitrabilidade de controvérsias nos contratos com o Estado e empresas estatais, in Revista
brasileira de arbitragem, 2004, n. 01, 9 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 50; R. de
Carvalho Aprigliano, Ordem pública e processo, San Paolo, 2011, 20-21; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem
na teoria geral do processo, cit., 87 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 39.
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l’art. 1, § 1°, è certamente norma da apprezzare42 e mette fine a quella prospettiva
più restrittiva – sostenuta da una parte della giurisprudenza (in particolare della
Corte dei Conti) e da alcuni studiosi – in base alla quale la pubblica amministrazione
poteva ricorrere all’arbitrato solo in presenza di una legge speciale che la autorizzasse
espressamente in tal senso e in relazione alle specifiche materie indicate43. In ragione
dell’innovazione della riforma in commento, risulta – chiaramente – superata quella
posizione dottrinaria più estrema che sosteneva l’esistenza di un assoluto divieto per
42. In senso favorevole all’introduzione dell’art. 1, §1°, si vedano: G. Fernandez de andrade, Arbitragem
e administração pública: da hostilidade à gradual aceitação, Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a
cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 411 ss.; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine
e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del
2015, cit., § 3.
Il citato art. 1, §1°, LA, pur contenendo una novità di rilievo, non pare risolvere tutti i dubbi sollevati in
dottrina rispetto alla concreta individuazione delle controversie arbitrabili, di cui è parte la pubblica
amministrazione. Come è stato, infatti, opportunamente dimostrato, i criteri civilistici della disponibilità
e della patrimonialità delle situazioni giuridiche non sono di facile applicazione nell’ambito del diritto
pubblico, data la mancanza di «un criterio generale che permetta di determinare i diritti disponibili
della pubblica amministrazione», da cui deriva la difficoltà di individuare con esattezza l’ambito delle
controversie compromettibili, così E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração
pública, cit., 115 ss., alla quale si rinvia per l’esaustiva analisi dei sei metodi cui si fa ricorso per
individuare il concetto di disponibilità dei diritti e, quindi, della compromettibilità delle controversie.
Merita approvazione la tesi, secondo cui per determinare l’area della compromettibilità dei conflitti
con la p.a., è necessario applicare dei criteri supplementari, oltre a quello della disponibilità, come il
criterio di «adeguazione», così: M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Arbitragem e Estado: ensaio sobre o litígio
adequado, cit., 155 ss.
43. Ricordiamo che negli ultimi anni diverse leggi speciali brasiliane avevano autorizzato la stipulazione
di convenzioni di arbitrato da parte della pubblica amministrazione per determinate materie, tra cui
ricordiamo: l’art. 23, XV, della legge n. 8.987 del 1995 (Lei de Concessões), l’art. 93, XV, della legge
n. 9.472 del 1997 (Lei Geral de Telecomunicações), l’art. 43, X, della legge n. 9.478 del 1997 (Lei do
Petróleo); l’art. 2, § 3º, della legge n. 10.433 del 2002 (Lei do Mercado Atacadista de Energia), l’art.
4º, § 6º, della legge n. 10.848 del 2004 (Lei da Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica); l’art.
11 della legge nº 11.079 del 2004 (Lei das Parcerias Público-Privadas).
Per la prospettiva secondo cui la pubblica amministrazione brasiliana poteva ricorrere all’arbitrato solo
in presenza di una legge che espressamente disponeva in tal senso, si vedano: L.R. Barroso, Sociedade
de economia mista prestadora de serviço público. Cláusula arbitral inserida em contrato administrativo
sem prévia autorização legal. Invalidade, in Revista de direito bancário, do mercado de capitais e da
arbitragem, 2003, n. 19, 427 ss.; C.A. de Salles, Arbitragem em contratos administrativos, cit., 239-40.
Come indicato nel testo, era questo anche l’orientamento della giurisprudenza della Corte dei Conti,
da sempre ostile ad ammettere la legittimità dell’arbitrato con la pubblica amministrazione, se non in
presenza di un’espressa autorizzazione legislativa, si vedano le seguenti decisioni: 28 maggio 2003,
n. 587/2003; 16 luglio 2003, n. 906/2003; 10 aprile 2003, n. 584/2003; 10 marzo 2003, n. 215/2004;
24 agosto 2005, n. 1.271/05; 14 marzo 2006, n. 537/2006. Sulla giurisprudenza della Corte dei Conti
in materia di arbitrato, si vedano: C. A. Guimaraes Pereira, Arbitragem e a Administração Pública
na Jurisprudência do TCU e do STJ, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem e Poder Público, a cura di C.A. Guimaraes
Pereira, E. Talamini, cit., 131 ss.; E.B. Baraldi, Arbitragem e contratos com a administração pública,
cit., p. 50.
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la pubblicazione amministrazione brasiliana di deferire la soluzione delle controversie
al giudizio degli arbitri44.
Sempre in relazione all’arbitrabilità delle controversie con la pubblica
amministrazione, l’art. 1, § 2°, dispone che: «L’autorità o l’organo della pubblica
amministrazione diretta competente per la stipulazione della convenzione di arbitrato
è la medesima autorità o lo stesso organo che può concludere accordi e transazioni».
Si tratta di una disposizione sulla c.d. arbitrabilità soggettiva, rispetto a cui la riforma
chiarisce quale l’organo della p.a. brasiliana è legittimato a stipulare compromessi e
clausole compromissorie.
Infine, nell’art. 2, § 3°, LA, vengono introdotte due regole processuali, di
applicazione inderogabile quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un processo
arbitrale. Si tratta del necessario rispetto del principio di pubblicità del processo e del
criterio della decisione che deve essere secondo le regole di diritto.
Rispetto al principio di pubblicità del processo arbitrale, la riforma in commento
ribadisce quanto già impone l’art. 37 della Costituzione Federale del 1988: «La pubblica
amministrazione diretta e indiretta (…) seguirà i principi di legalità, impersonalità,
moralità, pubblicità ed efficienza (…)»45. Dei dubbi, tuttavia, sussistono sulla portata
del principio di pubblicità che si impone alla p.a. quando partecipa ad un procedimento
arbitrale. Il principio in discorso può essere, infatti, concepito in due modi. In base ad
una prima prospettiva, sarebbe necessario preservare, comunque, gli interessi delle
parti private dell’arbitrato e, quindi, si dovrebbe ammettere la divulgazione solo della
pendenza dell’arbitrato, del lodo, nonché degli altri atti essenziali del procedimento,
escludendo l’accesso pubblico alle udienze e ai vari documenti prodotti nel giudizio46.
44. In effetti, una parte (del tutto) minoritaria della dottrina brasiliana considerava inarbitrabili le
controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, nel presupposto che quest’ultima fosse posta in
posizione di superiorità ed essendo portatrice di situazioni giuridiche soggettive di natura sempre
indisponibile, così si vedano: C.A. Bandeira De Mello, Curso de direito administrativo, 26° ed., San
Paolo, 2009, 711, secondo cui «É inadmissível que se possa afastar o Poder Judiciário quando em
pauta interesse indisponíveis, como o são os relativos ao serviço público, para que particulares
decidam sobre matéria que se constitui em res extra commercium e que passa, então, muito ao
largo da força decisória deles»; L. Valle Figueiredo, Curso de direito administrativo, 5° ed., San Paolo,
2001, 101-2, il quale sottolineava, tra l’altro, che «as regras de competência processual no tocante
às questões da União são de ordem constitucional, não podendo, à evidência, ser derrogadas por
legislação infraconstitucional».
45. In senso favorevole all’introduzione espressa del principio di pubblicità nell’arbitrato con la p.a., si
veda A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., § 5. Sui
principi di pubblicità e di riservatezza in arbitrato, si veda in generale: J.M. Júdice, Confidencialidade
e publicidade. Reflexão a propósito da Reforma da Lei de Arbitragem (Lei n. 13.129, de 25 de maio
de 2015), in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T.
Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 297 ss.
46. In questo senso, si rinvia a S.L. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 39, la
quale esclude che le istituzioni arbitrali debbano agire come delle cancellerie di un tribunale pubblico.
Nella stessa direzione, si veda anche anche C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 52, il quale,
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Seguendo, invece, una visione più ampia del principio di pubblicità (che, tra l’altro,
ci sembra preferibile), quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un arbitrato, è
necessario garantire, al pari di quanto accade nel processo statale, la totale trasparenza
del processo arbitrale, comprese udienze, fascicoli e documenti, considerando coperti
da riservatezza esclusivamente i segreti industriali e commerciali47. Inoltre, rispetto
al regime di pubblicità, una questione che le autorità brasiliane dovranno risolvere in
futuro è quella dell’individuazione delle modalità con cui divulgare la pendenza di un
processo arbitrale, di cui la pubblica amministrazione è parte48.
L’altra regola prevista dall’art. 2, § 3°, riguarda le norme per la deliberazione:
quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un arbitrato, gli arbitri dovranno
decidere sempre secondo le regole di diritto, essendo, quindi, vietata la decisione
secondo equità49.
Oltre agli aspetti espressamente regolati dalla riforma del 2015, altre sono le
questioni derivanti dalla partecipazione della pubblica amministrazione ad un processo
arbitrale, quali: i criteri da seguire per la scelta degli arbitri e dell’istituzione arbitrale;
la lingua del procedimento; l’applicazione di alcune deroghe al procedimento arbitrale;
l’esecuzione del lodo nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione. Il legislatore della
riforma ha preferito non prendere posizione sui menzionati aspetti50.
47.
48.
49.
50.
166
scrivendo prima della riforma del 2015, ritiene che debba essere garantito «acesso aos interessados
à decisão e aos atos essenciais do processo arbitral (quando necessário), preservando-se, porém, o
sigilo dos debates e a confidencialidade dos documentos que instruíram o processo arbitral».
Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração
pública, cit., 157-158; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº
9.307/1996, cit., § 5, secondo cui «o processo arbitral (incluindo as audiências, os debates, as provas
colhidas e os documentos apresentados) deverá ser moldado para dar total concreção ao princípio da
publicidade». In favore di questa seconda prospettiva, merita di essere ricordato il recente decreto 8
giugno 2015, n. 8.465, recante disposizioni in materia di porti, che ammette l’arbitrabilità di alcune
controversie in ambito portuario, indicando al tempo stesso che «tutte le informazioni relative al
processo saranno rese pubbliche» (art. 3, inciso IV).
Su questo aspetto E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública,
cit., 162, ritiene che: «A regulamentação da divulgação da existência de processo arbitral e de
seu desfecho é, portanto, medida que se impôe». Al riguardo A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a
arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., § 5, propone le seguenti soluzioni: imporre
che sia la stessa p.a. a divulgare l’esistenza del giudizio arbitrale, con la pubblicazione nella
Gazzetta Ufficiale o con altri canali di comunicazione pubblica; permettere alla p.a. di scegliere
come camere arbitrali solo quelle che garantiscono l’osservanza del dovere di pubblicità, in via
fisica o elettronica.
Si veda, sul punto E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit.,
148 ss. In senso parzialmente critico rispetto al divieto di arbitrato di equità con la p.a., si pone S.L.
Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 40.
Dati gli evidenti limiti della nostra indagine, per la trattazione delle questioni indicate nel testo
siamo costretti a rinviare alla dottrina brasiliana che si è recentemente dedicata ai rapporti tra
arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. Si rinvia, pertanto, ai recenti contributi di: E.C. Cleto Marolla,
A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 147 ss.; M.V. Armani Alves, A fazenda
pública na arbitragem, cit., 175 ss.; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma
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5.
IL VETO PRESIDENZIALE SULLE CLAUSOLA COMPROMISSORIE STIPULATE IN CONTRATTI PER ADESIONE, IN CONTRATTI PER ADESIONE IN
RAPPORTI DI CONSUMO E IN CONTRATTI INDIVIDUALI DI LAVORO.
Come già indicato nella parte introduttiva della nostra indagine, il progetto di
legge inviato alla Presidenza della Repubblica prevedeva la modificazione dell’art. 4,
§ 2°, nonché l’introduzione dei §§ 3 e 4° nell’art. 4. Si trattava di novità tendenti a
permettere e/o a facilitare la stipulazione di clausole compromissorie in: contratti per
adesione; contratti per adesione in rapporti di consumo; contratti individuali di lavoro,
stipulati da coloro che esercitano funzioni di amministratore o di direttore generale.
In ragione del menzionato veto presidenziale, la redazione del § 2° dell’art. 4 rimane
quella originale del 1996 e non vengono introdotti i nuovi paragrafi 3° e 4° nell’art.
451. Ciò nonostante, è interessante ricordare quale era il contenuto dei tre richiamati
paragrafi che il Parlamento avrebbe voluto inserire nella LA.
In riferimento alla stipulazione di una clausola compromissoria in un contratto
per adesione in un rapporto non di consumo, la vigente redazione dell’art. 4, § 2°,
prevede che: «Nei contratti per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace
solo se colui che vi aderisce assume l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato o accetta
la sua instaurazione, espressamente e per iscritto, in un documento allegato o in
grassetto contenente una firma o una specifica approvazione di tale clausola».
Tale disposizione tende a proteggere la parte «debole», che non ha predisposto il
contratto. La clausola compromissoria relativa ad un contratto per adesione è, infatti,
sempre efficace per la parte predisponente (criterio dell’efficacia relativa della
clausola), mentre vincola la parte non predisponente solo se redatta con le speciali e
rigorose formalità indicate nell’art. 4, § 2°. L’efficacia della clausola compromissoria
redatta senza il rispetto delle formalità previste dal citato art. 4, § 2°, resta, quindi,
subordinata all’iniziativa della parte non predisponente il contratto per adesione52.
La versione dell’art. 4, § 2°, che avrebbe voluto introdurre il Parlamento brasiliano era
la seguente: «Nei contratti per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace solo
se redatta in grassetto o in un documento separato». Il Parlamento avrebbe, quindi,
voluto aumentare e facilitare la diffusione dell’arbitrato rispetto ai contratti per
da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., §§ 5 ss.; G. Fernandez de andrade, Arbitragem e administração pública:
da hostilidade à gradual aceitação, cit., 411 ss.; G.H. Justino De Oliveira, G.B. Schwarstmann,
Arbitragem público-privada no Brasil: a especialidade do litígio administrativo e as especificidades
do procedimento arbitral, cit., 150 ss.
51. In senso critico, si vedano: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando
la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4, il quale parla di «tabù»
rispetto ai richiamati veti della Presidenza della Repubblica.
52. In questo senso, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 106 ss.; J.R. de Castro Neves,
Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A
reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit. 189 ss., spec. 201. Sul
tema si rinvia anche a L.F. Guerrero, Convenções de arbitragem e processo arbitral, San Paolo, 2009,
p. 16 ss.
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adesione nei rapporti non di consumo, dotando la clauso compromissoria, relativa
a tali rapporti, di un’efficacia piena e bilaterale (per entrambe le parti contrattuali),
purché redatta in grassetto o in un documento separato, senza imporre anche la
necessità di una specifica approvazione e sottoscrizione di tale clausola53.
In riferimento all’arbitrato con i consumatori, l’art. 4, § 3°, oggetto di veto
presidenziale, aveva la seguente redazione: «Nei rapporti di consumo creati con un
contratto per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace solo se il consumatore
prende l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato o concorda espressamente con la sua
instaurazione». Il Parlamento voleva, quindi, condizionare l’efficacia della clausola
compromissoria all’effettiva accettazione dell’arbitrato da parte del consumatore, il
quale avrebbe potuto manifestare la sua opzione per la via arbitrale sia instaurando
direttamente il processo arbitrale, sia esprimendo (a lite già insorta) il proprio
accordo quanto alla sua instaurazione del processo (avvenuta su iniziativa dell’altra
parte)54. Come indicato dai commentatori, la mancata introduzione del citato art.
4, § 3°, non sembra che sia in grado di cambiare la posizione del consumatore in
relazione all’arbitrato, nella misura in cui le controversie aventi ad oggetto un rapporto
di consumo restano, comunque, compromettibili, alla condizione che si dimostri
l’effettiva accettazione del consumatore di ricorrere allo strumento arbitrale, dopo
l’insorgere della lite e attraverso una delle seguenti modalità: la stipulazione di un
compromesso; l’instaurazione del processo arbitrale da parte dello stesso consumatore;
la manifestazione espressa di quest’ultimo relativa all’accettazione del giudizio arbitrale,
proposto su iniziativa della controparte sulla base di una clausola compromissoria55.
Infine, il § 4° dell’art. 4, parimenti oggetto di veto presidenziale, aveva la seguente
redazione: «Qualora il lavoratore ricopra, o sia chiamato a ricoprire, l’incarico o la
funzione di amministratore o di direttore statutario, nei contratti individuali di lavoro
potrà essere pattuita una clausola compromissoria, che sarà efficace solo se il lavoratore
assume l’iniziativa dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato o se concorda espressamente con
la sua instaurazione». Si trattava di un timido tentativo del Parlamento di aprire una
breccia in favore dell’arbitrabilità delle controversie di lavoro, il cui campo di applicazione
53. J.R. de Castro Neves, Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, cit., 202.
54. J.R. de Castro Neves, Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, cit., 201.
55. Così R. Loretti Henrici, L. Mayall M. de Araujo, Relações de consumo, contratos de adesão e arbitragem,
in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 459
ss., spec. 480. In altre parole, la clausola compromissoria inserita in un contratto per adesione non
possiede efficacia vincolante nei confronti del consumatore (come si desume dall’art. 51, inciso
VII, del codice di consumo brasiliano), essendo efficace solo rispetto al professionista. Per questa
soluzione, si veda Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia, decisione 6 novembre 2012 (recurso especial
1.169.841/RJ), secondo cui nei rapporti di consumo quello che viene vietato è «solo l’utilizzazione
imposta dell’arbitrato, ciò che non impedisce al consumatore di scegliere il procedimento arbitrale
come mezzo adeguato per la risoluzione degli eventuali conflitti sorti in relazione al professionista»
(traduzione nostra). Sull’argomento rinviamo a C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do
processo, cit., p. 82 ss.
168
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sarebbe stato alquanto limitato, essendo circoscritto a quei lavoratori di elevata posizione
economica e professionale (amministratori e direttori statutari), rispetto ai quali la
clausola compromissoria nemmeno sarebbe stata efficace, essendo necessaria la loro
accettazione espressa quanto allo svolgimento del giudizio arbitrale, dopo l’insorgere
della controversia56. Pur essendo circondato dalle menzionate cautele, la Presidenza della
Repubblica ha ritenuto opportuno mettere il veto sull’art. 4, § 4°, indicando, tra i motivi
ostativi alla sua approvazione, quello del rischio dell’assoggettamento al giudizio arbitrale
della generalità dei lavoratori subordinati57. Il netto (e probabilmente immotivato)
rifiuto della Presidenza della Repubblica, quanto alla possibilità di stipulare clausole
compromissorie nei contratti individuali di lavoro58, è un chiaro indice del fatto che in
Brasile è ancora molto forte l’ostilità nei confronti dell’arbitrato nel diritto del lavoro59.
56. Per un’analisi dell’art. 4, § 4°, oggetto di veto, si vedano: F. Verçosa, Arbitragem para a resolução de
conflitos trabalhistas no direito brasileiro, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos
Melo, R. Resende, cit., 483 ss.; A. Chateaubriand Martins, A arbitragem nas relações de trabalho:
proposta de tratamento legislativo, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação
brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 21 ss.
57. Nel messaggio della Presidenza della Repubblica in cui vengono esplicitate le ragioni del veto all’art. 4, §
4°, si legge che: «O dispositivo autorizaria a previsão de cláusula de compromisso em contrato individual
de trabalho. Para tal, realizaria, ainda, restrições de sua eficácia nas relações envolvendo determinados
empregados, a depender de sua ocupação. Dessa forma, acabaria por realizar uma distinção indesejada
entre empregados, além de recorrer a termo não definido tecnicamente na legislação trabalhista. Com
isso, colocaria em risco a generalidade de trabalhadores que poderiam se ver submetidos ao processo
arbitral» (in http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Msg/VEP-162.htm).
58. Per una critica alle ragioni del veto della Presidenza della Repubblica sull’art. 4, § 4°, rinviamo a F.
Verçosa, Arbitragem para a resolução de conflitos trabalhistas no direito brasileiro, cit., 497.
59. La giurisprudenza dominante del Tribunale Superiore del Lavoro (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) reputa
inarbitrabili le controversie di lavoro, qualificando come indisponibili i diritti soggettivi del lavoratore
subordinato. In proposito, ricordiamo le seguenti decisioni: 16 settembre 2009, 3° sezione, recurso n.
1599-2005-022-02-00, secondo cui «há incompatibilidade insanável da arbitragem com os princípios
norteadores do Direito do Trabalho, especialmente os da irrenunciabilidade e indisponibilidade dos
direitos trabalhistas»; 24 marzo 2010, 8° sezione, recurso n. 51085-09.2005.5.10.0014; 20 ottobre
2012, 3° sezione, recurso n. 90500-78.2008.5.05.0031. Per altri riferimenti giurisprudenziali si rinvia
a L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 92
Quanto alla dottrina, alcuni autori propendono per l’inarbitrabilità delle controversie di lavoro (C.H.
Bezerra Leite, Curso de direito processual do trabalho, 7° ed., San Paolo, p. 110). Mentre altri autori
sono favorevoli all’arbitrabilità di tali tipo di controversie, si vedano in questo senso: C.A. Carmona,
Arbitragem e processo, cit., 39 ss., secondo cui «As causas trabalhistas (…) são, em princípio,
arbitráveis, não havendo necessidade de procurara na Lei qualquer menção específica ao Direito
do Trabalho para que o mecanismo de solução de controvérsias seja aplicável também às questões
laborais». Infine, per L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 95, sono compromettibili le
controversie di lavoro, purché vertenti su una relazione giuridica già estinta (contratto di lavoro già
concluso) e il lavoratore prenda l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato.
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6.
LA CONVENZIONE DI ARBITRATO CONTENUTA NELLO STATUTO DI UNA
SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI.
Altra novità rilevante della riforma del 2015 riguarda la disciplina della convenzione
di arbitrato inserita nello statuto di una società per azioni, le cui regole vengono
dettate dal nuovo art. 136-A della legge n. 6.404, del 15 dicembre del 197660, recante
disposizioni sulle società anonime, ossia le società per azioni61.
60. È, in particolare, l’art. 3 della legge n. 13.129 del 2015 che introduce l’art. 136-A nella legge n. 6.404
del 1976. Tuttavia, per ragioni espositive, abbiamo considerato opportuno alterare l’ordine sistematico
della riforma e trattare, fin d’ora, del tema della convenzione di arbitrato in materia societario. Sul
punto, si vedano: D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária, San Paolo, 2015, 137 ss.; D. Bushatsky, A reforma
da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária, oportunidade de
reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos
sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 145 ss.; M. Barbosa
Araújo, Um regime jurídico mais seguro para a arbitragem societária: o art. 136-A da lei das S/A, in
Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A.
Freire, cit., 353 ss.; M. Valverde, Apontamentos sobre a adoção do direito de retirada como solução
para a questão da vinculação subjetiva à cláusula arbitral estatutária, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos
sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 395 ss.; A.C. Weber,
Arbitragem e direito societário, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R.
Resende Beneduzi, cit., 59 ss.; Id., A cláusula compromissória estatutária e o direito de recesso, Aa. Vv.,
Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão,
cit., 1 ss.; F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de
recesso, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit.,
673 ss.; F.A. Maciel Müssnich, A cláusula compromissória no direito societário, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem
e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 127 ss.;
C.L. Marques, C. Costa De Lima, Anotação ao PLS 406, de 2013 sobre arbitragem, in Revista de direito
do consumidor, vol. 91, 2014, p. 407 ss.; G. Leporace, Cláusulas compromissórias estatutárias. Análise
da proposta de nova regulamentação sob a ótica da lógica econômica e da política legislativa, in
Revista de arbitragem e mediação, vol. 40, 2014, p. 63 ss.; R. Ramalho Almeida, G. Leporace, Cláusulas
compromissórias estatutárias: análise sob a ótica da lógica econômica, política legislativa e alguns
problemas práticos, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, vol. 39, 2013, p. 67 ss.
Per un’analisi comparatistica della disciplina della clausola compromissoria statutaria, che prende
in esame il diritto italiano e quello brasiliano, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Arbitragem
societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória
e a nomeação dos árbitros, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, v. 46, 2015, p. 337 ss.
61. Ma F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de
recesso, cit., p. 691, ritengono che la disciplina di cui all’art. 136-A, della legge n. 6.404 del 1976, si
applichi anche alle società a responsabilità limitata.
Non è questa la sede per trattare il tema dell’arbitrato societario nel diritto brasiliano. Possiamo
solo ricordare che già con la legge n. 10.303 del 31 ottobre 2001, il legislatore ha chiarito che le
controversie in materia societaria sono arbitrabili, introducendo all’art. 109, § 3°, della legge n. 6.404,
del 15 dicembre del 1976, la seguente disposizione: «O estatuto da sociedade pode estabelecer que
as divergências entre os acionistas e a companhia, ou entre os acionistas controladores e os acionistas
minoritários, poderão ser solucionadas mediante arbitragem, nos termos em que especificar». Per
gli opportuni approfondimenti, rinviamo alla letteratura specializzata sul punto, tra cui: D. Franzoni,
Arbitragem societária, cit.; P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, San Paolo, 2012; A.C.
Weber, Arbitragem e direito societário, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos
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Nel caput (la prima parte) del citato art. 136-A viene stabilito che: «L’introduzione
di una convenzione di arbitrato nello statuto societario, rispettato il quorum dell’articolo
136, vincola tutti gli azionisti della società, salvo il diritto di recesso del socio dissidente
mediante il rimborso del valore delle sue azioni, ai sensi dell’art. 45». Il § 1º del
medesimo art. 136-A aggiunge che: «La convenzione di arbitrato sarà efficace solo dopo
il decorso del termine di trenta giorni, che decorrono dalla pubblicazione del verbale
dell’assemblea generale che ha approvato tale convenzione». Il diritto di recesso non
è, tuttavia, di applicazione generale, poiché la legge non lo attribuisce ai soci dissidenti
quando la convenzione di arbitrato statutaria viene inserita nello statuto di una società
per azioni c.d. «aperta» e ricorre, altresì, una delle due condizioni previste dall’art.
136-A, § 2°, della legge n. 6.404 del 197662.
La descritta soluzione adottata dalla riforma brasiliana del 2015 in materia
di convenzione arbitrale statutaria (che – chiaramente – si ispira alla disciplina
dell’arbitrato societario italiano, di cui all’art. 34, comma 6, del decreto legislativo
n. 5 del 200363) è quella più conforme con i principi costituzionali in tema di tutela
Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 59 ss.; M.D. Gonçalves Vileva, Arbitragem no direito societário, Belo
Horizonte, 2004; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 75 ss.
62. In particolare, il primo caso di esclusione del diritto di recesso si ha quando: «l’introduzione della
convenzione di arbitrato nello statuto societario costituisce la condizione affinché i valori mobiliari di
emissione della società siano ammessi alla negoziazione nei listini della borsa valori o di un mercato
regolamentato, fuori dalla borsa, che richieda la diffusione azionaria minina del 25% (venticinque)
delle azioni di ogni tipo o categoria» (art. 136-A, § 2°, inciso I). In questo caso, l’esclusione del diritto
di recesso si deve al fatto che la società per azioni tenta entrare in livelli differenziati di corporate
governance che danno maggiori garanzie agli azionisti di minoranza. In ragione dei vantaggi di
cui saranno beneficiati i soci di minoranza dall’ingresso della società in tale livello differenziato,
il legislatore ha deciso di non attribuire il diritto di recesso, compiendo una chiara «ponderazioni
di interessi», come ricordano F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito
societário e direito de recesso, cit., 689.
La seconda ipotesi di esclusione del diritto di recesso riguarda l’introduzione di convenzione di
arbitrato in uno statuto di una società aperta, le cui azioni sono dotate della caratteristica della
liquidità e dispersione nel mercato, «ai sensi dei commi “a” e “b” dell’inciso II dell’art. 137» della
legge n. 6.404 del 1976 (art. 136-A, § 2°, inciso II). In questa ipotesi, non è necessario attribuire ai
soci di minoranza il diritto di recesso visto che i dissidenti possono vendere facilmente le proprie
azioni ed uscire dalla società, senza costringere quest’ultima a rimborsare il valore delle azioni dei
soci uscenti. Si vedano ancora F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito
societário e direito de recesso, cit., 689, nonché G. Leporace, Cláusulas compromissórias estatutárias.
Análise da proposta de nova regulamentação sob a ótica da lógica econômica e da política legislativa,
cit., 63 ss.
63. Alcune differenze intercorrono tra la disciplina italiana e quella brasiliana, tra cui: il quorum di
approvazione della deliberazione relativa alla convenzione di arbitrato, che in Italia è di due terzi del
capitale sociale, mentre in Brasile è della metà delle azioni con diritto di voto; il diritto di recesso che in
Italia viene concesso sia ai soci assenti che a quelli dissidenti, mentre in Brasile viene attribuito solo a
questi ultimi; l’assenza di casi di esclusione del diritto di recesso in Italia, a differenza di quanto accade
in Brasile, divergenza che si spiega con il fatto che l’arbitrato societario italiano non si applica alle società
aperte che partecipano al mercato dei capitali ai sensi dell’art. 2325-bis del codice civile; l’applicazione
in Brasile dell’art. 136-A della legge n. 6.404 del 1976 solo in caso di introduzione di convenzione
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giurisdizionale dei diritti che vietano la previsione di forme di arbitrato obbligatorio64.
Si tratta, altresì, di un’innovazione del tutto opportuna65, nella misura in cui mette fine
di arbitrato in uno statuto societario, mentre in Italia l’art. 34, comma 6, del decreto legislativo n.
5 del 2003, si applica sia per l’introduzione che per la soppressione di clausole compromissorie
(su quest’ultimo punto si veda anche nelle note successive per ulteriori considerazioni). Per un
maggiore approfondimento su questi aspetti comparatistici, sia permesso di rinviare nuovamente
a G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da
cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 344 ss. In ogni caso, indipendentemente
dalle richiamate divergenze di disciplina intercorrenti tra i due sistemi posti a confronto, è evidente
l’influenza che ha giocato il legislatore italiano su quello brasiliano in relazione all’elaborazione della
disciplina della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria, come viene riconosciuto dalla dottrina brasiliana
(A. Wald, A reforma da lei de arbitragem, cit., 211; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., …; D. Franzoni,
Arbitragem societária, cit., p. 137; A.C. Weber, A cláusula compromissória estatutária e o direito
de recesso, cit., 13) e da quella italiana (A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici
considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3). Sull’arbitrato
societario italiano segnaliamo, senza pretesa di completezza: P. Biavati, Il procedimento nell’arbitrato
societario, in questa Rivista, 2003, 27 ss.; P. Biavati, E. Zucconi Galli Fonseca, Arbitrato societario, in Aa.
Vv., Arbitrati speciali, a cura di F. Carpi, cit., 53 ss.; E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società, Bologna, 2013;
C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit., 681 ss.; E.F. Ricci, Il nuovo arbitrato societario, in
Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 2003, 517 ss.; D. Corapi, A arbitragem no direito societário italiano, in Revista
de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 43, 285 ss.; G. Bonato, L’imparzialità e l’indipendenza degli arbitri
alla luce della riforma del diritto societario, in Aa.Vv., Davanti al giudice. Studi sul processo societario,
a cura di L. Lanfranchi, A. Carratta, Torino, 2005, 423 ss.; B. Makant, S. Leongo Queiroz, Comentários à
nova lei sobre arbitragem societária italiana, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2004, n. 3, 293 ss.;
G. Ruffini, La riforma dell’arbitrato societario, in Corr. Giur., 2003, 1524 ss.; L. Salvaneschi, L’arbitrato
societario, in Aa.Vv., Arbitrato, ADR, conciliazione, a cura di M. Rubino Sammartano, Bologna, 2009,
202 ss.; B. Sassani, B. Guicciardi, Arbitrato societario, in Digesto discipline privatistiche, sezione civile,
aggiornamento, vol. I, Torino, 2007, 119 ss.
64. Se, infatti, la riforma dell’arbitrato non avesse concesso il diritto di recesso ai soci dissenzienti, in
conseguenza dell’introduzione della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria, la maggioranza dei soci avrebbe
potuto imporre l’arbitrato alla minoranza, con conseguente violazione del divieto costituzionale di
arbitrato obbligatorio, su cui si vedano nel sistema brasiliano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit.,
36; A.T. de Abreu Boscolo, G. Valentiniano Benetti, O consensualismo como fundamento da arbitragem
e os impasses decorrentes do dissenso, in Revista de direito empresarial, 2014, n. 2, 303 ss.; G. Bonato,
Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália. Perspectiva de direito comparado com o sistema brasileiro,
cit., 59 ss. Quanto alla volontarietà dell’arbitrato nel sistema italiano, si veda N. Trocker, Processo e
strumenti alternativi di composizione delle liti nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale, in Aa.Vv.,
Diritto processuale civile e Corte costituzionale, a cura di E. Fazzalari, Napoli, 2006 439 ss., spec. 471 ss.
65. In tal senso, si vedano: A. Wald, A reforma da lei de arbitragem, cit., 213, secondo cui la «reforma
legislativa, ao tentar conciliar tendências contrárias, conseguiu soluções equilibradas e equitativas»; D.
Busharsky, A reforma da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária,
oportunidade de reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, cit., 145 ss.;
M. Barbosa Araújo, Um regime jurídico mais seguro para a arbitragem societária: o art. 136-A da lei
das S/A, cit., p. 379. Ricordiamo che la soluzione adottata nell’art. 136-A era stata difesa in dottrina
de lege ferenda da L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo arbitral, cit., 65. Tuttavia, in
senso critico rispetto alla disciplina dell’art. 136-A, si vedano: D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária,
cit., 137 ss.; M. Valverde, Apontamentos sobre a adoção do direito de retirada como solução para a
questão da vinculação subjetiva à cláusula arbitral estatutária, cit., 407-408, il quale ammette che,
pur non adottando la soluzione migliore, l’art. 136-A presenta aspetti positivi.
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ad una discussione della dottrina che si era divisa tra: quegli autori che consideravano
necessaria l’unanimità di tutti i soci per introdurre una clausola compromissoria
nello statuto di una società66; coloro che ritenevano sufficiente una deliberazione
assembleare adottata a maggioranza, dalla cui approvazione non sarebbe scaturito un
diritto di recesso ai soci di minoranza67; coloro, infine, che limitavano l’efficacia della
clausola ai soli soci che avessero espressamente manifestato il proprio consenso al
riguardo68.
A nostro sommesso avviso, pur avendo accolto una soluzione opportuna, l’art.
136-A in commento ci sembra criticabile nella parte in cui prevede che esclusivamente
l’introduzione e non anche la soppressione di una convenzione di arbitrato attribuisca
ai soci dissidenti il diritto di recesso69. Sebbene, infatti, non sia possibile riconoscere
l’esistenza di un diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato70, come accade, invece, per il
diritto costituzionale alla tutela giurisdizionale statale, l’esclusione di una clausola
compromissoria contenuta in uno statuto societario dovrebbe conferire anche in Brasile
66. Così C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 110-111, secondo cui: «Caso entretanto a cláusula
não tenha sido introduzida no momento da constituição da companhia, somente com o voto de
todos os acionistas poderá ser incluída no estatuto (...), eis que estará em jogo direito essencial do
acionista».
67. In questo senso, si vedano: P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, cit., 106 ss.; R.
de Carvalho Aprigliano, Extensão da cláusula compromissória a partes não signatárias no direito
societário, in Revista do advogado, n. 119, anno 33, 140 ss., spec. 148; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de
arbitragem, cit., 79; E.S. Munhoz, A importância do sistema de solução de conflitos para o direito
societário: limites do instituto da arbitragem, in Aa.Vv., Processo societário, a cura di F.L. Yarshell,
G. Setoguti Pereira, San Paolo, 2012, 77 ss., spec. 91.
68. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo arbitral, cit.,
p. 65, per una opinione de iure condito; M. Carvalhosa, Comentários à Lei das Sociedades Anônimas,
vol. 2, 5° ed., San Paolo, 2011, 303 ss.
69. Giova sottolineare, altresì, che né in Brasile né in Italia, la legge prevede alcunché rispetto alle
modificazioni di convenzione di arbitrato esistenti. Riteniamo che in tal caso non si applichi il diritto
di recesso, trattandosi di modificazioni che non hanno nessuna incidenza sulla scelta tra lo strumento
arbitrale e il processo pubblico. Ma in senso contrario, si veda E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società,
cit., 88-89.
70. In relazione al sistema italiano, ricordiamo, tuttavia, che una parte della dottrina ha elaborato un
«diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato», tra cui: V. Vigoriti, L’arbitrato internazionale in Italia, in Aa.Vv.,
Nuove dimensioni nei diritti di libertà. Scritti in onore di Paolo Barile, Padova, 1990, 727 ss.; G. Recchia,
«Disponibilità dell’azione in senso negativo» ed incostituzionalità dell’arbitrato obbligatorio, in questa
Rivista, 1992, 247 ss., spec. 255 ss., secondo cui il diritto all’arbitrato sarebbe un aspetto essenziale
del diritto di «disponibilità dell’azione in senso negativo», di cui all’art. 24 Cost.; A. Berlinguer, Scelta
degli arbitri e autonomia delle parti tra diritto comune e disciplina delle opere pubbliche, in questa
Rivista, 1998, 522 ss. In senso critico quanto all’esistenza di un diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato, si
vedano: G. Ruffini, Volontà delle parti e arbitrato nelle controversie relative agli appalti pubblici, in
questa Rivista, 2001, 643 ss.; S. Boccagna, L’impugnazione per nullità del lodo, Napoli, 2005, 198; E.
Odorisio, Arbitrato rituale e «lavori pubblici», Milano, 2011, 485 ss.
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GIOVANNI BONATO
il diritto di recesso ai soci dissidenti, parimenti a quanto viene stabilito in Italia dalla
disciplina dell’arbitrato societario (art. 34, comma 6, decreto legislativo n. 5 del 2003)71.
Da segnalare, infine, che la riforma del 2015 preferisce non prendere posizione su
altre questioni inerenti l’efficacia soggettiva della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria,
come quelle relative all’efficacia nei confronti di nuovi azionisti e rispetto agli organi
sociali72.
7.
LE INNOVAZIONI RISPETTO ALLA NOMINA DEGLI ARBITRI.
Altra modifica importante voluta dalla riforma del 2015 è contenuta nell’art. 13,
§ 4°, LA, il quale – secondo la versione attualmente vigente – dispone che: «Le parti, di
comune accordo, potranno disapplicare le disposizioni del regolamento dell’istituzione
arbitrale o dell’ente specializzato che limitano, all’interno di una lista di arbitri, la scelta
dell’arbitro unico, del co-arbitro o del presidente del collegio arbitrale, salvo il controllo
di tale scelta da parte degli organi competenti dell’istituzione; qualora sorgano delle
difficoltà e in caso di arbitrato con pluralità di parti, si osserverà quanto disposto nel
regolamento applicabile»73.
71. L’attribuzione del diritto di recesso ai soci dissidenti in caso di soppressione di una clausola arbitrale
ci pare, infatti, essere una soluzione più coerente rispetto alla sostanziale parificazione dell’arbitrato
con il processo statale, come si ritiene in base ad una visione moderna dell’arbitrato (C.A. Carmona,
Arbitragem e processo, cit., p. 32; Id., A arbitragem como meio adequado de resolução de litígios,
in Aa.Vv., Conciliação e mediação: estruturação da política judiciária nacional, a cura di A. Pellegrini
Grinover, A.C. Peluso, M. de Almeida Rocha, Rio de Janeiro, 2011, 199 ss.; Id., Superior Tribunal de
Justiça, segurança pública e arbitragem, cit., 97; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade,
cit., 63; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de direito processual civil, I, cit., 214). In effetti, trattandosi
di due strumenti di risoluzione delle controversie posti sullo stesso piano, l’opzione per la tutela
statale dovrebbe generare le stesse conseguenze giuridiche della scelta per la tutela arbitrale: i soci
di minoranza potrebbero, infatti, avere interesse a restare nella compagine sociale alla condizione
che le controversie societarie siano deferite al giudizio di arbitri e non a quello dei giudici statali. In
altre parole, la concessione del diritto di recesso non solo in caso di introduzione ma anche in caso di
soppressione di una convenzione di arbitrato sarebbe stata – a nostro modesto avviso – la soluzione
più ragionevole e opportuna, anche se, come indicato, non costituzionalmente necessaria.
72. Si tratta, infatti, di aspetti dibattuti nella dottrina brasiliana, come abbiamo cercato di ricordare in G.
Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula
compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 341 ss. Si rinvia anche a: D. Bushatsky, A reforma
da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária, oportunidade de
reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, cit. p. 158 ss.; P.A. Batista
Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, cit., 106 ss.; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Extensão da cláusula
compromissória a partes não signatárias no direito societário, cit., 148
73. La cui versione in lingua originale è la seguente: «As partes, de comum acordo, poderão afastar a
aplicação de dispositivo do regulamento do órgão arbitral institucional ou entidade especializada que
limite a escolha do árbitro único, coárbitro ou presidente do tribunal à respectiva lista de árbitros,
autorizado o controle da escolha pelos órgãos competentes da instituição, sendo que, nos casos de
impasse e arbitragem multiparte, deverá ser observado o que dispuser o regulamento aplicável».
La versione originaria dell’art. 13, § 4°, abrogata dalla riforma del 2015, regolava la designazione
del presidente del collegio arbitrale, disponendo che: «Sendo nomeados vários árbitros, estes, por
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La prima parte del citato art. 13, §4°, tratta della lista di arbitri nell’ambito
dell’arbitrato amministrato74. Il motivo per il quale il legislatore della riforma ha
ritenuto importante intervenire su questo punto deriva dal fatto che, in Brasile, la
stragrande maggioranza delle istituzioni arbitrali predispone una lista di potenziali
arbitri, all’interno della quale le parti (o gli organi dell’istituzione) devono o possono
(secondo il tipo di regolamento) scegliere coloro che saranno indicati per decidere
la controversia75. A questo riguardo, alcune istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane adottano
il sistema della lista chiusa rispetto all’arbitro unico o al presidente del collegio
arbitrale, i quali devono, quindi, essere necessariamente scelti tra coloro che fanno
parte dell’elenco predisposto dagli organi dell’istituzione76. Altre istituzioni arbitrali
maioria, elegerão o presidente do tribunal arbitral. Não havendo consenso, será designado presidente
o mais idoso».
Sull’art. 13, § 4°, nella versione attualmente in vigore, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros,
in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha,
L.F. Salomão, cit., 71 ss.; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, in Aa. Vv.,
Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão,
cit., 211 ss.; J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, in Aa. Vv., A
reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 565 ss.; T. Marinho
nunes, As listas fechadas de árbitros das instituições arbitrais brasileiras, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem.
Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 543 ss.;
V.C. Monteiro de Barros, A reforma da lei de arbitragem e as listas de árbitros, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem.
Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 583 ss.
74. Come ricorda J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 572,
un’istituzione arbitrale può scegliere tra quattro diverse soluzioni in relazione alla nomina degli arbitri:
non prevedere nessuna lista di arbitri e lasciare piena e completa libertà alle parti; predisporre liste
aperte che hanno solo un valore indicativo e non vincolante; predisporre delle liste chiuse, obbligando
le parti a scegliere gli arbitri all’interno dell’elenco; nominare direttamente gli arbitri. Oltre a quelle
indicate abbiamo anche delle soluzioni intermedie, come la previsione di liste semi-vincolanti, su
cui si veda nel testo.
75. Per un panorama generale dei regolamenti delle principali istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane, si rinvia a
V.C. Monteiro de Barros, A reforma da lei de arbitragem e as listas de árbitros, cit., 589 ss.
76. È la soluzione adottata dalla CAM (Câmara da arbitragem e do mercado), costituita in seno alla
BM&FBOVESPA S.A. (Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros), il cui art. 3.2.1 del regolamento
dispone che: «O Árbitro Único, que deverá ter necessariamente formação jurídica, será escolhido
dentre os membros do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem». L’art. 3.4.1 prevede che: «O
terceiro árbitro deverá ter formação jurídica, e ser escolhido dentre os membros integrantes do Corpo
de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem. Na ausência de consenso quanto à sua indicação, esta caberá
ao Presidente da Câmara de Arbitragem». Infine, l’art. 3.7, stabilisce che: «Os árbitros indicados pelas
partes deverão ser, preferencialmente, membros do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem.
Caso não o sejam, deverão ser confirmados pelo Presidente e por um dos Vice-Presidentes da Câmara
de Arbitragem». Quindi, l’arbitro unico o il presidente del collegio dovranno essere scelti sempre
all’interno della lista predisposta dalla istituzione arbitrale; mentre solo i co-arbitri potranno essere
persone estranee all’elenco, ma la loro nomina dovrà essere confermata dal presidente o da uno dei
vice-presidenti della camera arbitrale. Secondo quanto risulta dalla letteura del sito internet www.
bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/servicos/camara-de-arbitragem-do-mercado-cam/arbitros (consultato in
agosto 2016), la lista degli arbitri è composta da 62 persone, scelte dal consiglio di amministrazione
della BM&FBOVESPA.
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GIOVANNI BONATO
optano, invece, per il sistema della lista semi-vincolante, lasciando libertà in relazione
alla designazione dei co-arbitri e limitando la nomina del solo presidente del collegio
arbitrale (o dell’arbitro unico) che deve essere scelto tra coloro che sono inclusi
nell’elenco, salva espressa autorizzazione da parte del presidente della camera
arbitrale, concessa in casi eccezionali e per motivi fondati77. Altre istituzioni, ancora,
adottano il sistema della lista aperta di arbitri, che ha solo un valore orientativo
e non vincolante, in quanto la camera si limita a suggerire (senza imporre) alcuni
nominativi per la formazione del collegio arbitrale78. Poche, infine, sono quelle
istituzioni brasiliane che non prevedono nessun tipo di lista di arbitri, né chiusa, né
semi-chiusa né aperta79. Possiamo, quindi, affermare con tranquillità che il sistema
della lista di arbitri fa parte della «tradizione» dell’arbitrato brasiliano80, il quale pare
77. Si tratta della opzione adottata dalla CAM-CCBC (Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação della Câmara
de Comércio Brasil-Canadá). Si veda, infatti, l’art. 4.9 del regolamento di tale istituzione, secondo
cui: «Decorrido os prazos dos artigos 4.7 e 4.8, a Secretaria do CAM-CCBC notificará aos árbitros
indicados pelas partes que deverão, no prazo de 15 (quinze) dias, escolher o terceiro árbitro dentre
os membros integrantes do Corpo de Árbitros, o qual presidirá o Tribunal Arbitral.
4.9.1. A expressão “Tribunal Arbitral” aplica-se indiferentemente ao Árbitro Único ou ao Tribunal
Arbitral.
4.9.2. Em caráter excepcional e mediante fundamentada justificativa e aprovação do Presidente do
CAM-CCBC, os árbitros escolhidos pelas partes poderão indicar como Presidente do Tribunal, nome
que não integre o Corpo de Árbitros» (www.ccbc.org.br/Portal/Index). Sul punto C.A. Carmona, As
listas de árbitros, cit., 73, nota 4, ci riferisce che non ci sono state nomine di presidenti di collegi
arbitrali non inclusi nella lista di arbitri predisposta dalla CAM-CCBC.
Da ricordare che anche l’art. C.1 del regolamento della CAE (Câmara de mediação e arbitragem das
Eurocâmaras) prevede un sistema di lista semi-vincolante per tutti gli arbitri che dovranno essere
scelti tra i soggetti inclusi nell’elenco predisposto dall’istituzione, salvo deroga. Infatti, le parti, di
comune accordo, e con il consenso dell’organo della camera arbitrale, potranno scegliere come arbitri
dei soggetti non contemplati dall’elenco (www.euroarbitragem.com.br/pt/arbRegulamento.php).
78. Si tratta della soluzione adottata dall’art. 5.1 del vigente regolamento della Câmara de Conciliação,
Mediação e Arbitragem della CIEPS/FIESP (Federação das Industrias do Estado de São Paulo), il
quale dispone che: «Poderão ser nomeados árbitros tanto os membros do Corpo de Árbitros da
Câmara como outros que dele não façam parte, desde que não estejam impedidos, nos termos do
artigo 5.2». (www.ciesp.org.br/down/cma/Regulamentos_de_Arbitragem.pdf). Allo stesso modo
l’art. 4.1 del Regolamento della CAMARB (Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial – Brasil) lascia alle
parti la libertà di nominare come arbitri anche coloro che non sono inclusi nell’elenco. Tuttavia, la
stessa disposizione stabilisce che il presidente del collegio arbitrale deve essere «preferibilmente»
scelto tra coloro che fanno parte dell’elenco degli arbitri. Il citato art. 4.1. dispone che: «Poderão ser
nomeados árbitros tanto os integrantes da Lista de Árbitros da CAMARB como outros que dela não
façam parte, desde que sejam pessoas capazes e de confiança das partes, devendo o presidente do
Tribunal Arbitral ser preferencialmente escolhido entre os nomes que integram a Lista de Árbitros»
(http://camarb.com.br/regulamento).
79. È questo il caso del Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação da AMCHAM (Câmara de Comércio Americana
em São Paulo) che preferisce evitare di pubblicare liste o elenchi di arbitri, nemmeno a carattere
esclusivamente orientativo per evitare di influenzare, anche solo indirettamente, la volontà delle
parti rispetto alla designazione. Si veda sul punto C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 74.
80. Secondo T. Marinho Nunes, As listas fechadas de árbitros das instituições arbitrais brasileiras, cit., 543:
«A existência de uma lista de árbitros virou uma tradição no meio arbitral brasileiro»; l’A. aggiunge
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divergere, per tale aspetto, dalla prassi dominante nello scenario internazionale in
cui è lasciata piena libertà alle parti rispetto alla scelta degli arbitri, salvo il successivo
controllo della istituzione sulla nomina effettuata81.
Essendo le liste di arbitri una delle principali caratteristiche dell’arbitrato
amministrato in Brasile, è normale che l’art. 13, § 4°, sia stata la disposizione che ha
sollevato la discussione più accesa in seno alla Commissione di giuristi che ha elaborato
il testo della riforma del 201582. Sul tema si sono, infatti, contrapposte due visioni:
quella favorevole ad eliminare il sistema della lista chiusa o semi-vincolante, dovendo
essere sempre data prevalenza alla volontà delle parti rispetto alla designazione degli
arbitri83; quella tendente ad attribuire all’istituzione arbitrale la possibilità di limitare
la scelta degli arbitri con la predisposizione di una lista vincolante, per salvaguardare
(in applicazione dell’art. 5, inciso XVII, Cost.84) l’autonomia interna delle istituzioni
arbitrali, che sono enti di diritto privato85.
La riforma del 2015 opta per una soluzione che è stata definita «conciliativa»86,
ma che, di fatto, pone fine al sistema della lista chiusa e della lista semi-vincolante.
Come già indicato, infatti, ai sensi del vigente art. 13, § 4°, le parti, di comune accordo,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
che il sistema della lista chiusa di arbitri costituisce «um dos grandes paradigmas da arbitragem
institucional brasileira».
Ricorda J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 572, che
le più importanti e influenti istituzioni arbitrali internazionali non predispongono liste di arbitri e
lasciano piena libertà alle parti quanto alla scelta dei propri giudici privati, prevedendo solo un
controllo successivo quanto alla imparzialità e indipendenza.
A titolo di esempio ricordiamo né la Camera Arbitrale di Milano (CAM) né la Camera Arbitrale
Internazionale di Parigi (ICC) possiedono un elenco di arbitri, come ci ricorda L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato,
cit., 962. Tale circostanza giustifica lo scarso interesse della dottrina italiana rispetto alla tematica
della lista di arbitri, di cui troviamo dei riferimenti in U. Draetta, Il “rovescio” dell’arbitrato, Milano,
2010, 141 ss., che si dichiara scettico rispetto a tale prassi, affermando che le liste «finiscono con
l’essere di scarsa utilità e poco attendibili», oltre che dannose per le istituzioni e per le parti.
Sul punto si veda quanto scritto da due autorevoli membri della Commissione di Giuristi che ha
elaborato il testo della riforma dell’arbitrato: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 80 ss., anche
alle note 17 e 18, il quale ricorda che l’art. 13, § 4°, ha dato luogo alla «discussão mais ácida» durante
i lavori della Commissione; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 212,
ci dice che l’art. 13, § 4°, «gerou franca discussão não apenas intra muros, entre os integrantes da
Comissão de Juristas, mas também propiciou manifestação de inúmeros especialistas e de várias
câmaras arbitrais».
A favore di questa soluzione, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos
árbitros, cit., 216-217; A.T. Basilio, A. Freire, T. Rodovalho, Modernização da lei de arbitragem –
algumas reflexões, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J.
Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 49 ss., spec. 59, che definiscono il sistema della lista chiusa di
arbitri come una «anomalia», creata dalla prassi brasiliana.
Dispone la citata disposizione costituzionale che: «é plena a liberdade de associação para fins lícitos,
vedada a de caráter paramilitar».
Per questa visione, si veda C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 83.
Così, nuovamente, C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 84, il quale parla di un testo di «conciliação»
a proposito della versione vigente dell’art. 13, § 4°.
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possono scegliere liberamente gli arbitri, senza tener conto di quanto previsto nel
regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale, ma a quest’ultima rimane, comunque, il potere
di controllare la nomina effettuata dalle parti. In altre parole, grazie alla riforma, le
parti possono indicare come arbitri anche dei soggetti che non fanno parte dell’elenco
predisposto dall’istituzione arbitrale, la quale, tuttavia, può opporrsi alla scelta di
determinati arbitri87. Se dovesse persistere una divergenza tra le parti e l’istituzione
rispetto ai soggetti da nominare come arbitri, quest’ultima può sempre legittimamente
rifiutarsi di amministrare l’arbitrato88.
La disposizione in commento, di cui all’art. 13, § 4°, è non solo rilevante ma anche
opportuna perché, in sostanza, trasforma le liste chiuse e semi-vincolanti di arbitri in
liste aperte, dotate di una funzione persuasiva89.
La seconda parte del nuovo art. 13, § 4°, dispone che qualora sorgano delle
difficoltà in relazione alla nomina degli arbitri, anche derivanti dalla presenza di una
pluralità di parti nel procedimento, si applicheranno le disposizioni del regolamento
dell’istituzione arbitrale. Si tratta di una disposizione, probabilmente, inutile e
superflua, dal momento in cui ribadisce la regola già contenuta nell’art. 5 LA90: in
caso di arbitrato amministrato, si dovrà seguire quanto disposto dal regolamento
dell’istituzione che ha il compito di organizzare il procedimento91. Alla luce di quanto
87. La prassi futura ci dirà in base a quali criteri le istituzioni potranno legittimamente rifiutare la
scelta di un determinato arbitro ad opera delle parti. Presumiamo che le istituzioni tenderanno ad
accettare la scelta delle parti, a meno che non si tratti di arbitro privo dei requisiti di indipendenza
e imparzialità e della necessaria competenza e capacità professionale per svolgere adeguatamente
l’incarico. Sull’argomento, si vedano: J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento
da arbitragem, cit., 588, il quale ritiene che l’istituzione potrà rifiutare una nomina di un arbitro
considerata «inappropriata»; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit.,
217, secondo cui l’istituzione potrà opporsi alla nomina di quell’arbitro privo dei «requisiti minimi
per svolgere, con sicurezza e trasparenza, l’importante ruolo che gli spetta».
88. In materia, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 84; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das
partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 217.
89. In senso favorevole alla previsione dell’art. 13, § 4°, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na
escolha dos árbitros, cit., p. 216, che parla di una disposizione dettata in base al principio di ponderazione;
A. Wald, A reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), cit., che parla di «um justo equilíbrio,
garantindo a liberdade e flexibilidade, mas mantendo a ordem e a previsibilidade do processo arbitral
que as instituições devem assegurar»; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 203; A.T. Basilio, A. Freire,
T. Rodovalho, Modernização da lei de arbitragem – algumas reflexões, cit., 59; J.R. de Castro Neves,
A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 587 ss.; D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma
arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L.
De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, 711 ss., spec. 717. In senso critico, si pone C.A. Carmona, As
listas de árbitros, cit., 84. Sarà, naturalmente, la prassi futura a dirci se il nuovo art. 13, § 4°, avrà reali
ripercussioni sulla pratica arbitrale e sui procedimenti di nomina degli arbitri.
90. F. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 208 e 499, ritiene che la seconda parte dell’art. 13, § 4°, contenga
una soluzione «inutile» e «innocua».
91. Dispone l’art. 5 della LA: «Reportando-se as partes, na cláusula compromissória, às regras de algum
órgão arbitral institucional ou entidade especializada, a arbitragem será instituída e processada de
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disposto nella seconda parte dell’art. 13, § 4°, ci pare che la riforma del 2015 abbia
perso un’occasione92, lasciando sostanzialmente irrisolto il problema della designazione
degli arbitri nell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti. Spetterà, pertanto, alla giurisprudenza
brasiliana elaborare una soluzione per permettere la formazione del collegio arbitrale
quando l’arbitrato è ad hoc o quando il regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale non preve
nulla rispetto alla pluralità di parti93.
acordo com tais regras, podendo, igualmente, as partes estabelecer na própria cláusula, ou em outro
documento, a forma convencionada para a instituição da arbitragem».
92. Nella stessa direzione F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 242, sottolinea che la riforma brasiliana del
2015 non ha risolto il problema dell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti, «perdendo un’ottima opportunità
al riguardo»; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge
sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3, mette in rilievo la timidezza del
legislatore brasiliano quanto alla disciplina dell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti.
A nostro modesto avviso, sarebbe stato, probabilmente, più opportuno in materia adottare quella
che ci sembra essere la soluzione più diffusa in ambito comparatistico: in mancanza di accordo tra
le parti sulla nomina di uno o più arbitri, come anche nel caso in cui non ci sia l’aggregazione delle
parti in due poli distinti, è il giudice statale (o l’istituzione arbitrale in caso di arbitrato amministrato)
a provvedere alla designazione di tutti i membri del collegio, al fine di rispettare il principio della
parità delle parti rispetto alla formazione del collegio. Già in precedenza, avevamo sostenuto la nostra
preferenza per la soluzione, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana:
análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos
árbitros, cit., 350 ss. Tale soluzione è stata adottata, tra l’altro, dalla riforma francese del 2011 che ha
modificato l’art. 1453 c.p.c. secondo cui qualora si tratti di un arbitrato con pluralità di parti e queste
non si accordino sulle modalità di nomina, sarà la persona incaricata di organizzare l’arbitrato, o in
mancanza, il giudice statale a procedere alla designazione di uno o più arbitri (si veda G. Bonato,
L’ultima riforma francese dell’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 2012, 491 ss., spec. 505).
Per le diverse soluzioni previste in Italia nell’arbitrato di diritto comune e nell’arbitrato societario,
si rinvia a: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 486; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, I, cit., 578
ss.; E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società, cit., 168 ss.; F. Danovi, Gli arbitri e la loro formazione,
in Aa.Vv., Arbitrato, ADR, conciliazione, a cura di M. Rubino Sammartano, cit., 351 ss.; G. Bonato,
L’imparzialità e l’indipendenza degli arbitri alla luce della riforma del diritto societario, cit., 423 ss.;
Id., Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula
compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 350 ss.
93. In realtà, la stragrande maggioranza dei regolamenti delle istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane prevede la
regola secondo cui in caso di mancata aggregazione delle parti – ai fini della nomina degli arbitri – in
due poli, l’istituzione arbitale, senza tener conto di alcuna nomina effettuata dalle parti, designerà tutti
i membri del collegio arbitrale. Si vedano in Brasile, le seguenti norme: l’art. 9.5 del Regolamento del
Centro de Arbitragem da Câmara Americana de Comércio (AMCHAM); l’art. 30, § 2°, del Regolamento
della Câmara FGV de Conciliação e Arbitragem; l’art. 4.16 del Regolamento del Centro de Arbitragem
e Mediação da Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canada (CCBC); l’art. 3.1 del Regolamento della Câmara
de Conciliação, Mediação e Arbitragem CIESP/FIESP. La stessa soluzione è prevista nell’art. 12 del
Regolamento del 2012 della Corte internazionale di arbitrato di Parigi (CCI), nonché nell’art. 15 del
Regolamento della Camera arbitrale di Milano del 2010. Per un panorama dei regolamenti arbitrali
brasiliani, si vedano: L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 121 ss.; J.R. Cruz e Tucci, Igualdade
é assegurada às partes na composição do painel arbitral, in www.conjur.com.br
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8.
LE MODIFICHE RELATIVE AL PROCEDIMENTO ARBITRALE.
Tra le novità più rilevanti e di segno indubbiamente positivo, inserite nel capitolo
IV della LA che disciplina il procedimento arbitrale, è da segnalare l’art. 19, § 2°, ai sensi
del quale: «L’instaurazione dell’arbitrato interrompe la prescrizione retroattivamente,
a partire dalla data dell’istanza del suo promovimento, anche se il processo arbitrale
si estingue per difetto di giurisdizione»94. La nuova disposizione stabilisce, quindi, che
la prescrizione del diritto dedotto in giudizio è interrotta dall’atto dell’instaurazione
dell’arbitrato, momento che viene a coincidere con quello della costituzione del
collegio arbitrale, ossia dell’accettazione della nomina da parte di tutti gli arbitri95.
Tuttavia, per evitare che il diritto dedotto si prescriva durante la c.d. fase pre-arbitrale
(che va dalla proposizione dell’istanza di promovimento dell’arbitrato alla effettiva
instaurazione di quest’ultimo96), la riforma del 2015 ha previsto la regola secondo
cui l’effetto interruttivo-istantaneo si produce, in via retroattiva, fin dal giorno in cui
l’attore ha formulato l’istanza della instaurazione del procedimento («requerimento
94. Si vedano sul punto: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando
la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3, che parla di un
«approdo significativo» della riforma del 2015 quanto all’effetto interruttivo della prescrizione; M.R.
Mannheimer, Mudanças na lei de arbitragem, cit., 55, considera l’art. 19, § 2°, una delle modifiche
più importanti apportate alla LA dalla riforma del 2015; M. Cunha Azevedo Neto, A interrupção da
prescrição arbitral em face das alterações introduzidas na Lei n. 9.307/96, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem.
Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire,
Da sottolineare che la nuova disposizione allinea l’arbitrato con quanto previsto in relazione al
processo statale dall’art. 240, § 1°, c.p.c., secondo cui: «A interrupção da prescrição, operada pelo
despacho que ordena a citação, ainda que proferido por juízo incompetente, retroagirá à data de
propositura da ação». Ricordiamo che nel processo di cognizione brasiliano, la domanda dell’attore è
portata prima alla conoscenza del giudice e solo successivamente viene notificata al convenuto dopo
l’emanazione del decreto di citazione «despacho citatório». Per questo motivo, si prevede la regola
secondo cui è il decreto di citazione in giudizio che interrompe la prescrizione del diritto dedotto,
ma l’effetto interruttivo si produce retroattivamente, fin dalla data del deposito della domanda
introduttiva («protocolo da petição inicial», di cui all’art. 312). Adottando un principio classico del
diritto processuale civile, l’art. 240, § 1°, ammette la produzione dell’effetto interruttivo anche nel
caso in cui il decreto di citazione a giudizio sia stato emanato da un giudice incompetente (F. Didier
Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, 621-622; H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil,
vol. I, cit., 570-571).
95. Dispone l’art. 19, caput, che: «Considera-se instituída a arbitragem quando aceita a nomeação pelo
árbitro, se for único, ou por todos, se forem vários».
96. In effetti, tra il momento della formulazione dell’istanza di instaurazione dell’arbitrato e quello della
effettiva costituzione del collegio arbitrale possono trascorrere diverse settimane, se non alcuni mesi,
quindi un lasso di tempo che può essere «lungo e fatale» (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria
geral do processo, cit., 142), se non si prevede una regola di interruzione della prescrizione.
Non possiamo addentrarci in questa sede sull’analisi delle fasi di cui si compone l’arbitrato nel sistema
brasiliano, rinviamo a: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 110 ss.; P.A.
Batista Martins, As três fases da arbitragem, in Revista do advogado AASP, 2006, vol. XXVI, 87 ss.;
F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 238 ss.
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da instauração»)97. In altre parole, una volta instaurato l’arbitrato, la prescrizione si
considera retroattivamente interrotta fin dal giorno in cui la parte ha manifestato
la propria intenzione di instaurare il giudizio arbitrale, seguendo le regole formali
previste dalla legge98.
Nel colmare una lacuna esistente nel sistema brasiliano, l’art. 19, § 2°, è
certamente da apprezzare, visto che il rapporto tra arbitrato e prescrizione aveva
suscitato vari dubbi e incertezze in Brasile99. Tuttavia, una parte della dottrina ritiene
(a ragione) ancora non del tutto soddisfaciente la regolamentazione del rapporto tra
prescrizione e arbitrato, avendo proposto di modificare anche l’art. 202 c.c. brasiliano,
inserendo una disposizione che regoli specificamente le ipotesi di interruzione della
prescrizione in caso di arbitrato100. Si tratterebbe, in sostanza, di applicare in Brasile
97. L’art. 19, § 2°, denomina «requerimento da (…) instauração» dell’arbitrato il primo atto con il quale
la parte manifesta la propria intenzione di promuovere un giudizio arbitrale. In dottrina vengono
utilizzate anche espressioni differenti, quali: «pedido de instituição de procedimento arbitral» o
«pedido de instauração da arbitragem» (T.M. Nunes, Arbitragem e interrupção da prescrição, cit.,
p. 504). Quando l’arbitrato è ad hoc, una parte notificherà all’altra un «convite a vir à arbitragem»
(C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 141) come dispone l’art. 6: «Não
havendo acordo prévio sobre a forma de instituir a arbitragem, a parte interessada manifestará à
outra parte sua intenção de dar início à arbitragem, por via postal ou por outro meio qualquer de
comunicação, mediante comprovação de recebimento, convocando-a para, em dia, hora e local
certos, firmar o compromisso arbitral». Qualora si tratti di un arbitrato amministrato, si seguirà il
regolamento della camera arbitrale e la notificazione dell’istanza di promuovere l’arbitrato verrà
effettuata con una «iniciativa junto a uma instituição arbitral» (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na
teoria geral do processo, cit., 141).
98. La soluzione prevista dall’art. 19, § 2°, è coerente, perché l’esternazione dell’intenzione di promuovere
il giudizio arbitrale, secondo le forme stabilite dalla legge, costituisce «indiscutível manifestação
de irresignação em face de uma situação jurídica não desejada, equivalendo para esse efeito,
mutatis mutandi, à iniciativa de um processo perante o Poder Judiciário mediante o ajuizamento
da petição inicial» (così ancora C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 143,
che prima dell’entrata in vigore della riforma già propugnava la soluzione consacrata nell’art. 19,
§ 2°, in commento).
99. Per le questioni sorte anteriormente alla riforma del 2015 sul rapporto tra arbitrato e prescrizione,
si veda T.M. Nunes, Arbitragem e prescrição, San Paolo, 2014.
100. Per questa prospettiva si veda T.M. Nunes, A arbitragem e a interrupção da prescrição, cit., 531, il
quale, in particolare, propone di inserire tra i casi di interruzione della prescrizione, previsti dall’art.
202 del codice civile brasiliano, anche quello: della stipulazione di un compromesso; del deposito
dell’istanza di instaurazione dell’arbitrato presso l’organo competente dell’istituzione arbitrale
(qualora si tratta di arbitrato istituzionale); della notificazione alla controparte dell’atto con cui l’attore
manifesta la propria intenzione di promuovere il giudizio arbitrale. Concordiamo con quanto scritto
dall’A., in quanto l’aver ancorato la produzione (retroattiva) dell’effetto interruttivo-istantaneo della
prescrizione all’instaurazione dell’arbitrato potrebbe infatti creare un vuoto di tutela, qualora l’attore
abbia formulato l’istanza di instaurazione del giudizio arbitrale, ma poi non si giunga all’effettiva
costituzione del collegio arbitrale. Nella stessa linea anche D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral
brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit., 719, ritiene che sarebbe stato più opportuno stabilire
che la prescrizione venga interrotta dal «simples requerimento» dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato e
non dall’effettiva instaurazione di quest’ultimo.
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una regola simile a quella prevista dall’art. 2943 c.c. italiano in relazione alla domanda
di arbitrato101.
Tra l’altro, poiché l’art. 202 c.c. non tratta dell’arbitrato, tale lacuna potrebbe
suscitare dei dubbi in relazione alla produzione dell’effetto sospensivo della prescrizione
al giudizio arbitrale, di cui al § unico del citato articolo102. Crediamo che non sussistano
fondate ragioni per non applicare l’art. 202, § unico, al processo arbitrale103. Tuttavia,
sarebbe stato, probabilmente, opportuno un intervento chiarificatore del legislatore
della riforma del 2015 nella direzione precedentemente indicata.
Consacrando quanto già utilizzato nella pratica, la riforma del 2015 introduce una
disposizione sull’atto di missione, che l’art. 19, § 1°, chiama «adendo», considerato
parte integrante della convenzione di arbitrato104. Il citato art. 19, § 1°, dispone, in
particolare, che: «Una volta instaurato il procedimento arbitrale, qualora l’arbitro o il
collegio arbitrale ritengano che sia necessario precisare una questione che fa parte della
convenzione di arbitrato, verrà redatto, con le parti, un documento complementare
sottoscritto da tutti il quale farà parte integrante anch’esso della convenzione di
arbitrato».
Da notare anche la benefica abrogazione dell’art. 25 della LA105, secondo cui
qualora fosse sorta una questione pregiudiziale su un diritto indisponibile, dalla
quale dipendeva la soluzione della controversia oggetto dell’arbitrato, gli arbitri
avrebbero dovuto sospendere il procedimento e rimettere le parti davanti al giudice
statale. Decisa dal giudice statale la questione pregiudiziale non compromettibile, la
parte interessata avrebbe dovuto depositare presso gli arbitri copia della sentenza
passata in giudicato relativa alla questione pregiudiziale e l’arbitrato sarebbe, quindi,
proseguito106. L’abrogato art. 25 LA era frutto di una visione superata che incideva
101. Sugli effetti della domanda di arbitrato nel sistema italiano, rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit.,
246 ss.
102. Dispone l’art. 202, § unico, che: «La prescrizione interrotta ricomincia a decorrere dalla data dell’atto
che l’ha interrotta o dell’ultimo atto del processo per interromperla». Ciò significa che durante il
processo statale la prescrizione non corre e rimane sospesa fino al momento della chiusura del
processo con sentenza, come spiega H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. I, cit., 570:
«Verificada a interrupção pela citação, o fluxo prescricional permanecerá paralisado durante toda
a duração do processo, recomeçando a correr, por inteiro, do ato que lhe puser fim».
103. Concordiamo pienamente con C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 143,
che non applicare l’art. 202, § unico, all’arbitrato «privilegiaria indevidamente as demoras fora
do controle do titular do possível direito, em confronto ético com a regra da exceptionalidade da
prescrição da vida dos direitos».
104. Come ci ricorda L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 285, in Brasile l’atto di missione viene
denominato come «ata de missão», «termo de arbitragem» o anche «termo de referência».
105. L’art. 25 LA è, in realtà, contenuto nel capo V che contiene la disciplina del lodo arbitrale. Tuttavia, per
ragioni espositive, abbiamo ritenuto opportuno trattare dell’abrogata disposizione sulla pregiudizialità
all’interno del paragrafo relativo al procedimento arbitrale.
106. L’art. 25 LA conteneva una disciplina simile a quella dell’art. 819 c.p.c. italiano (nella versione abrogata
e anteriore alla riforma del 2006), come ricordano anche: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo,
182
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negativamente sull’arbitrato e rischiava di ritardare a dismisura la pronuncia del
lodo, in ragione dell’attesa della pronuncia incontrovertibile del giudice statale sulla
questione pregiudiziale107. L’eliminazione della regola, di cui all’art. 25 LA, è pertanto
salutare108: attualmente anche in Brasile agli arbitri potranno conoscere incidenter
tantum delle questioni pregiudiziali non compromettibili, come già previsto in Italia
grazie alla riforma del 2006109.
Infine, relativamente ad aspetti attienti al procedimento arbitrale, possiamo
notare che la riforma del 2015 ha preferito non dettare regole sull’intervento di terzi
nel giudizio arbitrale110, rimettendo, pertanto, la soluzione delle questioni ad esso
inerenti alla giurisprudenza e ai regolamenti delle istituzioni arbitrali111.
9.
LE NUOVE DISPOSIZIONI SU ARBITRATO E TUTELA CAUTELARE.
Degne di nota sono le nuove disposizioni disciplinanti i rapporti tra tutela cautelare
e arbitrato, contenute nel nuovo capitolo IV-A, intitolato «Delle tutele cautelari e
cit., 364, anche in nota; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando
la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3. Da segnalare che
prima della riforma del 2015, in Brasile una parte dottrina aveva proposto un’interpretazione
restrittiva dell’abrogato art. 25 LA che avrebbe permesso agli arbitri di conoscere in via meramente
incidentale le questioni pregiudiziali non compromettibili (J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge
brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 7-8; E.F. Ricci, Lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 176; C.R. Dinamarco,
A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 168 ss.). Si trattava di una soluzione analoga a quella
proposta in Italia prima della riforma del 2006 per limitare l’applicazione dell’art. 819 (redazione
vigente prima del 2006), su cui si veda, per tutti, F. Danovi, La pregiudizialità nell’arbitrato rituale,
Padova, 1999, 117 ss.
107. A proposito del sistema della pregiudizialità nel giudizio arbitrale C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e
processo, cit., 364, parlava di un «sistema antiquado».
108. In senso favorevole all’abrogazione dell’art. 25 LA, si veda F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 508.
109. Sul punto si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge
sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3. Sulla vigente disciplina italiana
della pregiudizialità nel giudizio arbitrale si rinvia a: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., p. 641 ss.; C. Punzi,
Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 178 ss.
110. Sul tema dell’intervento dei terzi nel giudizio arbitrale in Brasile, si vedano: P.A. Batista Martins,
Arbitragem e intervenção voluntária de terceiros: uma proposta, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação,
2012, n. 33, 245 ss.; N. Mazzonetto, Partes e terceiros na arbitragem, dissertação de mestrado,
USP, 2012.
111. N. Mazzonetto, A discussão em torno dos terceiros na arbitragem e a modernização da Lei de
Arbitragem Brasileira, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di
F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., spec. 460, considera tale scelta del legislatore della riforma
del 2015 come opportuna. L’A. ricorda, altresí, che in realtà solo il Regolamento della Câmara de
Arbitragem e do Mercado (CAM) contiene, all’art. 6, una disciplina espressa dell’intervento di
terzi (http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/servicos/camara-de-arbitragem-do-mercado-cam/
regulamentacao)
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di urgenza»112. Viene, conseguentemente, abrogata la disposizione contenuta nella
versione originaria dell’art. 22, § 4°, LA, la cui formulazione letterale poteva indurre a
ritenere che gli arbitri si sarebbero dovuti rivolgere al giudice statale per ottenere la
concessione di una misura cautelare113.
Gli articoli 22-A e 22-B, attualmente vigenti, ripartiscono le competenze tra giudici
statali e arbitri per l’emanazione di provvedimenti cautelari, nella forma seguente.
Prima dell’instaurazione del procedimento arbitrale, le parti si devono rivolgere al
giudice statale per ottenere la concessione di misure cautelari o di urgenza (art. 22A, caput). In questa ipotesi, l’art. 22-A, § unico, impone alla parte interessata l’onere
di instaurare il procedimento arbitrale entro trenta giorni, decorrenti dalla data di
efficacia del provvedimento cautelare o di urgenza, pena l’inefficacia di quest’ultimo114.
112. Sul tema, si vedano: C.C. Vieira Rocha, Medidas cautelares e urgentes na arbitragem: nova disciplina
normativa, Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira
Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 43 ss.; P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo
arbitral, in AA.VV., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T.
Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 461 ss.; C. de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz e a distribuição
da tutela de urgência, in Aa.Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende,
cit., 649 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 289; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti
comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit.,
§ 4;
113. L’art. 22, § 4°, nella sua versione abrogata, disponeva che: «Salvo quanto disposto nel § 2°, quando
sono necessarie misure coercitive o cautelari, gli arbitri possono chiederle all’organo giurisdizionale
che sarebbe stato, originariamente, competente per giudicare il merito della controversia». Tale
disposizione veniva interpretata in maniera riduttiva, al fine di dotare gli arbitri del potere di emanare
misure cautelari dopo la costituzione del collegio. Per maggiori informazioni sui rapporti tra tutela
cautelare e arbitrale nel sistema previgente alla riforma del 2015, rinviamo a: C.R. Dinamarco, A
arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 226, secondo il quale l’art. 22, § 4°, LA, ammetteva,
«implicitamente ma molto chiaramente», il potere degli arbitri di emanare misure cautelari; E.
Talamini, Arbitragem e a tutela provisória no Código de Processo Civil de 2015, in Revista de arbitragem
e mediação, 2015, n. 46, p. 287 ss. P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo
arbitral, cit., 463 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 322 ss.; Id., Árbitros e juízes: guerra
ou paz?, in Aa.Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da lei de arbitragem, a cura di P.A. Batista Martins, S.M.
Ferreira Lemes, C.A. Carmona, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 432 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem,
cit., 359 ss.; F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz
da Lei n. 13.129/2015, cit., 239; C.C. Vieira Rocha, Medidas cautelares e urgentes na arbitragem:
nova disciplina normativa, cit., 48 ss. Come vedremo nel testo, la riforma in commento accoglie la
menzionata interpretazione dottrinaria e giurisprudenziale in tema di rapporti tra tutela cautelare
e arbitrato.
114. Se si tratta di clausola compromissoria valida e pienamente efficace e in caso di arbitrato istituzionale,
la parte interessata dovrà promuovere l’instaurazione dell’arbitrato ai sensi dell’art. 5 LA: è la domanda
di arbitrato presentata davanti agli organi della istituzione, secondo il regolamento arbitrale, che
evita la perdita di efficacia della misura cautelare concessa. Mentre, in caso di arbitrato ad hoc, ai
fini dell’art. 22-A, la parte interessata proporre la domanda di arbitrato, manifestando all’altra parte
la propria intenzione di dare inizio al procedimento, a mezzo posta o mediante qualsiasi altro mezzo
idoneo di comunicazione, dando prova della ricezione dell’atto (P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das
medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 472). Ad ogni modo, ricordiamo che è la proposizione
della domanda di arbitrato (e non la costituzione del collegio arbitrale) che permette di mantere
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Una volta instaurato l’arbitrato, la compentenza per emanare misure cautelari o di
urgenza spetta agli arbitri (art. 22-B, § unico)115, i quali hanno il potere di modificare
o revocare la misura concessa in precedenza dal giudice statale (art. 22-B, caput)116.
In tema di rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrale, la riforma del 2015 configura
un «sistema equilibrato, lodevolmente assai sintetico dal punto di vista del wording
normativo e senza fughe precipitose»117; ciò nonostante, il capitolo IV-A solleva alcune
perplessità.
Innanzitutto, il capitolo IV-A nasce «vecchio»118. Pur essendo temporalmente
successiva (di pochi mesi) all’emanazione del c.p.c. del 2015, la riforma dell’arbitrato
non tiene conto di quest’ultimo e della nuova sistematica adottata in materia di
tutela provvisoria, che si divide in due categorie: la tutela di urgenza (composta, a
sua volta, dalla tutela anticipatoria-satisfattiva e dalla tutela cautelare-conservativa);
la tutela di evidenza. Inoltre, il richiamo alle misure cautelare e a quelle di urgenza,
compiuto dagli artt. 22-A e 22-B, sembra contrapporre i due tipi di tutela in discorso,
mentre, come appena accennato, secondo la classificazione processuale brasiliana
la tutela di urgenza è una categoria generale che comprende le due forme della
tutela cautelare-conservativa e di quella anticipatoria-satisfattiva119. Probabilmente
l’efficacia della misura cautelare o di urgenza concessa dal giudice statale, come anche ritengono C.
de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz e a distribuição da tutela de urgência, cit., 666.
115. Non essendoci nessuna restrizione normativa, gli arbitri possono emanare ogni tipo di provvedimento
provvisorio fondato sull’urgenza, anche di tipo anticipatorio, come riferisce P. Osternack Amaral, O
regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 463.
116. Il conferimento agli arbitri del potere di modificare e revocare la misura cautelare, concessa dal
giudice statale, era già stata riconosciuta dalla giurisprudenza e dalla dottrina, si vedano: C.A.
Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit, 322 ss.; Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia, decisione del 21
giugno 2012, agravo regimental 19226/MS, secondo cui «Superadas as circunstâncias temporárias
que justificavam a intervenção contingencial do Poder Judiciário e considerando que a celebração
do compromisso arbitral implica, como regra, a derrogação da jurisdição estatal, os autos devem
ser prontamente encaminhados ao juízo arbitral, para que este assuma o processamento da ação
e, se for o caso, reaprecie a tutela conferida, mantendo, alterando ou revogando a respectiva
decisão». La soluzione, di cui all’art. 22-B, caput, LA, è, pertanto, opportuna, come anche ritiengono:
P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 470; A. Briguglio,
Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana
anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4; C. de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz
e a distribuição da tutela de urgência, cit., 666, i quali specificano che la revoca e la modifica del
provvedimento cautelare, emanato dal giudice statale, può avvenire in sede arbitrale con un lodo
o con un’ordinanza.
117. Così A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato”
brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4.
118. In tal senso F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 504.
119. Per maggiori ragguagli sulla tutela provvisoria nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano, sia permesso di rinviare a G.
Bonato, Tutela anticipatoria di urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione
con il sistema francese e con quello italiano, in Revista de processo comparado, 2016, n. 4, e in www.
judicium.it, spec. § 4 ss. In questa sede, possiamo solo sottolineare che la terminologia processuale
utilizzata in Brasile per la tutela di urgenza è parzialmente differente rispetto a quella usata in Italia.
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sarebbe stato più opportuno il riferimento alla sola tutela di urgenza all’interno del
capitolo IV-A120.
In ogni caso, facendo l’art. 22-A riferimento alle sole misure cautelari e di urgenza,
deve essere escluso che i giudici statali possano emanare un provvedimento in materia
di tutela di evidenza prima dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato, anche in ossequio al
principio di non interferenza121.
Possiamo, infine, in questa sede, solo accennare al fatto che la legge (né il
c.p.c. né la LA) non prevede alcunché quanto all’applicabilità del meccanismo della
stabilizzazione della misura anticipatoria di urgenza, di cui all’art. 304 c.p.c., concessa
dal giudice statale prima dell’inizio dell’arbitrato (c.d. tutela antecipada pré-arbitral)122.
Restano, pertanto, aperte due opzione interpretative. Una prima opzione, in base
alla quale sarebbe da ritenere che anche in caso di stipulazione di una convenzione
di arbitrato, il provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza, emanato dal giudice statale,
sia dotato di effetti ultrattivi e che, pertanto, la parte interessata non sia onerata ad
instaurare l’arbitrato123. Seguendo una seconda prospettiva, si potrebbe considerare
che l’art. 304 si applichi solo al processo statale e che, pertanto, la conservazione
degli effetti del provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza dipenda dall’assolvimento
A grandi linee, possiamo notare che l’ambito della tutela di urgenza brasiliana corrisponde a quello
della tutela cautelare italiana e, in particolare, che: la tutela anticipatoria di urgenza brasiliana coincide
con la tutela cautelare italiana tendente ad anticipare gli effetti della tutela finale (a strumentalità
attenuata); mentre la tutela cautelare di urgenza brasiliana corrisponde alla tutela cautelare italiana
a strumentalità forte, che ha una finalità essenzialmente conservativa e che tende a cristallizzare
una situazione di fatto o di diritto. Per un’esaustiva analisi comparatistica della tutela di urgenza nel
sistema brasiliano e in quello italiano, si veda: E. Andrade, A técnica da tutela sumária no direito
italiano, in Revista de processo, 2010, n. 179, 175 ss.
120. Così anche F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz
da Lei n. 13.129/2015, cit., 242.
121. In questo senso, si vedano: F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada
da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, 243. La tutela di evidenza è una delle forme della tutela
provvisoria brasiliana che prescinde dalla condizione dell’urgenza. Si rinvia nuovamente a G. Bonato,
Tutela anticipatoria di urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione con
il sistema francese e con quello italiano, cit., § 4 ss.
122. E. Talamini, Arbitragem e estabilização da tutela antecipada, in Revista de processo, 2015,
n. 246, 455 ss., utilizza l’espressione «tutela antecipada pré-arbitral» per riferirsi alla misura
emanata da un giudice statale prima dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato. Come detto nel testo, non
è questa la sede per approfondire il discorso sul meccanismo della stabilizzazione della misura
anticipatoria di urgenza concessa in via antecedente (alla proposizione della domanda di tutela
finale), rispetto al quale sia permesso di rinviare ancora a G. Bonato, Tutela anticipatoria di
urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione con il sistema francese
e con quello italiano, cit., § 6 ss.
123. Tale soluzione sembra più in linea con l’idea del nuovo codice di evitare di onerare la parte alla
proposizione di un giudizio di cognizione piena sulla tutela definitiva, anche nel caso in cui tale
giudizio sia di tipo arbitrale.
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dell’onere di chiedere l’instaurazione del giudizio arbitrale124. La giurisprudenza dei
prossimi anni dovrà pronunciarsi sul punto e scegliere tra le due descritte opzioni
interpretative.
10. LA CARTA ARBITRALE E IL SISTEMA DELLA COOPERAZIONE TRA GIUDICI
STATALI E ARBITRI.
Allo scopo di perfezionare il sistema della cooperazione del giudice statale con
l’arbitrato, la riforma del 2015 introduce l’istituto della carta arbitrale, cui viene dedicato
un apposito capitolo IV-B, che contiene solo l’art. 22-C, ai sensi del quale: «L’arbitro o il
collegio arbitrale potrà inviare una carta arbitrale di modo che l’organo giurisdizionale
nazionale esegua o faccia eseguire, all’interno della sua area di competenza territoriale,
un atto richiesto dall’arbitro»125. L’art. 22-C, § unico, della LA stabilisce, inoltre, che:
«Nell’adempimento della carta arbitrale sarà osservato il segreto giudiziario, purché
venga dimostrata la riservatezza pattuita nell’arbitrato». Nella stessa linea l’art. 189,
IV, c.p.c., indica che le carte arbitrali e gli atti processuali statali relativi a procedimenti
arbitrale saranno coperti dal segreto giudiziario (vedi anche infra). Della carta arbitrale
si occupa anche il nuovo c.p.c. del 2015 nell’art. 260, § 3°, in cui viene indicato, in
maniera dettagliata, il contenuto dell’atto in esame126.
La carta arbitrale consiste, sostanzialmente, in una «richiesta di ausilio»
formulata dall’arbitro al giudice statale e può riguardare «qualsiasi atto o incombente
necessario»127. La riforma del 2015 istituisce, quindi, un meccanismo di comunicazione
124. Per questa seconda soluzione, si veda E. Talamini, Arbitragem e a tutela provisória no Código de
Processo Civil de 2015, cit., 313; Id., Arbitragem e estabilização da tutela antecipada, cit., spec.
480-481, secondo cui è inapplicabile il meccanismo della stabilizzazione della misura anticipatoria
di urgenza, di cui all’art. 304, rispetto ad una «tutela judicial antecipada pré-arbitral», sussistendo,
quindi, un onere per la parte interessata di formulare «un simples requerimento da instauração da
arbitragem» (non di proporre una formale domanda di arbitrato), al fine di mantenere gli effetti della
misura anticipatoria di urgenza. Seguendo tale prospettiva, sussisterebbe una relazione di necessaria
strumentalità tra provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza e giudizio arbitrale che, invece, il nuovo
c.p.c. ha voluto eliminare rispetto al giudizio statale.
125. Nell’introdurre la carta arbitrale la riforma accoglie gli auspici di una parte della dottrina brasiliana e
di gruppi di ricerca in materia di arbitrato, tra cui la Comissão de Arbitragem e a Procuradoria-Geral
da OAB-RJ e il Grupo de Pesquisa em Arbitragem della PUC-SP, come riferisce F.J. Cahali, Curso de
arbitragem, cit., 312.
126. Come dispone l’art. 260, § 3, la carta arbitrale deve indicare la convenzione di arbitrato, la prova della
nomina dell’arbitro e dell’accettazione della sua funzione e, altresí, rispettare i requisiti previsti in
generale per gli atti di richiesta di ausilio tra giudici statali, chiamate «cartas de ordem, precatória
e rogatória», la cui disciplina si trova sempre nel medesimo art. 260.
127. Così, sinteticamente, A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge
sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 6; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem,
315, definisce la carta arbitrale come un «ato objeto de pedido de cooperação». In materia, si veda
anche M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Princípios do processo no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 234.
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GIOVANNI BONATO
formale e completo tra giudici statali e arbitri128. Si ritiene, comunque, che gli arbitri e i
giudici statali possano collaborare tra loro in riferimento alla richiesta di informazioni e
in materia di prova anche «por intermédio de simples ofício» (una «semplice istanza»),
ossia attraverso un atto deformalizzato, non solo quindi usando l’istituto della carta
arbitrale129.
Deve essere sottolineato che la carta arbitrale non è l’unica forma di collaborazione
giudiziaria destinata a permettere un corretto svolgimento del procedimento arbitrale,
in quanto la LA contiene anche l’art. 22, § 2, secondo cui «l’arbitro, o il presidente del
collegio arbitrale, potrà richiedere all’autorità giudiziaria che ordini la comparizione
del testimone recalcitrante, provando l’esistenza della convenzione di arbitrato».
Si tratta di un meccanismo di ausilio giudiziario in materia istruttoria già previsto
dalla versione originaria della LA del 1996130 e che, come noto, ritroviamo anche nel
sistema italiano all’art. 816-ter, comma 3, come modificato dalla riforma del 2006131.
A proposito di attività istruttoria e arbitrato, possiamo notare che la riforma brasiliana
perde un’occasione, poiché non disciplina l’istituto della testimonianza scritta, che una
parte della dottrina brasiliana considera già implicitamente ammissibile132.
11. LE NOVITÀ RELATIVE AL LODO ARBITRALE.
Il capitolo V della LA contiene la disciplina del lodo arbitrale che – come già
ricordato – produce, tra le parti e i suoi successori, gli stessi effetti prodotti dalla
sentenza togata (art. 31 LA), è titolo esecutivo giudiziale (art. 515, inciso VII, c.p.c.)133,
nonché titolo per l’iscrizione di ipoteca giudiziale (art. 495 c.p.c.)134. Il lodo arbitrale
128. Così F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, 315; J.T. de Paiva Muniz, J.M.R. Martins da Silva, A carta arbitral,
in AA.VV., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende, cit., 311 ss., spec. 323.
129. In tal senso, si vedano: J.T. de Paiva Muniz, J.M.R. Martins da Silva, A carta arbitral, cit., 315, che
ritengono ammissibile l’uso della «semplice istanza» quando non si richiede l’uso di potere coercitivo.
130. Così C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 317.
131. Sul punto, si vedano: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit., 263, che valuta positivamente
la disposizione in esame «ai fini della effettività della tutela apud arbitros»; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato,
cit., 443, che parla di «salutare innovazione».
132. Per C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 320 ss., l’istituto della testimonianza scritta sarebbe
già ammissibile nel giudizio arbitrale. Sulla testimonianza scritta nel diritto italiano dell’arbitrato,
di cui all’art. 816 ter, comma 3, c.p.c., si vedano: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit.,
265, con considerazioni critiche rispetto ai principi dell’immediatezza e alla garanzia costituzionale
del contraddittorio; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 442, che ritiene la testimonianza scritta uno
«strumento di accelerazione dell’istruttoria».
133. Sul punto, si vedano L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 3,
cit., 513, i quali criticano l’art. 515, VII, c.p.c., nella parte in cui conferisce la natura di titolo esecutivo
giudiziale al lodo, in quanto sarebbe stato più opportuno, nell’ottica degli AA., denominare l’atto in
discorso come «título semi-judicial» e prevedere un regime specifico di esecuzione.
134. Sulla disciplina in generale della sentenza arbitrale, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo,
cit., 268 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 173 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo,
Curso de arbitragem, cit., 414 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 319 ss.
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diviene incontrovertibile, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre
l’impugnazione per nullità (ação de declaração de nulidade)135.
La riforma del 2015 incide anche sul capitolo V, introducendo alcune novità
rispetto al lodo e alla sua impugnazione (queste ultima saranno trattate nel paragrafo
successivo).
Rispetto alla decisione arbitrale, adottando una soluzione già contemplata
dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza, la riforma aggiunte una nuova disposizione, di
cui all’art. 23, § 1°, ai sensi del quale: «Gli arbitri possono emanare lodi parziali»136.
La previsione della possibilità di emanare lodi parziali è un’innovazione legislativa
opportuna, in quanto, nel codificare una prassi già presente nella pratica brasiliana
dell’arbitrato137, chiarisce ogni dubbio sul potere degli arbitri di organizzare in maniera
più flessibile la decisione della controversia, frazionandola in più decisioni138. Viene,
conseguentemente, modificato l’art. 33, § 1°, relativo all’impugnazione per nullità,
al cui interno si distinguono due tipi di lodi: quello «finale» (che definisce il giudizio
arbitrale)139, quello «parziale»; per entrambi i tipi di lodi, il termine per proporre
l’impugnazione per nullità è di 90 giorni che decorrono dall’avvenuta comunicazione
della decisione arbitrale o del provvedimento che conclude il procedimento di
correzione-integrazione140. La lettera dell’art. 33, § 1°, non sembra lasciare dubbi
135. Come indicato precedentemente, in Brasile la dottrina nettamente dominante ritiene che il lodo
arbitrale produca la cosa giudicata materiale, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre
l’impugnazione per nullità, sebbene non manchino posizione diverse (vedi retro § 2).
136. Sulla disciplina dei lodi parziali nella LA riformata, si rinvia a: E. Arruda Alvim, Sentença parcial e
arbitragem – inovações do projeto de lei n. 406/2013, do Senado Federal, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e
mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 87 ss.; J.A.
Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem brasileira,
in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 535 ss.;
A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, in Aa. Vv.,
Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire,
cit., 17 ss.
Per l’ammissibilità dei lodi parziali anche prima della riforma del 2015, si vedano: C.A. Carmona,
Arbitragem e processo, cit., 344 ss.; Id., Ensaio sobre a sentença arbitral parcial, in Revista de processo,
n. 165, 2008, 9 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 176 ss.; L. de
Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 431; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 335 ss.; G. Giusti,
R. Dalmaso Marques, Sentenças arbitrais parciais: uma análise prática, in Revista de arbitragem e
mediação, 2010, n. 26, 46 ss.
137. A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato”
brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 2, parla di una disposizione che va a colmare una
«mera dimenticanza normativa».
138. Così F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 507.
139. La dottrina (J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de
arbitragem brasileira, cit., 545) parla anche di «sentença arbitral global».
140. Dispone l’art. 33, § 1°, che: «A demanda para a declaração de nulidade da sentença arbitral, parcial
ou final, seguirá as regras do procedimento comum, previstas na Lei nº 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de
1973 (Código de Processo Civil), e deverá ser proposta no prazo de até 90 (noventa) dias após o
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in riferimento all’onere di impugnare immediatamente il lodo parziale, escludendo
la possibilità di una sua impugnazione differita insieme al lodo finale141. Se non
impugnato nel termine di 90 giorni, il lodo parziale diviene, pertanto, immutabile e
incontrovertibile142.
Al contrario di quanto avviene nel sistema italiano, in cui l’art. 827 c.p.c. fornisce
un’indicazione rispetto al contenuto del lodo parziale e di quello non definitivo143, il
legislatore brasiliano non prevede nessun criterio in relazione al contenuto del lodo
parziale, limitandosi a contrapporlo al lodo finale144. Anche basandoci su quanto
scritto dalla dottrina brasiliana, possiamo, senza dubbio, affermare che è un lodo
parziale quello con cui gli arbitri decidono una o alcuna delle domande cumulate,
rinviando la decisione delle altre domande ad un successivo lodo145. È parimenti
un lodo parziale quello di condanna generica146. Riteniamo che sia un lodo parziale
anche quello con il quale gli arbitri affermano la propria competenza a decidere la
controversia, dichiarando, ad esempio, la validità della convenzione di arbitrato147. Gli
arbitri emanano, al contrario, una decisione interlocutoria – una «ordem processual»,
recebimento da notificação da respectiva sentença, parcial ou final, ou da decisão do pedido de
esclarecimentos».
141. Così A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., 32;
J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem
brasileira, cit., 550; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 398; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria
geral do processo, cit., p. 179. Anteriormente alla riforma del 2015 si vedano: D. Armelin, Notas
sobre sentença parcial e arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, n. 18, 2008, 300 ss.; E.
Parente, Processo arbitral e sistema, cit., 277.
142. In questo senso E. Arruda Alvim, Sentença parcial e arbitragem – inovações do projeto de lei n.
406/2013, do Senado Federal, cit., 98 ss.; A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral
parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., p. 32.
143. Sui lodi definitivi, lodi parziali e lodi non definitivi nel sistema italiano, si rinvia a: Salvaneschi, Arbitrato,
cit., p. 849 ss.; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 379 ss., e 502, il quale esclude
la possibilità di impugnabilità differita dei lodi parziali.
144. Lo notano, infatti, A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos
paradigmas?, cit., p. 27, i quali sottolineano che: «Para a distinção entre sentença parcial e sentença
final, aplica-se somente o critério de seu efeito de encerramento ou não do procedimento arbitral».
145. Così J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem
brasileira, cit., 543; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 177.
146. Così C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 177; G. Giusti, R. Dalmaso
Marques, Sentenças arbitrais parciais: uma análise prática, cit., 51.
147. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit.,
176, anche in nota; A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos
paradigmas?, cit., p. 25. È chiaro che è un lodo finale quello con il quale gli arbitri dichiarano la propria
incompetenza a decidere la controversia (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo,
cit., 176, nota 188). Per il sistema italiano ricordiamo che L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 851, considera
come parziale quel lodo con cui gli arbitri decidono sulla propria potestas iudicandi; mentre C. Punzi,
Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 390, ritiene che siano lodi non definitivi su questioni,
quelli che «risolvono, in senso non definitivo del giudizio, una o più ‘questioni’, pregiudiziali di rito
o preliminari di merito»
190
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ossia un’ordinanza arbitrale – qualora decidano in senso non ostativo e, pertanto,
senza definire il giudizio una questione pregiudiziale di rito (diversa da quella vertente
sulla validità della convenzione di arbitrato) o una questione preliminare di merito148.
Assumono, naturalmente, la forma dell’ordinanza arbitrale («ordem processual») anche
i provvedimenti cautelari emanati dagli arbitri, nonché gli atti relativi alla organizzazione
e all’istruzione del procedimento arbitrale.
Sempre all’interno del capo V, due piccoli, ma importanti, ritocchi vengono
apportati in riferimento al procedimento di correzione e integrazione del lodo, di cui
all’art. 30 LA, che in Brasile ha lo scopo di: correggere errori materiali della decisione
arbitrale (inciso I); chiarire incertezze, dubbi e contraddizioni della decisione (inciso
II); permettere la pronuncia su un punto non deciso (inciso II)149. La nuova redazione
dell’art. 30, prima parte, permette alle parti di fissare per la proposizione dell’istanza
di correzione-integrazione del lodo un termine diverso da quello previsto dalla legge
(cinque giorni) dalla comunicazione della decisione arbitrale. In base alla nuova
redazione dell’art. 30, § unico, le parti possono, altresì, fissare un termine diverso da
quello di dieci giorni, indicato dalla legge, per l’emanazione del provvedimento arbitrale
che conclude il procedimento di correzione e integrazione. Nell’art. 33, § 1, viene,
infine, specificato che il termine di novanta giorni per proporre l’impugnazione del
lodo decorre dalla comunicazione della decisione che decide sull’istanza di correzione
e integrazione150.
12. LE NOVITÀ IN MATERIA DI IMPUGNAZIONE DEL LODO.
Prima di trattare delle novità introdotte dalla riforma del 2015 in materia di
impugnazione del lodo, è opportuno ricordare che la LA prevede un’unica impugnazione
esperibile nei confronti del lodo, chiamata «ação anulatória» 151. Si tratta di
un’impugnazione a critica vincolata che può essere proposta per limitati vizi di nullità di
148. Al contrario di quanto accade in Italia, non esiste nel sistema brasiliano la categoria dei lodi non
definitivi su questioni, che risolvono alcune delle questioni insorte senza definire il giudizio arbitrale.
149. Non è questa la sede per approfondire il procedimento di cui all’art. 30 LA, possiamo ricordare che si
tratta di un istituto simile a quello degli embargos de declaração del processo statale, meccanismo
che tende a correggere e integrare una decisione giurisdizionale, si rinvia a: A. Chateaubriand Martins,
Correção e interpretação da sentença arbitral: novas perspectivas para antigas controvérsias, in Aa.
Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 553 ss.; F.J.
Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 398 ss. L’ambito di applicazione del procedimento di correzione
e integrazione del lodo in Brasile è chiaramente più ampio di quello italiano, contenuto nell’art.
826 c.p.c., sul quale si vedano: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 830 ss.; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico
dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 459 ss.
150. Sulle modificazioni di cui agli artt. 30 e 33, § 1°, si veda A. Chateaubriand Martins, Correção e
interpretação da sentença arbitral: novas perspectivas para antigas controvérsias, cit., 557 ss.
151. Per l’utilizzo della terminologia «ação anulatória», si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria
geral do processo, cit., 244, il quale sottolinea l’efficacia «desconstitutiva» (o anche «constitutiva
negativa») dell’impugnazione in discorso, nella misura in cui tende ad eliminare dal «mondo giuridico»
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natura processuale152, il cui catalogo – dettato dall’art. 32 – si presenta più chiaramente
snello rispetto a quello previsto in Italia dall’art. 829 c.p.c. sulla impugnazione per
nullità153. Essendo quello brasiliano un catalogo alquanto ridotto, buona parte della
dottrina ritiene necessario adottare una «interpretazione integrativa» dell’art. 32
LA, introducendo alcuni vizi di nullità, come la violazione dell’ordine pubblico154 e, in
generale, ogni tipo di violazione delle garanzie costituzionali del «giusto processo»
commessa dagli arbitri155. Rimane, in ogni caso, esclusa la possibilità di dedurre errores
il lodo impugnato; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 479 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem
e processo, cit., 398.
152. Alcuni autori brasiliani considerano più tecnicamente più corretto parlare di annullabilità del lodo
(J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 13; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e
processo, cit., 398; P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 266 ss.), mentre
altri ritengono sia preferibile parlare di nullità (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do
processo, cit., 244; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 481).
153. Sull’impugnazione per nullità del lodo nel diritto italiano, si rinvia a: S. Boccagna, L’impugnazione
per nullità del lodo, Napoli, 2005, passim; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit.,
507 ss., il quale qualifica l’impugnazione per nullità come una «figura sui generis» che dà luogo
ad un giudizio attribuito «alla competenza in unico grado della corte d’appello»; E. Marinucci,
L’impugnazione del lodo arbitrale dopo la riforma, Milano, 2009; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 919
ss. Anche alla luce dell’analisi del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, concordiamo con L. Salvaneschi, I
motivi di impugnazione del lodo: una razionalizzazione?, in questa Rivista, 2015, 233 ss. spec. p. 242,
che in Italia sarebbe opportuno «un nuovo intervento razionalizzatore della disciplina che regola gli
esiti del giudizio di nullità» del lodo arbitrale.
154. La dottrina dominante ritiene che, nonostante non venga stabilito direttamente dall’art. 32,
il lodo nazionale sia nullo in caso di contrasto con l’ordine pubblico, anche in ragione del
fatto che la contrarietà all’ordine pubblico è espressamente prevista come motivo ostativo al
riconoscimento di un lodo straniero dall’art. 39, inciso II. In questo senso, per tutti, si vedano:
C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 418, secondo cui «o sistema brasileiro è coerente, de
modo que tanto as sentenças arbitrais nacionais quanto as sentenças arbitrais estrangeiras estão
sujeitas à mesma condição geral de validade, qual seja, não atentar contra a ordem pública»;
R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Ordem pública e processo, San Paolo, 2011; J. Schledorn de Camargo,
A ação anulatória com base na violação à ordem pública, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre
a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 313 ss., spec.
324, secondo cui «o sistema arbitrale deve ser interpretado com coerência e, assim, repelida a
sentença arbitral nacional que também afronte a ordem pública»; V. Galíndez, O novo marco
legal da arbitragem no Brasil: é suficiente?, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De
Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 708.
155. A favore di una «interpretazione integrativa» del catalogo dei vizi di nullità del lodo, si veda C.R.
Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 243, secondo cui provocano la nullità
del lodo la violazione di ogni tipo di garanzia costituzionale del processo, «anche quelle indirette
o riflesse e nonostante non siano espressamente previste» dall’art. 32 LA; l’A. indica quali cause di
nullità non espressamente previste, la nullità del lodo derivante dalla pronuncia di incostituzionalità,
da parte del Supremo Tribunale Federale, della legge su cui il lodo si è fondato, nonché la contrarietà
del lodo con una súmula vinculante (ossia una massima giurisprudenziale del Supremo Tribunale
Federale dotata di effiacia vincolante). Per la stessa prospettiva «integrativa», si veda già E.F. Ricci, Lei
brasileira de arbitragem, cit., 72 ss., il quale ammette come motivo di nullità (nonostante non venga
espressamente previsto dalla legge) anche la contrarietà del lodo con una precedente decisione,
statale o arbitrale, passata in giudicato, in modo simile a quanto avviene nel sistema italiano (art. 829,
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in iudicando nei confronti del lodo156, mentre con l’impugnazione per nullità si può
allegare un vizio di tipo revocatorio del lodo, quale quello della corruzione dell’arbitro
(art. 32, inciso VI)157. Ricordiamo che la competenza per decidere sull’impugnazione del
lodo viene attribuita ad un giudice di primo grado158 e si deve seguire il procedimento
di cognizione ordinario, come indicato dall’art. 33, § 1°159.
Sempre in relazione alla impugnazione per nullità, non è senza interesse
sottolineare che la legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato in nessuna ipotesi prevede che la
decisione nel merito della controversia sia affidata al giudice dell’impugnazione del
lodo160, in ossequio al principio di autonomia dell’arbitrato e di non interferenza della
giurisdizione statale su quest’ultimo161. In base alla disciplina di cui agli artt. 32 e 33,
in Brasile il giudice statale può procedere al solo annullamento del lodo, al quale può
seguire o meno il rinvio della decisione della controversia agli arbitri (vedi infra). La
soluzione brasiliana è chiaramente differente da quella vigente in Italia, dove, come
noto, l’art. 830 c.p.c. adotta «un sistema a carattere misto», in forza del quale in
n. 8, c.p.c.). A favore di un’interpretazione integrativa, si veda anche P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle
judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 279-280.
In senso contrario, propendono per la tassatività dei motivi di nullità del lodo: C.A. Carmona,
Arbitragem e processo, cit., 399, il quale (come indicato alla nota precedente) ammette, tuttavia, la
nullità della decisione arbitrale per contrarietà con l’ordine pubblico; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem,
cit., 388. Mentre ; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 483, parla di un catalogo dei motivi
di nullità del lodo «quasi tassativo».
156. Come ricorda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 235.
157. Ai sensi del citato art. 32, inciso VI, il lodo è nullo se viene dimostrata la «prevaricação, concussão
ou corrupção passiva» dell’arbitro, di cui A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici
considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 7, sottolinea
la natura di vizio di tipo revocatorio.
158. Sul punto scrive C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 251,
che sarebbe «ragionevole» affidare alla competenza originaria degli organi di secondo grado
(os tribunais) il potere di conoscere direttamente sull’impugnazione per nullità del lodo; ciò
che, tuttavia, richiederebbe una revisione costituzionale, in ragione di quanto disposto dalla
Costituzione brasiliana del 1988, cui spetta la disciplina della competenze originaria degli organi
di secondo grado.
159. Si veda sul punto la ricerca empirica della Fundação Getulio Vargas, da cui si evince la rarità dei casi
di annullamento del lodo in Brasile (http://cbar.org.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PesquisaJurisprud%C3%AAncia-CBAr-Relat%C3%B3rio Preliminar.pdf). Per un’analisi di alcune pronunce di
nullità del lodo, si veda anche N. Mizrahi Lamas, Ações anulatórias de sentença arbitral, in Aa. Vv.,
A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 169 ss.
160. C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 424: «anulado o laudo, não pode o juiz togado passar ao
exame da causa»; P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 267.
161. C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 239, scrive che: «Nem seria
sistematicamente aceitável dar ao juíz togado a competência para redecidir o mérito da causa
já julgada pelos árbitros, pois isso colidiria de frente com o desenho brasileiro da autonomia da
arbitragem e com a própria função institucional desta no sistema de meios de solução de litígios»;
C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 424, parla di una tecnica che «tende a prestigiar o juízo
arbitral, desestimulando o recurso à ação impugnativa»,
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alcune ipotesi il giudizio rescissorio spetta alla Corte d’appello, mentre in altre ipotesi
la decisione della causa viene rimessa al giudizio degli arbitri162.
All’infuori della ação anulatória non vengono previsti altri tipi di impugnazioni.
Nel silenzio della legge sul punto, la dottrina maggioritaria ritiene, quindi,
inammissibile la ação rescisória (impugnazione simile alla revocazione del sistema
italiano)163. La legge arbitrale brasiliana non prevede nemmeno nessun tipo di
rimedio esperibile da un terzo contro il lodo, quale ad esempio il recurso de terceiro
prejudicato, di cui all’art. 996 c.p.c. del 2015164. Ciò non significa che il terzo non si
possa difendere con altri strumenti, quali un mandado de segurança165, un’azione
di accertamento negativo166 e, secondo alcuni autori, utilizzando la stessa ação
anulatória167.
Descritta per sommi capi la disciplina dell’impugnazione del lodo, possiamo
tornare a trattare della riforma del 2015 e, a questi fini, segnaliamo, innanzitutto,
due modificazioni di ordine lessicale. All’interno dell’art. 32 il primo motivo di nullità
del lodo riguarda, attualmente, la nullità della convenzione di arbitrato e non più solo
la nullità del compromesso, come avveniva in base alla versione originale della LA
del 1996168. Inoltre, nell’art. 33 si utilizza l’espressione «declaração» di nullità della
162. La comparazione tra il diritto brasiliano e quello italiano su questo punto conduce C.R. Dinamarco, A
arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 239, ad affermare che in Brasile l’arbitrato gode di una
maggiore autonomia. Anche alla luce dell’analisi del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, concordiamo
con L. Salvaneschi, I motivi di impugnazione del lodo: una razionalizzazione?, in questa Rivista,
2015, 233 ss. spec. p. 242, che in Italia sarebbe opportuno «un nuovo intervento razionalizzatore
della disciplina che regola gli esiti del giudizio di nullità» del lodo arbitrale. Per uno studio di diritto
comparato in materia, rinviamo a E. Marinucci, Esito ed effetti dell’impugnazione giudiziaria del lodo
arbitrale: note di diritto comparato, in Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 2000, 1327 ss.
163. Per l’inammissibilità dell’ação rescisória nei confronti del lodo, si vedano: F.J. Cahali, Curso de
arbitragem, cit., 388; F.L. Yarshell, Ação anulatória de julgamento arbitral e ação rescisória, in Revista
de arbitragem e mediação, 2005, n. 5, 95 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 546; D.
Armelin, Notas sobre a ação rescisória em matéria arbitral, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação,
2004, n. 1, 12 ss., spec. 14; L. Britto Mejias, Controle da atividade do árbitro, cit., 205 ss.
164. Si tratta di un rimedio che, con tutte le dovute differenziazioni, assomiglia all’opposizione di terzo
dei sistema italiano, come ritiene C.R. Dinamarco, Litisconsorcio, San Paolo, 2009.
165. Sul mandado de segurança, si veda, per tutti, E. Andrade, Il c.d. “mandado de segurança” individuale
nel diritto processuale civile brasiliano, in Riv. dir. proc., 2010, 631 ss.
166. Per questa prospettiva, si veda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 237.
167. Ammettono l’esperibilità dell’impugnazione per nullità ad opera del terzo, G. Recena Costa, M.
Carvalho Engholm Cardoso, Limites subjetivos da sentença arbitral e legitimidade do terceiro para
ajuizar ação anulatória, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende
Beneduzi, cit., 595 ss., spec. 618 ss.,
168. Sul punto F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 510, parla di correzione di un equivoco redazionale
della legge del 1996. È chiaro che la nullità della clausola compromissoria provocava la nullità del lodo
anche precedentemente alla riforma del 2015. Come ricorda C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo,
cit., 400, il legislatore brasiliano del 1996 aveva commesso lo stesso errore che si trovava nel c.p.c.
italiano anteriormente alla riforma del 2006.
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sentenza arbitrale, in luogo di quello «decretação» di nullità che era contenuta nella
versione originaria della LA169.
A parte il citato mutamento terminologico, restano inalterati i vizi che possono
dar luogo ad una pronuncia di nullità del lodo, fatta salva l’abrogazione del vizio di
omessa pronuncia, di cui all’art. 32, inciso V (in ragione dell’introduzione della figura
del lodo complementare, su cui vedi infra).
Una novità di rilievo è costituita dall’abrogazione della disposizione che stabiliva
in quali casi il giudice dell’impugnazione si limitava a dichiarare la nullità del lodo e
chiudeva, pertanto, il giudizio con lo svolgimento della sola fase rescindente (art. 33, §
2°, inciso I, nella versione originaria170) e in quali casi il giudice doveva, invece, disporre
il rinvio della causa agli arbitri per l’emanazione di un nuovo lodo (art. 33, § 2°, inciso
II, nella versione originaria)171. La vigente redazione dell’art. 32, § 2°, prevede che il
giudice dell’impugnazione valuti, caso per caso, se la decisione di merito debba essere
rimessa o meno agli arbitri172.
Altra novità importante della riforma del 2015, inserita all’interno del capo V della
LA, è quella del lodo arbitrale complementare, la cui disciplina è contenuta nel nuovo
art. 33, § 4°, ai sensi del quale: «La parte interessata potrà promuovere un giudizio
per chiedere la pronuncia di un lodo arbitrale complementare, qualora l’arbitro non
abbia deciso su tutte le domande dedotte nel procedimento arbitrale». Si tratta di
un dispositivo, già conosciuto in ambito comparatistico173, che permette alla parte di
169. Si tratta di una modificazione lessicale appropriata, poiché la nullità del lodo non viene decretata
ma dichiarata dal giudice dell’impugnazione.
170. Erano i seguenti casi di nullità del lodo determinati da: nullità della convenzione di arbitrato; pronuncia
da parte di chi non poteva essere arbitro; dolo dell’arbitro; scadenza del termine; violazione dei
principi fondamentali del processo arbitrale, di cui all’art. 21, quali il principio del contraddittorio,
dell’uguaglianza delle parti, dell’imparzialità dell’arbitro e del suo libero convincimento.
171. Erano i residuali casi di nullità del lodo, ossia: mancanza di uno dei requisiti del lodo, di cui all’art.
26; pronuncia fuori dai limiti della convenzione di arbitrato; omissione di pronuncia. Sul regime
previgente si veda C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 398 ss.
172. Dispone l’attuale art. 33, § 2°, che: «La sentenza che accoglie l’impugnazione dichiara la nullità del
lodo, nelle ipotesi dell’art. 32, e determina, se è il caso, che l’arbitro o il collegio arbitrale emani
un nuovo lodo arbitrale». F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., p. 512, scrive che la decisione sulla
rimessione della controversia agli arbitri, a seguito della dichiarazione di nullità del lodo, dipende
dalle circostanze del caso «a ser avaliado e decidido no processo». In senso favorevole alla nuova
disposizione, nella misura in cui permette al giudice statale di valutare le circostanze del singolo caso,
si vedano: F. Zech Sylvestre; T.A. Rocha Lima, Aspectos processuais da ação de nulidade de sentença
arbitral: perspectivas reformistas, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015,
a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 559 ss., spec. 580; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine
e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del
2015, cit., § 7, secondo cui si tratta di «una scelta normativa che vuol essere il più possibile adeguata
alla varietà di situazioni».
173. Si veda l’analisi di R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a
sentença arbitral complementar, in in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos
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esperire un’azione davanti al giudice statale al fine di sanare il vizio di omissione di
pronuncia e, quindi, di ottenere che gli arbitri statuiscano sulle domande proposte, ma
non decise174. In conseguenza della riforma in commento, il vizio di omessa pronuncia
non costituisce più un caso di invalidità del lodo (come accadeva prima del 2015175)
e le parti hanno, attualmente, la facoltà di utilizzare il procedimento di cui all’art. 33,
§ 4°, LA, chiedendo che il giudice statale disponga che gli arbitri si pronuncino sulle
domande non decise. Siamo, quindi, in presenza di un meccanismo di integrazione
della decisione arbitrale176, attraverso un lodo complementare, che si fonda sulla
cooperazione tra giudice statale e arbitri e che costituisce una novità di rilievo e
salutare177, di cui la pratica dovrà specificare la disciplina di dettaglio e i rapporti con
altre azioni previste dalla LA, come con il procedimento di correzione dell’art. 30,
inciso II, che prevede la pronuncia su un «punto» omesso dagli arbitri178. In ogni caso,
Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 629 ss., sia per il diritto brasiliano che per un panorama di diritto
comparato sul lodo complementare.
174. L’esperibilità dell’azione davanti al giudice statale, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, ci pare residuale ed è
subordinata alla previa proposizione dell’istanza davanti agli arbitri di pronunciarsi sulla domanda non
decisa attraverso il procedimento di cui all’art. 30, inciso II, LA (simile agli embargos de declaração).
In tal senso si veda F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., p. 403. Naturalmente la parte interessata
non ha l’onere di proporre l’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, per chiedere una statuizione di merito sulla
domanda non decisa, avendo in ogni caso la facoltà di riproporre tale domanda all’interno di un
nuovo giudizio arbitrale. In tal senso, in relazione ai casi di omessa pronuncia, si veda C.R. Dinamarco,
A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., p. 198. Tra i casi in cui si ammette l’emanazione di
un lodo arbitrale complementare rientra anche quello in cui gli arbitri non abbiano determinato il
quantum della prestazione debitoria, limitandosi alla pronuncia di una condanna generica sul solo
an debeatur, come specificato da H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de processo civil, vol. II, cit., 591.
175. L’art. 32, inciso V (attualmente abrogato), disponeva: «È nula a sentença arbitral se: … V – não
decidir todo o litígio submetido à arbitragem». In ogni caso, anche prima della riforma del 2015,
la pronuncia sulle domande non decisa sarebbe spettata sempre agli arbitri. Si veda sul punto C.A.
Carmona, Arbitrato e processo, cit., p. 407.
176. L’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, LA, in materia di lodo complementare, non sembra essere
un’impugnazione in senso tecnico, trattandosi piuttosto di un «meccanismo peculiare di correzione
della sentenza arbitrale ‘incompleta’» (così R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças
arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, cit., 646). D. Levy, Os presságios da
reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit., 724, considera la figura del lodo
complementare come un meccanismo di «exercício do direito ao esgotamento da jurisdição» degli
arbitri.
177. In senso favorevole all’introduzione dell’art. 33, § 4°, si vedano: F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit.,
403; D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit.,
724.
178. Il procedimento di correzione, di cui all’art. 30, II, LA, sicuramente potrà essere utilizzato in caso
di mancata pronuncia su un punto o questione allegata dalle parti, ma anche per chiedere la
pronuncia su una domanda non decisa. L’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, concorre con il menzionato
procedimento di correzione, potendo la prima essere esperita una volta che siano scaduti i termini
per la proposizione del secondo.
La LA non indica, nemmeno, quale sia il collegio arbitrale competente a emanare il lodo complementare.
Secondo F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 403, sarà lo stesso collegio arbitrale a pronunciarsi
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l’azione diretta ad ottenere l’emanazione del lodo complementare è facoltativa, perché
la parte interessata può sempre instaurare un nuovo arbitrato per avere la pronuncia
sulla domanda non decisa179.
Ugualmente in materia di impugnazione, si è proceduto a modificare l’art. 33,
§ 3°, della LA, disponendo che: «La dichiarazione di nullità della sentenza arbitrale
potrà essere richiesta anche con l’opposizione all’esecuzione, ai sensi degli articoli
525 e seguenti del codice di procedura civile, qualora si proceda all’esecuzione forzata
giudiziale»180. L’opposizione all’esecuzione non deve essere proposta necessariamente
entro il termine di 90 giorni decorrente dalla comunicazione del lodo, potendo essere
fatta valere anche successivamente. In ragione di ciò, è necessario indagare quale sia
la conseguenza della scandenza del termine per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità
del lodo sul giudizio di l’opposizione all’esecuzione dello stesso. Sul punto gli studiosi
brasiliani si sono divisi in due orientamenti contrapposti.
Una parte della dottrina non limita temporalmente la possibilità di dedurre in
sede di opposizione all’esecuzione i motivi di nullità del lodo, di cui all’art. 32, LA, che
possono essere dedotti anche oltre la scandenza del termine di novanta giorni181.
Ma altra parte autorevole della dottrina – che appare maggioritaria – ritiene
opportuno adottare una «visione sistematica» dell’art. 33, § 3°, in materia di opposizione
all’esecuzione del lodo, evitando che il debitore possa contestare con tale rimedio i
vizi del lodo, di cui all’art. 32, una volta decorso il termine di novanta giorni182. Tale
sulle domande non decise, «evitando o enorme custo de repetição de providências, e até o risco de
decisões contraditórias, caso fossem trazidos novos árbitros». Mentre secondo R. Castro de Figueiredo,
A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, cit., 644, il
giudice statale potrà disporre che sia un nuovo organo arbitrale a emanare il lodo complementare.
179. Lo nota anche R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença
arbitral complementar, cit., 645, il quale, infatti, sottolinea come rispetto all’instaurazione di un nuovo
arbitrato il procedimento di integrazione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, si rivela «poco attraente» dal punto
di vista del tempo necessario per ottenere la decisione del giudice statale sull’istanza della pronuncia
di un lodo complementare. L’A. individua un vantaggio nell’esercizio dell’azione di integrazione in
discorso nella finalità di indurre l’arbitro «a modificare il proprio risultato del lodo originario».
180. Questa la versione in lingua originale dell’art. 33, § 3°, LA: «A decretação da nulidade da sentença
arbitral também poderá ser requerida na impugnação ao cumprimento da sentença, nos termos
dos arts. 525 e seguintes do Código de Processo Civil, se houver execução judicial». Nel testo abbiamo
tradotto la parte «impugnação ao cumprimento da sentença» come opposizione all’esecuzione del
lodo. Si tratta di una libera traduzione diretta a facilitare la comprensione del rimedio in discorso ai
lettori italiani.
181. Così L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 3, cit., 512, i quali
scrivono: «Na impugnação à execução fundada em sentença arbitral, poderá o executado deduzir,
além da matéria elencada no art. 539, § 1°, todas as causas de nulidade desta decisão, contempladas
pelo art. 32 da Lei de Arbitragem». Nella stessa direzione, si veda A. de Assis, Processo civil brasileiro,
vol. I, cit., 136.
182. Parla della opportunità di adottare una «visão sistematica do tema» C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e
processo, cit., 430.
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interpretazione restrittiva, quanto ai motivi spendibili con l’opposizione all’esecuzione,
si fonda sulla necessità di evitare lo «stato di incertezza», che deriverebbe dal
consentire la deducibilità dei vizi di nullità anche dopo la scadenza dei novanta giorni
per proporre la ação de declaração de nulidade183. In base a questa prospettiva, è
necessario distinguere due situazioni: anteriormente alla scadenza del termine di
novanta giorni, ci cui all’art. 33, il debitore può decidere di dedurre con l’opposizione
all’esecuzione anche i vizi di nullità del lodo; successivamente alla scadenza di detto
termine, il debitore può allegare con l’opposizione solo difese spendibili contro un
titolo giudiziale184.
13. LE DISPOSIZIONI DEL C.P.C. DEL 2015 IN MATERIA DI ARBITRATO.
Da segnalare, infine, le novità in materia di arbitrato contenute nel c.p.c. del 2015,
tra cui meritano menzione: l’espresso riconoscimento normativo dell’arbitrato (art.
3); un nuovo regime dell’eccezione di patto compromissorio (art. 337); regole sulla
riservatezza dei «procedimenti giudiziali ausiliari dell’arbitrato» (art. 189, inciso IV); la
superiorità delle convenzioni internazionali e della legge sull’arbitrato del 1996 sulle
disposizioni del c.p.c. in materia di delibazione di sentenze straniere (art. 960, § 3°)185.
183. C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 430. L’elaborazione di tale soluzione pare risalire a E.F.
Ricci, Reflexões sobre o art. 33 da lei de arbitragem, in Revista de processo, 1999, n. 93, 45 ss., § 7,
cui hanno aderito diversi studiosi, tra cui: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo,
cit., 272; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit. 370; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit.,
459 ss.; Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 287; J. Schledorn de Camargo,
A ação anulatória com base na violação à ordem pública, cit., 327-328. In questo senso si vedano
anche le opinioni, elaborate prima della introduzione della legge n. 11.232 del 2005 (la c.d. legge
sul cumprimento della sentenza), da: P. Batista Martins, Anotações sobre a sentença proferida em
sede arbitral, in Aa. Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da Lei de Arbitragem, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 418 ss.
184. Così, molto chiaramente, C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., p. 430-431, il quale in relazione
alla seconda situazione descritta nel testo scrive: «terá o impugnante, em tal hipótese, perdido, por
inércia, o direito de levar ao conhecimento do juiz togado qualquer uma das matérias enumeradas
no art. 32 da Lei. Enfrentará o impugnante as mesmas limitações impostas ao executado que ataca
a sentença judicial condenatória».
Tra l’altro, ricordiamo che tale sistematica è stata consacrata espressamente in Portogallo dalla Legge
di arbitrato volontario, n. 63 del 2011, all’art. 48, rubricato «Motivi dell’opposizione all’esecuzione»,
ai sensi del quale: «1 - À execução de sentença arbitral pode o executado opor-se com qualquer dos
fundamentos de anulação da sentença previstos no n.º 3 do artigo 46.º, desde que, na data em
que a oposição for deduzida, um pedido de anulação da sentença arbitral apresentado com esse
mesmo fundamento não tenha já sido rejeitado por sentença transitada em julgado. 2 - Não pode
ser invocado pelo executado na oposição à execução de sentença arbitral nenhum dos fundamentos
previstos na alínea a) do n.º 3 do artigo 46.º, se já tiver decorrido o prazo fixado no n.º 6 do mesmo
artigo para a apresentação do pedido de anulação da sentença, sem que nenhuma das partes haja
pedido tal anulação». L’art. 46 della citata legge portoghese tratta dell’impugnazione del lodo.
185. Art. 960, § 3, secondo cui: «A homologação de decisão arbitral estrangeira obedecerá ao disposto em
tratado e em lei, aplicando-se, subsidiariamente, as disposições deste Capítulo». Sul punto, si veda:
F. Didier, A arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, in Revista Tribunal Superior do Trabalho,
2013, vol. 79, n. 4, 73 ss., spec. 80, con giudizio favorevole sulla citata disposizione.
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La prima parte (caput) dell’art. 3 c.p.c., contenuto nel capitolo I (del titolo unico
del libro primo) dedicato alle «norme fondamentali del processo civile, stabilisce che:
«A nessuna minaccia o violazione di un diritto verrà negata tutela giurisdizionale». Il
§ 1° del medesimo articolo dispone, inoltre, che: «L’arbitrato è ammesso nella forma
stabilita dalla legge». L’art. 3, § 1°, c.p.c., si limita, quindi, a codificare l’interpretazione
data dal Supremo Tribunale Federale quanto alla costituzionalità dell’arbitrato e
qualifica formalmente l’arbitrato come un mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie186.
Nella stessa linea l’art. 42, c.p.c., dispone che: «Le cause civili saranno risolte e decise
dal giudice nei limiti della sua competenza, salvo il diritto delle parti di instaurare un
processo arbitrale, nella forma stabilita dalla legge»187.
L’art. 337, inciso X, § 5°, c.p.c., qualifica come eccezione in senso stretto l’eccezione
di patto compromissorio, escludendo, pertanto, che sia rilevabile d’ufficio dal giudice188.
Il nuovo c.p.c. del 2015 accoglie, quindi, la soluzione elaborata dalla maggioranza della
dottrina brasiliana e si allinea, altresì, alla tendenza assolutamente dominante nel
panorama comparatistico che riserva alla sola parte interessata il potere di sollevare
l’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato189. Risulta, attualmente, superata la tesi,
elaborata sotto l’imperio dell’abrogato c.p.c. del 1973, secondo cui il compromesso
dava luogo ad un’eccezione in senso stretto, mentre la clausola compromissoria
costituiva un’eccezione rilevabile d’ufficio dal giudice190. Qualora il convenuto non
alleghi tempestivamente l’eccezione di patto compromissorio, l’art. 337, § 6°, c.p.c.,
186. Così R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 252.
Ricordiamo, per ragioni di completezza, che i successivi paragrafi che compongono l’art. 3 c.p.c.
tendono a valorizzare i mezzi di autocomposizione delle controversie, disponendo che: lo Stato
dovrà promuoverne l’utilizzo, quando ciò sia possibile (§ 2°); l’utilizzo della conciliazione, mediazione
e di altri mezzi consensuali di risoluzione dei conflitti dovrà essere stimolato «da giudici, avvocati,
difensori pubblici e pubblici ministeri anche nel corso del processo statale» (§ 3°). Sul punto, rinvia
a W. Pimentel, O CPC de 2015, mediação e arbitragem: um sistema geral de solução de conflitos, in
Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 339 ss.
187. L’art. 42 del c.p.c. del 2015 riproduce sostanzialmente l’art. 86 del c.p.c. abrogato e ci pare essere una
disposizione ridondante, essendo già desumibile dal sistema (così, ancora, R. de Carvalho Aprigliano,
Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 254)
188. L’art. 337 c.p.c. indica quali sono le eccezioni che il convenuto ha l’onere di allegare nella comparsa
di risposta. Il § 5° dell’art. 337 dispone che: «fatte salve la convenzione di arbitrato e l’incompetenza
relativa, il giudice conoscerà di ufficio le materie indicate in questo articolo» (nostra libera traduzione).
Sulla disciplina dell’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato nel nuovo c.p.c., si vedano: R. Resende
Beneduzi, Premilinar de arbitragem no novo CPC, cit., 285 ss.; M. Lamego Carpenter, Primeiras
impressões sobre a convenção de arbitragem e o agravo de instrumento no CPC/2015, in Aa. Vv., A
reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, 357 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso
de arbitragem, cit., 186 ss.
189. In questo senso, si vedano: E. Talamini, Arguição de convenção arbitral no projeto de novo Cógido
de Processo Civil (exceção de arbitragem), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 40, 81 ss.,
cui si rinvia anche per riferimenti comparatistici; L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo
arbitral, cit., 128; C.R. Dinamarco, Arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 92-93.
190. Era la tesi di C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit. 485.
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qualifica tale omissione come «accettazione della giurisdizione statale e rinuncia
al giudizio arbitrale». La legge brasiliana non specifica, tuttavia, se tale rinuncia sia
condizionata o meno alla pronuncia di una decisione di merito nel processo statale191.
Sempre in materia, ricordiamo, altresì, che, ai sensi dell’art. 485, inciso VII, quando
il giudice accoglie l’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato, il processo si chiude con
una sentenza di rito che non decide il merito della controversia. Qualora, invece,
l’eccezione in discorso venga respinta con decisione interlocutoria (che non chiude il
processo), il convenuto potrà proporre l’impugnazione dell’agravo de instrumento,
ai sensi dell’art. 1.015, inciso III192.
L’art. 189, inciso IV, c.p.c., prevede una deroga al principio di pubblicità degli atti
processuali in caso di arbitrato: sono coperti da segreto di giustizia gli atti processuali
«in materia di arbitrato, inclusi i processi relativi all’esecuzione della carta arbitrale,
purché la riservatezza, concordata nell’arbitrato, sia dimostrata nel giudizio»193.
191. Stando alla formulazione dell’art. 819 ter, comma 1, c.p.c. italiano, la rinuncia alla giurisdizione arbitrale
dipende dalla mancata allegazione dell’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato e dalla pronuncia di
merito del giudice ordinario. Sul punto, rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 674 e 591 ss.
192. In materia, si veda M. Lamego Carpenter, Primeiras impressões sobre a convenção de arbitragem e
o agravo de instrumento no CPC/2015, cit., 362 ss.
Nel c.p.c. brasiliano vigente, l’agravo de instrumento è il mezzo di impugnazione esperibile contro
quelle decisioni interlocutorie (atti che non definiscono il giudizio) che la legge indica espressamente
come impugnabili (art. 1015), si rinvia a: L.R. Wambier, E. Talamini, Curso avançado de processo civil,
16° ed., vol. 2, San Paolo, 2016, 537; L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de
processo civil, vol. 2, cit., 533.
193. Sul tema, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e Tucci, Le garanzie costituzionali della pubblicità degli atti processuali
e della motivazione delle decisioni nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano, traduzione a cura di G. Bonato, in Riv.
trim. dir. proc. civ., 2015, 1221 ss., § 2; R. Garcia da Fonseca, O segredo da justiça e a arbitragem,
cit., 397 ss.
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Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017
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