Civil Procedure Review Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com Civil Procedure Review 2017 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 3 Rua Mato Grosso, 164, Ed. Marfina, 1º Andar – Pituba, CEP: 41830-151 – Salvador – Bahia Tel: (71) 3045.9051 • Contato: https://www.editorajuspodivm.com.br/sac Copyright: Edições JusPODIVM Todos os direitos desta edição reservados à Edições JusPODIVM. É terminantemente proibida a reprodução total ou parcial desta obra, por qualquer meio ou processo, sem a expressa autorização do autor e da Edições JusPODIVM. A violação dos direitos autorais caracteriza crime descrito na legislação em vigor, sem prejuízo das sanções civis cabíveis. 4 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com About the Authors 1 Anna Kampmann Licenciée en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany. Dr. Martin Zwickel Maître en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany. 2 Dr. Abbas Mirshekari Elm va Farhang University, Iran. Amir Ahmadi Student of Law, Nooretouba University, Iran. 3 Rrustem Qehaja PhD, Professor of Civil Procedural Law at University of Prishtina, Kosovo. 4 Dr. Cristina Elena Popa Associate Scientific Researcher at The Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy. Associate in the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Romania. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 5 Civil Procedure Review – Ad Omnibus Pro Omnibus 5 Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma LLM at the Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. Attorney at Law. 6 Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique Attorney for the Catholic University of Arequipa’s Santa María, Peru. 7 Giovanni Bonato Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, France. Visiting Professor at the Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil. 6 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com Summary • 1 Zivil- und zivilprozessrechtliche Aspekte der großen Justizreform in Frankreich (Justice du 21ème siècle) Civil and civil procedural aspects of the french major judicial reform (Justice du 21ème siècle – Justice of the 21st century) ................................................. 13 Anna Kampmann Dr. Martin Zwickel A. B. Justizentlastung durch Aufgabenverlagerung (v. a. im Familien- und Insolvenzrecht) ............................................................................................................................................................................ I. Einführung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung vor Notaren .......................................... II. Auslagerung des PACS aus der gerichtlichen Sphäre ........................................................ III. Weitere justizentlastende Maßnahmen .................................................................................... Verfahrensvereinfachung und Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht (justice plus accessible) .................................................................................................................................................................. I. Förderung der einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegung ............................................................. 1. Obligatorischer Schlichtungsversuch .............................................................................. 2. Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht .......................................................................................... 3. Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln.............................................. II. Einführung allgemeiner Regelungen für Gruppenklagen (actions de groupe) in Frankreich................................................................................................................................................. 1. Anwendungsbereich der Neuregelungen .................................................................... 2. Allgemeine Regelung der Voraussetzungen für actions de groupe ............. a. Parteibezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen:................................................... b. Prozessbezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen ................................................ 3. „Rechtsfolgen“ der actions de groupe ................................................................................ 4. Bewertung ......................................................................................................................................... 14 14 17 18 19 20 20 21 22 23 23 24 25 26 27 28 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 7 Civil Procedure Review – Ad Omnibus Pro Omnibus III. C. D. E. Änderungen des Verfahrens vor der Cour de Cassation .................................................... 1. Vorlagefragen (demandes d’avis) ........................................................................................ 2. Die Cour de Cassation als Hauptsacherichter (juge du fond).............................. 3. Überprüfung von Urteilen im Bereich des Zivilrechts nach Entscheidung des EGMR ........................................................................................................................................... Einrichtung einer einheitlichen Anlaufstelle (Rechtsantragsstelle) bei den Gerichten.................................................................................................................................................................................. Stärkung der richterlichen Unabhängigkeit ...................................................................................... I. Transparenz .................................................................................................................................................. II. Statusrechtliche Änderungen ......................................................................................................... 1. Schaffung eines eigenen Status für Haftrichter ......................................................... 2. Schaffung einer berufsethischen Kommission........................................................... 3. Abschaffung der Laiengerichte (juridiction de proximité) ..................................... Gesamtbewertung .............................................................................................................................................. Literatur ...................................................................................................................................................................... • 2 Comparative Study of Sources and General Content of Moral Damages in Iranian Civil Liability Law and International Human Rights Instruments ....... 29 29 30 31 32 33 33 34 34 34 35 35 37 41 Dr. Abbas Mirshekari Amir Ahmadi 12345- 6- 7- 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ The Concept of Loss (Damage) .................................................................................................................. Moral (Non-material) damage and its definition ............................................................................ Civil liability conception................................................................................................................................... Conditions of realization of civil responsibility ................................................................................. 5-1- Harmful action ............................................................................................................................................ 5-2-Illegal action .................................................................................................................................................. 5-3- Existence of damage .............................................................................................................................. 5-4-Undoubtedness of the loss ................................................................................................................. 5-5-Directness of the loss .............................................................................................................................. 5-6-The loss should not be compensated .......................................................................................... Jurisprudential foundations of civil liability ........................................................................................ 6-1- The rule of causality ................................................................................................................................ 6-2- Negligence ................................................................................................................................................... 6-3- The causal relationship and negligence ..................................................................................... The civil liability theories ................................................................................................................................. 7-1-Fault theory ................................................................................................................................................... 7-2- Endangering theory ................................................................................................................................ 7-3-The middle theory ...................................................................................................................................... 7-4-Loss separation theory ........................................................................................................................... Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 42 43 44 46 48 48 48 48 49 49 49 49 50 51 51 52 52 53 54 55 SUMMARY 891011- Causation relation between the harmful act and the loss entry .......................................... The History of Moral Damage in Civil Liability Law of Iran......................................................... Compensation of losses and other ways of property damage reimbursement .......... International Law: Authority and Instruments .................................................................................. 11-1- Regional treaties ...................................................................................................................................... 11-2-The European Convention on Human Rights ........................................................................ 12- Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 13-References .................................................................................................................................................................... • 55 56 61 66 72 72 74 75 3 Procedural actions concerning appeal in civil dispute under Kosovo legislation ......................................................................................................... 79 Rrustem Qehaja 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. • Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ Legal remedies and their meaning ........................................................................................................... 2.1. Use of legal remedies, as a basic right ......................................................................................... 2.2. Legal remedies in contested procedure .................................................................................... Procedure according to appeal against judgment ......................................................................... 3.1. Procedure at the first instance court ............................................................................................ 3.2. Procedure at the second instance court.................................................................................... Boundaries of examining the attacked decision .............................................................................. Decisions of the second instance court according to appeal ................................................. 5.1. Dismissal of appeal .................................................................................................................................. 5.2. The annulment of judgment and its return to retrial......................................................... 5.3. Annulment of judgment and dismissal of indictment ..................................................... 5.4. Rejection of appeal and confirmation of judgment........................................................... 5.5. Amendment of judgment .................................................................................................................. Reasoning of the second instance court decision .......................................................................... Returning file to the first instance court................................................................................................ 80 80 81 82 84 84 85 87 87 88 88 89 89 89 90 90 4 The obsolescence of the court, the evolutions of its application in the new civil procedure code and the shortcomings of the law, pending the reform .. 93 Dr. Cristina Elena Popa 1. The special obsolescence of the court and the provisions of art. 46 comma 1 of Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of some immovable properties which have been abusively taken over during the period March 6, 1945-December 22, 1989 .............................................................................................................................................................................. 96 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 9 Civil Procedure Review – Ad Omnibus Pro Omnibus 2. 3. 4. • Unconstitutionality related issues or shortcomings of the law? ............................................ Practical applications ......................................................................................................................................... Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................ 97 99 102 5 The luid recovery in class actions executions in Brazil and the Difuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD) .......................................................................................... 105 Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma 1. 2. 3. 4. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ Executions of class actions in Brazil and the allocation to funds ........................................... Paradigm for analysis: the FDD .................................................................................................................... Resources and their destination: the problem of the FDD’s subordination to The Annual Budget Act .............................................................................................................................................. 5. Fluid recovery? ....................................................................................................................................................... 6. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................. References............................................................................................................................................................................ • 106 107 109 114 117 118 119 6 Relexiones acerca de la interferencia del control administrativo en la independencia jurisdiccional Relections on the interference of administrative control in jurisdictional independence ................................................................................................... 121 Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. 10 A modo de introducción.- .............................................................................................................................. En relación a la garantía constitucional de competencia de la judicatura.-.................... Acerca de la independencia judicial y el control administrativo de la ocma.- .............. Tutela procesal efectiva.- ................................................................................................................................. Sobre la motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.- ......................................................... Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas................................... Convencionalidad.- ............................................................................................................................................. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad.- ................................................................... Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.-.......................................................................................... Tetra análisis jurígeno.- ..................................................................................................................................... Breve resumen de la resolución de la jefatura suprema de la ocma.- ............................... Analizando la misma.- ....................................................................................................................................... 12.1. Competencia de la judicatura.-........................................................................................................ 12.2. Independencia judicial y control administrativo. ................................................................ 12.3. Tutela procesal efectiva. ....................................................................................................................... Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 122 123 124 128 130 131 133 135 136 137 138 140 140 140 142 SUMMARY 12.4. Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. ................................................................... 12.5. Tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas. .................................................... 12.6. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad. .......................................................... 12.7. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. ................................................................................ 12.8. Tetra análisis jurígeno............................................................................................................................. XIII. Conclusiones.- ........................................................................................................................................................ XIV. Sugerencias.- ........................................................................................................................................................... XV. Referencias bibliográficas.- ............................................................................................................................. • 143 143 144 144 144 146 148 148 7 La riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato The arbitration reform in Brazilian law ............................................................ 151 Giovanni Bonato 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. Introduzione. ........................................................................................................................................................... L’evoluzione normativa del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. ....................................................... Struttura e caratteristiche essenziali del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. ........................... Le disposizioni sui rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. .............................. Il veto presidenziale sulle clausola compromissorie stipulate in contratti per adesione, in contratti per adesione in rapporti di consumo e in contratti individuali di lavoro...................................................................................................................................................................... La convenzione di arbitrato contenuta nello statuto di una società per azioni. .......... Le innovazioni rispetto alla nomina degli arbitri. ............................................................................. Le modifiche relative al procedimento arbitrale. ............................................................................. Le nuove disposizioni su arbitrato e tutela cautelare. ................................................................... La carta arbitrale e il sistema della cooperazione tra giudici statali e arbitri................... Le novità relative al lodo arbitrale.............................................................................................................. Le novità in materia di impugnazione del lodo. ............................................................................... Le disposizioni del c.p.c. del 2015 in materia di arbitrato............................................................ 152 154 160 162 167 170 174 180 183 187 188 191 198 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 11 1 Zivil- und zivilprozessrechtliche Aspekte der großen Justizreform in Frankreich (Justice du 21ème siècle) Civil and civil procedural aspects of the french major judicial reform (Justice du 21ème siècle – Justice of the 21st century) Anna Kampmann Licenciée en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Dr. Martin Zwickel Maître en droit, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Abstract By two laws issued on 8 August 2016 and 18 November 2016, the French legislator has undertaken extensive reforms of the civil and the civil procedure law, called “Justice of the 21st century” (Justice du 21ème siècle). These laws aim at setting up the judiciary for the 21st century by making it more efficient, transparent and easily accessible. The propositions have been discussed since 2014 and include several sets of measures. With the key issue of an efficient judicial system, justice shall be relieved by transferring several competences to other public authorities. The judicial organization shall be simplified and more easily accessible. For this reason, the laws “for a justice of the 21st century” contain instruments for procedural simplification and facilitating access to the courts. Finally, the independence of judiciary shall be guaranteed. By different measures, the judicial independence is being strengthened. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 13 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL Zusammenfassung Durch zwei Gesetze vom 8. August 2016 und vom 18. November 2016, betreffend „Die Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ (Justice du 21ème siècle), hat der französische Gesetzgeber umfassende Reformen des Zivil- und Zivilprozessrechts vorgenommen. Ziel dieses Gesetzes ist es, die Justiz auf das 21. Jahrhundert vorzubereiten und die Justiz effizienter, transparenter und leichter zugänglich zu machen. Die seit 2014 diskutierten Vorschläge zur Ausgestaltung der Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts umfassen mehrere Maßnahmenpakete. Unter dem Stichwort einer effizienteren Justiz soll zunächst eine Justizentlastung durch Verlagerung bestimmter bisher von der Justiz erledigter Aufgaben auf andere staatliche Stellen erreicht werden. Die Justiz soll zudem einfacher ausgestaltet werden und leichter zugänglich sein. Die Gesetze zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts enthalten daher auch Instrumente der Verfahrensvereinfachung und zur Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht. Diskutiert werden diese Maßnahmen unter dem Stichwort einer leichter zugänglichen Justiz. Schließlich soll die Justiz auch unabhängiger werden. Durch verschiedene, in den Gesetzen enthaltene Maßnahmen soll die richterliche Unabhängigkeit gestärkt werden. Schlagwörter: Frankreich, Justizreform, Streitbeilegung, Gruppenklagen, Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts Keywords: France, Judicial Reform, Dispute Settlement, Class Actions, Justice of the 21st century Die Maßnahmen der großen französischen Justizreform aus dem Jahr 2016 betreffen Schritte zur Justizentlastung durch Aufgabenverlagerung von den Richtern auf andere Organe (A), Maßnahmen zur Verfahrensvereinfachung und zur Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht (B) sowie die Schaffung neuer (C) und die Stärkung der Unabhängigkeit bestehender Justizorgane (D). A. JUSTIZENTLASTUNG DURCH AUFGABENVERLAGERUNG (V. A. IM FAMILIEN- UND INSOLVENZRECHT) Eine der wichtigsten Maßnahmen der großen französischen Justizreform ist die Auslagerung gerichtlicher Aufgaben an außergerichtliche Akteure, insbesondere Notare. Dies betrifft in erster Linie das Familienrecht, nämlich Scheidungen und Lebenspartnerschaften (PACS), sowie das Erb- und Insolvenzrecht. I. Einführung der einvernehmlichen Scheidung vor Notaren Seit dem 1. Januar 2017 gibt es in Frankreich mit dem sog. divorce par consentement mutuel, d. h. der einvernehmlichen Scheidung, ein komplett außergerichtliches Scheidungsverfahren. Dieses außergerichtliche Scheidungsverfahren wurde in 14 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Frankreich bereits seit längerer Zeit diskutiert1 und nun durch das Gesetz vom 18. November 2016 realisiert. Der französische Conseil Constitutionnel hat entschieden, dass das Gesetz nicht in Widerspruch zu dem Gleichheitsgrundsatz und anderen zentralen Grundprinzipien des französischen Familienrechts steht.2 Durch dieses Gesetz wird das gerichtliche Scheidungsurteil zum absoluten Ausnahmefall. Sind sich nämlich die Eheleute über ihre Scheidung und auch über deren Folgen einig, so kann künftig die Scheidung durch eine von den Anwälten beider Parteien unterzeichnete Urkunde nach Art. 229-1 ff. des französischen Code Civil (C. Civ.) erfolgen. Diese Urkunde wird nach den Vorgaben des Art. 1374 C. civ. erstellt und bei einem Notar in Verwahrung gegeben. Durch diese Übermittlung der Urkunde an einen Notar erhält die Urkunde ein eindeutiges Wirksamkeitsdatum und wird zur vollstreckbaren Urkunde (Art. 229-1 C. Civ.). Die Hauptaufgabe in diesem neuen Scheidungsverfahren kommt den Rechtsanwälten zu. Beide Parteien müssen von Rechtsanwälten vertreten sein und die Rechtsanwälte handeln dann für ihren jeweiligen Mandanten einen zivilrechtlichen Vertrag aus. Den Anwälten kommt also die Aufgabe zu, sich der Rechtswirksamkeit der Vereinbarung zu versichern und ihren Mandanten gegebenenfalls ein anderes Scheidungsverfahren anzuraten. Die Notare haben nur die Aufgabe, eine formale Prüfung der Vereinbarung vorzunehmen: Sie prüfen nur die formalen Voraussetzungen der Urkunde nach Art. 229-3 C. Civ. In der Urkunde müssen Angaben zur Identität der Ehegatten, den Kindern und zu den Anwälten enthalten sein. Zudem muss die Einigung der Ehegatten – sowohl im Hinblick auf die Trennung als auch auf deren Folgen – klar dokumentiert sein. Darüber hinaus müssen in der Urkunde Angaben zu den Modalitäten der Scheidungsfolgenregelung sowie zur Beendigung des ehelichen Güterstandes enthalten sein. In die Urkunde aufzunehmen ist ferner ein Vermerk darüber, dass eventuelle minderjährige Kinder des Paares über ihr Recht auf richterliche Anhörung informiert wurden, welches ihnen auch im Fall der einvernehmlichen Scheidung zusteht. Verzichten sie auf dieses Recht, so ist dies ebenso in die Urkunde einzutragen. Schließlich hat sich der Notar zu versichern, dass der Urkundenentwurf nicht vor Ablauf einer Überlegungsfrist von 15 Tagen nach Zugang des ersten Entwurfs unterzeichnet wurde. Der problematischste Punkt an diesem neuen französischen System der einvernehmlichen Scheidung ist, dass der französische Gesetzgeber die einvernehmliche Scheidung auch ermöglicht, wenn die Interessen minderjähriger Kinder betroffen sein können.3 Dieser Aspekt des neuen Scheidungsrechts hat zum Teil harsche Kritik hervorgerufen. 1. 2. 3. Sh. hierzu bereits die Berichte der Kommissionen Guinchard (ablehnend; Bericht „L’ ambition raisonnée d’une justice apaisée“, 2008, ab S. 87, insb. S. 98 f.) und Delmas-Goyon (befürwortend; B-ericht „Le juge du 21ème siècle – Un citoyen acteur, une équipe de justice“, 2013, S. 107). Conseil Constitutionnel, Entscheidung n° 2016-739 DC vom 17.11.2016, Rn. 34 ff. So besagt Art. 229-2 n° 1 C. Civ., das minderjährige Kind müsse von seinen Eltern über die Scheidung informiert werden und könne das außergerichtliche Verfahren ablehnen. Die außergerichtliche Scheidung ist also auch bei Beteiligung von Kindern grundsätzlich möglich. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 15 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL Kritiker bemängeln einen unzureichenden Schutz beteiligter Kinder, der sogar im Widerspruch zu internationalen Kinderrechtsabkommen stehe.4 Das Kind müsse schriftlich seinen Widerspruch zur außergerichtlichen Scheidung erklären. Dies widerspreche dem erklärten Ziel, Loyalitätskonflikte der Kinder in der belastenden Situation des Scheidungsverfahrens zu vermeiden.5 Auch sei gerade bei jüngeren Kindern fraglich, wann denn tatsächlich Einsichts- und Urteilsfähigkeit (discernement) gegeben seien.6 Zwar habe ein minderjähriges Kind nach Art. 388-1 C. Civ. die Möglichkeit, eine Anhörung durch den Richter zu verlangen. Insgesamt sei jedoch nicht sichergestellt, dass minderjährige Kinder die für die Ausübung dieses Rechts erforderliche Einsichtsfähigkeit besitzen oder eine ausreichende charakterliche Stärke aufweisen, um dem Elternwillen entgegenzutreten. Es muss hier auch bedacht werden, dass die Kinder als Dritte im Scheidungsverfahren keinen eigenen anwaltlichen Beistand haben. Es bestehe aber auch eine erhöhte Gefahr der Übervorteilung eines Ehepartners. Ohne Hinzuziehung eines Richters seien die Parteien allein auf das Geschick und die Weitsichtigkeit der Anwälte angewiesen.7 Die Pflicht der Anwälte, den tatsächlichen Mandantenwillen zu prüfen und gegebenenfalls ein gerichtliches Scheidungsverfahren zu empfehlen, ist also von größter Wichtigkeit. Das Scheidungsverfahren kann aber auch wieder vor den Richter getragen werden. Die wohl relevanteste Möglichkeit ist gemäß Art. 1148-2 Abs. 2 der französischen Zivilprozessordnung (Code de Procédure Civile) die Anrufung des Gerichts durch die Ehegatten mit dem Antrag auf gerichtliche Scheidung.8 Diese Möglichkeit des 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 16 Das Verfahren sei unzureichend, da die Kinder bei entgegenstehenden Interessen der Eltern nur in der Theorie ihren Anspruch auf richterliche Anhörung geltend machen könnten. Das Verfahren verstoße daher gegen Art. 12 der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention über die Berücksichtigung des Kindeswillens (Gautier, Critique de la déjudiciarisation à marche forcée: l’exemple du divorce par consentement mutuel devant le notaire dans la loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, LPA n° 232, 21.11.2016, S. 7). Widerspruchsformular gemäß Erlass vom 28.12.2016 (Arrêté du 28 décembre 2016 fixant le modèle de l’information délivrée aux enfants mineurs capables de discernement dans le cadre d’une procédure de divorce par consentement mutuel par acte sous signature privée contresigné par avocats, déposé au rang des minutes d’un notaire). Es enthält die Formel „Ich verstehe, dass infolge meines Antrags ein Richter zur Scheidung meiner Eltern angerufen wird“. Bogucki, Le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel, attention danger, Village de la Justice, 10.1.2017. Bogucki, Le rôle de l’avocat dans le divorce par consentement mutuel, Village de la Justice, 22.5.2017. Art. 1148-2 Abs. 2 Code de Procédure Civile: „Les époux peuvent également, jusqu’au dépôt de la convention de divorce au rang des minutes d’un notaire, saisir la juridiction d’une demande de séparation de corps ou de divorce judiciaire dans les conditions prévues aux articles 1106 et 1107“. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) nachträglichen Verzichts auf außergerichtliche Scheidung besteht bis zur Übermittlung der Urkunde an den Notar.9 Daneben sind auch die Rechtsbehelfe des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts nicht ausgeschlossen. Mit der Umstellung des französischen Scheidungsverfahrens auf eine vertragliche Regelung richtet sich diese nämlich nicht (mehr) nach familienrechtlichen Spezialregeln, sondern erfolgt auf dem Wege des Vertragsrechts. So wurde bereits zu Bedenken gegeben, dass unter Anwendung des allgemeinen Vertragsrechts eine Anfechtung durch einen der Ehegatten nach Art. 2224 C. Civ. denkbar sei. Dabei befürchten Kritiker aufgrund der fünfjährigen Verjährungsfrist des Anfechtungsrechts eine Rechtsunsicherheit im Scheidungsrecht. Dem steuert der Gesetzgeber mit der Begleitung durch zwei Anwälte entgegen, um so die Wahrung der beiderseitigen Interessen zu gewährleisten.10 Zudem könnten auch Dritte gerichtlich gegen die Scheidungsvereinbarung vorgehen, sofern sie ihren Interessen zuwiderläuft, etwa mittels der action paulienne (Gläubigeranfechtungsklage, Art. 1341-2 C. Civ.).11 Die Reform wird daher wohl nicht verhindern können, dass eine gewisse Anzahl an Scheidungen früher oder später doch noch vor dem Richter landet. Gleichzeitig dienen die allgemeinen Vertragsrechtsbestimmungen auch der Wahrung der Interessen beider Teile, selbst wenn bei der Scheidung selbst kein Richter mehr als „ausgleichende Instanz“ eingeschaltet wird. II. Auslagerung des PACS aus der gerichtlichen Sphäre Für die pactes civiles de solidarité (PACS) sind nun nicht mehr die erstinstanzlichen Gerichte, die tribunaux d’instance, sondern die Gemeindeverwaltungen zuständig.12 Diese grob mit der deutschen eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft vergleichbaren Verträge13 werden künftig vor den Standesbeamten geschlossen. Die nunmehr vollzogene Änderung war in der Vergangenheit, trotz entsprechender Vorschläge in den Berichten von Guinchard und Delmas-Goyon,14 am Widerstand der Vereinigung 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. Gueguen-Caroll, Peut-on contester un divorce par consentement mutuel ?, Village de la Justice, 21.6.2017. Égéa, Déjudiciarisation du divorce : brèves observations relatives à l’acte d’avocat, Dr.fam. n° 7-8, Juillet 2016, dossier 29. Thouret, Divorce – Quelles voies de recours dans le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel ?, Dr. fam., n° 7-8, Juillet 2016, dossier 30. Art. 515-3 C. Civ.: „Les personnes qui concluent un pacte civil de solidarité en font la déclaration conjointe devant l’officier de l’état civil de la commune dans laquelle elles fixent leur résidence commune ou, en cas d’empêchement grave à la fixation de celle-ci, devant l’officier de l’état civil de la commune où se trouve la résidence de l’une des parties“. Genauer zum PACS: Sh. etwa Ferrand/Francoz-Terminal, Entwicklungen im französischen Familienrecht 2006-2007, FamRZ 2007, S. 1501. Kommission Guinchard, S. 59 („La commission considère que l’enregistrement des PACS ne relève pas d’attributions judiciaires et devrait dès lors être transféré aux officiers d’état civil, sous réserve des adaptations rendues nécessaires par la nature des missions exercées par ces derniers.“); Kommission Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 17 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL der französischen Bürgermeister gescheitert, die zweierlei Befürchtungen hegten: eine Vermischung mit der Eheschließung (mariage) und eine finanzielle Belastung der Gebietskörperschaften. Mit Décret vom 6. Mai 2017 ist diese Neuerung umgesetzt worden. Die Auslagerung des PACS an die Gemeindeverwaltungen erfolgt zum 1. November 2017.15 III. Weitere justizentlastende Maßnahmen Im Bereich des Erbrechts sind einige justizentlastende Maßnahmen hinzugekommen, insbesondere durch eine Auslagerung bisher richterlicher Aufgaben an die Notare. Bislang musste im Fall des Nichtvorhandenseins von pflichtteilsberechtigten Erben, und, sofern kein notariell beurkundetes Testament vorlag, der Präsident des tribunal de grande instance (entspricht dem Landgericht) den eingesetzten Alleinerben (légataire universel) durch Verfügung zum Erbantritt berechtigen (envoi en possession). Im Zuge dieses Verfahrens wurden insbesondere die Gültigkeit der letztwilligen Verfügung sowie die tatsächliche Abwesenheit pflichtteilsberechtigter Erben geprüft. Mit Inkrafttreten von Art. 44 der Gesetzesreform vom 18. November 2016 reicht es nun aus, wenn der Alleinerbe das Testament einem Notar zur Eröffnung und Aufbewahrung vorlegt.16 Dieser übernimmt nun die Überprüfungspflichten hinsichtlich des Universalerbrechts des Bedachten. Nur wenn innerhalb eines Monats ein Widerspruch bezüglich der Universalsukzession eingeht, muss der Alleinerbe wie bislang eine Verfügung des Gerichtspräsidenten beantragen.17 Diese Reform ist nicht ohne Kritik geblieben; insbesondere wird eingewandt, ein Notar verfüge, anders als ein Richter, gar nicht über die Möglichkeiten der umfassenden Überprüfung des Testaments.18 15. 16. 17. 18. 18 Delmas-Goyon, S. 39 („L’argument ne peut emporter la conviction, alors que la portée symbolique du PACS a été nécessairement atténuée par l’entrée en vigueur de la loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe.“). Décret relatif au transfert aux officiers de l’état civil de l’enregistrement des déclarations, des modifications et des dissolutions des pactes civils de solidarité, n° 2017-889, 6.5.2017. Art. 1007 C. Civ. (ab 1.11.2017): „Tout testament olographe ou mystique sera, avant d’être mis à exécution, déposé entre les mains d’un notaire. Le testament sera ouvert s’il est cacheté. Le notaire dressera sur-le-champ procès-verbal de l’ouverture et de l’état du testament, en précisant les circonstances du dépôt. Dans le cas prévu à l’article 1006, le notaire vérifiera les conditions de la saisine du légataire au regard du caractère universel de sa vocation et de l’absence d’héritiers réservataires. Il portera mention de ces vérifications sur le procès-verbal. Le testament ainsi que le procès-verbal seront conservés au rang des minutes du dépositaire“. Mayer, Les déjudiciarisations opérées par la loi du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, Gazette du Palais n° 5, S. 59. Letellier, La réforme de l’envoi en possession du légataire universel et de l’exécuteur testamentaire, JCP éd. G., n° 49, 9.12. 2016, S. 1337: Der Notar könne zwar die formelle Korrektheit des Testaments feststellen; das tatsächliche Bestehen des Erbrechts erfordere aber eine Auslegung des Testaments, Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Weiterhin kann mit Art. 45 der Gesetzesreform ein Erbverzicht bzw. eine eingeschränkte Erbannahme ebenfalls bei einem Notar erklärt werden. Dieser muss die Entscheidung des Erben innerhalb eines Monats dem zuständigen Gericht durch Übermittlung einer Kopie des Erklärungsaktes bekannt geben.19 Es handelt sich hier aber um eine zusätzliche Möglichkeit. Der Erbe kann seine Erklärung auch weiterhin direkt bei Gericht abgeben.20 Eine weitere Maßnahme der Justizentlastung betrifft das französische Insolvenzverfahren. Das Insolvenzverfahren spielt sich künftig bei Verbraucherinsolvenzen ausschließlich im außergerichtlichen Bereich ab. Ein Richter muss nicht mehr zwingend intervenieren. Kommt die Überschuldungskommission (commission de surendettement)21 zu dem Ergebnis, der Schuldner befinde sich in einer „unwiederbringlich beeinträchtigten Situation“ (situation irrémédiablement compromise) verpflichtet sie ihn zum außergerichtlichen Privatinsolvenzverfahren. Nur im Fall von Anfechtungsverfahren ist noch ein gerichtlicher Prozess erforderlich. Findet keine Anfechtung statt, führt das Verfahren zur Löschung sämtlicher privater Schulden, mit Ausnahme von Unterhaltsschulden und Zahlungsverpflichtungen aufgrund strafrechtlicher Verurteilung (Art. L. 711-4 und L. 711-5 des Code de la Consommation).22 B. VERFAHRENSVEREINFACHUNG UND ERLEICHTERUNG DES ZUGANGS ZU GERICHT (JUSTICE PLUS ACCESSIBLE) Das Gesetz zur „Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ enthält auch mehrere Maßnahmen zur Verfahrensvereinfachung sowie zur Erleichterung des Zugangs zu Gericht. die dem Richter vorbehalten sein müsse. Zudem könne die Abwesenheit pflichtteilsberechtigter Erben mit den dem Notar zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln nicht ohne weiteres festgestellt werden. 19. Art. 804 Abs. 2 C. Civ.: „Pour être opposable aux tiers, la renonciation opérée par l’héritier universel ou à titre universel doit être adressée ou déposée au tribunal dans le ressort duquel la succession s’est ouverte ou faite devant notaire“. Abs. 3 (ab 1.11.2017): „Dans le mois suivant la renonciation, le notaire qui l’a reçue en adresse copie au tribunal dans le ressort duquel la succession s’est ouverte“. 20. Auf diese Weise wird die Möglichkeit gewahrt, den Erbverzicht ohne Entstehung von Kosten erklären zu können. 21. Gemäß Art. L.331-1ff. Code de la Consommation ist die Commission de surendettement eine Behörde bestehend aus Vertretern des Staates auf Département-Ebene und des örtlichen Vertreters der Banque de France sowie Rechnungsführern und andere Vertreter (vgl. Art. L. 331-1 Abs. 2). Sie ist zuständig für Anträge auf Verbraucherinsolvenz. Nach Antrag des Verbrauchers untersucht sie, ob die Voraussetzungen für das Insolvenzverfahren gegeben sind, stellt die Zahlungsunfähigkeit fest und hört Schuldner, Gläubiger und andere Beteiligte an. Nach dieser Untersuchung ordnet sie, je nach Situation, einen Zahlungsaufschub von bis zu zwei Jahren oder einen teilweisen Schuldenerlass an. 22. Die Anfechtungsfrist wurde im Zuge der Reform verlängert. Sie beträgt nun 30 Tage und muss per Einschreiben mit Rückschein bei der Commission erklärt werden (Décret n° 2017-896 du 9 mai 2017 relatif aux procédures de traitement des situations de surendettement des particuliers pris pour l’application de l’article 58 de la loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle). Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 19 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL I. Förderung der einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegung Titel II des Gesetzes vom 18.11.2016, überschrieben mit „Förderung von alternativen Streitbeilegungsmethoden“, umfasst diverse Regelungen mit dem Zweck, die außergerichtliche einvernehmliche Streitbeilegung zu begünstigen und so die Justiz zu entlasten. Die Reform umfasst dabei drei Hauptfelder, nämlich die Einführung eines obligatorischen Schlichtungsversuchs (i), der Möglichkeit zur Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht (ii) sowie eine Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln (iii). 1. Obligatorischer Schlichtungsversuch Art. 4 der Reform23 schreibt die Pflicht fest, einen Schlichtungsversuch vor Einschaltung des Gerichts zu unternehmen. Die Verpflichtung betrifft dabei alle Streitigkeiten, in denen das Gericht durch einfache Erklärung bei der Geschäftsstelle angerufen wird (sogenannte „saisine par déclaration au greffe“, Art. 843 f. Code de Procédure Civile).24 Die obligatorische Schlichtung gilt dagegen nicht bei einer Ladung des Beklagten mit gleichzeitiger Zustellung der Klageschrift, sogenannte „assignation“. Das französische Recht sieht diese Möglichkeiten für Klagen mit einem Streitwert von bis zu 4.000 € vor, die in die Zuständigkeit des tribunal d’instance (Amtsgericht) und der juges de proximité (ehrenamtliche Richter) fallen: Bei dieser vereinfachten Klageart reicht der Kläger das vollständige Klagedossier bei Gericht ein. Dieses übernimmt die Ladung des Beklagten, für die sonst der Kläger zuständig ist. Die „saisine par déclaration au greffe“ wurde in jüngerer Zeit für 59 % der Streitigkeiten vor den juridictions de proximité und 18 % der Streitigkeiten vor den tribunaux d´instance gewählt.25 Durch die Reform soll an dieser Stelle eine Entlastung vorgenommen werden. Der Richter kann (!) die Klage nunmehr als unzulässig abweisen, wenn kein Schlichtungsversuch bei einem durch das Gericht bestellten Schlichter (conciliateur de justice) unternommen wurde.26 23. Art. 4 des Gesetzes lautet wie folgt: «A peine d’irrecevabilité que le juge peut prononcer d’office, la saisine du tribunal d’instance par déclaration au greffe doit être précédée d’une tentative de conciliation menée par un conciliateur de justice, sauf : 1° Si l’une des parties au moins sollicite l’homologation d’un accord; 2° Si les parties justifient d’autres diligences entreprises en vue de parvenir à une résolution amiable de leur litige; 3° Si l’absence de recours à la conciliation est justifiée par un motif légitime.» 24. Sh. hierzu im Einzelnen Zwickel, Die Einführung der obligatorischen Schlichtung in Frankreich, im Erscheinen in: ZKM. 25. Étude d’impact, „Projet de loi portant application des mesures relatives à la justice du XXIème siècle“, 31.7.2015, S. 46. 26. Die Schlichter (conciliateurs de justice) sind ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter der Justiz. Sie dürfen daneben keine gerichtlichen Tätigkeiten ausüben, müssen aber mindestens drei Jahre Berufserfahrung im juristischen Bereich vorweisen können. Nach ihrer Auswahl und einer Vorbereitung durch die École 20 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Art. 4 enthält weiterhin einige Ausnahmen von dieser Verpflichtung. Eine erste Ausnahme ist die Anrufung des Gerichts zur Beglaubigung einer außergerichtlichen Übereinkunft. Weiterhin haben die Parteien die Möglichkeit, einen Nachweis über bereits unternommene Bemühungen zur Streitbeilegung zu erbringen (Nr. 2). Schließlich ist in Art. 4 Nr. 3 generalklauselartig ein „legitimes Motiv“ genannt, welches ebenfalls die Verpflichtung zum außergerichtlichen Schlichtungsversuch aufheben kann. Hierunter fallen insbesondere Fälle von besonderer Eilbedürftigkeit, in denen ein außergerichtliches Schlichtungsverfahren eine unzumutbare Verzögerung darstellen würde. Die Reform hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, die Justiz leichter zugänglich und effizienter zu gestalten. Nun wird mit der „Schlichtungsverpflichtung“ aber ein zusätzliches Hindernis der Klagezulässigkeit geschaffen. Auch hat die Schlichtungskultur ihren Ursprung im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtsraum; Kritiker bemängeln daher, das Instrument der Schlichtung stehe nicht in der französischen Rechtstradition, die vielmehr auf Konfrontation und klärendem Richterspruch basiere.27 Zudem sei die Verpflichtung konträr zum Prinzip der Freiwilligkeit einer Schlichtung.28 Gleichzeitig stellt eine höhere Zahl an einvernehmlichen Streitbeilegungen aber eine Entlastung der Justiz dar und kann so zur gewünschten Effizienzsteigerung beitragen. Außerdem ist eine gelungene außergerichtliche Einigung durchaus ein wirksames Mittel, einen dauerhaften Rechtsfrieden zu schaffen.29 Es bleibt daher abzuwarten, wie der neu eingeführte obligatorische Schlichtungsversuch in der gerichtlichen Praxis angenommen wird. 2. Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht Auch im Verwaltungsrecht wird die Mediation im Zuge der großen Justizreform ausgeweitet. Bislang war in der französischen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit der Begriff der Mediation nur im Zusammenhang mit grenzüberschreitenden Streitigkeiten geläufig. Diese Begrifflichkeit wurde mit der Reform vollständig aufgehoben und eine neue Definition der Mediation im Verwaltungsrecht geschaffen, die auf alle Arten verwaltungsrechtlicher Streitigkeiten anzuwenden ist.30 Dabei wird im Verwaltungsrecht 27. 28. 29. 30. Nationale de la Magistrature werden sie auf ein Jahr ernannt. Aufgrund dieser Anforderungen haben viele conciliateurs einen ähnlichen Hintergrund; die weit überwiegende Mehrheit (2012: 94%) sind Rentner. Auch die territoriale Verteilung ist aktuell noch unzureichend. (Bericht der Inspection Générale des Services Judiciaires, „Le développement des modes amiables de règlement des différends“, April 2015, n° 22-15, S. 27). Gautier, Le renforcement des modes de règlement amiables des litiges civils après la loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle : évolution forte ou arlésienne ?, LPA n° 256, 23.12.2016, S. 5. Mollard-Courtau, La tentative de conciliation obligatoire préalable à la saisine du tribunal d’instance adoptée par le Parlement : enjeux et limites, LPA n° 237, 28.11.2016, S. 12. Amrani-Mekki, Les modes amiables de résolution des différends dans la loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, Gaz. Pal.n° 5, 31.1.2017, S. 46. Zignani, Projet de loi J21 : des changements à venir dans le contentieux des collectivités, Gaz. Comm., 28.7.2016. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 21 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL unterschieden zwischen der Schlichtung („conciliation“) vor dem Verwaltungsrichter und der Mediation unter Rückgriff auf einen Dritten. Das Gesetz zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts sieht zwei Fälle der Mediation vor: Diese kann auf Initiative der Parteien oder aber des Richters stattfinden. Die Mediation auf Eigeninitiative der Parteien kann gemäß Artikel L. 213-5 des Code de justice administrative (frz. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) außerhalb jedes gerichtlichen Verfahrens erfolgen. Weiterhin können die Parteien den Präsidenten des örtlich zuständigen Verwaltungsgerichts auffordern, einen Mediator zu beauftragen sowie die Mediation zu organisieren. Daneben kann der Richter gemäß Art. L. 213-7 des Code de justice administrative, unter Zustimmung der Parteien, eine Mediation anordnen. Gegen diese Anordnung kann kein Rechtsbehelf eingelegt werden. Im Anschluss an das außergerichtliche Verfahren teilt der Mediator dem Richter mit, ob die Parteien zu einer Einigung gelangt sind. Dabei kann die Einigung nur solche Rechtsgüter umfassen, über die die Parteien verfügen können. Ausgenommen sind insbesondere Angelegenheiten des öffentlichen Interesses und der öffentlichen Ordnung, beispielsweise Verwaltungsakte, deren Erlass eine Anhörung der Öffentlichkeit voraussetzt (wie etwa städteplanerische Akte) und die somit eine Vielzahl von Individualinteressen betreffen.31 3. Erweiterung der Geltungskraft von Schiedsklauseln Eine weitere Entlastung der Justiz soll über eine Ausweitung der Geltung von Schiedsklauseln erreicht werden. Dazu wurde eine Neufassung des Art. 2061 C. Civ. vorgenommen: Bis zum Inkrafttreten der Reform waren Schiedsklauseln auf Unternehmerverträge beschränkt. Der Vertrag musste im Zusammenhang mit einer (beruflichen) Tätigkeit stehen, ansonsten war eine etwaige Schiedsklausel nichtig.32 Gemäß der Neufassung des Art. 2061 Abs. 2 C. Civ. kann einer Vertragspartei, die nicht als Unternehmer gehandelt hat, eine Schiedsklausel nicht entgegengehalten werden (sog. inopposabilité, Art. 2061 Abs. 2 C. Civ.). Diese Formulierung, die auf den ersten Blick mehr wie eine Umformulierung denn wie eine tatsächliche Neufassung erscheint, bildet die entscheidende Liberalisierung im Umgang mit Schiedsklauseln. Auch ein Vertrag zwischen Verbrauchern, oder zwischen Unternehmer und Verbraucher, kann nunmehr eine solche Klausel enthalten. Es steht dem Verbraucher frei, sich für die Anwendung der Klausel zu entscheiden. Er hat die Wahl, den Rechtsstreit vor einem Schiedsrichter zu lösen 31. Zignani, Projet de loi J21 : des changements à venir dans le contentieux des collectivités, Gaz. Comm., 28.7.2016. 32. Sh. etwa Cass. 1re civ., 29.2.2012, n° 11-12.782; Cass. 1re civ, 22.10.2014, n° 13-11.568. 22 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) oder ihn, wie sonst auch, durch ein nationales Gericht entscheiden zu lassen.33 Der Verbraucherschutz ist – nach Ansicht des Gesetzgebers – auch mit der erweiterten Klausel gesichert. Die Gültigkeit einer Schiedsklausel setzt die ausdrückliche Zustimmung beider Vertragsparteien voraus; zudem hat der Verbraucher die Wahl, sich die Schiedsklausel nicht entgegen halten zu lassen, sondern die klassische Gerichtsbarkeit zu wählen. Nach dem Bericht des Referenten des französischen Senats soll der Rückgriff auf die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit zudem mit geringeren Kosten für den Verbraucher verbunden sein.34 Auch hier zeigt sich der Wille, den Gang zum Gericht zum sprichwörtlich „letzten Mittel“ zu machen. Zivil- und auch verwaltungsrechtliche Streitigkeiten sollen nach Möglichkeit durch Schlichtung, Mediation und Schiedsverfahren beigelegt werden. Die Zivilgerichte sollen nicht mehr als erste, sondern vielmehr letzte Anlaufstelle dienen, sollte ein Konflikt auf andere Weise nicht lösbar erscheinen. II. Einführung allgemeiner Regelungen für Gruppenklagen (actions de groupe) in Frankreich Durch das Gesetz vom 18.11.2016 führte der französische Gesetzgeber allgemeingültige Regelungen für sogenannte Gruppenklagen (actions de groupe) ein. Ursprünglich war das französische Zivilprozessrecht nicht in der Lage, mit Massenphänomenen umzugehen. Im Fall von Massenschäden trat daher das Problem der notwendigen Bündelung einer Vielzahl von einzelnen Verfahren auf. Erstmals im Jahre 2014 hat der französische Gesetzgeber daher ausschließlich für den Bereich des Verbraucherschutzrechts eine sogenannte Gruppenklage eingeführt.35 Durch ein Gesetz vom 26.1.2016 wurde dieses Gruppenklageinstrument um ein weiteres Anwendungsfeld im Bereich des Gesundheitssystems (santé) ergänzt.36 Mit dem Gesetz zur Modernisierung der Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts geht der französische Gesetzgeber nunmehr einen Schritt weiter, indem er ein allgemeingültiges Regelwerk für alle Arten der Gruppenklagen schafft. 1. Anwendungsbereich der Neuregelungen Der französische Gesetzgeber unterscheidet zwar generell zwischen Gruppen- und Kollektivklagen, hält diese Unterscheidung aber selbst nicht ganz konsequent durch. 33. Pellerin, Commentaire de l’article 11 de la loi Justice du XXIe siècle : les nouvelles dispositions sur l’arbitrage, Gaz. Pal. n° 05, 31.1.2017, S. 54. 34. Rouzet, Libéralisation de la clause compromissoire, Defrénois, n° 24, 30.12.2016, S. 1299. 35. Sh. Véricel, Les recours collectifs en droit francais, in: Cottin/Ferrand/Zwickel (Hrsg.), Die prozessuale Modernisierung der Ziviljustiz in Deutschland und Frankreich, 2016, S. 145 ff., insb. ab S. 151. 36. Loi n° 2016-41 du 26 janvier 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé; Kommentar: Une action de groupe santé est créée, RGDA, 01.03.2016, n° 03, S. 117. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 23 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL Gruppenklagen stellen einen Unterfall der Kollektivklage dar.37 Bei Gruppenklagen ist es stets erforderlich, eine bestimmte Gruppe an Geschädigten namentlich zu identifizieren und diese Gruppe auch zu benennen. Bei Kollektivklagen hingegen ist es ausreichend, auf ein bestimmtes Fehlverhalten abzustellen. Die genaue Identifizierung der geschädigten Gruppe kann entfallen. Auch für Unterlassungsklagen, bei denen eigentlich keine Kenntnis der Betroffenen erforderlich ist, bringt der französische Gesetzgeber aber nunmehr (wie auch für Klagen auf Schadensersatz) das Instrument der Gruppenklage (action de groupe) in Ansatz. Die gewählte Benennung ist insofern nicht ganz stimmig. Wenngleich es Ziel des neuen Gesetzes sein sollte, einen allgemeinen Teil für Gruppenklagen zu schaffen, so gelten die neuen Regelungen dennoch nicht allgemein. Ihr Anwendungsbereich ist vielmehr relativ eng abgesteckt. Gruppenklagen kommen nach neuem französischem Zivilprozessrecht nur für bestimmte Streitgegenstände in Betracht. Im Bereich der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit sind Gruppenklagen künftig nur hinsichtlich folgender Streitgegenstände denkbar: Diskriminierung im Arbeitsverhältnis, Diskriminierung außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen, Umweltschutz, Gesundheitsschutz und Datenschutz. Für all diese Bereiche sieht das neue Regelwerk zunächst einen übergreifend gültigen allgemeinen Teil vor. Für die einzelnen Streitgegenstände folgen dann jeweils Präzisierungen und Detaillierungen. Gänzlich außerhalb des neuen Anwendungsbereichs des Regimes für Gruppenklagen steht das Verbraucherschutzrecht. Für das Verbraucherschutzrecht bleibt es bei den bisher bestehenden Regelungen.38 Der Anwendungsbereich der generellen Regelung von Gruppenklagen ist abschließend geregelt. Selbstverständlich ist aber eine gesetzgeberische Intervention hinsichtlich einer Ausweitung der Streitgegenstände, für die Gruppenklagen in Betracht kommen, jederzeit denkbar und möglich. 2. Allgemeine Regelung der Voraussetzungen für actions de groupe Hinsichtlich der Voraussetzungen für die neuen actions de groupe lassen sich zwei Voraussetzungsarten unterscheiden. Zunächst die parteibezogenen Voraussetzungen 37. Vgl. Tilp/Schiefer, VW Dieselgate – die Notwendigkeit zur Einführung einer zivilrechtlichen Sammelklage, NZV 2017, 14 (15), die von „Kollektivklagen in Form von Muster- oder Gruppenklagen“ sprechen. 38. Im Verbraucherschutzrecht gibt es das Gruppenklageverfahren bereits seit 17.3.2014 (vgl. Sh. Véricel, Les recours collectifs en droit francais, in: Cottin/Ferrand/Zwickel (Hrsg.), Die prozessuale Modernisierung der Ziviljustiz in Deutschland und Frankreich, 2016, S. 145 ff., insb. ab S. 151), Art. 623-1ff. Code de la Consommation. Genauere Ausführungen sh. Hilt, L’action de groupe consacrée par la loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation : peut-on s’en satisfaire ?, Gaz. Pal., 24.4.2014. Auch hat das Institut National de la Consommation eine erste Bilanz veröffentlicht: INC, L’action de groupe „consommation“ : 9 actions introduites en deux ans, 29.12.2016. 24 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) und schließlich die prozessbezogenen Voraussetzungen der neuen Verfahrensarten. Hinsichtlich der parteibezogenen Voraussetzungen ist festzustellen, dass das Klagerecht auf Klägerseite relativ stark beschränkt ist. Auf Beklagtenseite schließlich ist stets eine genaue Identifizierung des Beklagten erforderlich. a. Parteibezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen: Das neue Gesetz beschränkt den Bereich der Klageberechtigten auf bestimmte Vereinigungen, die eine Gruppenklage einreichen können. Klageberechtigt sind nur Vereinigungen, die seit mindestens fünf Jahren bestehen und deren satzungsmäßiger Zweck es ist, bestimmte Rechte ihrer Mitglieder oder auch von Nichtmitgliedern durchzusetzen. Für jeden der oben erwähnten Streitgegenstände finden sich nun im neuen Gesetz detaillierte Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf die klageberechtigten Vereinigungen. Auffällig ist dabei, dass die Anforderungen an die Klageberechtigung teilweise sehr streng sind, so zum Beispiel im Bereich des Umweltschutzes, wo nur zwei Arten an Verbänden die Klageberechtigung zukommt.39 Im Bereich anderer Streitgegenstände, beispielsweise bei der Diskriminierung im Rahmen von Arbeitsverhältnissen, steht ein Klagerecht entweder Behindertenverbänden oder aber auch Verbänden zu, die spezifisch im Bereich des verletzten rechtlichen Interesses tätig sind. Es muss sich also nicht um Verbände handeln, deren satzungsmäßiger Zweck die Bekämpfung von Diskriminierung ist. Ziel der strikten Begrenzung der Klageberechtigten ist es, einen Missbrauch des Instruments der Gruppenklage durch eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Akteure zu vermeiden. Diesbezüglich stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich damit um ein wirksames Instrument der Missbrauchsvermeidung handelt. Schließlich hat der französische Gesetzgeber keine Bestimmungen dahingehend vorgesehen, Parallelverfahren mehrerer gleichermaßen Klageberechtigter zu bündeln. Auch auf der Beklagtenseite existieren Beschränkungen des Gruppenklagerechts. So darf sich eine Gruppenklage nach den neuen Rechtsregeln immer nur gegen einen einzigen Beklagten richten. Darüber hinausgehend enthalten die auf die auf einzelne Streitgegenstände bezogenen Regeln vielfach noch bestimmte Vorgaben im Hinblick auf die genaue Angabe des Beklagten. 39. Klageberechtigt sind im Bereich des Umweltschutzes Verbände, die seit mindestens fünf Jahren bestehen und deren satzungsmäßiges Ziel die Vertretung von Opfern körperlicher Schädigungen ist, sowie eingetragene Umweltschutzvereine. Unter Berücksichtigung des Art.L. 141-1 des Code de l’environnement müssen diese Verbände seit drei Jahren bestehen und im Bereich des Natur- und Wildtierschutzes, der Bekämpfung von Wasser- und Luftverschmutzung oder ähnlichem aktiv sein. (Zarka, L’action de groupe en matière environnementale dans le projet de loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, LPA, 20.07.2016, n° 144, S.6). Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 25 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL So ist im Fall von Diskriminierungen außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen eine Klage gegen einen nur möglichen Schädiger grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen, was die Klagemöglichkeit bei nicht einwandfrei geklärten Sachverhalten stark beschränkt. Im Bereich des Gesundheitsschutzes schließlich ist eine Gruppenklage nur gegen den Produzenten, einen Lieferanten oder einen Dienstleister eines der in Art. 5311-1 des Code de la santé publique genannten Medizinproduktes möglich. b. Prozessbezogene Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen Im Bereich der prozessbezogenen Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen enthalten die neuen Rechtsregeln zwei zentrale Beschränkungen. Generelle Beschränkung einer Gruppenklage ist das Vorliegen einer Mahnung (mise en demeure). Nach einer solchen Mahnung hat der Schädiger vier Monate lang die Möglichkeit, sein Fehlverhalten abzustellen bzw. Schadensersatz zu leisten. Gleichwohl sind aber zwei wichtige Ausnahmen vorgesehen. Für den Bereich des Gesundheitsschutzes ist das Einhalten einer Frist nicht erforderlich. Bei der Diskriminierung im Bereich von Arbeitsverhältnissen sieht der französische Gesetzgeber ein Spezialsystem vor, das es ermöglicht, Personalvertretungen vor Einreichung einer Gruppenklage zu beteiligen. Aus diesem Grund wird auch die Wartefrist von vier auf sechs Monate verlängert. Des Weiteren können nur bestimmte Klagebegehren mittels der Gruppenklage verfolgt werden. Erstens ist eine Gruppenklage nicht für alle Schadensarten gleichermaßen eröffnet. So ist beispielsweise im Bereich des Gesundheitsschutzes eine Gruppenklage nur für Körperschäden, nicht aber für Vermögensschäden denkbar. Die Entschädigung für Diskriminierungen in Arbeitsverhältnissen kann nur dann mit einer Gruppenklage eingeklagt werden, wenn es um Schäden geht, die nach einer an den Arbeitgeber gerichteten Aufforderung entstanden sind, die Diskriminierungen abzustellen. Zweitens ist auch der zeitliche Anwendungsbereich der Gruppenklagen eingeschränkt. Die neuen Gruppenklagemöglichkeiten kommen nämlich nur in Betracht, wenn sie Rechtsverletzungen betreffen, die nach Inkrafttreten der neuen Bestimmungen eingetreten sind. Dies gilt jedoch nicht im Bereich von Diskriminierungen und in Umweltschutzfällen. Drittens muss es sich um einen einheitlichen Schaden handeln. Der Rechtsverletzung bzw. dem Schaden muss eine einheitliche Tatsachenbasis zugrunde liegen. So müssen etwa einer Gruppenklage wegen Diskriminierung alle Fälle den gleiche Diskriminierungsgrund zugrunde legen. Insgesamt beschränkt also der französische Gesetzgeber den persönlichen und sachlichen Anwendungsbereich der neuen Gruppenklagemöglichkeiten sehr entscheidend. 26 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) 3. „Rechtsfolgen“ der actions de groupe Erhebt eine klageberechtigte Vereinigung die Gruppenklage, schließt sich ein zweigliedriges Verfahren an. Zunächst wird der Haftungsgrund geklärt. Anschließend wird die Höhe der Entschädigung ermittelt. Im ersten Schritt erlässt das zuständige Gericht (grundsätzlich ist für alle Fälle der Gruppenklagen das tribunal de grande instance, das Pendant des Landgerichts, zuständig)40 ein Grundurteil. Nach den neuen Rechtsvorschriften umfasst das Grundurteil folgende Fragen: erstens die Frage der Haftung des Beklagten, zweitens die Feststellung der Anspruchsberechtigten (in seinem Urteil hat das Gericht die Kriterien der Zuordnung zu der relevanten Gruppe klarzustellen) und drittens die Bezeichnung der Schadensbzw. der Unterlassungspositionen. Im Grundurteil wird nun eine Frist41 gesetzt, innerhalb der sich weitere betroffene Personen der Gruppenklage anschließen können. Zum Erhalt des Schadensersatzes ist es also nicht notwendig, von Anfang an Teil der action de groupe zu sein. Es genügt, wenn sich der Geschädigte innerhalb der festgelegten Frist beteiligt. Den zweiten Verfahrensschritt bildet das Entschädigungsverfahren. Für diesen zweiten Verfahrensschritt sieht der französische Gesetzgeber zwei voneinander abzugrenzende Verfahrensarten vor. Der Richter hat sich für eine der zwei zur Verfügung stehenden Verfahrensarten zu entscheiden. Bei der ersten Verfahrensart handelt es sich um das Individualverfahren (procédure individuelle). Die zweite Verfahrensart ist das kollektive Entschädigungsverfahren (procédure collective). Das Individualverfahren besteht aus zwei Schritten. In einem ersten Schritt tritt eine Einzelperson der Gruppenklage bei und erteilt auf diese Weise dem Kläger Vollmacht, seine Interessen im Rahmen des Gruppenklageverfahrens zu vertreten. Vom Geschädigten wird nun der gesamte Entschädigungsbetrag auf ein staatliches Konto überwiesen, das wiederum nur mit der Entschädigung der einzelnen Gruppenkläger belastet werden darf. Dieser Betrag wird nun auf die Gruppenkläger verteilt. Anders läuft das kollektive Entschädigungsverfahren ab, das nur für Gruppenklagen betreffend Diskriminierungen außerhalb von Arbeitsverhältnissen und in Umweltschutzangelegenheiten in Betracht kommt. Der Unterschied zwischen dem Individualverfahren und dem kollektiven Entschädigungsverfahren liegt darin, 40. Insbesondere gilt diese Zuständigkeit des tribunal de grande instance auch für alle arbeitsrechtlichen Diskriminierungsfälle. 41. Die zu bestimmende Frist ist teilweise in den Spezialregelungen zu den einzelnen Streitgegenständen der Gruppenklagen geregelt. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 27 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL dass dem Urteil über die Haftungsbegründung (Grundurteil) bei Wahl des kollektiven Entschädigungsverfahrens zwingend eine Verhandlung zwischen Kläger und Beklagtem vorangehen muss. In dieser Verhandlungsphase versuchen Kläger- und Beklagtenpartei, eine Einigung herbeizuführen. Der Vergleichsvertrag, der von allen an der Gruppenklage beteiligten Personen akzeptiert werden muss, wird dann vom Richter für vollstreckbar erklärt (homologation). Kommt es in diesem Einigungsverfahren nicht zu einem Vergleichsabschluss, legt der Richter die individuellen Entschädigungen wie im Individualentschädigungsverfahren fest. 4. Bewertung Mit der Reform erhält die Gruppenklage also eine grundsätzlich weite Definition, die tatsächliche Anwendbarkeit ist aber erheblich beschränkt. Im Verfahren selbst wird eine einvernehmliche Lösung angestrebt. Der Klage muss die mise en demeure vorausgehen, um dem Beklagten die Behebung zu ermöglichen. Es wird also eine außergerichtliche Einigung ohne Beteiligung eines Richters privilegiert. Dieser Ansatz steht in einem Gleichklang mit der Grundidee der Reform zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts.42 Gleichwohl ist der gerichtliche Teil des Verfahrens ebenso vorgesehen. So sieht die Gruppenklage vor, dass sich Betroffene auch noch nach Beginn des Verfahrens der Klage anschließen können. Dieser spätere Beitritt ist eine der Besonderheiten von „optin“-Klagen wie der action de groupe. Im Gegensatz zu den im deutschen Recht bereits existierenden Kollektivklagemöglichkeiten wie der Streitgenossenschaft (§§ 59, 60 ZPO) und der Vertretung durch Verbraucherverbände (§ 79 I 2, II 2 Nr. 3 ZPO i.V.m. § 8 I Nr. 4 RDG) wird der Prozess gerade nicht mehr als eigenständige Schadensersatzklage jedes Betroffenen geführt. Mit der Aufnahme in die action de groupe ist die Betroffenheit des Einzelnen sozusagen abschließend geklärt, womit er bei Erfolg der Gruppenklage den Schadensersatzanspruch erwirbt.43 Es ist dem Gesetzgeber damit gelungen, die Zutrittsschranken für Klageberechtige zumindest in der Theorie niedrig zu halten. In der Praxis stellt sich, neben den prozessualen Beschränkungen, auch die Frage nach der Finanzierung der action de groupe. Die Regeln über die Prozesskostenhilfe lassen auch die Unterstützung von eingetragenen Vereinen als juristischen Personen zu. Der Gesetzgeber hätte hier eine klarere Regelung treffen können, die speziell auch die action de groupe einschließt, die allgemeinen Regeln sind wohl aber ausreichend. 42. Sereno, Les actions de groupe issues de la loi J21 : outils de modernisation de la justice (sociale) ?, Gaz. Pal., n° 20, S. 86. 43. Weiterführend sh. Keßler, Verbraucherschutz reloaded – Auf dem Weg zu einer deutschen Kollektivklage?, ZRP 2016, S. 2. 28 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Anders stellt sich die Situation bezüglich der Kostenauferlegung dar, sollte die Klägerseite im Prozess unterliegen. Die Prozesskostenhilfe dient in erster Linie dazu, die klägereigenen Kosten zu übernehmen. Die Kosten der Gegenseite sind grundsätzlich vom Kläger zu tragen. Hier wäre eine Anpassung an die Besonderheiten der Gruppenklage notwendig. So wäre es denkbar, die Kosten der action de groupe im Fall des Unterliegens stets dem Staat aufzuerlegen. Die Beteiligten hätten so die Absicherung, keinen Kosten ausgesetzt zu sein.44 Die allgemeinen Regeln des Gruppenklageverfahrens sind also recht eng gefasst, aber gleichzeitig umfassend. In der Praxis bestehen noch Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere in finanzieller Hinsicht. Inwieweit hier eine Anpassung stattfinden kann, bleibt abzuwarten.45 III. Änderungen des Verfahrens vor der Cour de Cassation Das Verfahren vor dem französischen Kassationshof ist ebenfalls Gegenstand der Reform.46 Dabei soll neben einer grundsätzlichen Vereinfachung auch die Zahl der bestandskräftigen Entscheidungen der Untergerichte erhöht werde. Dadurch soll die Zahl der Revisionen (pourvois en Cassation) zurückgehen. Neben solchen „gerichtsökonomischen“ Neuerungen wurde mit der Reform auch die Möglichkeit zur gerichtlichen Überprüfung von Urteilen geschaffen, wenn der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte entsprechend entschieden hat. 1. Vorlagefragen (demandes d’avis) Das französische Zivilprozessrecht gibt mit sog. „Vorlagefragen“ (demandes d’avis) den unteren Gerichten die Möglichkeit, bei „Fragen von ernsthafter Schwierigkeit“, die von Bedeutung für eine Vielzahl von Fällen sind, eine Stellungnahme des Kassationshofs zu verlangen.47 Der Richter muss dabei die beteiligten Parteien informieren; die Vorlage unterbricht das Hauptverfahren bis zur Stellungnahme. Der Instanzrichter ist im Übrigen nicht verpflichtet, der Ansicht der Cour de Cassation zu folgen.48 Bislang wurden diese Fragen von einer besonderen Gerichtsbesetzung bestehend aus dem Gerichtspräsidenten, dem Vorsitzenden sowie zwei weiteren Richtern der jeweils betroffenen Kammer der Cour de Cassation entschieden. 44. Azar-Baud, (In)action de groupe, Gaz. Pal., n° 42, S. 52. 45. Bezüglich der 2014 geschaffenen Gruppenklage im Verbraucherschutzrecht ist dies dem Parlament in einem ersten Bericht angezeigt worden. Daraus folgend ist eine Anpassung zu erwarten. Sh. Commission des affaires économiques, Rapport d’information sur la mise en application de la loi n° 2014-344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation, 19.10.2016. 46. Vgl. Art. 38 bis Art. 43 des Gesetzes n° 2016-1547 vom 18.11.2016. 47. Sh. Art. L 441-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire. 48. Guinchard/Montagnier, Institutions juridictionnelles, 11e édition, 2011, Rn. 680. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 29 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL Mit der Reform soll auch dieses Verfahren vereinfacht werden. Für die Entscheidung ist nun allein die Kammer (ohne Beteiligung des Gerichtspräsidenten) zuständig, die bei einer Revision angerufen werden würde. Sofern die Vorlagefrage die Zuständigkeit von zwei oder mehreren Kammern berührt, wird ein gemischter Ausschuss gebildet. Ist eine Grundsatzfrage betroffen, wird im gerichtlichen Plenum entschieden. Der gemischte Ausschuss und das Plenum entscheiden unter Vorsitz des Gerichtspräsidenten. Dieser entscheidet auch über die Einberufung des Ausschusses bzw. Plenums. Durch die Reform soll das Verfahren nicht nur vereinfacht werden; der Gesetzgeber verspricht sich auch einen Rückgang der Revisionen (pourvois en Cassation), da die Vorlagefragen in gleicher Besetzung wie eine eventuelle Revision entschieden werden. Gleichzeitig ist auch ein Anstieg der Vorlagefragen zu erwarten: Zwar ist der Instanzrichter auch weiterhin nicht an die Stellungnahme gebunden; da eine gleichlautende Entscheidung auch in der Revision zu erwarten ist, erhalten die avis aber einen urteilsähnlichen Charakter.49 Bislang ist die Anzahl an Vorlagefragen (durchschnittlich etwa zehn Entscheidungen pro Jahr) verschwindend gering.50 Die Vorlagefragen müssen aber binnen zwei Monaten entschieden werden und betreffen eine durch den Instanzrichter klar definierte Frage. Trotz des zu erwartenden Anstiegs der demandes d’avis erhofft sich der Gesetzgeber so eine Vereinfachung und Entlastung der Prozessführung. 2. Die Cour de Cassation als Hauptsacherichter (juge du fond) Die Kompetenz der Cour de Cassation, bei einer stattgegebenen Revision („cassation“) abschließend in der Hauptsache („au fond“) – ohne Rückverweisung an die unteren Gerichte – zu urteilen, wird ebenfalls erweitert. Bislang war die Entscheidung ohne Rückverweisung nur in zwei Fällen möglich: Sofern in der Revision die Unzulässigkeit der Klage oder die Unzuständigkeit des angerufenen Gerichts festgestellt wurde oder aber wenn die Tatsachenbeweise durch die Instanzgerichte in der Weise festgestellt worden waren, dass nur noch die korrekte Anwendung der verwendeten Rechtsnorm in Frage stand. Im Zivilrecht (nicht jedoch im Strafrecht) soll die Cour de Cassation gemäß dem neuen Art. 411-3 Code de l’organisation judiciaire (französisches Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) nunmehr die Hauptsacheentscheidung treffen können, wenn dies „im Interesse einer geordneten Rechtspflege liegt“ („Elle peut aussi, en matière civile, statuer au fond lorsque l‘intérêt d‘une bonne administration de la justice le justifie“). Hinsichtlich der genauen Ausgestaltung ist aber eine weitere Präzisierung, durch 49. Piwnica, Commentaire des dispositions de la loi J21 relatives à la Cour de cassation, Gaz. Pal. n° 5, S. 77. 50. Cour de Cassation, Avis classés par date (1992-2017), Stand: 29.6.2017. 30 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Verordnung (Décret), notwendig.51 So sehen einige Autoren die Möglichkeit, der Cour de Cassation könnten künftig weitreichende Kompetenzen über den üblichen Rahmen eines Revisionsverfahrens hinaus zugesprochen werden, beispielsweise auch neue Tatsachenbeweise zuzulassen oder sogar ein Beweiserhebungsverfahren durchzuführen. In ähnlicher Weise wurden auch bereits bestehende Praktiken zur Einschaltung von Sachverständigen und Zeugen im Revisionsverfahren kodifiziert.52 Denkbar wäre auch eine weniger weitreichende Änderung, bei der sich die Entscheidung der Cour de Cassation ausschließlich auf die bereits in den unteren Instanzen erhobenen Beweise und Rechtsmittel stützen darf. Der Grundsatz, dass die Cour de Cassation nur hinsichtlich der Rechts-, nicht aber der Tatsachenlage entscheidet, soll dennoch weiterhin bestehen: Art. 411-2 des Code de l‘organisation judiciaire wurde nicht angetastet. Der neue Art. 411-3 stellt also eine weitere Ausnahme und nicht die neue Regel dar. Die Rechtsnatur der Kassationsbeschwerde sowie der gerichtlichen Kontrolle sollen nicht berührt werden. Erst nachdem eine Entscheidung hinsichtlich der Rechtslage vorliegt, kann die Cour de Cassation von ihrer neuen Letztentscheidungskompetenz Gebrauch machen.53 3. Überprüfung von Urteilen im Bereich des Zivilrechts nach Entscheidung des EGMR Neben diesen Elementen, die vorrangig der Vereinfachung des Verfahrens und der Entlastung der Gerichte dienen, wird mit der Reform auch die Möglichkeit eröffnet, eine im Grunde endgültige Entscheidung in einer Zivilsache dem Kassationshof zur Überprüfung vorzulegen. Dazu muss eine Entscheidung des EGMR vorliegen, der zufolge das Urteil unter Verletzung der Grundrechte aus der EMRK zustande gekommen ist. Bislang existierte 51. Eine erste Präzisierung hinsichtlich der Parteibeteiligung im Verfahren der „cassation sans renvoi“ hat mit dem „Décret n° 2017-396 du 24 mars 2017 portant diverses dispositions relatives à la Cour de cassation“ stattgefunden: Die Parteien können durch den Vorsitzenden aufgefordert werden, Beweismittel im Hinblick auf ein Endurteil vorzulegen. 52. Durch die Reform wird die Rolle des Staatsanwalts (procureur général) näher definiert. Gemäß Art. L. 432-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire soll er nunmehr seine Auffassung hinsichtlich rechtlicher Gegebenheiten sowie hinsichtlich des öffentlichen Wohls abgeben. Dies stellt keine tatsächliche Neuerung dar, sondern ist vielmehr die gesetzliche Verankerung der bereits bestehenden Praxis. Daneben wurde die Möglichkeit des Kassationshofs kodifiziert, sachverständige Dritte zur Aufklärung des Sachverhaltes hinzuziehen. Dies ist ebenfalls in der Vergangenheit bereits geschehen. Der neue Art. L. 431-3-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire übernimmt den fast gleichlautenden Art. R. 625-3 des Code de justice administrative, der in dieser Form bereits seit 2010 eine entsprechende Vorschrift für die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit bis hin zum Conseil d’Etat („Staatsrat“), dem obersten Verwaltungsgericht Frankreichs, vorsah. 53. Piwnica, Commentaire des dispositions de la loi J21 relatives à la Cour de cassation, Gaz. Pal. n° 5, S. 77. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 31 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL diese Möglichkeit nur im Strafrecht. Die Überprüfungsmöglichkeit im Zivilrecht ist an das Verfahren im Strafrecht angelehnt. Sie ist gemäß Art. L. 452-1 des Code de l’organisation judiciaire jedoch auf personenstandsrechtliche Entscheidungen beschränkt, in denen der Einzelne aufgrund der Verletzung in seinen persönlichen Rechten derart betroffen ist, dass die durch den EGMR angeordnete Entschädigungszahlung nicht zur Wiederherstellung seines betroffenen Rechts ausreicht. Dies ist beispielsweise der Fall, wenn der Richter die Anerkennung der Abstammung (lien de filiation) verweigert hat.54 Die Überprüfung wird durch eine eigene Kammer der Cour de Cassation vorgenommen. Diese besteht aus 13 Richtern der verschiedenen Kammern, darunter dem dienstältesten Kammervorsitzenden (doyen). Ausgeschlossen sind diejenigen Richter, die an der Ursprungsentscheidung mitgewirkt haben. C. EINRICHTUNG EINER EINHEITLICHEN (RECHTSANTRAGSSTELLE) BEI DEN GERICHTEN ANL AUFSTELLE In seinem Art. 2 Abs. 1 sieht das Gesetz n° 2016-1547 vom 18.11.2016 die Einrichtung einer einheitlichen Anlaufstelle bei den tribunaux d’instance vor. Schon 1997 war die Einrichtung einer solchen Stelle in einem Bericht gefordert worden.55 So soll der Zugang zum Gericht vereinfacht und ein besseres Verständnis des Justizsystems erreicht werden.56 Durch Art. 2 des Gesetzesprojekts zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts wird das französische Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Code de l’organisation judiciaire) um einen Art. L. 123-3 ergänzt. Nach dieser Vorschrift ist die Einrichtung einer einheitlichen Anlaufstelle, eines sog. service d’accueil unique du justiciable vorgesehen. Der Aufgabenbereich dieser Anlauf- und Informationsstelle, die grob mit den deutschen Rechtsantragsstellen57 verglichen werden kann, erstreckt sich ausdrücklich über den örtlichen Bereich des Gerichts, an dem sie ihren Sitz hat, hinaus. Aufgabe der Anlaufund Informationsstelle des service d’accueil unique du justiciable ist es, alle Personen zu den sie betreffenden Verfahren zu informieren und Anträge entgegen zu nehmen. Die Besonderheit liegt dabei darin, dass die Anlaufstellen alle Gerichtsbarkeiten innerhalb eines bestimmten Gerichtsbezirks betreuen. So können beispielsweise bei der Antrags- und Informationsstelle des tribunal d’instance auch Anträge zu Verfahren bei einem Arbeitsgericht im gleichen Gerichtsbezirk eingereicht werden. 54. Raoul-Cormeil, La procédure de réexamen en matière civile après une décision de la CEDH, EDFP n° 1, 01.01.2017, S. 6. 55. Casorla, Réflexions sur l’amélioration de l’accès à la justice par la mise en place d’un guichet unique de greffe et la simplification de juridictions de première instance : rapport à M. le garde des sceaux, Ministre de la justice, Mai 1997. 56. Raschel, Loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 : quelle modernisation du service public de la justice ?, Gaz. Pal., n° 5, S. 68. 57. Wittschier, in: Musielak/Voit (Hrsg.), ZPO, 14. Aufl. 2017, ZPO § 496 Rn. 1-3. 32 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) D. STÄRKUNG DER RICHTERLICHEN UNABHÄNGIGKEIT Das Vertrauen der Bürger in die Justiz sollte durch die Reform J21 gestärkt werden. Mit dem Ziel der Korruptionsbekämpfung hat der Gesetzgeber die Justizbeamten verpflichtet, Nebentätigkeiten und Privatvermögen gegenüber dem Arbeitgeber offenzulegen. Daneben sollten durch weitere statusrechtliche Änderungen die Arbeitsethik und juristische Kontinuität betont werden. I. Transparenz Im Zuge der Justizreform hat der Gesetzgeber mit der Loi Organique (Grundlagengesetz) n° 2016-1090 vom 8. August 201658 weitreichende Verpflichtungen der höheren Justizbeamten geschaffen, um mehr Transparenz zu gewährleisten und Interessenkonflikte zu vermeiden. Die Richter und Staatsanwälte müssen binnen zwei Monaten nach ihrer Ernennung eine Interessenserklärung abliefern. Sie enthält Informationen zu aktuell ausgeübten beruflichen (Neben-)Tätigkeiten, Unternehmensbeteiligungen und Teilhabe in Direktionsgremien von öffentlich- oder privatrechtlichen Körperschaften. Auch diesbezügliche Aktivitäten des Lebenspartners sind in die Erklärung aufzunehmen. Die Erklärung muss „vollständig, korrekt und wahrheitsgemäß“ sein, wobei politische, religiöse oder gewerkschaftliche Aktivitäten zu verschweigen sind. Auf Grundlage dieser Erklärung kann der jeweilige Gerichtspräsident (bzw. der Oberstaatsanwalt) die berufsethische Kommission bezüglich eventueller Interessenkonflikte anrufen. In jedem Fall folgt eine Unterredung des betroffenen Richters mit der zuständigen Stelle, um eine Ausräumung der Interessenkonflikte zu besprechen und vorzubereiten. Weiterhin hatte der Gesetzgeber ursprünglich vorgesehen, alle Gerichtspräsidenten einschließlich der Kammervorsitzenden der Cour de Cassation sowie die Oberstaatsanwälte zu einer Vermögenserklärung zu verpflichten. Auch substantielle Vermögensänderungen sollten angezeigt werden. Der Verfassungsrat hat die entsprechenden Passagen des Gesetzes jedoch aufgrund der Ungleichbehandlung im Vergleich zu den übrigen Richtern und Staatsanwälten als verfassungswidrig eingestuft.59 Die Pflicht wurde daher auf die Angehörigen des obersten Justizrats (Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, CSM) beschränkt. Aufgrund des besonderen Status der Mitglieder des CSM ist diese Einschränkung verfassungskonform und verstößt nicht gegen den Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz. Tatsächlich hätte der Gesetzgeber auch die Möglichkeit gehabt, die Verpflichtung nicht zu beschränken, sondern auf sämtliche 58. Loi organique n° 2016-1090 du 8 août 2016 relative aux garanties statutaires, aux obligations déontologiques et au recrutement des magistrats ainsi qu’au Conseil supérieur de la magistrature. 59. C. Const., Décision n° 2016-732 DC, 28. Juli 2016, Rn. 57. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 33 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL französische Richter und Staatsanwälte auszuweiten: Der Verfassungsrat hat die Offenlegungspflicht im Grundsatz nämlich als der Korruptionsbekämpfung dienend und somit im Interesse der Allgemeinheit stehend betrachtet. Wohl auch aus Gründen der Praktikabilität – aufgrund der hohen Anzahl an betroffenen Beamten, und der Auslastung der berufsethischen Kommission durch die Interessenerklärung – hat der Gesetzgeber sich jedoch gegen die Ausweitung auf alle Beamten entschieden.60 II. Statusrechtliche Änderungen Schließlich umfasst die Reform einige statusrechtliche Änderungen für die Haftrichter (juge des libertés et de la détention) und besiegelt das Ende der juges de proximité. 1. Schaffung eines eigenen Status für Haftrichter In Bezug auf die Stellung der Haftrichter (juge des libertés et de la détention, JLD) trägt das Gesetz zur „Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts“ einer bereits begonnenen funktionellen Umstrukturierung Rechnung. Die Haftrichter erhalten ihren eigenen Status und werden so zu „Spezialrichtern“, ähnlich wie bereits die Ermittlungsrichter, was nicht nur neue Fortbildungsmöglichkeiten, sondern auch eine Erhöhung der Beamtenzulagen mit sich bringt. So soll ihrem stetig wachsenden Aufgabenbereich Rechnung getragen werden. Die „JLD“ waren ursprünglich dazu berufen, über die Anordnung von Untersuchungshaft zu entscheiden, heute kontrollieren sie in größerem Umfang die Verhältnismäßigkeit grundrechtsbeschränkender Maßnahmen.61 2. Schaffung einer berufsethischen Kommission Weiterhin wird eine berufsethische Kommission (collège de déontologie) für die Richter der ordentlichen Gerichtsbarkeit geschaffen. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, etwaige Interessenskonflikte der Richter zu überwachen und Stellungnahmen zu berufsethischen Anliegen zu geben. Dies soll ebenfalls zu einer größeren Unabhängigkeit der Richter beitragen. 60. Letteron, Déclaration de patrimoine : ça n’arrive qu’aux autres, Blog: Liberté, Libertés chéries, 7.8.2016, (Stand: 27.4.2017). 61. Die JLD entscheiden heute über die Verlängerung von Polizeigewahrsam (garde à vue), über Durchsuchungen und Abhöraktionen. Zum „juge des libertés“ sh. Urvoas, Je découvre presque chaque jour un peu plus l’ampleur des difficultés, Gaz. Pal. n° 33, 27.9.2016. 34 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) 3. Abschaffung der Laiengerichte (juridiction de proximité) Mit der Loi Organique n° 2016-1090 vom 8. August 2016 ist auch die Abschaffung der Laiengerichte (juges de proximité) zum 1. Juli 2017 besiegelt worden. Diese Gerichte waren im Jahr 2002 zur Entlastung der Amtsgerichte und mit dem Zweck, eine höhere Bürgernähe der Gerichte zu erreichen, geschaffen worden. Es handelte sich um Laienrichter, die in Zivilsachen bis zu einem Streitwert von 4.000 € sowie in Strafsachen für kleine Delikte als Einzelrichter entschieden. Kritisiert wurde, nach anfänglichen Bedenken, eine „Zusammenhanglosigkeit“ der Rechtsprechung der Laienrichter. Insbesondere Richterverbände kritisierten eine „Verkomplizierung“ der Justiz und forderten, dass die Rechtsprechung wieder ausschließlich in die Hände von Richtern gelegt werden solle, die sich vollständig einer solchen Karriere verschrieben hätten. Die Abschaffung der Laiengerichte war daher bereits seit mehreren Jahren vorgesehen, wurde jedoch aufgrund der Überlastung der Amtsgerichte (tribunaux d’instance) noch nicht verwirklicht.62 Mit der großen Justizreform wurde dies nun abgeschlossen. Die Amtsgerichte wurden zum Stichtag 1. Juli 2017 in ihre Struktur aus dem Jahr 2002 zurückversetzt. Die zu diesem Zeitpunkt anhängigen Verfahren wurden von den juridictions de proximité an die Amtsgerichte übergeben. Gleichzeitig haben die bisherigen juges de proximité die Möglichkeit, in die Funktion eines vorübergehend tätigen Richters (sog. magistrats à titre temporaire, kurz MTT) überzugehen. Diese MTT wurden bereits im Jahr 1995 geschaffen und werden etwa als Beisitzer den Gerichten zugeordnet. Bislang ist die Zahl der MTT jedoch sehr gering. Durch die Fusion mit den juges de proximité soll ihre Zahl nun steigen.63 Kritiker der aktuellen Justizreform befürchten nun eine Überlastung der Gerichte aufgrund der vielen zusätzlichen Verfahren. Zudem bestünden nicht abschließend geklärte Fragen bezüglich des Verbleibs der amtierenden Laienrichter sowie der Rolle von Laien in der französischen Gerichtsbarkeit im Allgemeinen. Dennoch erhoffen sich die Befürworter der Reform eine Vereinfachung und bessere Verständlichkeit der Zivilgerichtsbarkeit.64 E. GESAMTBEWERTUNG Der ehemalige französische Justizminister, Jean-Jacques Urvoas, hatte bei Vorstellung der vorliegend beschriebenen Reform als Zielsetzung vorangestellt: „Die Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts muss eine für den Menschen gemachte Justiz sein. Dies 62. Bléry, 1er juillet 2017 : l’adieu aux juges de proximité (?), Gaz. Pal., 30.8.2016, n° 29, S. 40. 63. Zum Ende der juridiction de proximité: Zwickel, Das Ende der französischen juridictions und juges de proximité am 1. Juli 2017, RohR 2017, S. 58. 64. Marque, La réforme des juges de proximité, D. Actualité, 16.9.2016. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 35 ANNA KAMPMANN & DR. MARTIN ZWICKEL ist die ganze Zielsetzung dieses Gesetzes: Verbesserung der alltäglichen Justiz und der juristischen Dienstleistung für die Bürger.65 Das Gesetz zur Justiz des 21. Jahrhunderts war die letzte große Reform in der Amtszeit von François Hollande. In Umfragen hatten große Teile der französischen Bevölkerung ihre Unzufriedenheit hinsichtlich Effizienz und Unübersichtlichkeit des Justizsystems zum Ausdruck gebracht.66 Unter dem Vorzeichen der bevorstehenden Wahlen ist die Reform mittels eines beschleunigten Verfahrens noch auf den Weg gebracht worden. Bis Januar 2018 werden die Maßnahmen mittels mehrerer Dekrete noch umgesetzt. An vorderster Stelle der Reform steht der Wille, die Gerichte zu entlasten. Streitigkeiten sollen, wenn möglich, mit Hilfe eines conciliateur oder médiateur durch die Parteien selbst gelöst werden. Die Parteien sollen so schneller zu einem beidseitig zufriedenstellenden Ergebnis gelangen. Dabei hat sich der Gesetzgeber nicht nur auf den Zivilprozess beschränkt. Auch verwaltungsrechtliche Streitigkeiten sollen künftig durch Mediation gelöst werden. Gleichzeitig wird ein geringerer Zulauf zu Gericht erwartet. Fälle, die einen Richterspruch erfordern, sollen so schneller bearbeitet werden. Auch der Zugang zum Gericht wird erleichtert. Die Gerichte bleiben zentraler Ansprechpartner bei der Vermittlung von Mediatoren und Schlichtern. Mithilfe der zentralen Rechtsantragsstelle soll zudem auch für Kläger ohne anwaltliche Beratung die Stellung von Klageanträgen und der Zugang zu gesicherten Informationen erleichtert werden. Nicht alle Fragen sind gelöst: Die außergerichtliche, einvernehmliche Scheidung vor den Notaren hat in Frankreich eine rege Debatte angestoßen und ist verschiedentlich kritisiert worden. So wird insbesondere ein unzureichender Schutz der Kinder des scheidungswilligen Paares befürchtet. Auch wird befürchtet, in Situationen mit einem starken Gefälle (etwa hinsichtlich Finanzen oder Bildung) zwischen den Partnern könnten ohne den Einfluss eines Richters einer der Parteien nachteilige Bedingungen auferlegt werden. Die Verantwortung der Anwälte ist hier noch größer als im bisherigen Verfahren. Auch ansonsten lässt sich feststellen, dass durch die Auslagerung ehemals gerichtlicher Aufgaben die Verantwortlichkeit außergerichtlicher (auch nichtstaatlicher) Akteure beträchtlich steigt. Die Anwalts- und Notarverbände stehen dieser Entwicklung zwiespältig gegenüber. Ob die Auslagerung in die nichtstaatliche Sphäre den gewünschten Erfolg bringt, wird die Zukunft zeigen. 65. Urvoas, Dossier de présentation de la loi J21, Ministère de la justice: „La justice du 21e siècle doit être une justice faite pour l’homme. C’est toute l’ambition de cette loi: améliorer la justice du quotidien, le service public rendu au justiciable“. 66. Dossier de présentation de la loi J21, Ministère de la justice, S. 2. 36 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER GROßEN JUSTIZREFORM IN FRANKREICH (JUSTICE DU 21ÈME SIÈCLE) Die juridictions de proximité wurden zum 1. Juli 2017 abgeschafft. Ihre Einsetzung im Jahr 2002 sollte nicht nur zur Entlastung der Richter, sondern auch zur Schaffung einer bürgernahen Justiz beitragen. Das Wegfallen dieser Instanz soll kompensiert werden durch eine Verstärkung der „vorübergehend tätigen Richter“. Inwieweit dadurch eine drohende Überlastung der Amtsgerichte vermieden werden kann, bleibt abzuwarten. Schlussendlich enthält die Reform weitreichende Neuerungen hinsichtlich Transparenz und Überprüfung der „Arbeitsethik“ von Richtern. Diese Neuerungen, wiewohl sie nicht unmittelbar im Zusammenhang mit dem primären Ziel der Effizienzsteigerung stehen, sollen das Vertrauen der Bürger in die richterliche Unabhängigkeit stärken. Unter dem Schlagwort der „Moralisierung des öffentlichen Lebens“ (moralisation de la vie publique) handelt es sich um eine hochpolitische Angelegenheit, die bei weitem nicht nur die Richter betrifft und die durch die verschiedenen Skandale um Scheinbeschäftigungen Familien- und Parteiangehöriger im Wahlkampf besondere Brisanz erlangt hat. Der neue französische Präsident Emmanuel Macron hat auch für diesen Bereich der Justiz weitreichende Reformen angekündigt.67 Im juristischen Bereich ist etwa denkbar, dass Transparenzpflichten, wie vom Conseil Constitutionnel bereits abgesegnet, auf alle amtierenden Richter und Staatsanwälte ausgeweitet werden. Daneben soll weiter an einer Verfahrensbeschleunigung und Digitalisierung des Gerichtsprozesses gearbeitet werden. Inwieweit diese Pläne umgesetzt werden können, wird sich im Laufe der nächsten Monate und Jahre zeigen. Die bereits erfolgten und möglicherweise noch anstehenden Reformen können jedenfalls, nach Praxiserprobung, durchaus auch für den deutschen und EU-weiten Rechtsraum als Inspiration dienen. Die Entwicklung im Frankreich in den kommenden Monaten und Jahren darf mit Interesse verfolgt werden. 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Auflage, München 2017 Pellerin, Jacques, Commentaire de l’article 11 de la loi Justice du XXIe siècle : les nouvelles dispositions sur l’arbitrage, Gazette du Palais n° 05, 31.1.2017, S. 54 Piwnica, Emmanuel, Commentaire des dispositions de la loi J21 relatives à la Cour de cassation, Gazette du Palais n° 5, S. 77 Raoul-Cormeil, Gilles, La procédure de réexamen en matière civile après une décision de la CEDH, L’essentiel, Droit de la famille et des personnes, n° 1, 01 01.01.2017, S.6 Raschel, Loïs, Loi n° 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016: quelle modernisation du service public de la justice?, Gazette du Palais, n° 5, S. 68 Rouzet, Gilles, Libéralisation de la clause compromissoire, Defrénois, n° 24, 30.12.2016, S. 1299 Sereno, Sophie, Les actions de groupe issues de la loi J21 : outils de modernisation de la justice (sociale) ?, Gazette du Palais, n° 20, S.86 Thouret, Sylvain, Divorce - Quelles voies de recours dans le nouveau divorce par consentement mutuel ?, Droit de la famille, n° 7-8, Juillet 2016, dossier 30 Tilp, Andreas/Schiefer, Marc, VW Dieselgate – die Notwendigkeit zur Einführung einer zivilrechtlichen Sammelklage, Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht, 2017, S. 14 Urvoas, Jean-Jacques, Dossier de présentation de la loi J21, Ministère de la Justice, http:// www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/j21_dossier_de_presentation.pdf, November 2016 (Zugriff: 24.8.2017) Urvoas, Jean-Jacques, Je découvre presque chaque jour un peu plus l’ampleur des difficultés, Gazette du Palais, n° 33, 27.9.2016 Véricel, Marc, Les recours collectifs en droit francais, in: Tagungsband: Die prozessuale Modernisierung der Ziviljustiz in Deutschland und Frankreich, Hrsg. Zwickel, Martin/Cottin, Marianne/Ferrand, Frédérique, Jena 2016, S.147 Zarka, Jean-Claude, L’action de groupe en matière environnementale dans le projet de loi de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, Petites affiches, 20.07.2016, n° 144, S. 6 Zignani, Gabriel, Projet de loi J21: des changements à venir dans le contentieux des collectivités, La Gazette des Communes, 28.7.2016 Zwickel, Martin, Das Ende der französischen juridictions und juges de proximité am 1. Juli 2017, Richter ohne Robe 2017, S. 58 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 13-40, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 39 2 Comparative Study of Sources and General Content of Moral Damages in Iranian Civil Liability Law and International Human Rights Instruments Dr. Abbas Mirshekari Email:Mirshekariabbas1@yahoo.com Elm va Farhang University Amir Ahmadi Student of Law , Nooretouba University,Tehran, Iran Email:Amir.Ahmadi.law@gmail.com Abstract: In the Iranian Law, since many legal rules comply with Shiite jurisprudence, compensation is justified by “principle of no harm”. The subject of civil liability is compensation for losses caused by fault or risky activities of a person. In the present study, we have tried to explain and analyze the place for moral damages, in Iran’s rights compared to International Human Rights of Conventions as one of the most important rules in this field. The results suggest the Iranian legal system compared to International Human Rights of Conventions legal systems, despite the fact that, in various rules, moral damage is referred scatter, but no certain legal system can be considered for it. Therefore, nowadays damage, as an important topic in law, holds a special place in the legal system of the developed countries. Thus, not only restitution could be sought for any physical damage, but also claims could be made to be reimbursed for any moral damages suffered. In this paper, it is tried to show that any moral damages suffered, if the necessary conditions of certainty, legitimacy, directness and other criteria are met, claims for compensation and restitution could be made. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 41 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Keyword: Moral damage, Iranian Civil Liability Law, European Union, Compensation, International Conventions of Human Rights 1- INTRODUCTION The aim of civil liability rule is the compensation of loss. The loss and damage that due to being destructive harms another individual, which may be moral or Material/financial damage and the Material damage is reduction of personal wealth of the individual and preventing its increase and moral/spiritual damage is the damage to moral wealth and not financial thing like the damage to reputation and feelings. After in case all the conditions of civil liability are gathered, the factors of the damage should be compensated and the individual who is affected is the worthy of it. As it is relation creates between the loss bearer and damager who should be assessed for to pay that damage and drop out of the obligor from the responsibility. Matters on compensation of moral damage are one of the most controversial and topical in enforcement practice for today, especially in developing countries, such as Iran. This is because the matters of protection of the individual, his moral rights and benefits are the same priority as the protection of property rights. Compensation for such damages is not only in accordance with the holy laws of Islam, but also justice and social security are guaranteed by its complete implementation. The objective of the religious law makers from enacting laws and rules is protecting religion, wisdom, race, property and self. Protecting self includes two aspects: physical and moral. From the Islamic jurisprudence point of view, the main and widely accepted by the law experts source, which seeking compensation for any moral damages could be based on is the principle Islamic law of, ‘no harm and no person who harms is allowed in Islam’. This principle is accepted by all the Islamic Law experts. In the holy Quran, gossip, nitpicking, and unreasonable search in others’ affairs is condemned in verse 12 of the holy book of Hajarat. Moreover, in verses 19 and 20 of the holy book of Noor false accusation and vilification is strongly prohibited. The rules of waste, Tasbib, Laharaj and Banayeoghala and the rule of almaghrooryarjeoela men ghorreh ( one who has misplaced pride could seek restitution from the one who has induced this pride in him, are what could be referred to in the Islamic Jurisprudence when seeking compensation.(Khoeeni, Mahdavi, Koroghli, & Zaher Mohammadi, 2014) Establishment of Islamic Republic system in Iran provided again an opportunity where Islamic jurisprudence may retrieve its prior role in managing the society and government. Formation of a system based on guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and emphasis of Constitutional Law on the point that “all civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, etc. rules must be based on Islamic principles” (Fourth principle of Constitutional Law) make Shiite jurisprudence areas to be engaged in the 42 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... sophisticated political matters and remedy management of this newly established government.(Zakeri, 2015) Although Imam Khomeini tried in exile and after victory of Islamic revolution to explain theoretical bases of Islamic government thought and response to the challenges of this thought, it must be confessed that abundant problems of the first decade of Islamic republic system sovereignty did not permit him to elaborate all he had in the mind. Albeit Imam continually sought to provide proper mechanisms for managing the society based on Islam until the last years of his life, and his messages and statements during 1987–1989 regarding authorities of Islamic ruler, guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, and formation of Expediency Discernment Council confirm this matter. However, many researches have been done in moral damages, in the rights of Iran, but so far, no independent research has been done in the field of comparative study between rights in Iran and International Human Rights of Conventions , in the field of moral damage and this research tries to do this important work. The basic question, which is raised in this context, is that, what is the position of moral damages, in Iran and International Human Rights of Conventions and what are the manners to compensate moral damages in the rights of the two cases? Research Hypothesis can also be raised in this way, that in the legal systems of the two cases, moral damage has been accepted, with the exception that in the rights of the International Human Rights of Conventions, it is made clear, while in Iran’s rights, in different laws, the moral damage is noted. in Iranian law, no certain way is mentioned explicitly, but we can refer to different ways, such as an apology and rehabilitation. This paper tries, using analytical, descriptive methods and library studies to examine the question and hypotheses. In this regard, first the concept of damages and moral damages is explained, then, the status of moral damages is explained in Iran and International Human Rights of Conventions, and in continuing the way of compensation for moral damages are explained in two legal systems, and eventually, results have been raised. The legal research was primarily based on literature and documents extracted from studies on the legislation, books on pertinent legal sciences, besides court decisions. Such contributions were mainly originated from the study of civil rights books, besides the decisions from the Iranian Courts of Law, or jurisprudence. In the legal field, the literature review is the method of choice available for the researchers, considering that a study approaching legal issues cannot be developed without mentioning the laws which regulate the theme, or the Court decisions that applied such laws to the conflicts of interest existing in society . 2- THE CONCEPT OF LOSS (DAMAGE) About Hadith of la Zarar, Akhund Khurasani writes in investigating the cause: “Loss is what is against the interests, that is, harm to the life or property or part of the body or reputation or property”. (Khorasani, 2004) Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 43 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Loss is loss of what is owned by the human, including life, reputation or property or limbs and body parts. So if a person’s property or body parlor life is lost through the loss or partial loss or if he dies, or his reputation is harmed, whether intentional or unintentionally, then he is called as harmed. However, according to customary law, loss of profit is also loss in case it should be obtained. He explicitly stated that criterion of loss is customary law . (Katouzian, 2008) According to the Iranians lawyers definition, damage means the property which should pay by a person who causes financial loss to loser.(Jafari Langeroudi, 1999) Others have said that, if a defect, creates in property or a certain benefits loss or if indemnify insert to health, prestige and feeling of a person, in this time, damage has been occurred, reducing of person property and prevention of its excess in any situation, is his/her infliction . (Katouzian, 2008) According to other definitions, the damage is a detriment for financial or nonfinancial benefits of loss and the word of damage or loss which is a condition of civil responsibility creation have same meanings.(Jurdan, 2006) Law doesn’t define the term of damage, but mentions various examples of damage under this title or other names such as loss, detriment and tort. For example; trial compensation, delayed compensation payment the compensation resulting from lack of commitment, delay in commitment compensation (art.515-522 of civil procedure code 2000). also, legislator doesn’t present the precise definition for material and moral damage. But The Law of Civil Liability Act 1960, Code of Criminal Procedure(1999) has pointed to instances of it. What it is concerned in this research is common meaning of damage which consists incurring of damage that in non-financial damage usually uses the term of loss the damage that can be direct on un-direct. Which divided in 2 general sections: Material damage and moral damage.(Eyvazi, 2013) 3- MORAL (NON-MATERIAL) DAMAGE AND ITS DEFINITION The notion of ‘moral damages’ derives from the French concept of ‘le préjudice moral’, which refers to a wrong to an individual’s emotions, honour or reputation.(Jagusch & Sebastian, 2013) Moral damages are thus, in the civil law tradition, compensatory – they are claimed pursuant to the principle of full reparation in the French Civil Code.(“French Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber,” 15 May 2012) The right to recover moral damages as compensation is explicitly set out under several civil codes in the Middle East, including most notably the Egyptian, Libyan and Lebanese civil codes.(M; Shahidi, 2003) The assessment of moral damages, including the quantum of such damages, in France is subject to the court’s discretion. (Mehmannavazan, 2010)As the conduct of the defaulting party will not, in principle, be relevant to the court’s assessment, an award of moral damages cannot, therefore, be characterized as punitive.(Mohtashami , Holland , & El-Hosseny, 18 November 2016) English law imported this terminology from EU intellectual property law. Moral damages equate to non-pecuniary loss, which English courts can compensate, including 44 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... in contractual and commercial matters. These particularly cover physical inconvenience or discomfort, pain and suffering and loss of amenities, mental distress and social discredit.(Mohtashami et al., 18 November 2016) Notwithstanding that moral damages are considered as compensatory in both the civil and common law systems (as well as in international law), they stand distinct to monetary damages. Moreover, certain recent investment treaty awards demonstrate that moral damages are beginning to be understood as having a punitive (and therefore non-compensatory) function. We explore this development in the section ‘Noncompensatory damages awarded in investment treaty arbitration’ below.(Mohtashami et al., 18 November 2016) The book of Legal Terminology defines moral damage as follows: any reputation or dignity loss on the part of a person or his/her relatives is considered moral damage .(Jaafari Langeroodi, 1994) Doctor Shahidi defines moral damage as follows: moral damage refers to any non-financial damages inflicted upon a person’s psyche, reputation and body. Moreover, those moral damages for which a person could seek compensation are the damages inflicted upon a person’s reputation, character, body, soul, freedom, and, as the article one of the laws governing civil responsibility states, any other rights a person holds.(M; Shahidi, 1988) on the contrary to what some believe that non-financial and moral rights are the same, these two differ from one another. Moral right is a type of financial rights, but non-financial rights, according to its definition in the book of Legal Terminology, is a right which doesn’t have any economic value, such as spousal right, rights which a father and son have with respect to one another.(Parvin, 2000) Moral rights are sometimes associated with the non-financial rights and not only the financial effects of the non-financial rights bring these two together, but also with respect to some rights, they are mixed, such as the right of an author .(Katozian, 1996) Moral damage is any sort of damage upon one’s personality as well as any physical or motional Harm . In other words, Moral damages can be concisely defined as “damages on emotional and non-financial interests” . Moreover, many Islamic texts have mentioned moral damages saying that “loss” includes the destruction of anything that a person has the right to have it whether in a person, honor, mental or a part of body .(Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016) Non-material damage includes damage to non-financial benefits such as emotional and physical pain and suffering, feelings, loss of reputation and freedom and with respect to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the last part of article one civil liability Act, the source of non-material detriment is harm to the rights and freedoms of the individual character and honor, or is the result of trauma. (Katouzian, 2008) Also in this regard, detriment to credits dignity of persons or trauma and in other words, moral damage or loss to prestige and emotions of persons are non-financial rights (non-material) loss, even hurting sense of friendship, family and religious as well as the suffering that occurs as a result of an accident can be claimed today as moral damages .(Safai, 1976) Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 45 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Another author writes: “The non-financial damage includes physical injury like assault and battery, full and partial disability and losses caused by deprivation of liberty of the individual such as imprisonment, detention, deportation, unlawful deportation and finally non-material damage caused by bearing the suffering that and hurts the feelings of human spirituality” .(Fuyuzi, 1977) What all these definitions show is definition by example rather than the concept and definition of rules for finding the instances. But all these definitions are an expression of the moral damages, whether to natural or legal person. Moreover, the damage has not a financial aspect unlike financial losses that apply to property with property rights. By paying attention to principle of 177 from constitutional law and article 1 civil liability act, Moral damage is: “damage to reputation or credibility and character, body and spirit, and freedom and every legal right that is no material.” With consideration of these principles We find that moral damage is the spiritual aspect and is not material. (Eyvazi, 2013) 4- CIVIL LIABILITY CONCEPTION In law, liable means “responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated.”(H. C. Black, Garner, & McDaniel, 2014) Legal liability is following the engagement party with answering to destructive behavior applied to meet the people. The diagnostic criteria of legal responsibility, external appearance and behavior that it is causing harm to another. Responsibility means being responsible and being obliged to do what is and who is responsible if it does not fulfill the obligation of the obligation, will be held accountable.(Shahroodi, 2015) Legal liability concerns both civil law and criminal law and can arise from various areas of law, such as contracts, torts, taxes, or fines given by government agencies. The claimant is the one who seeks to establish, or prove, liability. Claimants can prove liability through a myriad of different theories, known as theories of liability. Which theories of liability are available in a given case depends on nature of the law in question. For example, in case involving a contractual dispute, one available theory of liability is breach of contract; or in the tort context, negligence, negligence per se, respondent superior, vicarious liability, strict liability, or intentional conduct are all valid theories of liability.(O’Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003) Liability means legal obligations of individuals to compensate another for harm caused by the former, whether caused by negligence of his or due to his/her act. (Jafari Langeroudi, 1999) Within Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia, liability is synonyms with the guarantee and one who is responsible for the obligation is called responsible or guarantor.(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016) The need to compensate for losses suffered by a person is called civil liability. And such liability that is mainly borne by one who inflicts harm and negligence is sometimes used in broad sense where a person is held liable for breaking a law, promise and inflicts losses. 46 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... In most cases, the civil liability is used in narrow sense in contrast with liabilities arising from breach of contract or delay in its implementation (contractual liability). (Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016) The civil liability in specific sense is when an individual is held liable for causing injury suffered by others without any contract being signed between the two. Such responsibilities that is referred to in general rules and the general principles of civil law under the heading of “extra contractual requirements” is also called extra contractual liability. Liability may be moral or legal. The idea of civil liability is connected with the existence of a wrongful conduct, which is configured whenever imprudence, malpractice or neglect are present. In order to achieve a comprehension of the civil liability concept, one should refer to the teachings by Pontes de Miranda:“Whenever we do what we do not have the right to do, it is certain that we commit an injurious act, as we reduce, against one’s will, the assets represented by one’s rights, or increase one’s liabilities, which generally means the same”.(Oliveira, Fonseca, & Koch, 2011) Indeed, in most of cases, the legal duty of responsibility arises from a contract, a fact or omission, originating from the agreement between the parties or from the rule of Law. Therefore, civil liability can be simply defined as the obligation to repair the damage caused to someone. In this sense, the understanding and conceptualization of civil liability from Maria Helena Diniz is very helpful: “Civil liability is the application of measures that oblige a person to repair moral or patrimonial damage caused to third parties, on account of one’s actions, or actions by persons one is responsible for, by something that one owns, or simply by the rule of Law”.(Oliveira et al., 2011) There is no identical definition for civil liability in legal texts. Sometimes the phrase has generally utilized as “legal liability” against “criminal responsibility” and “moral responsibility”. In this sense, all the following requirements out of contract titles are the subset of “civil liability”: confiscation, loss, indirect causation, demand, inappropriate use, managing the other properties and damages resulting from the failure to perform the obligation and the harm caused by crime. But, some individuals also consider the “civil liability” more limited and have proposed independent discussion of some requirements out of contract such as confiscation, demand, inappropriate use, and managing the other’s property. There is no definition for “civil liability” in law.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014) However, it has been proposed in article 1 of the law on civil liability Act 1339. Everyone who does the damages to the life, health, property, freedom, reputation, or commercial reputation deliberately without legal license or as a result of recklessness, or according to any other right which has been provided by law, cause the damages which result in other material or moral harm is responsible for compensation. The definition is so general that include all the requirements alternative of the contract, sub-contract, crime, and tort. But, in the paper more attention has been paid to cases where the government has done damages to natural or legal persons out of requireCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 47 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI ments of contract, regardless of the issues exist in presenting a comprehensive definition for “civil liability”.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014) According to Mabsout, civil liability has two meaning in the terminology of rights: 1. The losses caused by crime which should be asked the court through lawsuit. 2. The responsibility of other action out of criminal cases like father responsibility for his children action. Generally, when a person is assigned to compensate for the effects and results of damages done to others, he is deemed to be in charge based on civil law. The civil liability is either due to contract or non-contract which the harm is caused due to violation of general duty. In the former, if a person does the damage, he has to compensate for.(Fanazad & Shafie 2014) 5- CONDITIONS OF REALIZATION OF CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY 5-1- Harmful action The existence of harmful action is of the columns of civil responsibility and when the harmful action is assigned to the agent he should be known as the one who is responsible for compensating the damage. So wherever a person is charged with doing something because of contraction and law and convention and refuse doing that and therefore causes damages to another person, so he will be responsible for it.(Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016) 5-2-Illegal action In addition to the necessity of doing harmful action from the person, the mentioned action should be done in an illegal and illicit way; it means that the action has made damages should be considered inelegant in the case of discipline and morality so that it is possible to assume civil responsibility for the person. In spite of the fact that this principle is obvious the substance no. 1 of civil responsibility to demystification and necessitate this condition expresses that: “everybody who causes injuries to life or health or property or freedom of reputation or business fame or any other right that is known for the people by law and makes spiritual and financial damages to them is responsible for compensating the damage resulted from his action.” (Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016) 5-3- Existence of damage The first column of claims of civil responsibility whether it is conventional or compulsory, is the damage. Loss means damage to the person or his properties and one of the most important columns of civil responsibility is the loss. Generally, loss is divided into two groups of material and spiritual (virtual). By material or monetary loss it means the loss to the material benefits that are in the domain of the proper48 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... ties of the person who is having lost and includes deficit, extinct, waste or deformed owning and hurts to the human’s health. Spiritual loss is to the virtual rights of the human that has to do with the individual personality of the person such as freedom of speech or freedom of action.(Abbasloo, 2011) 5-4-Undoubtedness of the loss One of the conditions of compensable loss is that the mentioned loss is certain and definite.(M; Shahidi, 2003) It means that the loss claimant should prove definitely and certainly that he has received a loss. This is a crucial term in compensation of conventional or compulsory damage because basically, compensating the loss is impossible unless with certainty about happening of the damage. So, it is mentioned in the provision 728 of trail custom law legislated in 1318 that, “the court gives the verdict of damage if the claimant proves that he has received a loss.” Regarding the verb used here in this phrase it can be said that the loss should be happened (in the past) and on the other hand, the claimant should prove it based on this verdict and what that has happened is lawfully a definite issue .(Mehmannavazan, 2010) 5-5-Directness of the loss The second term of the compensable loss is that the loss is resulted directly and without mediators from the called person action. In the case that the loss does not have direct causal relationship with the harmful action compensation of such action is not demanding and the agent if the harmful action cannot be sentenced. There is no verdict about this term in the law of civil responsibility and civil law of Iran. But as it is mentioned in the start of provision 728 in the law of previous trial custom, the loss should be without mediator. (Sedaghat & Arefian, 2016) 5-6-The loss should not be compensated Another term of the compensable loss is that the loss is not compensated at the time of demand and request in any way. This condition in necessary because the issue of civil responsibility is to compensate the damage and if the loss and damage is compensated in any way, so the issue of civil responsibility that includes the necessity of compensation of the damage to the damaged person will be eliminated and therefore the verdict to compensate the loss will not be valuable anymore .(Barikloo, 2008) 6- JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL LIABILITY 1400-year history of relation of law and Islamic jurisprudential justifies inevitable relation of law and jurisprudence in Islamic states; however, new law doesn’t accept many discussions of jurisprudential books, many issues discussed in jurisprudence are inspired by customs and can fertilize the new law and enrich it .(Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016) Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 49 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Each theory of liability has certain conditions, or elements, that must be proven by the claimant before liability will be established. For example, the theory of negligence requires the claimant to prove that (1) the defendant had a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the defendant’s breach caused the injury; and (4) that injury resulted in recoverable damages. Theories of liability can also be created by legislation. For example, under English law, with the passing of the Theft Act 1978, it is an offense to evade a liability dishonestly. Payment of damages usually resolves the liability. A given liability may be covered by insurance. In general, however, insurance providers only cover liabilities arising from negligent torts rather than intentional wrongs or breach of contract. In commercial law, limited liability is a business form that shields its owners from certain types of liability and that amount a given owner will be liable for. A limited liability form separates the owner(s) from the business. This means that when a business is found liable in case, the owners are not themselves liable; rather, the business is. Thus, only the funds or property the owner(s) have invested into the business are subject to that liability. If, for example, a limited liability business goes bankrupt, then the owner(s) will not lose unrelated assets such as a personal residence (assuming they do not give personal guarantees). This is the standard model for larger businesses, in which a shareholder will only lose the amount invested (in the form of stock value decreasing). There is an exception to this rule that allows a claimant to go after the owners of a limited liability business where the owners have engaged in conduct that justifies the claimant’s recovery from the owners. This is known as “piercing the veil.” Manufacturer’s liability (product liability), a legal concept in most countries, reflects the fact that producers have a responsibility not to sell a defective product. Economists use the term “legal liability” to describe the legal-bound obligation to pay debts. 6-1- The rule of causality This is a legislative rule of Islamic jurisprudence, and is unquestionable, stating that everybody who causes loss is liable even if he doesn’t know it is harmful and shall compensate for it, and civil liability is borne by the cause, for example one who constructs foundation of a several-story building and damages the neighboring house is liable and shall pay damages even if such damage is causes negligently. Causality is not subject to abetting while rule of loss is subject to it, causality has conditions and grounds, it has four grounds in Islamic jurisprudence including reasoning, consensus, Qur’an and hadith . (Jafari Langeroudi, 1999) Holy Quran verses have numerous references to the rule of causality and responsibility such as Sura An’am (verses 164 and 104) and Surah Saba (verses 24 and 41) and Az-Zumar (verse 9) Ma’idan (verse 104) and Israel (16, 106 and 77) and (verses 51, 52, 53), referring to liability and liability of the cause, but the Hadiths also have the numerous references to this, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 50 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... Conditions of causality in jurisprudence: In jurisprudence, terms of causality are the same as stipulated in the Civil Code and are summarized as follows: 1. Emergence of loss from positive or negative action of the cause 2. Capacity of the cause 3. Loss must be caused by fault of the cause (the relationship between loss and action) 4. The cause must not have mens rea. 5. Cause must not be perpetration in creating the loss. The fifth term of causality is non-perpetration because if the cause perpetrates the harm then the cause doesn’t match causality but matches the rule of loss, which is the case in which positive act of a person causes loss to another directly, for example, a driver hits his car to a shop recklessly and breaks the window of the shop, while in causality, positive or negative act causes loss to another with mediation. The act of the cause may be positive or negative: positive act is for example when someone put in the passage melon skin and passersby who carries his china and crystal with slides over it and breaks his china and crystal. The cause of negative act is for example when the guardian withholds from leasing property of his ward and withholds from the trading with the extra money of the minor. (Jafari Langeroudi, 1999) 6-2- Negligence Known lawyers so far have offered various definitions of negligence; some have considered it as a violation of previous commitments. Infringement of cautious behavior or usual behavior, failing an assignment, violation of behavior whose observance is required for protection of others, violation of reasonable behavior are among famous definition. In all cases brought based on negligence, the burden of proof is on plaintiff. (Sharifi & Sherafatpeyma, 2016) 6-3- The causal relationship and negligence Iranian Civil Code Article 334 states: “The owner or possessor of the animal is not responsible for damages caused by that animal unless he is negligent in keeping the animal, but in any case if the animal causes loss by any man’s act, the source of losses will be responsible for damages .(Mohaqeq Damad, 2008) Existence of negligence is necessary for establishing causal relationship, and without that, harmful act will not be capable of attribution to the cause. In other words, without infringing (fault), there is no causal relationship between the damage and the act committed. No responsibility for the transmission can be established for person not involved in such transmission. But it should be noted that there is distinction and differentiation Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 51 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI between causal relationship and negligence. The causal relationship means the relationship between language and act of the subject, whether this relationship is distant or close. Mere establishment of causal relationship, especially a distant relation, for example, the causal relationship of carries of blood with the Blood Center cannot be accurate basis and unique basis of liability, but common practice recognize and assign the responsibility of compensation to the cause. In the examples of jurisprudence, all efforts are made to create a causal relationship and attribute losses the cause, while this causal relationship, in other cases, doesn’t lead to responsibility without element of negligence.(Mohaqeq Damad, 2008) On the other hand, it should be noted that choice of negligent cause and holding the latter liable doesn’t result in disconnection of other cause with loss, but they are related to loss, as track carrying contaminated blood of hospital or veterinarians secretary who turned on sterilizing device for surgical instruments, etc. all are transmissionrelated, but only relationship that doesn’t seem to create responsibility and liability. Thus, contrary to the above, some jurists believe negligence is not the causal relationship, but there is a separate element whose existence at least in some cases is necessary to establish responsibility. So when several causes cause damage, the negligence element by being attached to one of them determines responsible cause. Yes, we may say that the customary law only consider causal relationship between the negligence and the loss as established and ignores the other causes, but this doesn’t mean that element of negligence and the causality are one and same in causal relationship. (Mohaqeq Damad, 2008) 7- THE CIVIL LIABILITY THEORIES The various theories and standpoints have been introduced about civil liability and its principle by scholars. Each of the theories has had some proponents at a period time of the history and has been accomplished. The main ideas are as follows: 7-1-Fault theory The first question comes to the mind after a harmful event—especially if it is widespread and done numerous damages—is that who is at fault and responsible for? In case the accident is happened by a particular person and the damages have been done to a given individual/individuals, the subject is not so much ambiguous. However, in case the accident is not imputed to a given factor and the maximum thing can be said is that the accident has happened due to legal person indifference, a legal person of public law—like the government and the institute related to it. In the case, the investigation is more intricate. As the point is proposed in various cases including bridge collapse, not having installed the guard and safety signs on the roadside and bridge, continuous malfunction lights, drilling the street without installing warning signs and cutting off the power continuously and frequently which all cause 52 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... the abundant losses and damages. The point is proposed in factories explosion and fire, oil and gas refineries, educational and fun centers, etc. thus, according to fault theory the only reason can justify the responsibility of a person for compensation the damages is the causality relation between the fault and the loss. In other words, the first thing comes to the mind of a person seeking for the responsible for a harmful event is who the damages is done due to his/her fault. Accordingly, the lost person should prove the loss factor fault as a claimant. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014) The question is being raised is that if it is necessary to seek for the main person who is at fault or it suffices to prove the responsibility and accountability of a legal or natural person. In such cases, if finding the guilty and proving his/her guilt is not impossible, there will exist a great hardship and consequently according to the view the right of claimant to compensation for the damages done unintentionally would be wasted and insisting to prove the guilt and finding the guilty doesn’t permit us to achieve our main goal which is proving the civil liability of the cause of loss. Therefore, it seems it suffices the person to be accountable for and it is not necessary to find the guilty of an accident. On the other hand, the easy way to achieve the goal is to expand the concept of guilty and guilt is attributed to the legal person who is supporting the main reason instead of the direct and main reason. As we observe, the votes manifest the fact that purpose and fault are not only the reasons of conscience guarantee, but also is its main and basic reason. So it can be said: wasting the others property is primarily the effect and purpose of the loss’s causes and if the scholars don’t explain the absence of difference between purpose cases and fault cases, the conception which express that civil liability is followed by the fault theory based on juridical, it was right and proper. According to the fault theory, the only reason can justify a person’s responsibility for compensation is the existence of causality relation between the fault and the damage has been done. The civil liability in the Europe and the other parts of the world was based on the fault up to 18 century, except for the article 1382 of French civil liability which had accepted the absolute and unlimited responsibility and the responsibility was radically based on the person’s fault. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014) 7-2- Endangering theory According to the theory, it suffices the causality relation to be in existence between the loss and action in order to the loss cause’s responsibility determined. In other words, the action and activity of each natural or legal person endanger without existing the guilt or crime and should undergo its results. It means because the employers benefit from the job, the losses should be undertaken by him as well. For instance, if a company or factory takes an action to produce various products or a bureau is in charge of some social and economical affairs which benefit them, they should be responsible for the damages are done to individuals by their actions and their activities. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 53 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Apparently the theory has been emerged in response to the fault theory and indeed it accepts the responsibility without fault and it deems every harmful action to be guaranteed and it consider any activity which is generating interest to create the responsibility. Thus, in addition to the many criticisms, it is an optimal approach toward civil liability according to some scholars. There are some cases of acceptance this theory in religious texts: If a person has been invited to another’s house and he/she enters with the permission of host and in the meanwhile the dog of host hurts him/her, the host is responsible. A person who is riding a horse or is dragging it, is responsible for the damages done to the properties by the animal. A person who put the animal on the way of people is responsible for the damages done to individuals by the animal. If a person dig a well on his/her land and cover it, but do not inform the others and somebody or something fall in it and lost, that person is responsible. If a person drop the water on his property and another person’s property is drowned due to that or fire in his property and is informed or suspicious of the harm, is responsible. If a person’s wall collapse due to the exhaustion and cause the human or animal to die or cause the financial loss, the owner of the wall is responsible in case he is aware of exhaustion. As it is observed, according to jurisprudence the existence of causal relation between action and loss result in responsibility and it means that endangering theory is also has been accepted in jurisprudence. 7-3-The middle theory According to the theory, the activity which is exotic and unusual results in responsibility. This view emphasizes on individual liberty and doesn’t consider dangerous all their actions and activities but it only considers responsibility for those actions which are exotic and irregular. While this theory supports the agent of loss and devise of harm, it is a criterion to achieve civil liability which is an abstract and subjective concept and it seems it is difficult to achieve and finally it will be relative. Yet, it is evident in both religious texts and narrative sources. The cases such as digging wall in other’s property or on the road travelling center, irrigation or opening the fire in one’s own property to excessive necessity, riding the rental animal in an unusual way, and so on emphasize that performing the exotic and unusual action result in responsibility, because these actions are highly due to the fault of the agent or at least the role of fault is more prominent than the other factors. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014) 54 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... 7-4-Loss separation theory Based on this theory, the physical and financial damages and moral and economical damages have been separated and it has been predicted the responsibility without fault for the first time and the responsibility based on fault for the second type, because according to this conception financial and physical damages mean the loss insertion but moral and economical damages is to foreclose the interest. Therefore, if the damages are done to a person due to the other one’s actions, the principle of liability is without the governor fault, but where one activity leads to interest insertion, the basic condition of responsibility is to take the blame. What expressed about the theoretical principle of civil liability result us in coming to the conclusion that none of the theories can be accepted as the mere principle of civil liability and establish a justly system based on. On the other hand, the reality which is in existence within them cannot be denied. What is significant is to do the justice to the society and this logical goal is the only way to achieve the goal. It probably can be said: it’s because of this consideration that no definite theory has been presented in jurisprudence regarding the civil liability. Sometimes it has been emphasized on the cause of fault, sometimes on the risk factor, and sometimes on violation the conventional and in some cases all the factors have been considered. Therefore, the fundamental strategies on civil liability are to provide the justice and defend the rights of those who have been hurt by the actions and activities of natural and legal persons. In fact, what is important in this regard is the presence of the direct causality relationship between the loss and the doer of the action so that we can say: typically, in terms of feature the loss is necessary and judgment is the best criterion to distinguish between the overseer and those who have caused the damages. None of the triple titles, stewardship, causation, and creating the context has been presented in narrative texts. Apply the law as a loss title—intentionally or unintentionally—has the pivotal role and the particular texts apparently doesn’t implicate beyond the conventional verity. (Fanazad & Shafie 2014) 8- CAUSATION RELATION BETWEEN THE HARMFUL ACT AND THE LOSS ENTRY To fulfill responsibility should be established that there is a causation relationship between Loss and the harmful act i.e. the loss was caused by the action. Of course, if to cause an accident, the event must be one of the necessary conditions to realize loss, it was proven that the loss is not made actually. In this case, this is a loser who should prove that causality relationship exists between the harmful act and the harm, and until causality cannot be established, it cannot say that it is a harmful act. To establish the causation relationship between the fault and a loss led to make the complex issues that cannot be found the solution for them except by the talent sense and evidences in every case. In the cases that, responsibility is due to the PerCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 55 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI sonal action, it must confirmed causation relationship between the defendant fault and Loss entry. On the contrary, in an assumption, there is responsibility due to others action, thus, it is not necessary to establish. However, it must be proved that between the act and fault of the person who his acts responsibility is on defendant and loss entry, there is causality. For example, it is claimed that worker has damaged to another when working and the employer must compensate that. In this case, causation relationship between the fault of the employer and the Loss entry does not need to prove. But it must be established that the loss is resulting from the action of labor. It is also correct about the responsibility of the guardian of minors and the insane on his actions and so .(Katoozian, 2012) 9- THE HISTORY OF MORAL DAMAGE IN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW OF IRAN The legal state of moral damages as mentioned above, among fund mental principles accepted by jurists and legal systems is the fact that moral damages are compensable, this is also accepted in the Islamic jurisprudence according to some Islamic rules .(Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016) Moral damages have been raised in the current Iranian laws and one of the most important laws in this regard is Civil Liability Law. The history of moral damage in Iranian legal system can be traced back to 90 years ago in the former Criminal Code. Later the Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil Liability Code affirmed the statement of the Criminal Code on recognition of moral damage in the Iranian legal system. Specifically, the provisions that are based on the compensation of damages is enacted Civil Liability Act 1950. Article 1 of this law provides that: “Anyone who intentionally or as a result of recklessness without legal authorization to life or health or property or freedom or dignity or business reputation or to any other right that is established by law for persons, material or moral prejudice that causes harm to another, is liable to compensate for damage caused by their actions. “ The theme of the material taken from Germanic law and the text of the first paragraph of Article 823 of the German Civil Code is very close. Another object of the law of civil liability for material damage is reparable article 6 of the cost of treatment and the patient’s disability, in the event of the death and burial expenses paid pension necessary alimony people died during or afterwards; articles 8, 9 and 10 on the material and moral damage caused by the deficit of credibility, reputation and credibility. (Shahroodi, 2015) As is seen, the law of civil liability recognized compensate for the loss in the range of losses and the compensation of damages to dramatically compared to the social development, but the main question the civil liability provisions of the plan: first, despite the extent of the damage is repairable-the need to compensate for all losses this is recognized in law? Secondly, if principally in our legal regime appli56 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... cable provisions of the act are and reflect the real situation of human rights in Iran? (Shahroodi, 2015) The answer is yes to both questions is the difficulty and uncertainty. Civil liability act no way against all losses there. When damage Iranian lawyers have frequently been the subject of discussion, but the law does not mention the ability to repay them; including a range of moral damage suffered as a result of losing yakhsart severe physical and Johnny’s soul, and mental shock, do not operate and enjoy a healthy environment and environmental degradation There are also some financial losses however, the disadvantage is that the common law, but the law does not mention the responsibility and ability to repay them; including the loss of financial position that actually exists, but not on the right, and lack of benefit chances. (Shahroodi, 2015) Perhaps may be assumed that the damage is mentioned in the law of civil liability not imitative aspects, especially the last part of the rule, due to the popularity of all the damage has been compensated, but the letter of the law and accept the terms and-drop development compensation for damages due to the need to the reason for this has been provided. Also refer to the principle of the rule of law are taken (as specified by law in Germany and Switzerland) prove the opposite impression. As we shall see, the German law - the source of one of our civic responsibility to seems - not recognized compensation for all losses Lawyers and the courts of this country very carefully implemented article 823 of the civil code stipulates in article with the concept of opposition, much of the damage is not clear, it considered irrecoverable. In conclusion, it can be said that even the civil liability act 1950 and the compensation all damages not recognize the reference to the law in this regard, it is a misunderstanding. (Mazaheri Tehrani, 05.07.2013) But the more fundamental question of law, civil liability, Iran’s position in the current law and the validity and necessity of implementing it. This rule is derived from the German and Swiss law and many the exact translation of the items in the laws of the two countries. Many of the provisions of this law and the principles recognized in particular civil liability are totally alien to the Iranian law, the fundamental differences between civil law and legal history of Iran these conflicts and Islamic jurisprudence so that some lawyers after the enactment of this act, according to the prescriptions of the law about civic responsibility were civil.(Ghaemmaghami 1968) Furthermore, the liability under this Act, the said Article is a fault and error, while Iran’s rights, unlike typical western countries, never blame as the responsibility is unknown, but what is a civil rights law, landlord responsibilities, damage to the harmful act is only causality relation and in case of damage due to fault only used to establish causality. Another fundamental difference in how physical and human damage is calculated. Islamic jurisprudence and the laws of the revolution, with regard to the payment of a certain sum as compensation for physical damage and soul irrespective of social status and economic injured or responsible for the accident are determined and paid, while the civil liability act physical damage and life is determined accordCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 57 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI ing to the above considerations it can be quite different from one person to another. There are also concepts and considerations in civil liability law that is totally alien to our principles and legal views and the new facility is about obvious ones this sentence articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the terms of fairness, the social and moral responsibility for the incident, how responsible and the injured party, and the consequences of physical and social cognition liability for damage assessment is responsible for the accident. (Shahroodi, 2015) A system established by this law, even before the result of fundamental changes result of the Islamic Revolution in 1978, has been a major problem for transplant the body of our law, which was watered during the centuries of Islamic jurisprudence-in is included. After the adoption of the constitution and the emphasis on Islamic Republic the implementation of Islamic law, particularly the legal rights of Iran, relies on the legal system, which in many cases in conflict with the principles of civil law jurisprudence and Islamic tradition and Iranian legal culture, it seems very difficult. Although the provisions of the civil liability act explicitly are not abrogated by the new rules, however, many of the provisions of this act and referred to the courts is not being practically abandoned. Including the rules and regulations of the abandoned much of the damage is that the law has been introduced as compensation for damages. Insurances law and the penal provisions of the law that is also capable of compensating for physical damage and life is very difficult, or is unknown. However, this insurance observation does not mean that the civil liability act 1970 is quite outdated and is not applicable in any part. (Shahroodi, 2015) Article 9 of the criminal procedure act of 1956 had stated with total clarity that one could not only seek compensation for the physical damages suffered as the result of a crime committed but also do so for the moral damages inflicted and the profits lost. (Khoeeni et al., 2014) In 1960, the criminal procedure clearly stated the fact that moral damages could be compensated for, and section 2 of the article 9 defined moral losses as harming one’s dignity, credibility and any spiritual damage. However, despite all this clarity there still existed a major doubt on whether moral damage is open to compensation only when it is the result of a criminal act or compensation could be sought for damages suffered through acts which are not of criminal nature? (Khoeeni et al., 2014) With enactment of the laws of civil responsibility, the rules in this area became more comprehensive and any type of moral damage became claimable in the common law of the Iranian courts, and even, article 8 of the laws governing the civil responsibility is solely about false publications which harm anyone’s dignity, position and credibility. (Khoeeni et al., 2014) Civil Liability Law had been enacted in May 6, 1960 was mainly derived from Swiss Obligations Law and German Civil Law and included 16 articles. When the bill 58 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... related to this Law was passing through the enactment process, deputy Minister of Justice declared in a speech in the auditoriums of this Ministry that, the main reason of preparing this bill was that the laws were not adequate for compensation based on current economic and social circumstances. So it can be stated that legislators of Civil Liability Law sought to complete Civil Law 1928 as regards “automatic liability” (Articles 307-337 of Civil Law). Civil Liability Law 1960 is the most important legal reference regarding compensation in a broad sense and moral damages. Article 1 of the mentioned Law provided that, Anyone who causes damages for life, health, property, freedom, dignity, business reputation or any other right of recognized for persons by law, without legal authority, intentionally or due to imprudence and bring about material or moral losses for another person will be responsible for compensation. Article 2 has provided that claims for moral damages, whether associated with material damages or independently, may be investigated.So, one can state that according to “Civil Liability Law”, anyone who causes material and moral losses is bound to compensate them. According to Article 5, if physical injuries or damages to health of a person cause civil deficiency, the causer is responsible for all compensation of all damages. However it must be noted that compensation of moral damages will be based on conditions and features of claims for damages. That is, damages must be obvious, direct, uncompensated, and predictable and mere claim of a person cannot be heard. It is concluded that moral damages have an important position in Islamic legal issues and Civil Law, particularly in civil liability and have various examples. They are not confined to damages to dignity and personal and social reputation; rather they include physical injuries, disability of working, mental health, and beauty. According to Articles 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Civil Liability Law, any of below losses could be requested in body injuries. Treatment costs, Disability compensation, Increase in living expenses, Moral damages. In article 9 of this law, the possibility of seeking restitution by a girl who is forced to have an adulterous affair with another either through force, threat or just being a subordinate and fear of losing her job is mentioned. Moreover, article 10 of the same law gives the right to a person whose individual or family’s dignity and credibility has suffered to seek restitution. Naturally, here, as with the physical damage, presence of a harmful illegal act, and as interpreted in the article 1 of the civil responsibility laws, without a legal permit, the causal relationship between the harmful act and the damage, existence of loss and damage, certainty of harm, violation one’s legal rights and legality of the claim are necessary to seek compensation. Furthermore, any form of justifiable acts such as self-defense nullifies this responsibility. It is because of the fact that the mere reason of harming another by an act committed does not makes the acting party responsible. The act must have been found illegal by the law and ethics must find it Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 59 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI undue. Furthermore, it should include both an act or an inaction, because inaction could equally cause moral damages. (Khoeeni et al., 2014) If the injury led to death of the injured person, “all costs particularly cost of burial” must be paid, and if death was not immediate, “treatment costs and losses arising from inability to work in the illness period are regarded as among damages”. Moreover, there are some forms of compensations, though very weak, for moral damages in other laws such as the business law with regard to inappropriate use of trademarks, …, or in laws protecting the rights of the authors, poets and artists and the laws governing the right of the press. The legal office of the justice department in a unified opinion, no. 136/10/30-7/5947, states as follows: The rules associated with seeking compensation for physical and moral damages, including the article 9 of the criminal procedure of 1960 still is in effect. After the revolution 1979, the Constitution Act stipulated moral damage in principle 171.Article 171 of the constitution has also clearly talked about such claims, thus, seeking compensation for any damages is considered legal. According to the article 171, whenever, as the result of a mistake or a fault on the judge’s part, a person suffers a physical or a moral loss, the guilty party is obligated; otherwise, the government must take the necessary steps to compensate the harmed and no matter what and how the restitution must be made. For the first time, in the article 212 of the general penal law has predicted restitution for moral damages. According to this article, anyone who has committed one of the crimes mentioned in articles 2077, 208, and 209, beside the punishment assigned for the crime he/she must make payment of not less than 500 Rials to the plaintiff. After the 1978 victorious Islamic Revolution of Iran, establishment of the rule of Islamic Laws, and the consequent enactment of the laws of retaliation, hodud, atonement and taazirat along with the silence of the procedural Law, a misunderstanding was formed in the minds of the judges. They thought that the only compensation which should be paid to the plaintiff for the purpose of restitution for the crime committed against him/her was a certain sum of money the physical damages suffered. Furthermore, they didn’t believe that, from the legal standpoint, any compensation was due to the plaintiff for the moral damages suffered as the result of the crime committed against him/her. According to clarification 3 of the article 24 of 1979 law of the press, a plaintiff could seek compensation for physical and moral damages suffered as the result of a crime committed, but since this law is nullified by the press law of 1985, and in article 30 of his law, which has replaced the article 24 of the previous law, the clarification 1 is omitted, one could not to this law when seeking restitution for any moral damages. In their interpretation of article 30 (1) of the press Act (1364), the Islamic jurisprudents of the Guardian Council declared that, the mentioned article- under which moral damage was recognized- is contrary to Sharia. Thus, the legislature in the amendment 60 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... of the Criminal Procedure Code eliminated moral damage from section 2 of article 9 of the criminal procedure code (1378). By the elimination of moral damage from the Criminal Procedure Code (1378), some judges changed their approach and are reluctant to consider moral damage as a compensable damage; whereas, the existence of article 171 of the Constitution and the applicability of the Civil Liability Code leave no doubt over the recognition of moral damage under Iranian law. The criticism of some judges about the lack of any criterion for measuring moral damages is rejected by reference to article 3 and 5 of the Civil Liability Code. According to the stated articles, the amount of moral damages depends on the circumstances and should be decided by judges on a case by case basis. Apart from criminal law, moral damage is not mentioned in civil law, but in some instances, the existence of intellectual damage is observed while its compensation is not discussed. For example article 1130 of the civil law (amendment,1991) states: “If the continuity of marriage causes a disability for a wife, she can refer to the judge for divorce; if the disability is proved in the court, the court can have the husband divorce, and if the husband disobeys, the religious judge will divorce his wife”. (Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016)The note to this article (approved in 2000) states the condition which continuously of a conjugal life inflicts an intellectual damage on a wife. In addition, articles 130, 132, 133, 1035, 1037, 1041, 1043, 1056, 1103, 1115, 1117, 1173 and 1191 of the civil law also states instances of obligation in the civil law concerning intellectual damages.(Afshar, 2015) The civil procedure code dominating civil proceedings and procedure, includes all the legal proceedings and procedures (articles 47-66), and defines damage and its instances in article 515 and 519. Although the above articles do not directly mention the concept “intellectual damage”, they can guarantee the accomplishment of articles 3, 40, 169 and 171 of the constitution to follow legal fairness and justice. The law of the inspecting the behavior of judges was ratified in 2001 .(Walidi, 1996) 10- COMPENSATION OF LOSSES AND OTHER WAYS OF PROPERTY DAMAGE REIMBURSEMENT A person, who has incurred the losses as a result of the violation of his (her) civil rights, is entitled to their compensation. Damages are: - losses, which are incurred by a person due to the destruction or impairment of the something, as well as expenses that person made or have to make to restore his violated right (actual damages); - income that person would really get under the normal circumstances, if his (her) rights had not been violated (lost profits). Damages are compensated in full, unless the contract or the law provides reimbursement in a smaller or larger size. If the person, who has violated law, received because of this the revenue, the amount of lost profit, which must be reimbursed to the person whose rights were violated, can not be less than the income that is received by a person who has violated the law. At the request of the person who has suffered, and according to the circumCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 61 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI stances of the case, the property damages could be compensated in other ways, the nuisance of property may be compensated in kind (transfer of the same kind thing and of the same quality or correction of damaged thing etc.). The most important legal topics are considered compensation for moral damage. In Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 declared that:” Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” And with due regard to the rights enumerated in the Declaration of most spiritual and financial compensation for this loss has been emphasized.(H. Black, 2004)Theoretical Foundations of the claim moral damage is theories that discussed on material damage, such as the fault theory, Direct responsibility is based on the theory of risk and benefit or guaranteed the right. However, considering the above theories of damage should be compensated, through the appropriate method of compensation and non-cash compensation is primarily. But, there is difference of opinion on the issue of compensation for moral damages and the possibility of financial compensation is faced with doubt. Because these losses are immaterial. And there may be pricing of some suffering unacceptable and an insult to the realm of emotions is a person. Brief reasons for opposition include: • Inability to assess moral losses • Impossibility of making Equivalent of moral damage to money • Unable to return to the former position with payment of money • Impossibility of eliminating the harmful effects of the practice and the lack of congruity between the harm inflicted and the similarity of its financial And the other reasons for such. (Eyvazi, 2013) One major issue in this regard is whether compensation includes a financial damage, or an intellectual one, too? Some legal theorists believe compensation should be financial, but this theory is questionable because first, as the time goes on, the same mulct does not fit the pattern. Second, moral damage has historically included physical damage along with financial loss instead of bloody revenges while financial compensation cannot rebuild every loss. Moreover, an intellectual compensation is the only solution when a judge neglects financial compensation for it.(S; Hedayatollah, 2001) Although this issue has not been clearly considered, these kinds of studies can help it forward. Moreover, reasons such as chapter Nesa (Verse 58): “When judging between people, be fair”, fig rules considering loss, disability, and rules including civil liability code infer that any loss - intellectual, or financial - has to be compensated. (Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016) Those who believe in restitution for moral damages, despite the fact that they have pointed out to problems when trying to measure the damage in terms of money, overall find it just to seek compensation for moral damages. 62 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... They reason that the causal relationship between the action and the damage exists. Moreover, it is not possible to ignore the suffered damages and a form of restitution must be made. Therefore, a judge must base the extent of the moral damage, in terms of money, based on his judgment, the evidence and the expert’s recommendation .(Katozian, 1985) The law experts do not hold different opinions on the principle of compensation for moral damages. What they differ in is possibility of monetary compensation for these moral damages. The main reasoning of those opposing financial restitution for moral damages is the difference in nature of physical damage with moral damage, ethical aspect of it, immeasurability of moral damage and disproportionality of compensation with respect to the damage. Those who favor monetary compensation, do accept the problems and the fact that the judge must not issue a ruling on making financial compensation for certain moral damages, but claim that the justification for their belief is the monetary compensation is for partial carriage of justice and restitution for the moral damage which somewhat pleases the harmed. Furthermore, they believe that the disproportionality exists when dealing with crimes which harm the entire body, such as murder .(Mahdavi, 2006) In such cases, first of all, paying certain sum of money to the harmed isn’t the only way of making restitution considered by the lawmakers. Most often, the lawmakers have considered other measures as well. Second of all, the goal of restitution is not returning the conditions to their original states. It is only a way to sooth the pain and suffering of the harmed, and undoubtedly, paying certain sum of money will make it easier for the plaintiff to deal with the losses. To this end, those who favor monetary compensation, point to the laws of the Islamic Jurisprudence. Iering, German lawyer, states that not compensating for moral damages and not holding the criminal responsible for the moral damages is far worse and inhumane than monetary compensation.(Akhundi, 2006) The criminal courts, even after the Islamic Revolution, have accepted compensation claims for moral damages. Petition number 1984/4/30-251-252 in the criminal court number 2, branch 181 could be used as an example. This petition was about a husband who falsely accused his wife of not being a virgin at the time of marriage. The court ordered compensation of 300,000 Rials to be paid to the wife by the husband to compensate for the moral damage suffered by the wife .(M;, 1985) Ways of compensating for moral damages suffered as the result of a crime committed Methods of compensation for moral damages are not limitative, because in compensation for such damages the important factor is restitutions not the method, which is just a mean. In some cases, money may do the trick, and in some others, a simple apology may be more effective than any amount of money. Thus, even though the civil responsibility law in article 2 obligates the courts to pass ruling in favor of compensating for the moral damages suffered, in article 3, it states that the court shall decide on the degree of harm and the method of restitution on a case by case basis. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 63 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI The prosecution will assign and expert to estimate the damage financially and convict the offender. The court has the power to convict the offender to pay a certain sum of money, restore the damaged property, pay its profit or accept the plaintiff’s victory .(S; Hedayatollah, 1997) The restoration made must be the same as what is damaged i.e. there has to be a conventional relation between what is damaged and is given in return .(Hamid, 2011) The purpose is not to rebuild the thing damaged, but to compensate it as much as possible.(Fattah N, 2004) In fact, since the offender’s conviction reduces the victim’s pain, and castigates the offender, social logic accepts it . (Hasan, 1977) Therefore, the method of restitution is divided into two groups, financial and non-financial. In the financial method, judge orders for a sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff. Generally, money payment is the most common way to redress and today judicial bias is based on money payment for damage the judge by referring to article 3 of civil liability and available option, can determine the way of redress, but there are some rules that must be regarded such as: The amount of money that pay for redress is equal to the amount of loss not the degree and manner of fault and it is possible a simple fault leads to heavy loss and was forced guilty to redress. Sometimes it is possible there isn’t any error but because of special reason, law recognize the responsible (loss doer) as a sponsor. (Eyvazi, 2013) In the non-financial method, different means such as making an apology, terminating the harmful act, publishing the crime in the press and/or a promise to stop an act or to do something. .(Parvin, 2000) The recreation of a reputation is the non-financial method for compensating a damage stated in the Islamic criminal law, article 1 of the civil liability code, and article 171 of the Iranian constitution. It can be accomplished in different ways including apology, announcement in mass media, etc. According to article 1 of the civil liability code, a victim can claim financial and intellectual compensation against the party inflicting the damage. The court can sentence the offender to announcement in mass media or an apology. There is no limitation in this article, and the decision is on the court. For example, if a person is brought to a court on the basis of a false report regard illegitimate adultery, and his innocence is proved, he can claim for compensation against the court. The court will sentence the reporter to announce the victim’s innocence in public. Article 19 of computer crimes also includes this. The ruling to compensate for moral damages is complementary to the punishment sentence, and even in a ruling for Hadd to be carried out, the defendant could be ordered to make monetary or non-monetary compensation for the moral damages suffered. In case of Dieh, since it is not a punishment but a form of restitution for any physical and moral damages, further monetary compensation could not be sought. In such cases, non-monetary compensation is allowed. In cases where the amount of 64 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... Dieh is not known, the courts must take the moral damages in consideration. Restitution for moral damages is not allowed in retaliation cases .(Parvin, 2000) One kind of intellectual damage clearly mentioned in the Iranian criminal proceeding law (Art. 9, par.2) is mental damage .(S; Hedayatollah, 2014) One case is the detention of an innocent person who has to request compensation within 6 month after the final decision of the court. The provincial commission including 3 members will confirm the compensation based on the conditions in the law. The person can announce his protest against it to the commission within 20 days after the decision on the basis of article 258. The six-month term for protest is allocated because most decisions are protested in the first instance, but in the appeal the final decisions are made. It is worth to note that a 20 day or 2 month term is set for the decisions made in the first stance, and not protested within 6 months (article 431) . In conjugal relations, the case may include misbehavior, yet, it is an offence, and penal liability relating to assault and battery, but other cases lead to compensation in the way to prove the offence. There is another instance in which the victim is not the offence’s spouse but indirectly affected by the offence including the spouse’s addiction to drugs, or his detention .(Homa, 2011) Among instances of conjugal intellectual damages is violating certain agreements including a negative social relation .The rights and responsibilities between spouses need a positive relation between them, and the violation of the relation is an instance of negative relation . Another instance is violating the marriage preconditions. Trickery, avoiding sexual intercourse, and apostasy are the instances. Another kind of conjugal damage is made by the husband confining his wife at home, having her take care of his parents, and violating the legal number of wives [38]. To compensate a conjugal damage considering the spouse’s negative relation’ the case should be considered different with intellectual damages outside conjugal relation. The civil liability code (article 3) suggests that that kind of damage, family condition, and the couple’s decision is effective in allocating compensation. The damage may be compensating by a sum of money, or redempting some responsibilities from the wife, etc., but it might not work for a couple from a high social class and need compensations including an apology, attending training classes etc. (Mazaheri, 2013) Another instance of compensation is legal divorce if the methods above do not work. According to the civil law (Art.1130), if any problem from the husband’s side enables the wife’s conjugal life troublesome, and impossible, she can request divorce, and if the case is approved by the court, the husband is bound to divorce her . Sometimes living together with the wife makes intellectual damages for the husband; the civil law does not consider the case. The quality of the couple’s rights enables the husband request the court for a decision on temporary separation of the domiciles . (Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016) Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 65 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Another method of compensating husband’s intellectual damages according to the civil law (art.1108) is depriving the wife of her expenditure if she avoids living in the same domicile with her husband. Besides the above methods, the prosecution can have either of the spouses compensate damages according to the civil liability code (art.10) in a nominal or non-financial method such as an apology. (Raouf & Angurajtaghavi, 2016) 11- INTERNATIONAL LAW: AUTHORITY AND INSTRUMENTS The fundamental norms of international law are contained in customary international law, and reflect widely accepted basic ideas about the nature of law, its elation to legal wrongs, and the duty to provide recompense. The Permanent Court of Justice, set up after World War I, gave the most authoritative renderings of his foundation for the legal obligation to provide reparations. This most general international law imperative was set forth most authoritatively, although without any equally general prospect of implementation, in the Chorzow Factory (Jurisdictions) Case: ‘It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.’(Du Plessis, 2003) The Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice involving the Israeli Security Wall reaffirmed this cardinal principle in ruling that Israel was under an obligation to provide reparations to the Palestinians for damages sustained due to the illegal wall built on their territory.(Scobbie, 2005) A second equally important idea embodied in customary international law had to do with the nationality of claims associated with wrongs done to individuals. In essence, this norm expressed the prevailing understanding that only states were subjects within the international legal order, and that wrongs done to foreign individuals were in actuality inflicted upon their state of nationality. Accordingly, if the individual was stateless, a national of the wrongdoing state, or a national of a state unwilling to support the claim for reparations, there was no basis on which to proceed. This limiting notion was expressed succinctly by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Case: ‘[b]y taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’(Brownlie, 1990) It is important to appreciate that these formulations were made before there existed any pretense of internationally protected human rights. A third important idea in customary international law, that has persisted, forbids a state to invoke national law as a legal defense in an international dispute involving allegations of wrongdoing by the injured state. Such a principle pertains to the setting of international disputes, which is where the main precedents and doctrines of international law relative to reparations are fashioned. Somewhat surprisingly, the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility, despite years of work, clarified to some extent this earlier teaching, 66 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... refining and codifying it conceptually more than changing it substantively.(Crawford, 2002; Shelton, 2002) The ILC approach to remedial or corrective justice was based on distinguishing between restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. Restitution is defined in Article 35 as the effort ‘to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed’. Such a remedy is rather exceptional. It is usually illustrated by reference to the Temple case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which Thailand was ordered to return religious relics taken from a Buddhist temple located in Cambodia.(Oliver, 1962) This primary reliance on restitution where practicable has been recently reaffirmed by the ICJ in its ruling on Israel’s security wall, an important restatement of international law although contained in an advisory opinion, because it was endorsed by fourteen of the fifteen judges. The language of the Advisory Opinion expresses this viewpoint with clarity in paragraph 153: ‘Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall’s construction.’ (Oliver, 1962) Article 35(a) and (b) of the ILC Draft Articles indicates that restitution is not the appropriate form of reparations in circumstances where it is ‘materially impossible’ or would ‘involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation’. Compensation, resting on the fungibility of money, is more widely used to overcome the adverse consequences caused by illegal acts. In the Chorzow case it was declared that where restitution cannot be provided to the wronged state, then the wrongdoer should be required to compensate up to the level of the value attributed to whatever was lost, including loss of profits. Articles 36 and 37 go along with this approach of full reimbursement, without qualifications based on capacity to pay. Satisfaction is the third, and lesser known, manner of providing reparations. The ILC Articles make it a residual category in relation to restitution and compensation. As explained by du Plessis, ‘[s]atisfaction provides reparation in particular for moral damage such as emotional injury, mental suffering, injury to reputation and similar damage suffered by nationals of the injured state’.(Oliver, 1962) Customary international law, as well as the ILC Draft Articles of State Responsibility, impose an undifferentiated burden, as stated in Article 37, on the wrong-doing state ‘to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’. As such, it gives very little guidance in specific situations where a variety of considerations may make the grant of full reparation undesirable for various reasons, although commentary by the ILC on each article does go well beyond the statement of the abstract rule. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 67 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI International treaty law does no more than to restate these very general legal ideas in a variety of instruments, and without the benefit of commentary attached to the ILC articles. Because property rights are of paramount concern, the language of reparation is not used, and the more common formulations emphasize compensation for the wrongs suffered. The basic direction of these treaty norms also derives from international customary law, especially legal doctrine associated with the confiscation of foreign-owned property. The legal formula for overcoming the legal wrong accepted in international law involved ‘prompt, adequate, and effective compensation’. Discussion of ‘restitution’ and ‘satisfaction’ is abandoned as the wrongdoing states are acknowledged by the United Nations to possess ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources.(UN General Assembly, 2014b) The United Nations Charter does not define the term ‘human rights’, although it contains a clear prohibition of discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion. The absence of a human rights catalogue in the Charter led to a continuing effort to define and codify human rights, beginning with the adoption, on 10 December 1948, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.(Shelton, 2015) The codification effort in the United Nations and its specialized agencies has resulted in a vast body of international human rights law including on the right to a remedy.(Shelton, 2015) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights shifts the locus of relief to national arenas and away from international disputes between sovereign states. Individuals are endowed with competence, and the notion of wrongdoing is generalized to encompass the entirety of human rights. Article 8 reads: ‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental human rights granted him by the constitution or by the law.’ Of course, such a right tends to be unavailable where it is needed most, although the existence of the right does provide a legal foundation for reparation in future circumstances when political conditions have changed.(Shelton, 2015) The Universal Declaration was followed, in 1965, by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (Schwelb, 1966) and, in 1966, by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)(Hoag, 2011) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).(Craven, 1995) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains three separate articles on remedies. According to Article 2(3): Each State Party to the . . . Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as . . . recognized [in the Covenant] are violated shall have an effective remedy notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have the right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, 68 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.(Craven, 1995) Articles 9(5) and 14(6) add specific guarantees that anyone unlawfully arrested, detained, or convicted shall have an enforceable right to compensation or be compensated according to law.(Craven, 1995) The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Article 6, also contains broad guarantees of an effective remedy including ‘protection’ by national tribunals and other state institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals ‘just and adequate reparation or satisfaction’ for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination.(Page, 2006) The treaty leaves open the question of what forms of reparation or satisfaction are required, as well as the question of how broadly the term ‘victim’ should be interpreted and who is liable for reparation or satisfaction.(Lerner, 1980) Upon signing ICERD, six states made declarations regarding Article 6, including the UK, which said it interpreted the requirement in Article 6 concerning ‘reparation or satisfaction’ as being fulfilled if either of these forms of redress is made available. It further interpreted ‘satisfaction’ as ‘including any form of redress effective to bring the discriminatory conduct to an end’. The reference to ‘protection’ in CERD Article 6 seems to anticipate the use of injunctive or other preventive measures against discrimination, as well as compensation or other remedies for consequential damages. A similar provision is found in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, whereby the states parties undertake to establish ‘legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men’ and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions ‘the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination’.(UN General Assembly, 1979) Article 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1978) particularizes a ‘Right of Compensation’ in a limited and overly specific manner: ‘Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event that he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice.’ It seems to refer exclusively to improper behavior of the state associated with criminal prosecution and punishment within the judicial system. It is available only on the basis of an individual initiative. Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Other Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) imposes on parties the obligation to ‘ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible’. Again, the emphasis is on the legal duty of the state to provide Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 69 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI individuals who are victims with a remedy within the domestic system of laws. That is, victims are not dependent on governments of their nationality pursuing claims on their behalf, nor are nationals barred from relief by the obstacle of sovereign immunity. Unusually, the provision also explicitly guarantees remedies to ‘dependents’ of those who die from torture. A combination of criminal prosecution and civil redress appears in the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,(Faso, 2014) as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.(Dennis, 2000) The remedies of Article 24 of the Disappearances Convention extend for the benefit of anyone forcibly disappeared and ‘any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance’ (Art. 24(1). Each such victim has the right to know the truth, the progress and results of the investigation into the disappearance and the fate of the missing person. Article 24(3) requires each state party to ‘take all appropriate measures to search for, locate and release disappeared persons and, in the event of death, to locate, respect and return their remains’. The legal system of each state party is to ensure that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation. Article 24 goes on to specify that reparations include ‘material and moral damages and, where appropriate, other forms of reparation, such as: restitution; rehabilitation; satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and reputation; and guarantees of non-repetition’.(Faso, 2014) Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) refers to specific forms of reparations for children that should aim to promote their physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration. ‘Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child’.(UN General Assembly, 2014a) The CRC Protocol adds that states parties must ensure that the acts referred to in the Convention are made criminal offences punishable by ‘appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature’ and take measures of forfeiture against proceeds and assets involved in such offences. It also provides a lengthy list of measures on behalf of the victims, detailed in Articles 8 and 9, that include informing children of their rights, providing support services to them, protecting their privacy and identity during criminal proceedings, protecting the victims and their families, avoiding unnecessary delay in prosecutions and awards of compensation to child victims, and taking ‘all feasible measures with the aim of ensuring all appropriate assistance to victims of such offences, including their full social reintegration and their full physical and psychological recovery’. States parties are to ensure that there are adequate procedures in place for child victims to seek, without discrimination, compensation for damages from those legally responsible. The UN Convention on Migrant Workers has several specific provisions on remedies, guaranteeing the right to fair and adequate compensation for expropriated 70 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... property (Art. 15), an enforceable right to compensation for unlawful arrest and detention or miscarriage of justice (Arts. 16(9), 18(6)), equality of treatment before courts and tribunals and the right to a fair and public hearing before a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal (Art. 18), the right to seek compensation for an expulsion order carried out before all appeals are exhausted (if the decision is subsequently annulled), and the right to consular or diplomatic assistance to assist with remedies. In addition, Article 83 generally provides that each state party undertakes to ensure effective remedies to anyone whose rights or freedoms guaranteed by the treaty are violated, a fair hearing on claimed violations, and enforcement of any remedies granted. Several International treaties refer to the right to legal protection for attacks on privacy, family, home or correspondence, or attacks on honour and reputation.(UN General Assembly, 1948; Unicef, 1989; United Nations, 1988; Wojcik, 1994) Other specific remedies are explicitly guaranteed in the law on indigenous rights, which has developed significantly in the last three decades.(Wiessner, 2011) ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries(Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 1989) refers to ‘fair compensation for damages’ (Art. 15(2)), ‘compensation in money’ (Art. 16(4)) and full compensation for ‘any loss or injury’ (Art. 16(5)). Article 15 refers to the common situation of states owning or claiming mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources on indigenous lands.(Pasqualucci, 2009) Before exploring or extracting such resources, states ‘shall consult these peoples’;(Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005) the communities concerned also ‘shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages’.(Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005) Article 16 concerns another frequent scenario: when indigenous peoples have been evicted or displaced from their lands. It guarantees a right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. In the event such return is not possible ‘… these peoples shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development’. (Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005) If communities prefer ‘compensation in money or in kind’, they may exercise that option. (Rodríguez-Piñero, 2005) In sum, International instruments generally include provisions requiring domestic remedies and often specify preventive measures as well as types of remedies that must be provided. Certain treaties, like the Convention against Torture and the Convention on Forced Disappearances, also require investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 71 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI 11-1- Regional treaties Regional human rights systems differ from the International ones in establishing courts and other tribunals to hear complaints from those claiming to be victims of human rights violations committed by a member state.(Shelton & Carozza, 2013) However, the systems emphasize the duty of states to provide domestic remedies. International procedures are subsidiary and only available if domestic remedies fail or are exhausted. Article 9 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) similarly obligates parties to ‘undertake to incorporate into their national laws regulations guaranteeing suitable compensation for victims of torture’. In the absence of case law it is difficult to know what this standard might mean in practice, and whether it is purely aspirational or represents a genuine effort to acknowledge the full spectrum of injury that often results from torture and severe abuse. Beyond this duty of the state, Article 8 allows persons alleging torture to internationalize their claims for relief ‘[a]fter all the domestic legal procedures of the respective State . . . have been exhausted’ by submitting their case ‘to the international fora whose competence has been recognized by that State’. (Kaplan, 1989) 11-2- The European Convention on Human Rights Within the European regional system there is a right of an individual in Article 50 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) to seek ‘just satisfaction’ in the event that national law provides ‘partial reparation’ due to injury sustained as a result of a violation of the Convention. A proceeding of this nature would fall within the authority of the European Court of Human Rights. Here, too, the idea is to provide individuals with a remedy at the regional level beyond what is available within the national legal system. The Statute of the Council of Europe, adopted by Western European nations in 1949, provides that every member must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its system for the protection of human rights is based on the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and its protocols, plus the European Social Charter. Council membership is de facto conditioned upon adherence to the European Convention. The ECHR, signed 4 November 1950, entered into force on 3 September 1953.249 As originally adopted, it guaranteed a limited number of civil and political rights, considerably expanded by the adoption of later Additional Protocols to the Convention. The European Convention was the first treaty to create an international court for the protection of human rights and to create a procedure for individual denuncia72 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... tions of human rights violations in addition to inter-state complaints. The European Court of Human Rights (European Court) issues judgments in which it may afford ‘just satisfaction’ to the injured party, including compensation for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.(Coblentz & Warshaw, 1956) The ECHR declares that ‘the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the decisions of the Court in any case to which they are parties’ (Convention, Art. 46(1)). The Committee of Ministers supervises compliance with the judgments. The ECHR contains several provisions on national remedies. The first provision, Article 6, guarantees access to justice and the right to a fair hearing.(Buergenthal, 1977) Article 13 provides ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity’. In addition to these general provisions, Article 5(4) guarantees a right of habeas corpus and Article 5(5) requires compensation be afforded for unlawful arrest. Article 13 has been referred to as ‘the most obscure’ provision in the Convention(Arai, 1998) because of its seeming suggestion that access to a remedy is required only after a violation has been demonstrated—proof of which would require access to a remedial authority. This circularity was noted in early decisions of the European Court. In Klass and others v. Germany(Mowbray, 2004) the Court noted that Article 13, read literally, seems to say that a person is entitled to a national remedy only if a ‘violation’ has occurred; but a person cannot establish a violation before a national authority unless he or she is first able to lodge with such an authority a complaint to that effect. Thus, according to the Court, Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy ‘to everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have been violated’,(Mowbray, 2004) a ruling that the Court repeated in Silver v. United Kingdom, one of the few early cases where the Court found a violation of Article 13.(Gomien & Eide, 1993) The Court said that ‘[a] n individual who has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of one of the rights in the Convention is entitled to a national remedy in order to have his claim decided and if appropriate to obtain redress’.(Janis, Kay, & Bradley, 2008) The Committee of Ministers sought to reinforce Article 13 and uphold the system with a recommendation adopted in 1984 that calls on all Council of Europe member states to provide remedies for governmental wrongs.(Green & Barav, 1986) Principle I of the recommendation says: Reparation should be ensured for damage caused by an act due to a failure of a public authority to conduct itself in a way which can be expected from it in law in relation to the injured person. Such a failure is presumed in case of transgression of an established legal rule. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 73 DR. ABBAS MIRSHEKARI & AMIR AHMADI Principle V adds that reparation under Principle I should be made in full. The Commentary indicates that the victim must be compensated for all the damage resulting from the wrongful act that can be assessed in terms of money. 12- CONCLUSION Trespass against the physical wholeness and the moral reputation of others is considered to be a crime and requires punishment. Trespass to the moral aspect of the self is considered as moral damage. This includes non-monetary damages such as spiritual losses, defamation of character, and profanity against the sacred religious and national values. Moral harm is compensated with cash, other property or by other ways. The size of monetary compensation for moral damage is defined by court decision, which depend on the nature of the offense, the depth of physical and mental suffering, deterioration of the victim skills or his (her) deprivation of feasibility for their use. Also the size of compensation depends on the degree of guilt of the person which caused the moral damages, if guilt is the basis for reimbursement, as well as on other circumstances which are significant. In determining the amount of reimbursement, court take into account the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. Moral harm is compensated regardless of the property damage, which is refundable, and is not associated with the size of this reimbursement. Moral harm is compensated only once, unless otherwise is stipulated by contract or law. The necessity of paying attention to moral damages is clearly mentioned in the laws governing civil liability, constitution, Islamic punishment and the press. It is hoped that the judicial trend in Iran start paying more practical attention to this crucial issue, and the regulating agencies remove any forms of ambiguity and pass necessary laws that fill the legal loop holes pertaining to the issue of moral damages. Based on what was said, both in Iran and in Human Rights Conventions, moral damages have been accepted. The obligation to provide effective remedies is an essential component of international human rights law. A state that fails to fully protect individuals against human rights violations or that denies remedial rights commits an independent, further breach of law. International instruments do not clarify, however, what are considered to be ‘effective’ remedies. Nor do they indicate what remedies should be made available through international procedures in the event a state fails to afford the necessary redress. It is thus necessary to look at the theory and practice of national and international tribunals to determine what constitutes an effective remedy. In the past, international tribunals seemed unwilling to recognize the importance of their decisions, not only in providing a remedy for past abuse, but in persuading those in power to comply with human rights norms in the future. Now they seem more convinced that effective enforcement of norms can influence the incidence of violations. 74 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOURCES AND GENERAL CONTENT OF MORAL DAMAGES IN IRANIAN CIVIL LIABILITY LAW... Municipal legal concepts and the law of state responsibility influence remedies for international law violations and there has been considerable expansion of the scope of redress afforded during the past decade. Consistency and principled decision-making can help avoid forum shopping, provide remedies for victims, incite national action to bring wrongdoers to justice, and enhance the legitimacy of international tribunals. It seems, common methods of compensation for moral damages, according to legal texts in Iranian law are stopping or eliminating the source of losses, oral apologizing from the injured party, practical or written apologizing, or printing apology in the press, rehabilitation of the injured in any other way, paying property or money for the injured. In whole, it seems moral damages, in Iran laws and especially in Iranian courts are very obsolete. According to the above explanation, it is suggested to the Parliament that in legal texts related to special review and approval of the Civil procedure bill, which is the original position of moral damages principles, it should predict illustrated and comprehensive Articles, and fill the vacuum available and establish an important law in the Principle 171 of the constitution, develop it and present the issue, clearly. The judiciary and the courts of the country are considered the second valid source of the laws of the country. By establishing firm and strong approaches, they should welcome demands about moral damages and try to provide the rights of good people, in this territory. 13- REFERENCES Abbasloo, B. (2011). Civil Responsibility (with a comparative sttitude) Publications. (1 ed.). Tehran: Mizan. Afshar, H. (2015). Intellectual Damages in Civil Law. Tehran: Majd Publisher. Akhundi, M. (2006). Criminal procedure,vol.1. Tehran: Ministry of guidance and cultural affairs. Arai, Y. 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Research Journal of Recent Sciences, 4(3), 115-120. 78 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 41-78, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 3 Procedural actions concerning appeal in civil dispute under Kosovo legislation Rrustem Qehaja Professor of Civil Procedural Law at the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina” PhD Prof. Dr. Rrustem QEHAJA, has completed basic and postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Law, University of Pristina, in the Republic of Kosovo. Whereas, he is doctorated in civil legal sciences at the University of Tirana in Albania. At the beginning he used to work as an assistant, later as a lecturer, and now is in Advanced Prof. Asoc. at the Faculty of Law at the University of Prishtina “Hasan Prishtina” in Prishtina, Republic of Kosova. He lectures contested civil procedure, noncontested civil procedure and insurance law. He has published several scientific articles in several national and international journals, and has also been part and he is acting as an expert in several vital projects in Kosovo legal system. rrqehaja@yahoo.com rrustem.qehaja@uni-pr.edu Abstract In this scientific paper shall be handled the description of undertaking procedural actions on the purpose of conducting procedure according to appeal against civil judgment. Appeal represents a regular legal remedy with suspensive effect in comparison to extraordinary legal remedies of attacking civil decisions which do not have suspensive effect. Therefore, a special attention shall be paid to the handling of appeal in procedural terms as well actions concerning the appeal, but not to causes from which the appeal may be submitted as a regular legal remedy, deadlines and decisions rendered by a higher degree court, and not only regarding local level how this issue is regulated by our legislation respectively by the Law on Contested Procedure (LCP) provisions, but also broader. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 79 RRUSTEM QEHAJA Keywords: Appeal, Court, Civil procedure, Contest, Law on Contested Procedure 1. INTRODUCTION Based on the fact that one of the fundamental rights of every citizen is his right to attack a decision of any state body in cases when he does not agree with that decision and claims that by that decision it has been made any injustice to him, hence due to this intention the legislator has foreseen legal remedies with special importance within this group takes the appeal. Conducting procedure according to appeal in legal-civil context is preceded by the submission of appeal from the dissatisfied party with the court decision which may act within legal deadlines and only if it comes to the fulfillment of at least one of determined causes by provisions of the Law on Contested Procedure (hereinafter LCP). 2. LEGAL REMEDIES AND THEIR MEANING Legal remedy is one of the most important legal instruments in contemporary countries through which to every individual is guaranteed the protection of rights and freedoms known by national and international legal acts. A court decision, like any human act, may be flawed and with errors.1 Therefore, legal remedies represent instruments through which a party who is not satisfied by a rendered court decision in a particular procedure in which it was subject to it, to attack that decision and by that to request that decision to be reviewed or to be annulled in order to recognize its right. For correction of decisions’ errors, it is accepted by different procedural systems the reviewing of case by another court through attacking these decisions with special legal remedies called means of attacking decisions.2 By this is created the possibility through submitting legal remedies, to be rendered a fairer court decision, where a new decision shall be rendered as a consequence of control and critical review of a decision rendered in the previous trial and that a new trial shall be conducted by a higher court, whose judicial panel consists of judges supposed to be more qualified than judges of the first instance.3 By means of attack is implied the procedural remedy through which a party or any other authorized person from a competent court requires to annul or change the decision he claims to prove that is unfavorable, unfair and unlawful to him.4 Thus, by this procedural remedy this party expresses its dissatisfaction to the rendered decision in a particular procedure. Appeal is a legal remedy which the law makes available to 1. 2. 3. 4. 80 Brati, Alban A.; Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2008, pg. 435. Brestovci, Faik; Civil Procedural Law II, (Fourth reprint) Prishtina, (2006), pg. 62. Brati, Alban A.; Op.cit., pg. 435. Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 62. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION the parties in order to provoke a new trial, through which is hoped to regulate flaws and errors of a previous rendered court decision.5 Due to this reason, from the subjective point of view, the means of attack represent the power and right known by the law to a subject, in order to request for a new reviewing of case and rendering a new court decision by a higher court. Whereas from the objective point of view, it represents the act by means of which is exercised this power and this right, by including also the internal procedure initiated by this act. 6 Appeal is an act through which parties or other participants to the process submit before of the Court of Appeals their objections against a final decision of the district court.7 2.1. Use of legal remedies, as a basic right The right to appeal by using legal remedies of attacking decisions is a basic human right guaranteed by Declarations and International Conventions, as well as by Constitution and national laws. This right is protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under articles 88 and 10.9 Likewise, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms foresees and guarantees this right under Articles 610 and 13.11 This right is also a constitutional category, where the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo as a contemporary document that meets the parameters of a democratic state, based on the principles of liberty, peace, democracy, equality, respect for human rights and freedoms , the rule of law, non-discrimination, property rights, environmental 5. 6. 7. 8. Brati, Alban A.; Op.cit.,, pg. 435. Ibid., pg. 436. Terihati, Franc: Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2015, pg. 237. Article 8: “Everyone has the right to an effective recourse before competent national jurisdictions for acts that violate the fundamental rights recognized to him by the constitution or law.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly by its 217A (III) resolution of 10 December, 1948. 9. Article 10: Everyone has the right, in full equality, to have his case handled fairly and publicly by an independent and impartial tribunal, which has to decide in terms of his rights and obligations, as well as concerning any accusations in the criminal court directed against him. “ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly by its 217A (III) resolution of 10 December 1948. 10. Article 6: “Everyone has the right to be heard fairly, publicly and within a reasonable time by a legally established independent and impartial tribunal that decides either on claims that may arise against his rights and obligations of a civil character, whether to determine if any charges of a criminal nature directed against him are grounded” (Parts from Paragraph 1 of this Article). European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950. 11. Article 13: “Any person to whom the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention have been violated shall be entitled to submit an effective remedy before a national instance, even where such offense may be committed by persons acting while exercising their official functions “. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 81 RRUSTEM QEHAJA protection, social justice, pluralism, state power sharing and market economy,12 foresees this right under Article 32,13 Article 5414 and Article 102, paragraph 515.16 Such decision is also accepted and proclaimed by the European Court of Human Rights: “Anyone in criminal process, whether in civil process, should have the possibility to present to the court rightfully, his case, under conditions that do not set him in a significantly disadvantaged situation in relation to the opposing party.” 17 2.2. Legal remedies in contested procedure Legal remedies bearing in mind the fact that are procedural actions by means of which parties and other authorized persons in procedure attack the decision which they consider to be unlawful and unfair and request to the court of legal remedy after verifying merits of their claims to change or annul it by its own decision, these attacking legal remedies have been foreseen in all procedural law areas: In civil proceedings (contested, non-contentious and execution proceedings) in criminal proceedings and in administrative proceedings.18 Based on this, is implied that also in contested procedure as one of the main civil procedures are allowed legal remedies in terms of attacking rendered decisions in this procedure, by providing in this manner the maximum protection of human rights. When it comes to procedure it is necessary to make a distinction between legal remedy in broad aspect and legal remedy in narrow aspect. Legal remedies in broad aspect include in addition to legal remedies in narrow aspect also several other legal remedies allowed by law, but in systematic terms the legislator does not regulate them as in sections where are regulated regular legal remedies of attacking decisions. As such is rejection according to payment order (according to the provision of Article 497 of LCP), and the request for returning to 12. Omari, Luan; The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in a comparative observation, Tirana, 2009, pg. 7. 13. Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies): “Everyone has the right to use legal remedies against judicial and administrative decisions that violate his / her rights and interests in the manner determined by law.” The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008. 14. Article 54 [Judicial Protection of Rights]: “Everyone has the right to judicial protection in the case of violation or denial of any rights guaranteed by this Constitution or by law, as well as the right to effective legal remedies if it is found that such a right has been violated.” The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008. 15. Article 102, paragraph 2 (General Principles of the Judicial System): “The judicial power is unique, independent, fair, apolitical and impartial and provides equal access to the courts.” The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on 15 June 2008. 16. Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Commentary, The Law on Contested Procedure, (LCP - Edition I), Pristina, 2012, pg. 346. 17. Cited by: Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Albania (Enriched with Judicial Practice), 1996, pg. 267. 18. Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 62. 82 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION previous situation (Article 129 of the LCP). As such legal remedy could be considered also the request to change a court decision under Article 141 of LCP. Hence, these legal remedies are legal remedies in a broad aspect by means of which the appellant aims to change or even abrogate a court decision.19 Legal remedies in narrow aspect are considered to be all legal remedies by means of which is attacked a court decision. Legal remedies in narrow aspect may be listed according to different criteria. They are divided into legal remedies (ordinary) and irregular legal remedies (extraordinary). 20 In the Law on Kosovo Contested Procedure, 21 in Chapters XIII and XIV, are foreseen rules concerning means of attacking decisions. The Law itself legally foresees the distinction between legal remedies (ordinary) and irregular legal remedies (extraordinary) of attacking decisions. In Chapter XIII, articles 176 up to 210 of the LCP are foreseen rules concerning regular legal remedies of attacking decisions. Whereas in Chapter XIV, articles 211 up to 251 of the LCP, are regulated in detail the so-called extraordinary legal remedies.22 By ordinary legal remedy of attacking decision is implied that legal remedy which is allowed up to the moment when a decision becomes final in formal terms. Which means such legal remedy is filed against a decision which did not yet become final and as such obstructs the finalization of the decision, while the second instance court (and in some cases the third instance court) render a decision about it. As a legal remedy (ordinary) under this law is the appeal against judgment and appeal against a ruling.23 Whereas as extraordinary legal remedies of attacking decisions are those legal remedies which can be submitted after the decision has become final in formal terms. Consequently against the same decision at the same time cannot be submitted the regular legal remedy and extraordinary legal remedy. As extraordinary legal remedies of attacking decisions are: Revision, request for Protection of Legality and proposal for Repetition of Procedure.24 Legal remedies are divided also into evolutive and devolutive remedies. By devolutive character of a legal remedy is implied the fact that in relation to a submitted legal remedy shall be decided by court of a higher instance from the one who has rendered the attacked decision.25 19. Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Commentary, Law on Contested Procedure, (LCP - Edition I), Pristina, 2012, pg. 346. 20. Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63. 21. Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted on 30 June, 2008. 22. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345. 23. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63. 24. Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 345-346. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 63. 25. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 64. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 83 RRUSTEM QEHAJA There is also a division into suspensive and non-suspensive legal remedies. Legal remedies have a suspensive character when they suspend the execution of a court decision, whereas lack this feature when they do not stop the execution of a court decision. Appeal against judgment is always of a suspensive character, whereas appeal against a ruling in principle has this characteristic, but to several rulings the appeal does not have a suspensive character. Extraordinary legal remedies do not have a suspensive character, although, according to circumstances of a concrete case, court may decide to suspend the execution of a decision until proceedings related to that legal remedy comes to an end.26 There is also a division into unilateral and bilateral legal remedies. A legal remedy is unilateral if a court decides upon it without having the need to give the possibility to the opposing party to declare concerning its content. On the contrary a legal remedy is bilateral if to the opposing party should be given the possibility to declare concerning claims that the complainer filed. Unilateral means of attack is solely appeal against ruling. All other legal remedies of attacking decisions are bilateral.27 There is also a division into independent and dependent legal remedies. Means of attacking decisions are usually independent, and by using them independently may be attacked all court decisions. There are few exceptions to this rule, and they have to do with appeal against several rulings of the first instance court.28 3. PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO APPEAL AGAINST JUDGMENT In the procedure initiated according to appeal acting the court of the first instance which rendered the attacked decision, (judex a quo), as well as the court of the second instance, which is competent to decide on merits concerning appeal (judex ad quem).29 Procedure according to appeal against judgment is conducted into two sections: In the first one acts the court of the first instance whereas in the second one acts the court of the second instance. 3.1. Procedure at the first instance court The appeal shall be submitted in sufficient copies to the first degree court which rendered the attacked decision (Article 185 of LCP). All this procedure is conducted by the presiding judge who also finds that appeal is filed on time under the law and whether it is complete or permissible. If the appeal is flawed, then the appeal is 26. 27. 28. 29. 84 Ibid., pg. 63-64. Ibid., pg. 64. Ibid., pg. 64-65. Brestovci. Faik, Morina, Iset & Qehaja, Rrustem, Civil Procedure Law, Contested procedure, Prishtina, 2017, pg. 420. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION returned to the appellant to complete it. The appeal presented after the deadline foreseeable by the court, the incomplete one, or the illegal one the court can reject with a decision of the first degree without setting a court session. A sample of the appeal presented timely, legally and complete, is sent within seven days to the opposing party by the court of the first degree complain, that can be replied with presentation of an appeal within seven days (Article 187). After this, the first instance court within seven days, prepares the complete file of case concerning appeal and reply to appeal and sends it to the second instance court. If the appellant claims that in first instance court procedure have been violated provisions of contested procedure, then court should give explanations concerning appellant’s claims (Article 188 of the LCP).30 3.2. Procedure at the second instance court In the second instance court, is assigned a relevant judge by the president of the judicial panel based on the internal regulation on courts. The rapporteur judge plays a decisive role in a concrete process and is obliged to actively deal with the submitted appeal. In Albania, the rapporteur is appointed by lot.31 He is entitled to request for additional explanations from the court first instance, which was competent regarding the concrete case. The law does not set a deadline within which the court of first instance should give explanations. Whereas by bearing in mind the principle of efficiency in the procedure as a fundamental principle in the judicial civil proceedings, then the first instance court must give clarifications within a reasonable period of time (Article 189 of LCP).32 Concerning the appeal, the second instance court decides either at the main trial hearing or at the judicial panel hearing. In principle, it reviews the case only at the judicial panel hearing. Exceptionally, the appeal is reviewed at the main trial hearing. New facts cannot be presented through the appeal, or new proof, except when the appellant presents new proofs which couldn’t be presented by no fault of the appellant, specifically they should be presented until the main hearing of the first instance court. For discussion, the court of second instance shall determine a direct examination for the case even if the verdict of the first instance court was twice annulled, and in the case when court evaluates that the verdict against which an appeal is filed was based on essential violation of provisions of contestation procedure, or when the factual state was evaluated wrongly or incompletely. The court of second instance can determine evaluation of the case when it estimates that for a rightful 30. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 366-372. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 83-85. 31. Tafaj, Kola, Flutura & Vokshi, Asim: Civil Procedure, Part II, Tirana, 2014, pg. 295. 32. See: Morina, Iset – Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 372-373. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit, pg. 85. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 85 RRUSTEM QEHAJA factual state is to be determined and all or partial proofs administered in the court of first instance should be considered (Article 190 of LCP).33 In cases when the court determines a hearing for the main trial, then general rules are applicable, which are also applicable concerning procedure before the first instance court. However, certain rules are applicable only to the court of second instance. The court will summon parties and their representatives for the main trial hearing. All rules are applicable as in the court of first instance. The court may summon as well as witnesses and experts if necessary. In this case it is more expressed the principle of investigation rather than the principle of reviewing. In case of appellant or the opposing party absence, cannot be rendered a judgment because of disobedience or absence, which would be conducted in the procedure of the first instance, where would be concluded that party either waived or the appellant has withdrawn the appeal. In case of one or both parties are absent court acts based on these documents: appeal and the reply to appeal. As a matter of fact the procedure is conducted by acting on the basis of the documentation contained in the case file from the content of which depend decision-making concerning the appeal. Court on summons shall notify the parties about legal procedural consequences of not attending the hearing. This procedural legal consequence consists in the fact that the court shall decide regardless whether the parties will reply to the summons or not (Article 191 of LCP). 34 The court hearing for the main trial is conducted in accordance with the rules as in procedure of first instance court. Hearing is conducted with the presentation of case by a relevant judge, which has no right to express his opinion on the merits of the appeal. After the rapporteur’s report, the verdict is read, or its attacking part. After this, the verdict is read or just the part involving the appeal and when needed the record in the final hearing in front of the court of first instance is read. Than, the appellant justifies its appeal, while the opposing party responds to the appeal. Primarily in civil judicial procedure the administration of evidence is made directly, as it is in the first instance court, but there are also exceptions. Therefore also in the second instance court, if there is a proof that can’t be used directly, the court decides to read the record covering the part of that specific proof (Article 192 of the LCP).35 Everything determined by this law regarding to the first instance court procedure adequately can be implemented in the procedures of the second instance court (Article 193 of LCP).36 33. 34. 35. 36. 86 See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 373-374. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 85-86. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 375-376. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 86. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 376-377. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 86. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 378. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION 4. BOUNDARIES OF EXAMINING THE ATTACKED DECISION The second instance court acts only within limits of what was required by an appeal. Otherwise it would commit a violation of procedural provisions. Likewise, the appellant cannot be put in a worse legal position with the decision of the second instance court, than it was with the decision of first instance court (Article 203 LCP). The second instance court shall only deal with that part of judgment for which was filed an appeal. The other part of judgment which was not attacked by appeal cannot be subject of review by the second instance court due to the fact that part has become final in formal and material meaning. The second instance court is limited also concerning causes of appeal, so shall deal only with those causes that were submitted by the party in appeal. However, court ex officio shall consider essential the violations of absolute importance and whether the substantive law was properly applicable. Of course the court shall not deal with these issues by its own initiative, but only after the appeal has been submitted against the verdict of the first instance court. The Law by article 194 of the LCP is limited to several essential causes of procedural provisions. Thus, the second instance court shall consider ex officio essential violations of absolute importance according to provision of the article 182, par. 2 sub. b), g), j), k) and m) of the LCP. Which implies for other violations of procedural provisions according to the provision of Article 182, par. 2 of the LCP, the law does not provide any clarification. Therefore, from the provision of Article 194 of the LCP it appears that the court of second instance shall not be able to deal ex officio with essential violations of absolute importance, according to article 182, paragraph. 2 subparagraph. a), c), d), e), f), h), i), l), n) and o) of the LCP. The same applies also concerning essential violations of relative importance, since with these violations shall deal solely the second instance court if the appellant has requested such a thing (Article 194 LCP).37 5. DECISIONS OF THE SECOND INSTANCE COURT ACCORDING TO APPEAL Article 195 of the LCP also provides that the second instance court shall examine the appeal either at the panel of judges hearing or at the main trial hearing, in detail and specifically by law determines how this court shall act. These decisions are defined in detail due to the fact by these provisions are foreseen all possible decisions of the second instance court: a) Dismiss the appeal that arrives after the deadline, it’s incomplete or illegal; b) Annul the attacked judgment and reject the indictment; 37. Ibid., pg. 378-379. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 87 RRUSTEM QEHAJA c) Annul the attacked judgment and return case for re-trial at the court of the first instance; d) Reject the appeal as unfounded and verify the attacked decision; e) Change the decision of the first instance court. Concerning these, the court of second instance decides either by a ruling or by a judgment.38 The law does not require that a party in its appeal to propose to the second instance court what decision should be render according to its opinion. If a party does such a thing this is not binding to the court. But the second instance court may annul the attacked judgment although a party has proposed its amendment and vice versa (Article 195 LCP).39 5.1. Dismissal of appeal The appeal presented after the deadline foreseeable by the court, the incomplete one, or the illegal one the court can reject with a decision of the first degree without setting a court session. According to Article 196 of the LCP, the appeal that is delayed, incomplete or not allowed can be dismissed by the second instance court with a verdict, if it wasn’t done initially by the court of the first instance. 40 5.2. The annulment of judgment and its return to retrial The second instance court decides by ruling to annul the decision of the first instance court and returning the case for retrial at the first instance court. The LCP in Article 197 explicitly provides cases in which the court acts in this manner, the following cases are: a) If in opposition with provisions of this law, the court has rendered a decision based on confession or the decision was rendered based on withdrawal from the lawsuit; b) If any of the opposing parties with an illegal act, especially due to the irregular summon the party was not given the opportunity to attend the hearing and this act had influenced in rendering of legal and rightful decision; c) If the court has brought a decision without conducting a main trial of legal case; d) If a judge who according to the law should be excluded from the trial participated in bringing the decision.41 38. 39. 40. 41. 88 See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 380-381. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op. cit., pg. 87. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 381. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 88. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 382. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION When the second instance court revokes the decision of the first instance court and the case is sent to the same for retrial, the court can decide that another judge resides over the case. The second instance court may decide that the case to be retried by another court with the same subject matter jurisdiction if there is no other judge in the competent court which could be dealing with the retrial of the case (Article 198, par. 3 of the LCP).42 LCP by the article 199 referring to articles 197 and 198 LCP provides that immediately upon arrival of the case from the second instance, the court of the case should set a preliminary session or trial session for the main hearing, which should take place within thirty (30) days of the decision arriving from the second instance court, the court should also conduct all procedural actions, re-examine all contesting issues offered by the court of the second instance in their verdict.43 5.3. Annulment of judgment and dismissal of indictment The second instance court by its ruling annuls the judgment and dismisses the indictment as inadmissible in all cases in which such a thing should have been made by the first instance court. The court acts like this when it concludes that the legal case submitted by an indictment does not fall within the judicial jurisdiction (Article 198 paragraph 1 of the LCP), when it concludes there is a negative procedural presumption (Article 198 paragraph 2), or when it concludes the absence dealing with the capacity to be a party, with procedural capacity and with the representation of a party, cannot be avoided even in a retrial by the court of first instance (Article 198 of the LCP). 44 5.4. Rejection of appeal and confirmation of judgment The court of the second instance through a decision will reject the appeal as ungrounded, thus verifies the decision of the first instance court if it decides that there are no causes that affects the decision, nor causes for which is entitled to deal according to the official task. In these two cases, this second instance court judgment becomes final in both formal and material meaning at the moment of delivery of the verdict to the parties (Article 200 LCP). 45 5.5. Amendment of judgment The second instance court by judgment changes the attacked verdict, deciding on the object of the dispute. According to article 201 of the LCP the second instance 42. 43. 44. 45. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 383-384. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 384. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 89. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op. cit., pg. 89-90. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 385. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 88-89. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 89 RRUSTEM QEHAJA court can change the decision of the first instance court in the college session, or on the basis of examination of the main issue directly through a decision, if it decides that one of the under mentioned causes are presenting the appeal: a) If it considers that there is a violation of the provisions of the contestation procedures expect the ones mentioned in the article 197 of this law; b) If in the college session through a different evaluation of the file and proofs received indirectly, it ascertains different factual circumstances from the ones in the decision of the first instance court; c) After direct examination of the case, based on new proofs, or based on newly possessed proofs administered by the first instance court, it ascertains different factual circumstances from the ones in the decision of the first instance court; d) If it considers that the factual state in decision of the first instance court is rightly ascertained but substantive law has been applicable wrongly from the court of first instance; e) If it has found that with the judgment of the first instance it is over passed the claim so that it is accepted more than what has been requested by the claim.46 The amendment of judgment by the second instance court decision cannot be done in disadvantage of the appellant, if it is the only one who appeals (Article 203 and LCP). 6. REASONING OF THE SECOND INSTANCE COURT DECISION The LCP, by Article 204, dismisses the second instance court from the obligation to give a general reasoning of its decision. So this decision should not contain the reasoning part as it is the case with the decision of the first instance court. But in certain cases it must present the decisive facts on the basis of which the decision was rendered, as if it was the rendering of a judgment on the merits of the appeal. After all, any eventual violation of this provision can not constitute grounds for filing a revision because of the violation of procedural provisions.47 7. RETURNING FILE TO THE FIRST INSTANCE COURT The second instance court returns all writs related to the case to the first instance court with a considerable amount of samples of its decisions to be sent to the parties and other interested parties, as well as a sample for the first instance court. The second 46. See: Morina, Iset - Nikçi, Selim; Op.cit., pg. 385-386. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 90. 47. Ibid., pg. 388. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 91. 90 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com PROCEDURAL ACTIONS CONCERNING APPEAL IN CIVIL DISPUTE UNDER KOSOVO LEGISLATION instance court shall do this in a period of thirty (30) days from the day the verdict was rendered. This administrative judicial matter for sending the case to the first instance court is regulated by the provision of Article 205 of the Law on Contested Procedure.48 Conclusion Conducting the contested procedure is characterized by a series of actions related to the procedural actions of disputable parties during the development of the first and second instance court proceedings. It is the right of parties included to civil contest not to be satisfied by the first instance court decision, therefore, the plaintiff the respondent or both parties are entitled to attack the respective decision by appeal, which represents a regular legal remedy. By appeal within determined legal deadline may be attacked all types of civil judgments regardless of whether the party participated during conducting contested civil procedure or not, respectively the court has ruled by judgment on the absence. This circumstance is of special importance due to the fact it determines timelines to file an appeal which in principle is 15 days, with certain exceptions. Maintaining legal deadline for submitting the appeal constitutes a fundamental and formal issue whether the court shall examine the appeal or the same will be rejected as delayed. Court actions concerning the appeal are categorized into two groups, in those undertaken by the first and second instance courts. These actions should be welldefined so the appellant shall not be damaged concerning time aspect in terms of waiting for the appeal to be reviewed by the Court of Appeals that in judicial practice unfortunately occurs many times, this due to the fact that delayed justice is not any type justice. References Brestovci, Faik; Civil Procedure Law II, (Fourth Reprint) Prishtina, 2006. Brestovci, Faik, Morina, Iset and Qehaja, Rrustem: Civil procedural law, contested procedure, Pristina, 2017. Brati, Alban A .; Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2008. Grupa autora, Komentari Zakona o Parnicnom Postupku u Federaciji BH i RS, Sarajevo, 2005. Jaksiq, Aleksandar: Gradjansko procesno pravo, Beograd, 2013. Morina, Iset - Nikci, Selim; Commentary, Law on Contested Procedure, (LPK – First Edition) Prishtina, 2012. Ristic, Vukasin dhe Ristic, Millosin: Praktikum za parnicu, Beograd, 2000 Omari, Luan; Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo in a comparative observation, Tirana, 2009. 48. Ibid., pg. 388-389. See: Brestovci, Faik; Op.cit., pg. 91. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 91 RRUSTEM QEHAJA Qehaja, Rrustem: Appeal against the judgment in civil contested procedure, “Jeta juridike”, No. 1/2013, Tirana, 2013. Tafaj, Kola, Flutura and Vokshi, Asim: Civil Procedure, Part II, Tirana, 2014. Terihati, Franc: Civil Procedure, Tirana, 2015. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly by its resolution 217A (III) on December 10, 1948. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on 09 April 2008, entered into force on June 15, 2008. Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on June 30, 2008. Law no. 04 / L-118 on Amending and Supplementing the Law no. 03 / L-006 on Contested Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo adopted on September 13, 2012. Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Albania (Enriched with Judicial Practice), 1996. 92 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 79-92, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 4 Translation from Romanian The obsolescence of the court, the evolutions of its application in the new civil procedure code and the shortcomings of the law, pending the reform1 Dr. Cristina Elena Popa2 Associate scientific researcher - the Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy, Associate in the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Arbiter and mediator in Vienna International Arbitral Centre, Member of Arbitral Women Abstract The respect of the equality of rights, and of the non-discrimination liability, involves taking into account the treatment provided by the law for the ones to which it is applied, throughout the period while its regulations are effective, legal treatment that cannot be different. The present paper brings into debate a very serious problem, the settlement of which consists of the analysis of the constitutionality and/or of the shortcomings of the law by reference to art. 3 of Law no. 76/2012 for the 1. 2. This paper is written during the susteinability stage of the project entitled „Horizon 2020 - Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Investing in people! e-mail: cristina@adrlegal.ro Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 93 DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, in the context of the special obsolescence of the court, considering the provisions of art. 46 comma (1) of Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of certain immovable properties which had been abusively taken over during the period March 6 1945-December 22, 1989 (by which the suspension cannot last for an unlimited period of time, without the obsolescence to operate, according to the regulations provided by the old Civil procedure code). It shall be further checked whether the principle of nonretroactivity of the civil procedural law – in terms of the obsolescence of the civil action – is compatible with art. 6 of the CEDO convention which guarantees the right to an equitable trial, but also if the litigants who are parties to proceedings under the old law are somehow discriminated compared to those who are parties to proceedings under the new law and to whom is applied the privilege of special obsolescence within 10 years. Results from this study that Romanian law is located on a transition phase. Reform of areas of law becomes imperative. Keywords: reform, transition law, obsolescence, Civil procedure code, constitutionality. Preliminaries Pursuant to the provisions of art. 248 comma (1) of the Civ. Pr. Code since 1865, any sue petition, contestation, appeal, recourse, review, shall become obsolete by law within one year, if they have remained not worked by the party’s fault. The institution of the obsolescence of the court did not exist in the regulation of the Civ. Proc. C. 1865, but this type of obsolescence was somehow provided by art. 1891 of the Civ. code of 18643. We must specify the following: The civil procedure code of 1865, in its initial form, provided, at art. 257, a term of obsolescence of 2 years, and further on, through the amendments made in the year 1948 (assigning the texts a new re-numbering, so that art. 257 became art. 248 )- the term was reduced to 1 year in civil matters and to 6 months in „commercial” matters and in forced execution matters (art. 389 of the Civ. Pr. c. of 1865). 3. 94 The Civil Code was decreed on November 26,1864 enacted on December 4, 1864 and enforced on December 1, 1865. Art. 1891 provided that: The courts initiated and slacked shall be obsoleted, in the absence of a request for pre-emption, by 30 years calculated since the latest procedural deed, whichever the prescription term of the actions following which those instances may have been initiated might be. Law no. 394/1943 for the acceleration of the judgements in civil and commercial matters, effective since15.09.1943 until 01.03.1948, which had been abrogated by Law no. 18/1948 and replaced by the Civil Procedure Code of 1865, enshrined at art. 64: The obsolescence under the conditions provided by art. 257 of the civil procedure, operates by full law. Following the expiry of the obsolescence term, any procedural deed remains inoperative. The obsolescence may be ascertained upon request made by the party concerned or of the own motion. It may be proposed also by way of exception. The obsolescence operates also in the processes in which the procedure is made of the own motion, unless it has been insisted on the establishment of the hearing. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT, THE EVOLUTIONS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE... The new Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter referred to as the Code, was republished in the Official Gazette, Part I no. 247 as of April 10, 2015, pursuant to art. XIV of Law no. 138 as of 2014 for the amendment and supplementation of Law no. 134 of 2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, and for the amendment and supplementation of certain connected normative deeds, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 753 as of October 16, 2014, assigning to the texts a new numbering. Among the aims of the4 elaboration of the Code have been both the modernization of the regulation of the civil legal relations and the organic and detailed regulation of the rights of the persons and of the related defence and of the matters of liabilities according to the European trends in the contracts field. In the New Civil Procedure Code was introduced art. 423 according to which any request addressed to a court and which has remained un-processed for 10 years shall be obsolete by law, even in the absence of reasons attributable to the party. The provisions of art. 420 apply accordingly. The sanction of obsolescence of the court ensures the final closure of the requests over which the courts have acquired jurisdiction and which have unreasonably remained in the records of the later for longer periods of time, without the plaintiff to have performed any step (procedural action) in order to settle the case or without the plaintiff to have shown any kind of interest as far as stage of the later is concerned. Has been established therefore, a special obsolescence - the obsolescence of the court, which is different respect to the obsolescence of the request, due to the fact that: the obsolescence of the court intervenes as a sanction no matter which the cases which have determined the trial to remain not worked might have been, without any relation to any fault of the party; this type of obsolescence regards all the requests addressed to the court, and the term of obsolescence is of 10 years due to a more permitting system of penalties; upon the expiry of the 10 years term, the special obsolescence of the court, intervenes even in the cases when the obsolescence of the request was unable to produce effects. The institution of the special obsolescence of the court is governed by the same procedural rules regarding the invocation, the settlement and the generation of the effects as in the case of the obsolescence of the request. 4. These aspirations are included, in addition, in the explanatory memorandum which laid at the basis of the draft of this normative deed, point 1.1. specifying very clearly that :„ The New Civil Procedure Code represents the natural continuation of the reform of the Romanian judicial system, a rational consequence of the entry into force of the new Civil Code. The procedural-civil legislation creates the framework for capitalization by way of justice of the new substantive legal rules, setting-out the bodies, the forms and the procedural means necessary for their enforcement. The substantive reform of the substantive law and the organic inter-dependency between the substantive rule and the procedural one, rendered necessary the elaboration of an appropriate legal instrument in the procedural field - the new Civil procedure code - which might assign efficiency to this reform, introducing standards which fulfil the requirements of a modern, fast, close to the litigants institution.” Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 95 DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA 1. THE SPECIAL OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT AND THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 46 COMMA 1 OF LAW NO. 10/2001 REGARDING THE LEGAL REGIME OF SOME IMMOVABLE PROPERTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ABUSIVELY TAKEN OVER DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 6, 1945-DECEMBER 22, 19895 The High Court of Cassation and Justice has decided 6 that the suspension of the judgement of the case pursuant to art. 47 comma (1)7 of Law no. 10/2001, in view of the administrative settlement of the notification, shall produce its effects by the time the decision issued for the enforcement of such law remains irrevocable, being not contested by the party entitled to the return. From now on, the suspension ceases, and the obsolescence term regains its proper course, the parties involved in the judgement of the trial being bound, within the term of one year enshrined by art. 248 comma (1) of the old Civ. proc. code, to communicate to the court the res judicata of the decision by which the request for return of the immovable property in kind was settled. The Decision no. 5632 as of December 4, 2013 delivered in the appeal by the 1st Civil Section of the High Court of Cassation and Justice having as an object the obsolescence of the appeal. The full text of this decision may be read on the official online page dedicated to the case law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice: http://www.scj.ro/1258/ Jurisprudenta, link last accessed on 04.03.2017. Pursuant to the provisions of art. 248 comma (1) of the Civ. Pr. Code since 1865, any sue petition, contestation, appeal, recourse, review, shall become obsolete by law within one year, if they had remained unprocessed by the party’s fault. We acknowledge that, pursuant to art. 250 comma (1) of the Civ. pr. c., the course of the obsolescence is suspended as long as endures the judgement suspension, ruled by the court in the cases enshrined at art. 244, and in other cases established by law, unless the suspension was not caused by the lack of insistence by the parties to the judgement. It may be asserted that the suspension has been disposed in one of the cases contemplated by the law, respectively by Law no. 10/2001, and that the existence of a reason contemplated by law is not nevertheless sufficient to suspend the course 5. 6. 7. 96 Art. 46. - (1) The provisions of this law are enforceable also in the case of the actions in course of judgement, the person entitled being able to choose the way of this law, waiving the judgement of the case or requesting the suspension of the case. (2) In the case of the actions formulated pursuant to art. 45 and 47, the return procedure which has been initiated under the hereby law is suspended until the settlement of those actions through a final and irrevocable judicial decision. The entitled person shall notify immediately the notified person, pursuant to art. 22 comma (1). (3) If to the entitled person has been rejected, through a final and irrevocable judicial decision, the action regarding the return in kind of the requested asset, the notification term provided at art. 22 comma (1) shall run from the date when the judicial decision remains final and irrevocable. The Decision no. 5632 as of December 4, 2013 delivered in the appeal by the 1st Civil Section of the High Court of Cassation and Justice having as an object the obsolescence of the appeal. The full text of this decision may be read on the official online page dedicated to the case law of the High Court of Cassation and Justice: http://www.scj.ro/1258/Jurisprudenta, link last accessed on 04.03.2017. Currently, this article became, by re-numbering, art.46 of Law no. 10/2001. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT, THE EVOLUTIONS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE... of the obsolescence. According to the afore-mentioned provisions, it is moreover necessary that this suspension – although enshrined by the law – be not generated by the lack of insistence by the parties to the proceedings. Not for last, must be taken into account also the circumstance that there are pending with the courts of law cases suspended during the years 2001-2002, which are, therefore, in suspension for over fifteen years, obviously with the infringement of the principle of celerity, a general principle regulated also by the old civil procedure code, regulation which does not include nevertheless a maximal rigorous delimited term. These situations in which are actually about 10,000 litigants are obviously, unrelated to the judgement of the case with celerity, the later having as an aim the very removal of the uncertainty in which the parties are, through the restoring as soon as possible, of the infringed rights and through the reinstatement of the lawfulness which must govern all the legal relationships in a rule of law state, which represents the guarantee of a fair trial. 2. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY RELATED ISSUES OR SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LAW? Under the afore-described conditions, it is brought into debate a very serious problem, the settlement of which consists of the analysis of the constitutionality of art. 3 of Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, according to which (1) The dispositions of the Civil procedure code apply only to the trials and to the forced executions initiated following the entry into force of the later. (2) The trials initiated through requests submitted, under the law, at the post office, at military units or at penitentiaries before the entry into force of the Civil procedure code remain subjected to the old law, even if they are registered at the court of law after such date. It shall be further checked whether the principle of non-retroactivity of the civil procedural law – in terms of the obsolescence of the civil action – is compatible with art. 6 of the CEDO convention 8 which guarantees the right 8. The Convention for the defence of human rights and of fundamental freedoms, elaborated in the European Council, opened for signing in Rome, on November 4, 1950, became effective on September 1953. In the spirit of its authors, it is about adopting the first measures meant to ensure the collective guarantee of some of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Convention enshrines, on the one hand, a series of civil and political rights and freedoms and establishes, on the other hand, a system which aims the guarantee and the compliance by the contracting states with the liabilities taken by them. By Law no.30 as of May 18, 1994, published in the Official Gazette no.135 on May 31, 1994, Romania ratified the European Convention for the defence of the Human Rights (C.E.D.O.), as well as the additional Protocols to the later no. 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10. According to the provisions of art.11 and 20 of the Constitution, the Convention and its additional Protocols have become an integrant part of the national law, having priority compared to the later, in other words, C.E.D.O. and the additional protocols have become a compulsory and priority source of national law, which, on a national level, has as an immediate consequence the enforcement of Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 97 DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA to an equitable trial9, but also if the litigants who are parties to proceedings under the old law are somehow discriminated compared to those who are parties to proceedings under the new law and to whom is applied the privilege of special obsolescence within 10 years. Pursuant to art. 21 of the Romanian Constitution, any person may address to justice in order to defend its legitimate rights, freedoms and interests, the parties being entitled to a fair trial and to the settlement of the cases within a reasonable time period. Introduced by the Law for the revising of the Constitution no. 429/2003, the provisions regarding the reasonable term for case settlement represents a rule which has been directly taken over from the European Convention of Human Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which, as the very authors of the revising law have indicated at that time, was intended to represent a guarantee of the ”fact that the justice, as a public service, ensures the defence of the rights and freedoms of the citizens, with the removal of any vexatious means and of any tergiversations (...), means by which are infringed the rights of the litigant and is compromised the quality of the act of justice”. Similar provisions are contemplated also in Law no. 304/2004 regarding the judiciary organization, with further amendments and supplementations, which at art. 10 enshrines that all the persons are entitled to a fair trial and to the settlement of the cases within a reasonable term, by an impartial and independent court, established under the law. The result obtained from the enforcement strict sensu of the legislation in force, shows a different situation in which the citizens are, according to the regulation enforceable according to the tempus regit actum principle, as it cannot be regarded by the courts as an infringement of the constitutional dispositions, the judges often invoking it, an example in this sense being the Constitutional Court Decision no. 1541/201010 which invokes the Decision no.820 of November 9, 2006, published in the the convention and of the protocols by the Romanian courts of law, and on an international level, the acceptance of the control provided by C.E.D.O. with regard to the national judicial decisions. 9. The judgement of the trial within a reasonable term aims at removing the uncertainty in which the parties are, through the restoring as soon as possible, of the infringed rights and through the reinstatement of the lawfulness, which must govern all the legal relationships in a rule of law state, which represents a guarantee of a fair trial. For instance, CEDO has ascertained in the case Corabian against Romania , the infringement of article 6 comma (1) - the right to a fair trial - from the Convention and, respectively, of art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol (the right to the peaceful enjoyment of the property) to the Convention. Another case in which has been ascertained such an infringement has been the case Abramiuc against Romania. 10. DECISION No.1.541 of November 25, 2010 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. II comma (4) of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 209/2008 for the amendment of Law no.19/2000 regarding the public system of pensions and other social security rights, published in the Official Gazette no. 30 as of 13.01.2011 includes in its considerations the reference to the Decision no. 820/2006, the full text of both decisions being available on the official internet site of the Romanian Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/ SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on 04.03.2017. ../../../../Documents and Settings/user/Sintact 2.0/cache/Legislatie/temp/00137381.HTM - # 98 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT, THE EVOLUTIONS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE... Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 39 of January 18, 2007,which established that “the different situation in which the citizens are according to the regulation enforceable under the tempus regit actum principle cannot be regarded as an infringement of the constitutional dispositions which enshrine the equality before law and before public authorities, without privileges and discriminations”. It is worth noticing that in this argumentation are motivated judicial decisions, even if the afore-mentioned decision precedes the Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2000 regarding the Civil procedure code. The respect of the equality of rights, and of the non-discrimination liability, involves taking into account the treatment provided by the law for the ones to which it is applied, throughout the period while its regulations are effective, legal treatment which cannot be different. Basically, the unconstitutionality of a text of law cannot be claimed through the bare comparison between the old regulation and the new one, nor can it apply to any kind of cases. Another decision of the Constitutional Court which is often claimed when debating the unconstitutionality of the text of law to which we are referring, is the Decision no. 1038/201011, but we must underline again both the fact that the decision is earlier to Law no. 76/2012 for the enforcement of Law no. 134/2010 regarding the Civil procedure code, and the fact that such decision has a different scope and refers to a case which is different in terms of the legal ground. 3. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS Pending with the Bucharest Court of Law, IVth Civil Section, has been identified the case file no. 730/3/2001 (96/2001), having as a scope real estate claim, suspended upon the plaintiffs’ request on 29.11.2002 pursuant to art 47 (1) of Law no. 10/2001. The defendant has repeatedly attempted, the re- docketing of the case 12, facing repeated 11. The DECISION no.1.038 of September 14, 2010 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. 44 comma(1) lett.a) of Law no.303/2004 regarding the statute of judges and of prosecutors, published in the Official Gazette no. 742 as of 05.11.2010, in which case the Court has established on the grounds of the rejection of the exception, that: ”The principle of equal treatment does not mean uniformity, so that, if to equal situations must correspond an equal treatment, in the case of different situations, the legal treatment cannot be otherwise but different. The infringement of the equal treatment and of non-discrimination principle occurs when to equal cases is applied a differentiated treatment, without an objective and reasonable motivation. ”This is nevertheless the very argument which lays at the basis of the lacuna existent in the law which regulates the new special obsolescence; the full text of the decision is available on the official website of the Romanian Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on 04.03.2017. 12. In support of the assertion that leaving the case unprocessed since 29.11.2002 until now (for over 13 years) is completely unrelated to the aspiration regarding the celerity of the civil trial and moreover to the right to a fair trial, we acknowledge inclusively the provisions of art. 423 of the New Civil Procedure Code. Thus, under these legal provisions, the obsolescence of the Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 99 DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA solutions of rejection, insufficiently motivated, especially against the background of certain suspicions that currently, most likely, the plaintiffs might be no longer alive, that their proxy has died, this being a certain fact, etc. In the case, it has been ascertained that the plaintiffs have initiated the proceedings for the recovery of their asset by formulating a notification during the year 2001, and the relevant authority in the field of restitution has replied through a circular letter, saying that the real estate property could not be returned in kind, and that the complainants shall be issued instead a decision for the granting of the relative compensations. The plaintiffs did not complete other formalities, showing passivity and lack of insistence in the exercise of their legal rights, although they would have had available against the relevant authority, as the case might have been and according to the moment of the action, both an action in administrative contentious, having as a scope the binding for the issuance of the administrative deed, and an action for the binding of the authority to reply to the notification. Accordingly, the plaintiffs, throughout the case suspension term (currently the case having been suspended for 15 years), did not submit other documents on the file the settlement of which has been suspended by law. Of course, they could have filed an action in administrative contentious, pursuant to the provisions of art. 16 of Law no. 247/2005, as such provisions were effective on that date, and an action (according to their effective situation) pursuant to art. 25 comma (1) of Law no. 10/2001, under the form in which the later has been amended, provision in the sense that to the General Mayor of the Bucharest Municipality, as a representative of the unit holding the afore-mentioned real estate property, devolves the liability to express an opinion with regard to the notification, within 60 days since its registration or, as the case may be, since the date of submittal of the documents in proof, it had been taken into account that the authority did not express itself with regard to the relevant notification. This term may be calculated starting from two reference dates, according to the peculiarity of each and every case, respectively, either from the date of registration of the notification (in the situation in which all the documents-in-proof necessary to settle the notification had been submitted along with it), or from the date on which all the documents-in-proof have been submitted. The defendant, taking into consideration the possibilities expressed by the applicable texts of law, has repeatedly formulated requests for re- docketing, for the verification of the actual situation both regarding the court file, and regarding the administrative file, all court operates in the case of any request which has remained unprocessed for 10 years, with the consequence of the obsolescence by law even in the absence of reasons attributable to the party. It is certain that such provisions do not apply to the current litigation, but the intention of the legislator to establish a special obsolescence (called by the legislator the obsolescence of the court) with a 10 years term, is a further argument in support of the idea that leaving the current case unprocessed for over 13 years is inacceptable and contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Practically, if we accepted a contrary thesis, it would mean that this case might remain pending forever. 100 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT, THE EVOLUTIONS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE... of them having been rejected by the court, which preferred to maintain the suspension, without performing other checking in terms of aspects which might have been directly related to the insistence of the plaintiffs, considering that the suspension was that type of suspension which operated by law, under the afore-mentioned conditions. On the other hand, as we have mentioned, one of the guarantees enshrined by art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is the principle of celerity of the judicial proceedings; the reasonable term imposed by art. 6 includes, within its meaning, also the length of the preliminary administrative proceedings, especially when the possibility to refer to a jurisdiction is obviously conditioned by the internal law rules and by the compulsory running of such a proceeding, as in the present case. In order to meet the reasonable deadline, the state must organize the system of its own powers, so as to answer to this requirement, despite the difficulties generated by various factors which might delay proceedings, the administrative proceedings included. Nevertheless, the parties concerned do not obtain a justification or an excuse for the lack of insistence in exercising their rights. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that this case file falls for certain, under the scope of the Report issued by the Judicial Inspection regarding the result of the activity for the monitoring of the files older than 10 years and pending on the dockets of the courts of law during the 1st semester of the year 201513”, approved during the meeting of the Section for Judges of the Superior Council of Magistracy, held on January 21, 201614. The 13. According to the communicate issued by the Superior Council of Magistracy on 22.01.2016, document which may be viewed by accessing the official website of the Superior Council of Magistracy: http:// www.csm1909.ro/csm/linkuri/22_01_2016__78538_ro.htm, last accessed on 04.03.2017, among the reasons which have determined the excessive extension of the term for the settlement of the cases, is also the change along the time of the composition of the panels of judges, the taking of several procedural cycles, the submission with delay of the technical expert reports or of a complex evidentiary basis, disclaimers of competence, changes of venue of some case files, the suspension of the judgement for extensive periods of time, the admission of the extraordinary remedies at law at a big interval of time from the date of the initial settlement of the case, the failure to perform the checking regarding the suspended files, the lack of the active role of the courts, the assignment of hearings with a long duration or with an inadequate duration considering the delay reasons, the subsequent delay of the ruling, as well as the motivation with delay of the judge decisions.”The Section for Judges considers that an excessive duration of the judicial proceeding may undermine the right to a fair trial of the parties. Accordingly, these cases must benefit from greater attention by the judges, through the assignment of short terms and through the disposal of all the procedural measures which might contribute to accelerating the judgement. Starting 2012, the activity for the monitoring of the case files which are in the judicial system for over 10 years, has represented a permanent activity of the Judicial Inspection. The monitoring regards the compliance with the legal provisions regarding the settlement with celerity of the cases, in order to increase the degree of accountability of the judges”, has specified the representative of the Superior Council of Magistracy. 14. The content of this Report may be viewed online on the official website of the Judicial Inspection of the Superior Council of Magistracy: http://www.inspectiajudiciara.ro/News.aspx, at page no.3 of the box reserved to news, last accessed on 04.03.2017. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 101 DR. CRISTINA ELENA POPA monitoring regards the compliance with the legal provisions regarding the settlement with celerity of the cases, in order to increase the degree of accountability of the judges. We consider that the solution of keeping the case on the docket is contrary inclusively to art. 6 of the CEDO convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial. These dispositions with value of a principle guarantee to any of the parties - therefore also to the defendant and to the intervener - and not only to the plaintiff, the right to a fair trial. But, in this case, leaving the case unprocessed for such a long period of time has actually nothing to do with the fair character of the trial, since it prejudices the sub-acquirer of the claimed asset, by the fact that the existence of the controversy pending is practically equivalent to the removal of the asset from the civil registry. As long as the ownership title upon the real estate is a litigious right, any act of disposition upon the same real estate is paralyzed. 4. CONCLUSIONS Is it possible that the issue which makes the scope of the debate in this study, more precisely this difference of juridical treatment resulted following the modification of the civil procedure code, might not represent a constitutionality-related problem, but one of succession in time of the law which applies only for the future15? Is it possible that the same procedural exception might have a different legal regime of implementation? Thus, each time a new law brings modifications to the previous legal dispositions in terms of certain social relationships, all the effects generated before its entry into force can no longer be modified following the adoption of the new regulation16. Is has been noticed moreover also an inefficiency of the direct applicability/ implementation of the CEDO conventional provisions and case law, in the absence of 15. If the answer is yes, why did the legislator, for instance, through Law no. 202/2010 regarding certain measures for trials settlement acceleration, provide at Art. XXVI the following” The provisions of art. 26 comma (3) of Law no. 10/2001 regarding the legal regime of some real estate property which had been abusively taken over during the period March 6, 1945—December 22, 1989, republished, further amended and supplemented, as well as with those brought through this law, by art. 132 comma (9) of Law no. 31/1990regarding trade companies, republished, further amended and supplemented, and with the ones made through this law and the ones of art. 4 comma (6) and of art. 5 commas (1) and (2) of Law no. 221/2009 regarding political convictions and the administrative measures assimilated to the later, ruled during the period March 6, 1945—December 22, 1989,further amended and supplemented, and with the ones made through this law, apply also to the trials pending at the court of first instance, unless a decision has been ruled in the case by the date of entrance into force of the hereby law? 16. The DECISION no.1.105 of September 8, 2011 regarding the exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. I point 46 of title I of Law no. 247/2005 regarding the reformation in the field of property and justice, as well as some accompanying measures, published in the Official Gazette no. 783 as of 04.11.2011; the full text of the decision is available on the official website of the Romanian Constitutional Court: https://www.ccr.ro/ccrSearch/MainSearch/SearchForm.aspx, last accessed on 04.03.2017. 102 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE COURT, THE EVOLUTIONS OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE... an express regulation in the case of the un-reasonability of the term for the settlement of the proceedings, argument which leads us to consider that the aspects related to the litigants’ actions in the case of the excessive extension of the case settlements, is a fundamental problem of the Romanian legal system, and the problem referred to in this study, brings into the attention a requirement which is mandatory in order to guarantee the right to a fair trial. Under this circumstance, to the extent in which the old regulation did not establish a deadline which might interrupt the effects of the obsolescence, we consider that it is both a liability of the courts of law (which must assume the important role of improving and unifying the juridical practice), and the liability of the legislator, to regulate this shortcoming of the new Civil procedure code. The legal problem results from the legislative enforcement process (being still uncertain whether by this, the equality of rights of the citizens was infringed or not), shortcoming which is self-evident, with regard to which the relevant courts have proven their inability, although, generally speaking, the judicial practice has the role to solve even such situations. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 93-104, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 103 5 The fluid recovery in class actions executions in Brazil and the Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD) Fernanda Lissa Fujiwara Homma LLM in Law at the Federal University of Paraná. Member of the Comparative Civil Procedure Law Nucleum at the Federal University of Paraná. Lawyer. fernanda.fujiwara@gmail.com Abstract: In the execution of class actions in Brazil, something that is especially important is the administrative funds for being the current destination of the pecuniary damages. It is an institute that, supposedly, has as main function to operate the fluid recovery. It seeks to repair the legal asset in the best possible way, when a specific injunction is impracticable. However, at the same time, it moves away from the idea of an execution connected to the jurisdiction and the potential of the injunctions determined to operate in the case. Thus, based in an analytical methodology, we seek to study the configuration and performance of the main fund in Brazil, which is Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD). From the origin of its resources to the problem of their proper destination we seek, above all, to highlight the conflict of the need to repair the originally harmed legal asset in the best possible way, with the way the funds operate, that is openly disconnected from the adjudicative process. Keywords: pecuniary executions; class actions; administrative funds; fluid recovery Resumo: Na execução dos processos coletivos no Brasil uma figura que ganha especial importância é a dos fundos administrativos, o atual destino das condenações pecuniárias. É instituto que, supostamente, tem como principal função operar a Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 105 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA reparação fluida e buscar reparar o bem jurídico da melhor maneira possível quando uma tutela específica torna-se inviável. Entretanto, ao mesmo tempo, afasta-se de uma execução ligada a jurisdição e das potencialidades dos provimentos executivos do juiz. Assim, a partir de uma metodologia analítica, busca-se o estudo da configuração e atuação do principal fundo no Brasil, que é o Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos (FDD). Da origem de seus recursos ao problema de sua adequada destinação, buscase, sobretudo, atentar ao conflito da tentativa de reparar o melhor possível o bem jurídico originalmente lesado com o funcionamento dos fundos, que é abertamente desvinculado do processo. Palavras-chave: execução pecuniária; processos coletivos; FDD; reparação fluida Summary: 1. Introduction 2. Executions of class actions in Brazil and the designation to funds 3. Paradigm for analysis: the FDD 4. Resources and their destination: the problem of the subordination to the LOA 5. Fluid recovery? 6. Conclusion 1. INTRODUCTION The analysis of the execution is extremely relevant within the class action system, although it has been left a little aside by the doctrine. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental part of the procedure and it is crucial to keep in mind that it is the execution that makes it possible to verify the effects that the class action can operate in the real world. It is mainly under this approach that the study of execution must be developed: as something that is organic to the jurisdiction and connected to a procedure committed to protect rights. Thus, this study begins with a panoramic view of the execution of class actions in Brazil. Especially, we analyze how its configuration gave rise to the fluid recovery, because of a legal prediction that allocates the class actions’ residual damages to a fund. Next, we analyze the Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD), a federal fund that can be considered the main one in the Brazilian system because of its organization and bulky resources – therefore a paradigm for the analysis of the others. In addition, it is fundamental to face one of the main problems that the use of the funds involve: its submission to the Annual Budget Act and its connection with the State’s administration. Finally, we analyze its function in contrast to the fluid recovery that was originally drawn in the US legal system and we try to question whether or not the Brazilian institute can be considered a fluid recovery. 106 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) 2. EXECUTIONS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE ALLOCATION TO FUNDS In general, the execution of class actions in Brazil unfolds in one way for diffuse and collective rights and in another for individual homogeneous rights; it is a division due to the similarity of the procedures to be adopted in each case. The diffuse and collective rights strictu sensu have a transindividual character, distinguished, mainly, by their indivisibility, their unavailability and their non-patrimonial essence that reflect immensely in the form of their execution. The best form of protection is the preventive one, that acts in a way to avoid the injury to happen; and specific: in case it happens it should be repaired in natura and as a fully as possible, so as to preserve the nature of the right and keep it whole for all its owners.1 Moreover, a fundamental characteristic of the execution of diffuse and collective rights is their mandatoriness, which is to say that the plaintiff’s representative cannot give up executing a favorable decision for the represented ones.2 So that, in cases of their omission, there is a legal provision3 deliberately enforcing this special: in these cases, the execution must be promoted by a representative of the Public Prosecution Service. Thus, in the protection of collective assets, the judicial measures adopted must maintain or restore their fundamental characteristics and guarantee their use in equal conditions of quality and quantity, for all holders. The maintenance of these characteristics can only be done through the complete recomposition of the damaged asset; otherwise, it will not contemplate the plurality of interests connected to it.4 In attention to that, there are the provisions on specific injunctions, obligations to do and not to do, both in the Consumer Defense Code (Act n. 8.078/1990), especially in article 84 and in the Civil Procedure Code (Act n. 13.105/2015), in articles 536 to 538.5 Because of that, there is the possibility to use all sorts of injunctions, aiming at more adequate provisions to protect the rights. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000. p. 94. VENTURI, E. Idem, p. 106. It is stated in the Popular Action Atc: BRASIL. Lei n.º 4717/1965. Art. 16. Caso decorridos 60 (sessenta) dias da publicação da sentença condenatória de segunda instância, sem que o autor ou terceiro promova a respectiva execução, o representante do Ministério Público a promoverá nos 30 (trinta) dias seguintes, sob pena de falta grave. And in the Public Civil Action Act: BRASIL. Lei 7347/1985. Art. 15. Decorridos sessenta dias do trânsito em julgado da sentença condenatória, sem que a associação autora lhe promova a execução, deverá fazê-lo o Ministério Público, facultada igual iniciativa aos demais legitimados. SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução específica e a Ação Civil Pública. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.). A Ação Civil Pública após 20 anos: efetividade e desafios. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2005. p. 86. About that: MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Tutela Específica (arts. 461, CPC e 84, CDC). São Paulo: Editora: Revista dos Tribunais, 2000 and TALAMINI, Eduardo. Tutela relativa aos deveres de fazer e Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 107 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA Regarding the execution of homogeneous individual rights, the system currently adopted is specified in Articles 95 to 100 of the Consumer Defense Code. The standard procedure is that the sentence must generically establish the liability of the defendants for the damages caused. Then, the victims, their successors or others legally legitimated may promote the liquidation and execution of this sentence. Contrary to what happens in the execution of diffuse and collective rights, the protection of homogeneous individual interests tends to be compensatory, aimed at the payment of a certain amount, instead of a specific protection. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility to use injunctions, such as in cases involving the recall.6 However, even with the possibility of promoting a collective execution, usually there is a preference for this biphasic procedure, in which the case is collective only in the beginning. It dies with a sentence and leaves the execution to the individuals. Such option ends up taking away much of the strength and effectiveness of the class action, undermining the collective technique, precisely because it contradicts its aptitude for molecularizing the demands.7 Thus, part of the doctrine claims there is a “pulverization of rights”8 to refer to this individualized analysis of interests or issues that is done by the Courts and whose assessment should have occurred jointly.9 This spraying is heavily criticized as it opposes to an effective jurisdictional performance by generating thousands of cases instead of only one. The Courts loose economic and human resources and go against a more practical and efficiency-oriented management. This ends up contributing to an overwhelming workload of the Courts.10 In this sense, there is a tendency to choose techniques that seek to promote a procedure that is more aligned with the fundamental objectives of the homogeneous individual rights. Incentives are given for the defendants themselves to take the necessary measures to repair the injured individuals when they are easily identifiable.11 não fazer: e sua extensão aos deveres de entrega de coisa (CPC, arts. 461 e 461-A; CDC, art.84). 2. ed. rev., atual. ampl. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2003. 6. ALMEIDA, Gustavo Milaré. Execução de Interesses Individuais Homogêneos: Análise crítica e propostas. São Paulo, 2012. 247 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo. f. 112. 7. GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos. Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015. p. 224. 8. This term is especially used and justified by Professors Aluísio Gonçalves Castro Mendes, Gustavo Osna and Sergio Cruz Arenhart in: MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART, Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento de sentenças coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de Processo, v. 222, p. 41-64, 2013. 9. MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART, Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento de sentenças coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de Processo, v. 222, p. 41-64, 2013. p. 44. 10. MENDES, A. G. C.; OSNA, G.; ARENHART, S. C. Idem, p. 47. 11. This option is openly raised by Luciano Picoli Gagno em: GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos. Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015. 108 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) In cases of injury to bank customers, for example, the financial institution itself should make the deposits into their customers’ accounts. It is about using techniques that do not require an individual action of the injured party. Although being the easiest alternative within the current system, it is by far the most inefficient and distant to the fundamental objectives of the Brazilian class action. In summary, we can perceive that, in general, in order to repair injuries to diffuse, collective and individual homogeneous rights, techniques that have the ability to reconstitute as much as possible the damaged legal asset are privileged, drifting away from the techniques applied on individual claims. However, if this is not possible, the only alternative is to resort to an ordinary technique that is not always efficient, either due to the very nature of the damaged property or due to flaws that are inherent of the judicial system. Considering that, the legislation itself sought to create a safeguard so that, even in this situation, there could be an attempt to hold responsible the ones who caused the injury and also to try to recover the legal asset as much as possible. We refer to the provisions of article 13 of the Public Civil Action Act (Act n. 7.347/1985) that brought the so-called fluid recovery, allocating this money to funds that, in turn, will try to perform this recomposition. 3. PARADIGM FOR ANALYSIS: THE FDD The Public Civil Action Act, might not be the first legislation on collective rights, but was the first one that predicted the possibility of allocating the amount from pecuniary damages in collective cases to a fund, due to the impossibility of full compensation. On federal level, this fund was initially regulated by Decree n. 92.302/1986, subsequently repealed by Decree n. 407 of 1991, which was again repealed by Decree n. 1.306/1994, which is currently valid, with some amendments from Decree n. 96.617 /1988. The fund is denominated Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (FDD). The Consumer Protection Code, in turn, made reference to the fund that was created by the Public Civil Action Act as the recipient of any amount that might be residual in consumer class actions. The FDD was chosen as paradigm for this analysis not only because of its detailed regulation, but also for being the most relevant and resourceful fund. In addition to that, there is a serious issue regarding the lack of standardization of the states’ funds in terms of regulation.12 12. A major problem to study the state funds is the lack of their implementation by many federated states. Also because of the federative system, it is difficult to verify their operation. Only to have a parameter: in a survey carried out by the State Public Prosecutor’s Office of Goiânia in 2013, on the situation of the state funds of the Environment, Diffuse Rights and Forests, it can be seen that the states of Alagoas, Amazonas and Espírito Santo, did not have any funds for this area. The other states, mostly adopted the Special Fund for the Envirolment (FEMA). Survey available at: <http:// www.mpgo.mp. br/portal/system/resources/W1siZiIsIjIwMTMvMDQvMTYvMTJfMDNfMjRfOTlfZ Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 109 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA Even so, many questions remained about the operation of the FDD, especially regarding the duties of its management council. Therefore it was edited the Act n. 9.008/1995, which created the Federal Board of the Diffuse Rights Defense Fund (CFDD) inside the organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice. It was established the main rules regarding its purpose, the origins of its resources and their application. Act n. 9.008/1995, already in its article 1, section 2, brings the resources that can integrate the FDD. Basically, they are the judicial damages from class actions that seek to protect the environment, consumers, legal assets or rights of artistic, aesthetic or historical value and other diffuse or collective interests. In addition, FDD funds include fines and damages resulting from the protection of people with disabilities and fines against violations of the economic order. Although being created in 1985, at least until 2005, the FDD had a negligible revenue level, considering the demands involving damages on collective rights. This may be due to not only the lack of adequate regulation of the origins of the resources, but also due to the lack of knowledge about how the FDD operated.13 However, there has been a gradual increase in its revenue over the last 11 years. In addition, it is important to consider the percentage that each of the categories contribute to the revenue of the fund. In this sense, data survey conducted by Professor Albano Francisco Schmidt14 and complemented in this study seems fundamental. Table 1. Total revenue of the FDD (per year) YEAR 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 REVENUE R$4.534.793,04 R$11.682.120,87 R$30.038.220,75 R$73.139.111,42 R$52.196.887,98 R$31.161.751,83 R$44.240.709,38 R$58.128.704,71 R$121.870.115,27 R$192.354.624,49 % OF REVENUE 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% nVuZG9zX2VzdGFkdWFpc19kZV9tZWlvX2FtYmllbnRlX2VfZGlyZWl0b3NfZGlmdXNvcy5wZGYiXV0/ fundos_estaduais_de_meio_ambiente_e_direitos_difusos.pdf> 13. SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Os primeiros 30 Anos do Fundo De Defesa De Direitos Difusos sob a luz da Análise Econômica Do Direito: “contribuintes”, projetos apoiados e novas perspectivas sociais. Argumentum Revista de Direito, n. 15, p. 201-226, 2014. p. 216. 14. The reserach originally made by professor Albano Schmidt brings data from the last 10 years of the FDD revenue, from 2005 until half of 2014. Based on the data already collected by the author we use the same methodology of cataloging and organizing it, completing it with the data of the end of 2014 and 2015. 110 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) YEAR 2015 TOTAL REVENUE R$564.272.628,92 R$1.183.619.668,66 % OF REVENUE 100% 100% It is possible to verify that the FDD resources from fines and damages on cases that involve the environmental protection represented only 0.83% of the fund’s total revenues in recent years. This raises many to questions related to whether the amounts collected adequately mirror the reality in Courts:15 either the injunctions on the cases are being highly efficient and providing an in natura reparation; or actions are not moving forward due to the complexity and high costs that this kind of case usually involves. Table 2. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Environmental Protection (per year) ENVIRONMENT 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL FINES + DAMAGES R$43.840,00 R$29.288,36 R$840.120,92 R$1.788.225,28 R$1.106.917,53 R$620.694,33 R$3.445.073,02 R$679.571,20 R$1.008.904,22 R$152.226,27 R$192.407,34 R$9.907.268,58 % OF REVENUE 1,04% 0,26% 2,80% 2,46% 2,23% 2,01% 8,31% 1,19% 0,84% 0,08% 0,03% 0,83% Fines and damages related to Consumer protection represent approximately 1.25% of total revenue since 2005. It is known that consumer actions are thousands in the Brazilian judiciary, which again leads us to inquire if the execution is being so effective that there is no need to direct residual values to the fund, or it is the opposite: if there is a fundamental problem and the class actions are not even making to this stage.16 Table 3. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Consumer Protection (per year) CONSUMER 2005 2006 2007 2008 FINES + DAMAGES R$1.144.097,23 R$245.206,03 R$713.451,71 R$3.801.021,17 % OF REVENUE 27% 2,16% 2,38% 5,22% 15. SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Op. Cit., p. 217. 16. SCHMIDT, A. F. Idem, p. 218. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 111 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA CONSUMER 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL FINES + DAMAGES R$202.142,85 R$305.572,89 R$315.978,33 R$3.767.691,26 R$1.546.523,04 R$2.101.163,13 R$760.596,32 R$14.903.443,96 % OF REVENUE 4,01% 1% 2,1% 6,71% 1,2% 0,45% 0,12% 1,25% On the other hand, the reports consulted – available on the Ministry of Justice website – show that 6.95% of the total amount collected, almost fifty million Brazillian Reais that are about 16 million US dollars, and are under the caption “other collective and diffuse interests”. Professor Schmidt criticizes the fact that such a large amount is under a vague caption. This would contradict the FDD guidelines, that determines the injured rights to be clearly revealed, in order to make it possible to direct the resources for their proper reparation. In addition, this generic figure jeopardizes the transparency of the fund and also the analysis of the compatibility of what has been developed by the CFDD and the objectives of its creation.17 Table 4. Fines and damages of the FDD in other Collective and Difuse Interests Protection (per year) OTHER INTERESTS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 FINES + DAMAGES R$443.548,76 R$366.219,35 R$683.975,15 R$2.595.334,85 R$1.854.965,82 R$5.486.265,20 . 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL R$6.420.152,64 R$17.037.216,16 R$11.287.502,51 R$29.737.931,18 R$82.312.451,33 % OF REVENUE 10,5% 3,22% 2,28% 3,57% 3,73% 17,80% 15,42% 11,26% 14,16% 5,87% 5,28% 6,95% Finally, the data collection from offenses that involve the economic order show that in the last years, their protection represented at least 87.53% of the FDD revenues. We highlight that, in the year of 2015, it reached the percentage of 93.02%. 17. SCHMIDT, A. F. Idem, p. 218. 112 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) Table 5. Fines and damages of the FDD in the Economic Order Protection (per year) ECONOMIC ORDER 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL FINES + DAMAGES R$2.530.573,64 R$10.715.548,85 R$27.693.861,48 R$64.114.659,78 R$46.026.106,42 R$23.863.448,07 R$30.536.112,68 R$45.642.670,28 R$91.857.098,46 R$169.098.785,48 R$524.027.225,58 R$1.036.106.090,72 % OF REVENUE 59,92% 94,18% 92,42% 88,12% 92,58% 77,44% 73,65% 80,06% 76,36% 87,91% 93,02% 87,53% Therefore, it is possible to state that the overwhelming source of revenue of the FDD comes not from judicial convictions in class action, according to the provisions of the Public Civil Action ACt, but from administrative infractions determined by the Administrative Council of Economic Defense (CADE), which is responsible for this kind of control. This is related to, above all, the high specialization and expertise of this instance that makes its decisions extremely difficult to change in the adjudication.18 In addition, it seems important to take into consideration how this impact, or should impact, on the performance of fund managers, especially the CFDD. It is also worth noting the inclusion of the § 2o in article 13 of the Public Civil Action Act, by Act n. 12.288/2010. It states need for the allocation of resources for damages on cases involving ethnic discrimination, according to the guidelines of the National Council for the Promotion of Racial Equality or the local Racial Equality Promotion Councils, depending on the extension of the damages.19 Regarding the allocation of resources, it usually occurs through agreements or specific transfer contracts with public agencies, at federal, state or municipal level and with nonprofit organizations.20 These partnerships are regulated by administrative acts 18. About CADE’s work on the economic order’s defense: FORGIONI, Paula. Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. 8. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2015. 19. BRASIL. Lei n.º 7.347/1985. Art. 13. § 2o Havendo acordo ou condenação com fundamento em dano causado por ato de discriminação étnica nos termos do disposto no art. 1o desta Lei, a prestação em dinheiro reverterá diretamente ao fundo de que trata o caput e será utilizada para ações de promoção da igualdade étnica, conforme definição do Conselho Nacional de Promoção da Igualdade Racial, na hipótese de extensão nacional, ou dos Conselhos de Promoção de Igualdade Racial estaduais ou locais, nas hipóteses de danos com extensão regional ou local, respectivamente. 20. A celebração dos convênios é regulada, principalmente, por meio da Portaria Interministerial nº 507, de 24 de novembro de 2011 do Conselho Federal Gestor do Fundo de Defesa dos Direitos Difusos. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 113 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA such as resolutions that establish the general guidelines for their signing, execution, supervision and accountability. For the selection, the interested parties must submit to the CFDD projects that are related to the criteria and requirements established by the decrees. The project must include all the basic data of the recipient and the project that will be financed, especially: (i) the description of the project; (ii) the justification with the link between the proposal and the guidelines of the fund’s program with the expected results; (iii) an estimative of the necessary financial resources; (iv) a prediction of the deadline for completion; (v) and information about the technical capacity of the proposer to conduct the project. However, before allocating revenues for projects, it is fundamental that the fund has its resources secured in the annual Budget Act. 4. RESOURCES AND THEIR DESTINATION: THE PROBLEM OF THE FDD’S SUBORDINATION TO THE ANNUAL BUDGET ACT The FDD’s resources depend a great deal of the Annual Budget Act, since it integrates the public administration, with its management council, the CFDD, linked to the Ministry of Justice. Thus, the doctrine heavily criticizes this subordination that could deplete its purposes, since because of a political decision not to grant budgetary credits to the fund, its performance would be compromised. This concern is plausible, especially since it indeed happens quite usually. An analysis carried out by Arthur Badin shows that, from 2000 to 2007, budgetary credits approved for the FDD were significantly lower than the revenues: Source: BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano 17, n. 67, p. 6299, 2008. p. 85. Author’s formatting. 114 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) The logical option would be the full availability of what was collected in a year, for the next year, since it is an amount with a specific purpose. However, it is not what happens when we analyze the resources available to be used in projects by CFDD. This situation becomes even more problematic when we verify that the State is also one of the biggest defendants in the Judiciary.21 However, the funds and their configuration were a choice made by the legislator. Much censurable it might be, it seems difficult to be ignored by the Courts. Another major concern of the doctrine is the proper application of the amount available in the fund considering the original plaintiffs. Professor Elton Venturi, for example, defends that even after integrating the fund, the values must be directed to the benefit of the injured members of the class action – specifically aiming to satisfy their common interests.22 Therefore, there is an undoubtful link between the origin and application of the resources, even though the legislation has left a wide margin of discretion for the fund management council. However, the only parameter established by the legislation is article 7 of Decree n. 1.306/1994 that determines that the use of the resources should be, as much as possible, related to the nature of the infraction or damage caused. Thus, values from pecuniary convictions in the consumer protection must be applied in this area, instead of in the environmental area, for example. The doctrine also defends the importance of the use of the revenues in the same geographic area where the damage occurred. Although there is no specific rule that determines so, it seems a logical alternative considering the best protection of those who were more directly harmed.23 The use of the fund’s resources in an attempt to repair the damaged legal asset does not surprise considering its own purpose. On the other hand, its use in the promotion of educational and scientific events and in the edition of informational material specifically related to the offense or damage caused also appears to be justifiable, from a prospective idea of protection and considering that many damages will not allow any kind of reparation.24 This seems to be the case predicted by § 2 of article 13 of the Public Civil Action Act regarding the promotion of programs related to ethnic equality and diversity, on damages resulting from ethnic discrimination actions. 21. On this matter see: BRASIIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. 100 Maiores Litigantes. Brasília, 2011. And: FONSECA, Juliana Pondé. O (Des)controle do Estado no Judiciário brasileiro: direito e política em processo. Curitiba, 2015. 274 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Paraná. 22. VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000. p. 158. 23. LEITE, José Rubens Morato; DANTAS, Marcelo Buzaglo. Algumas considerações acerca do Fundo para reconstituição dos bens lesados. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 726, p. 71-82, 1996. p. 81. 24. MACEDO JÚNIOR, Ronaldo Porto. Propostas para a reformulação da Lei que criou o Fundo de Reparação de Interesses Difusos Lesados. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.) Ação Civil Pública: Lei 7.347/1985 – 15 anos. 2. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2002. p. 814. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 115 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA A more controversial issue refers to the use of fund’s resources in the modernization, acquisition and improvement of the equipment of the State agencies responsible for activities related to the protection of diffuse and collective interests. Such an extension is dangerous and undesirable, since it opens the possibility to use resources in activities that are completely diverted from the class action’s purpose.25 Although some authors, such as Arthur Badin, defend this initiative stating that it was attentive to the scarcity of public resources26 others – rightly – claim that this possibility would not be justifiable, since it would go against the original intention of the legislator.27 In addition, there is a large gap on the supervision of how the fund’s resources are being used. The process of selecting proposals is relatively well defined and objective. However, there is a great margin of discretion for the fund’s council in this choice, especially since the establishment of priority areas is defined by administrative act. Thus, there is a very strong criticism for the fact that the use of the resources from the funds is limited to the simple presentation of projects by the interested parties with the approval, or not, by the members of the CFDD.28 When analyzing the Public Calls of the CFDD, in particular the last one published, the n. 01/2015, we can see that there is a thematic division between five main areas, each with its own Call: (i) environment, (ii) consumer (iii) antitrust (iv) historic patrimony and (v) other diffuse rights. The Call I, for the environment, has prioritized projects involving sustainable actions, promotion of traditional practices in rural communities, protection of the environment through the sustainable use of natural resources. The selected projects for Calls II (consumer) and III (competition) focused on projects that involved the conscious consuming and the promotion of an antitrust culture focusing on the more needing communities. Projects selected for Calls IV (historic patrimony) and V (other diffuse and collective rights) involve valuing linguistic diversity – in particular, projects that focused on the Brazilian Language of Signs (LIBRAS), the fight against child labor and the promotion of racial equality. Also, preserving the historic patrimony from the human, environmental and architectural points of view. 25. MACEDO JÚNIOR, R. P. Idem, p. 814. 26. BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano 17, n. 67, p. 62-99, 2008. p. 81. 27. MILARÉ, Édis. SETZER, Joana. CASTANHO, Renata. O compromisso de ajustamento de conduta e o fundo de defesa de direitos difusos: relação entre os instrumentos alternativos de defesa ambiental da Lei 7.347/1985. Revista de Direito Ambiental, n. 38, p. 9-22, 2005. p. 9. 28. DELLORE, Luiz Guilherme Pennachi. Fundo federal de Reparação de Direitos Difusos (FDD): aspectos atuais e análise comparativa com institutos norte-americanos. Revista de Direito Ambiental, vol. 38, p. 124-139, 2005. p. 131. 116 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) A huge number of projects are presented every year, and it keeps increasing. It is mainly due to a better knowledge about the FDD. Just to illustrate the point, in 2014, 526 working proposals were sent to the CFDD (257 in the environment area, 213 in historical and other diffuse rights’ area and 56 in the consumer area). Of those, 29 were selected as priority, but only 11 projects received resources in 2015.29 Source: BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do Exercício de 2015. Brasília, 2016. p. 29. Author’s formatting. Although FDD’s revenue collection has increased in recent years, the number of projects supported has been decreasing, and is well below expectations, considering the relation between resources available and the reversions to the Fund. In addition, it should be noted that although the supported projects are undoubtedly deserving of this funding, many doubts remain about their connection with those who were plaintiffs of the action that originated these resources. Also, it should be noticed that there aren’t any public reports detailing these projects’ performance and results. This, in a certain way, harms the accountability on the allocation of the values that have originated from an injury to the community. 5. FLUID RECOVERY? As previously noted, there would be a fluid recovery system in Brazil because of the allocation of the residual resources of class actions to a fund. This fund would be entrusted to perform the reparation of the damaged legal assets in an indirect manner, in the best possible way. Such technique would be inspired by the fluid recovery in the US system, which takes place, precisely, in an attempt to offer a suitable allocation to the residual amount left in the class actions’ damages. It is above all a recognition of the influence that the US class action had on the Brazilian system, since it comes from it - albeit indirectly, through the Italian 29. BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do Exercício de 2015. Brasília, 2016. p. 28. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 117 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA doctrine; also, it’s justifies the US class action to be the most important source in the interpretation and application of our collective procedural law. However, in a more detailed analysis it is possible to verify several points in which the fluid recovery of the Brazilian system differs from the institute in US system. Mainly, because of the technique of the funds used in Brazil. So, it is not only an ontological difference, but also the very framework that its application in both systems ended up getting.30 Above all, the fluid recovery in the United States is jurisdictional. That is to say, the institution that determines how to apply the residual amount are the Courts, unlike the Brazilian system in which the application of resources is given by the fund’s management council linked to the Public Administration. In this sense, some authors claim that in order to carry out a comparative study of the fluid recovery between the Brazilian system and the US legal system, considering the FDD, it would be better to compare it to the fund created by the US environmental legislation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Professor Carlos Alberto de Salles defends this position saying that the similarity comes mainly from the fact that CERCLA Superfund is also an administrative fund, linked to a government agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that determines the destination of its resources.31 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the CERCLA Superfund has a very complex mechanism that involves funding not only through class action damages, but mostly through taxation on the chemical and petroleum industries as well as a very strict liability system.32 6. CONCLUSIONS At the end of the analysis carried out in this research paper, several questions remain, especially since fluid recovery in Brazil does not match any other institute in comparative law; neither it’s compatible with the system of collective procedure that we hope to have. 30. GIDI, Antonio. A Class Action como instrumento de tutela coletiva: As ações coletivas em uma perspectiva comparada. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2007. p. 17. 31. SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução Judicial em Matéria Ambiental. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1998. p. 309-315. 32. To start a study about the CERCLA Superfund see: HIRD, John A. Superfund: The Political Economy of Environmental Risk. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994 and JUDY, Martha L. PROBST, Katherine N. Superfund at 30. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 11, p. 191-247, 2009. 118 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com THE FLUID RECOVERY IN CLASS ACTIONS EXECUTIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE DIFFUSE RIGHTS DEFENSE FUND (FDD) The Brazillian system cannot be considered a fluid recovery as proposed by US system. It is not a mechanism linked to the Courts, nor is it connected to the case that originated the resources. However, it is also not possible to compare it bluntly to other institutes like the CERCLA Superfund, only because they both are administrative funds. Their purpose, in essence, is completely different, especially considering the destination of resources in both cases. In addition, the fluid recovery through funds that was developed in Brazil has several inconsistencies with an execution that is effectively linked to the jurisdiction. Its current configuration demands an urgent reflection on this matter and in the way we want to develop our collective procedure. REFERENCES: ALMEIDA, Gustavo Milaré. Execução de Interesses Individuais Homogêneos: Análise crítica e propostas. São Paulo, 2012. 247 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo. BADIN, Arthur. O fundo de defesa de direitos difusos. Revista de Direito do Consumidor, ano 17, n. 67, p. 62-99, 2008. BRASIIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. 100 Maiores Litigantes. Brasília, 2011. BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Secretaria Nacional do Consumidor. Relatório de Gestão do Exercício de 2015. Brasília, 2016. DELLORE, Luiz Guilherme Pennachi. Fundo federal de Reparação de Direitos Difusos (FDD): aspectos atuais e análise comparativa com institutos norte-americanos. Revista de Direito Ambiental, vol. 38, p. 124-139, 2005. FONSECA, Juliana Pondé. O (Des)controle do Estado no Judiciário brasileiro: direito e política em processo. Curitiba, 2015. 274 f. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade Federal do Paraná. FORGIONI, Paula. Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. 8. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2015. GAGNO, Luciano Picoli. Tutela mandamental e efetividade dos direitos individuais homogêneos. Revista dos Tribunais, vol. 953, p. 223-257, 2015. GIDI, Antonio. A Class Action como instrumento de tutela coletiva: As ações coletivas em uma perspectiva comparada. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2007. HIRD, John A. Superfund: The Political Economy of Environmental Risk. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. JUDY, Martha L. PROBST, Katherine N. Superfund at 30. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 11, p. 191-247, 2009. LEITE, José Rubens Morato; DANTAS, Marcelo Buzaglo. Algumas considerações acerca do Fundo para reconstituição dos bens lesados. Revista dos Tribunais, v. 726, p. 71-82, 1996. MACEDO JÚNIOR, Ronaldo Porto. Propostas para a reformulação da Lei que criou o Fundo de Reparação de Interesses Difusos Lesados. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.) Ação Civil Pública: Lei 7.347/1985 – 15 anos. 2. ed. rev. atual. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2002. MARINONI, Luiz Guilherme. Tutela Específica (arts. 461, CPC e 84, CDC). São Paulo: Editora: Revista dos Tribunais, 2000. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 119 FERNANDA LISSA FUJIWARA HOMMA MENDES, Aluísio Gonçalves Castro; OSNA, Gustavo; ARENHART, Sérgio Cruz. Cumprimento de sentenças coletivas: da pulverização à molecularização. Revista de Processo, v. 222, p. 41-64, 2013. MILARÉ, Édis. SETZER, Joana. CASTANHO, Renata. O compromisso de ajustamento de conduta e o fundo de defesa de direitos difusos: relação entre os instrumentos alternativos de defesa ambiental da Lei 7.347/1985. Revista de Direito Ambiental, n. 38, p. 9-22, 2005. SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução específica e a Ação Civil Pública. In: MILARÉ, Édis (Coord.). A Ação Civil Pública após 20 anos: efetividade e desafios. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2005. SALLES, Carlos Alberto de. Execução Judicial em Matéria Ambiental. São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 1998. SCHMIDT, Albano Francisco. Os primeiros 30 Anos do Fundo De Defesa De Direitos Difusos sob a luz da Análise Econômica Do Direito: “contribuintes”, projetos apoiados e novas perspectivas sociais. Argumentum Revista de Direito, n. 15, p. 201-226, 2014. TALAMINI, Eduardo. Tutela relativa aos deveres de fazer e não fazer: e sua extensão aos deveres de entrega de coisa (CPC, arts. 461 e 461-A; CDC, art.84). 2. ed. rev., atual. ampl. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2003. VENTURI, Elton. Execução da tutela coletiva. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2000. 120 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 123-138, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 6 Reflexiones acerca de la interferencia del control administrativo en la independencia jurisdiccional Reflections on the interference of administrative control in jurisdictional independence Jorge Isaac Torres Manrique1 Resumen: En la presente entrega, el autor analiza los alcances de la temática de la independencia jurisdiccional y el control administrativo disciplinario de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura. Ello, a propósito de la expedición de una resolución de sanción por parte de la mencionada Oficina. Palabras claves: Independencia judicial, control administrativo, debido proceso, tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, tutela procesal efectiva. 1. Consultor Jurídico. Abogado por la Universidad Católica de Santa María (Arequipa). Egresado de los Doctorados en Derecho y Administración, y de las Maestrías en Derecho Empresarial y Derecho Penal, por la Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal (Lima). Columnista de la Asociación Civil El-terno.com (Perú). Miembro del Comité Científico Internacional del Instituto Jurídico Internacional de Torino (Italia). Miembro Asociado de E-Justicia Latinoamérica (Argentina). Experto en Derecho Empresarial y Administrativo, en Avalón, la Red de Expertos de España, Portugal y Latinoamérica (España). Miembro, par académico evaluador, corresponsal e investigador externo adscrito al Instituto Vasco de Derecho Procesal (País Vasco). Par académico evaluador de la Revista Misión Jurídica, de la Universidad Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca (Colombia). Investigador Externo de la Universidad Global (Honduras). Miembro Consultivo Nacional y Director de Investigaciones de la Revista de Actualidad Jurídica Essentia Juris (Perú). Director, Traductor, Autor y Coautor de diversos libros Derecho Constitucional, Procesal Constitucional, Derechos Fundamentales, Garantías Constitucionales y Justicia Restaurativa. Autor de diversos artículos de carácter jurídico y de administración, en importantes medios físicos y virtuales de más de veinte países. Ponente nacional e internacional en diversos eventos académicos de carácter jurídico. kimblellmen@outlook.com. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 121 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE Abstract: In this presentation, the author analyzes the scope of jurisdictional independence and administrative disciplinary control of the Office of Judicial Control. This, with regard to the issuance of a sanction resolution by the aforementioned Office. Keywords: Judicial independence, administrative control, due process, effective judicial protection, effective procedural protection. Sumario: I. A modo de introducción.- II. En relación a la garantía constitucional de competencia de la judicatura.- III. Acerca de la independencia judicial y el control administrativo de la OCMA.- IV. Tutela procesal efectiva.- V. Sobre la motivación de las resoluciones administrativas.- VI. Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas.- VII. Convencionalidad.- VIII. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad.- IX. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad.- X. Tetra análisis jurígeno.- XI. Breve resumen de la Resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial.- XII. Analizando la misma.- XIII. Conclusiones.- XIV. Sugerencias.- XV. Referencias bibliográficas. I. A MODO DE INTRODUCCIÓN.- En no pocas oportunidades, se observa con aceptación inobjetable el que el ente administrativo controle la labor judicial. Sin embargo, ciertamente ello corresponde a un tema espinoso, nada pacífico, muy relevante, insoslayable como trascendente. En principio, corresponde dejar constancia que el control administrativo disciplinario de los jueces, comporta un origen ciertamente administrativo. Allende de ello, no debe perderse de vista que dicha naturaleza sancionadora no solamente debe abrazar lo abrazado por los predios administrativos sancionatorios, sino también, los constitucionales, convencionales y también, legítimos. Luego, es verse que la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura (OCMA), es el órgano disciplinario del Poder Judicial, goza de autonomía funcional, tiene competencia nacional y desarrolla actividades de control preventivo, concurrente y posterior; respecto de todos los magistrados del Poder Judicial con excepción de los vocales de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República. Asimismo, su actividad contralora comprende a todos los auxiliares jurisdiccionales de éste poder del Estado. La OCMA, desarrolla sus actividades con sujeción a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, a su Reglamento de Organización y Funciones y supletoriamente, por el Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley de Normas Generales y Procedimientos Administrativos y los Códigos Adjetivos en materia Civil y Penal, en cuanto le sean aplicables. Además, los objetivos institucionales de la OCMA son: i) Emprender políticas de prevención, que fomenten la lucha contra la corrupción, ii) Identificación de las áreas críticas y erradicación de malas prácticas en el servicio de justicia, iii) Descentralización de las políticas de Control del Poder Judicial, iv) Coadyuvar a que el Poder Judicial se 122 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL desarrolle en observancia a los principios de la administración de justicia y los valores éticos de la función judicial, v) Establecer mecanismos de transparencia y publicidad sobre las acciones de control judicial, vi) Constituirse en un instrumento fundamental para el estricto cumplimiento de las acciones de control orientadas a la permanente evaluación de la conducta funcional de magistrados y auxiliares jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial, y vii) Establecer mecanismos premiales a las buenas practicas judiciales, incentivando el trabajo honesto e independiente de magistrados y auxiliares jurisdiccionales.2 Empero, consideramos que existe una situación problemática, cuando la independencia judicial se vé mellada por el control administrativo, pues este último rebasa sus competencias e ingresa a parcelas exclusivamente de conocimiento jurisdiccional y no administrativo sancionador. En ese orden de ideas, en la presente entrega analizamos en primer término, la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida en fecha 29/01/16, por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial (en adelante, OCMA), y en segundo lugar, la legitimidad que le asiste o no a dicho órgano contralor, para poder juzgar a los señores magistrados. Dicho de otro modo, abordaremos la temática de la independencia jurisdiccional y el control disciplinario administrativo del órgano mencionado. Para la construcción de tal empresa, previamente desarrollaremos algunas instituciones jurídicas que consideramos capitales, las que empalmamos desde una óptica (a excepción de la costumbre) de la totalidad de fuentes del derecho; las mismas que aportarán las luces basilares suficientes. Entre ellas tenemos: i) Garantía constitucional de competencia de la judicatura, ii) Independencia judicial y control administrativo de la OCMA, iii) Tutela procesal efectiva, iv) Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas, v) Principios de tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas, vi) Convencionalidad, vii) Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad, viii) Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad y ix) Tetra análisis jurígeno. Ingresemos pues amable lector, al apasionante recorrido del presente estudio, el que consideramos que trata de unimismarse lo más cercanamente posible al valor justicia, en parcela sancionatoria administrativa disciplinaria. II. EN RELACIÓN A LA GARANTÍA CONSTITUCIONAL DE COMPETENCIA DE LA JUDICATURA.- En principio, tenemos que3 “La competencia es la participación que un órgano jurisdiccional tiene en el Poder Judicial, por la que queda legitimado para desarrollar la 2. 3. S/a. ¿Qué es OCMA?. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de http://ocma.pj.gob.pe/site/portal. aspx?view=queesocma, Lima. PÉREZ DEL BLANCO, Gilberto. La competencia. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http:// procesalciviluam.blogspot.pe/2012/02/tema-5-la-competencia.html, Madrid, 2012. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 123 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE función jurisdiccional respecto de un tipo concreto de conflictos/litigios determinados por un ámbito material, funcional y territorial”. Así también, las reglas de competencia tienen por finalidad establecer a qué juez, entre los muchos que existen, le debe ser propuesta una litis. Por ello, la necesidad del instituto de la competencia puede ser expresada en las siguientes palabras: “Si fuera factible pensar, aunque fuera imaginativamente, acerca de la posibilidad de que existiera un solo juez, no se daría el problema a exponer ahora, puesto que jurisdicción y competencia se identificarían”. Pero como ello no es posible, se hace preciso que se determinen los ámbitos dentro de los cuales puede ser ejercida válidamente, por esos varios jueces, la función jurisdiccional. Por ello, definimos a la competencia como la aptitud que tiene un juez para ejercer válidamente la función jurisdiccional. De esta forma, la competencia es un presupuesto de validez de la relación jurídica procesal. Como lógica consecuencia de lo anterior, todo acto realizado por un juez incompetente será nulo.4 Consecuentemente, la competencia viene a ser todas las acciones procesales que un magistrado o juzgado, puede llevar a cabo el ejercicio de su jurisdicción, las mismas que deberán ubicarse estrictamente en los márgenes establecidos por la ley. III. ACERCA DE LA INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL Y EL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO DE LA OCMA.Ante todo, consideramos importante definir la independencia judicial, así tenemos: “La independencia y responsabilidad en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional es un principio –garantía constitucional– que permite a los órganos jurisdiccionales que en el ejercicio de su función no puedan verse afectados por las decisiones o presiones extra-jurisdiccionales, ajenas a los fines del proceso. Como refiere Bernales, la independencia del Poder Judicial no solo debe estar referida al manejo autónomo de su estructura orgánica, sino fundamentalmente a la autonomía de la decisión de los magistrados, es allí donde se verifica la real independencia de los órganos jurisdiccionales”.5 En primer lugar, corresponde abordar lo concerniente al principio de independencia judicial, el Inc. 2., del Art. 139°, de la Norma Fundamental, establece: “Ninguna autoridad puede avocarse a causas pendientes ante el órgano jurisdiccional ni interferir en el ejercicio de sus funciones. Tampoco puede dejar sin efecto resoluciones que han pasado en autoridad de cosa juzgada, ni cortar procedimientos en trámites, ni modificar sentencias ni retardar su ejecución”. 4. 5. 124 PRIORI POSADA, Giovanni F. La competencia en el proceso civil peruano. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/derysoc/2008/06/05/la-competencia-en-el-proceso-civil-peruano/, Lima, 2008. LAMA MORE, Héctor Enrique. La independencia judicial en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/4a082300 4cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b/D_La_Independencia_Judicial_120912.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEI D=4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b, Lima, 2012. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL El Art. 2.-, del Decreto Supremo Nº 017-93-JUS, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, en relación a la autonomía e independencia del Poder Judicial, señala: “El Poder Judicial en su ejercicio funcional es autónomo en lo político, administrativo, económico, disciplinario e independiente en lo jurisdiccional, con sujeción a la Constitución y a la presente ley”. Además, el Art. 16.-, del citado Decreto estipula: “Los Magistrados son independientes en su actuación jurisdiccional dentro de su competencia. Ninguna autoridad, ni siquiera los Magistrados de instancia superior, pueden interferir en su actuación. Están obligados a preservar esta garantía, bajo responsabilidad, pudiendo dirigirse al Ministerio Público, con conocimiento del Consejo Ejecutivo del Poder Judicial, sin perjuicio de ejercer directamente los derechos que les faculta la ley”. Por su parte, el Art. I.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, en relación a los principios rectores de la carrera judicial, respecto de la independencia e imparcialidad de la función jurisdiccional, preconiza: “Los jueces ejercen sus funciones jurisdiccionales con independencia e imparcialidad, sujetos únicamente a la Constitución y a la ley”. Por su parte, el Fund. 28., de la Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N° 23-2003-AI/TC, al respecto enseña: “La independencia judicial debe ser entendida como aquella capacidad autodeterminativa para proceder a la declaración del derecho, juzgando y haciendo ejecutar lo juzgado, dentro de los marcos que fijan la Constitución y la Ley. En puridad, se trata de una condición de albedrío funcional”. Otro punto que consideramos importante, es el relacionado al carácter tripartito que presenta el principio de independencia judicial. En ese sentido, el Fund. 31., de la Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N° 23-2003-AI/TC, juridiza: “La independencia judicial debe, pues, percibirse como la ausencia de vínculos de sujeción política (imposición de directivas por parte de los órganos políticos) o de procedencia jerárquica al interior de la organización judicial, en lo concerniente a la actuación judicial per se, salvo el caso de los recursos impugnativos, aunque sujetos a las reglas de competencia. El principio de independencia judicial debe entenderse desde tres perspectivas; a saber: a) Como garantía del órgano que administra justicia (independencia orgánica), por sujeción al respeto al principio de separación de poderes. b) Como garantía operativa para la actuación del juez (independencia funcional), por conexión con los principios de reserva y exclusividad de la jurisdicción. c) Como capacidad subjetiva, con sujeción a la propia voluntad de ejercer y defender dicha independencia. Cabe precisar que en este ámbito radica uno de los mayores males de la justicia ordinaria nacional, en gran medida por la falta de convicción y energía para hacer cumplir la garantía de independencia que desde la primera Constitución republicana se consagra y reconoce”. A su turno el Fund. 18., del 0004-2006-PI/TC, del Tribunal Constitucional establece las dos dimensiones del principio de independencia de la función jurisdiccional: “a) Independencia externa. Según esta dimensión, la autoridad judicial, en el desarrollo de Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 125 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE la función jurisdiccional, no puede sujetarse a ningún interés que provenga de fuera de la organización judicial en conjunto, ni admitir presiones para resolver un caso en un determinado sentido. Las decisiones de la autoridad judicial, ya sea que ésta se desempeñe en la especialidad constitucional, civil, penal, penal militar, laboral, entre otras, no pueden depender de la voluntad de otros poderes públicos (Poder Ejecutivo o Poder Legislativo, por ejemplo), partidos políticos, medios de comunicación o particulares en general, sino tan solo de la Constitución y de la ley que sea acorde con ésta(…) b) Independencia interna. De acuerdo con esta dimensión, la independencia judicial implica, entre otros aspectos, que, dentro de la organización judicial: 1) la autoridad judicial, en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional, no puede sujetarse a la voluntad de otros órganos judiciales, salvo que medie un medio impugnatorio; y, 2) que la autoridad judicial, en el desempeño de la función jurisdiccional, no pueda sujetarse a los intereses de órganos administrativos de gobierno que existan dentro de la organización judicial”. Además, es de verse lo sostenido por Inc. 1., del Art. 8., de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, que en referencia a las garantías judiciales, enseña: “Toda persona tiene derecho a ser oída, con las debidas garantías y dentro de un plazo razonable, por un juez o tribunal competente, independiente e imparcial, establecido con anterioridad por la ley, en la sustanciación de cualquier acusación penal formulada contra ella, o para la determinación de sus derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter”. A propósito, nótese lo que menciona sobre ello: “(…)la línea jurisprudencial de la Corte confirma que si bien el artículo 8 de la Convención Americana se titula ‘Garantías Judiciales’, su aplicación no se limita a los procesos judiciales en sentido estricto, “sino [al] conjunto de requisitos que deben observarse en las instancias procesales”, a efecto de que las personas puedan defenderse adecuadamente ante cualquier tipo de acto emanado del Estado que pueda afectar sus derechos. Esas otras instancias procesales pueden comprender aquellas en las que se determinan derechos y obligaciones de orden civil, laboral, fiscal o de cualquier otro carácter. De manera que la amplitud en el desarrollo de este artículo se justifica también en la citada interpretación del Tribunal según la cual las garantías del artículo 8 superan los casos tradicionales de la jurisdicción penal e incluso los procesos estrictamente judiciales.”6 En ese orden de ideas, el principio de independencia judicial, resulta ser de competencia exclusiva para el poder judicial, de por sí y ante sí, poder declarar el derecho o avocarse a una causa, sin ser objeto de interferencia de tipo judicial o administrativo. Además, es de considerar que el referido principio debe ser entendido desde una triple perspectiva, esto es, ya sea, orgánica, funcional y capacidad subjetiva. En segundo término, corresponde desarrollar el control administrativo que la OCMA ejerce sobre los magistrados. 6. 126 GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Ob. Cit., p. 211. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL En principio, es pertinente dejar constancia que la Resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, fue resuelta de conformidad a lo establecido en la R. A. 229-2012-CE-PJ, Reglamento de Organización y Funciones de la OCMA, vigente a la fecha de la cursación del Oficio del representante de la sociedad civil, ante dicho órgano (esto es: el 13/09/13). Así tenemos, que el Inc. 1., del Art. 4º., del mencionado reglamento acerca de las funciones de la OCMA, juridiza: “Las señaladas en el Art.105º del Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial”. Y el Inc. 9., del Art 105.-, del D. S. Nº 017-93-JUS, del Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, que acerca de las funciones de la OCMA preconiza: “Rechazar de plano las quejas manifiestamente maliciosas, o, que no sean de carácter funcional sino jurisdiccional, aplicando al quejoso las sanciones y las multas previstas en el artículo 297 de la presente Ley”. Al respecto, CAVANI señala:7 “el art. 48, inciso 13, de la Ley de Carrera Judicial, que coloca como falta grave el «No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales». Esta disposición ya resulta problemática, pues estaría permitiendo que el órgano de control pueda controlar el íntegro de la motivación de cualquier resolución del juez y que, si hubiese algún defecto considerable (nótese la vaguedad de esto último), podría suspenderlo o, inclusive, destituirlo”. Además, continúa CAVANI: “(…)los textos infraconstitucionales deben ser interpretados de conformidad con la Constitución()con las garantías de la independencia y de la imparcialidad, en lo que atañe a la esfera de autonomía de los órganos jurisdiccionales respecto de la interpretación y aplicación del derecho y de la motivación de sus decisiones()los criterios jurisdiccionales solamente pueden ser cuestionados jurisdiccionalmente. No existe órgano administrativo que pueda suplantar esta tarea; caso contrario, el funcionario que así lo hiciese violaría la Constitución y, por si fuera poco, cometería un ilícito penal” Agrega CAVANI: “Sería plenamente inconstitucional, por ejemplo, entender que la Ley de Carrera Judicial facultaría al órgano de control a cuestionar la forma cómo el juez valora los medios probatorios, cómo interpreta el Código Civil, cómo resuelve antinomias, cómo integra lagunas o, inclusive, cómo analiza los presupuestos de una solicitud cautelar o el monto de la caución que decide fijar. Todo esto puede ser cuestionado o atacado mediante los medios impugnatorios respectivos: para eso es que existe la regulación pertinente en los códigos procesales y, además, la asignación de competencias entre los órganos jurisdiccionales (y no entre órganos administrativos)”. Y así también: “Si se entiende que la disposición normativa expresa una norma como la señalada, entonces sería inaplicable por inconstitucional. No obstante, como se 7. CAVANI, Renzo. Ob. Cit. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 127 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE ha advertido, es un deber de cualquier órgano estatal que haga las veces de juzgador (como es el caso del órgano juzgador en un procedimiento administrativo sancionador), interpretar de conformidad con la Constitución. Nótese que ello no presupone exactamente hacer un control difuso, en donde existe una auténtica inaplicación de cualquier norma que pueda desprenderse del texto infraconstitucional para preferir directamente, la norma constitucional. La técnica de la interpretación conforme implica que, entre los sentidos que un texto normativo puede expresar, debe preferirse el que sea más acorde con las normas constitucionales. Y esta técnica también está a cargo del órgano contralor”. En esa línea de argumentación, se aprecia los Funds. 8. y 10., respectivamente, del voto del magistrado Álvarez Miranda, en el Exp. N.° 5765-2007-PA/TC del Tribunal Constitucional, que refieren: “Si bien la labor de órganos como la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura (OCMA) es la mayor relevancia, ésta no puede desarrollarse desconociendo los derechos fundamentales de quienes ejercen la función jurisdiccional, pues más allá de los derechos fundamentales que ellos tienen dicha sede disciplinaria, se encuentran protegidos constitucionalmente mediante la garantía institucional de la independencia judicial” y “Sólo cuando existe una suficiente, congruente y lógica justificación de las decisiones de los órganos de control de la magistratura respecto de una conducta funcional irregular se logra legitimar la labor de tales órganos y se despeja cualquier cuestionamiento respecto de afectaciones a la independencia judicial”. Entonces, de lo desarrolado se colige que la delgada línea que aparentemente separa a la naturaleza funcional de la jurisdiccional, constituye en serio riesgo, debido a que de traspasarla permite que el órgano administrativo disciplinario funcional de la magistratura (OCMA), ingrese a controlar a la magistratura en funciones que no le competen, por ser materia jurisdiccional y no funcional. Entonces, el reparo no es de poco calibre. IV. TUTELA PROCESAL EFECTIVA.Para el debido aterrizaje en el presente acápite, comporta precisar de manera previa como ineludible, algunas instituciones jurídicas procesales. Esto es, la siguiente triada: i) tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, ii) debido proceso y iii) tutela procesal efectiva.8 Así, tenemos que en los predios del derecho procesal, se cuenta con derechos fundamentales y garantías procesales, los que supervigilan que el iter procesal se lleve a cabo de manera óptima, para poder cumplir sus fines. Los mismos se hacen presentes en los cuatro estadios que cuenta, los mismos que desarrollamos: 8. 128 TORRES MANRIQUE, Jorge Isaac. La tutela jurisdiccional laboral. Acciones esenciales en el avance del nuevo modelo procesal. En Suplemento Jurídica del diario oficial El Peruano, N° 598, Lima, 2006, pp. 06-07. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL En primer lugar, se encuentra la tutela jurisdiccional, la que garantiza al justiciable que su accionar o petición judicial sea admitido y que posteriormente sea materializado y resuelto a través de una sentencia. Al respecto, el Tribunal Constitucional, a través del Exp. N° 010-2002-AI/TC, juridiza: “El derecho a la tutela jurisdiccional es un atributo subjetivo que comprende una serie de derechos, entre los que destacan el acceso a la justicia, es decir, el derecho de cualquier persona de promover la actividad jurisdiccional del Estado, sin que se le obstruya, impida o disuada irrazonablemente; y como quedó dicho, el derecho a la efectividad de las resoluciones judiciales. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en otras constituciones, la nuestra no alude al derecho a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva. Sin embargo, en modo alguno puede concebirse que nuestra Carta Fundamental tan sólo garantice un proceso intrínsecamente correcto y leal, justo sobre el plano de las modalidades de su tránsito, sino también (…) capaz de consentir los resultados alcanzados, con rapidez y efectividad”.9 En segundo lugar, se ubica el debido proceso, el que comporta el derecho de los justiciables a un proceso judicial sin postergaciones, retrasos, alteraciones o deformaciones, durante el camino, devenir o desenvolvimiento lógico procesal del mismo; que desvirtúen su finalidad que es la justicia. Consecuentemente, queda claro que, prima facie, el derecho que tienen los justiciables a un derecho justamente debido. Ubicándose el debido proceso, en el espacio comprendido, entre la tutela jurisdiccional y la efectividad de la misma. Tanto la tutela jurisdiccional, como el debido proceso, son reconocidos en el Inc. 3., del Art. 139°.-, de la Constitución Política, que señala: “Son principios y derechos de la función jurisdiccional, la observancia del debido proceso y la tutela jurisdiccional”. En tercer lugar, tenemos la efectividad de la tutela jurisdiccional, la que se hace presente, cuando dicha sentencia sea oportuna y debida como efectivamente ejecutada (tutela efectiva). Entonces, es de verse que entre el debido proceso y tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, existe una marcada diferencia, es decir, mientras que el primero: i) se desenvuelve en el transcurso del trayecto procesal —iter procesal, específicamente entre la tutela jurisdiccional y la efectividad de la misma— ii) la segunda, se manifiesta al comienzo (cuando el aparato jurisdiccional ampara la demanda del justiciable- tutela jurídica) y final (al ejecutarse la sentencia debida y oportunamente) de dicho devenir procesal. Ergo, existe pues entre ellos, una relación muy estrecha. Finalmente, debido proceso y tulela referidos se complementan, pero no significan lo mismo. En un cuarto momento, se hace presente la tutela procesal efectiva, la que comprende, tanto al acceso a la justicia, como al debido proceso. Consecuentemente, la 9. Véase GARCÍA BELAÚNDE, Domingo. Diccionario de jurisprudencia constitucional. Definiciones y conceptos extraídos de las resoluciones y sentencias del tribunal constitucional. Editora Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2009, p. 832. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 129 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE tutela procesal efectiva, abarca o engloba, tanto a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva como al debido proceso. Así se tiene la tutela procesal efectiva, se encuentra preconizada por el Art. 4.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional, que preconiza: “(…)Se entiende por tutela procesal efectiva aquella situación jurídica de una persona en la que se respetan, de modo enunciativo, sus derechos de libre acceso al órgano jurisdiccional, a probar, de defensa, al contradictorio e igualdad sustancial en el proceso, a no ser desviado de la jurisdicción predeterminada ni sometido a procedimientos distintos de los previstos por la ley, a la obtención de una resolución fundada en derecho, a acceder a los medios impugnatorios regulados, a la imposibilidad de revivir procesos fenecidos, a la actuación adecuada y temporalmente oportuna de las resoluciones judiciales y a la observancia del principio de legalidad procesal penal”. V. SOBRE LA MOTIVACIÓN DE LAS RESOLUCIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS.- En este acápite, amerita abordar el tema de la ineludible motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. En ese sentido, es de verse el Fund. 14., de la Resolución del Tribunal Constitucional del Exp. N° 00503 2013-PA/TC, cuando al respecto establece: “(…)un acto administrativo dictado al amparo de una potestad discrecional legalmente establecida resulta arbitrario cuando solo expresa la apreciación individual de quien ejerce la competencia administrativa, o cuando el órgano administrativo, al adoptar la decisión, no motiva o expresa las razones que lo han conducido a adoptar tal decisión. De modo que, como ya se ha dicho, motivar una decisión no solo significa expresar únicamente al amparo de qué norma legal se expide el acto administrativo, sino, fundamentalmente, exponer en forma sucinta— pero suficiente— las razones de hecho y el sustento jurídico que justifican la decisión tomada”. También, el referido Colegiado Constitucional, en el Fund. 9., del Exp. N.º 00912005-PA/TC, ha señalado que: “(…)el derecho a la motivación de las resoluciones administrativas es de especial relevancia. Consiste en el derecho a la certeza, el cual supone la garantía de todo administrado a que las sentencias estén motivadas, es decir, que exista un razonamiento jurídico explícito entre los hechos y las leyes que se aplican. Cabe acotar que la Constitución no establece una determinada extensión de la motivación, por lo que su contenido esencial se respeta siempre que exista fundamentación, congruencia entre lo pedido y lo resuelto y, por sí misma, exprese una suficiente justificación de la decisión adoptada, aun si esta es breve o concisa o se presenta el supuesto de motivación por remisión. La motivación de la actuación administrativa, es decir, la fundamentación con los razonamientos en que se apoya, es una exigencia ineludible para todo tipo de actos administrativos, imponiéndose las mismas razones para exigirla tanto respecto de actos emanados de una potestad reglada como discrecional. El tema de la motivación del acto administrativo es una cuestión clave en el ordenamiento jurídico-administrativo, y es objeto central de control integral por el juez constitucional de la actividad administrativa y la consiguiente supresión de los ámbitos de inmunidad jurisdiccional. Constituye una exigencia o condición impuesta para la vigencia efectiva del principio de legalidad, presupuesto ineludible de todo 130 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL Estado de derecho. A ello, se debe añadir la estrecha vinculación que existe entre la actividad administrativa y los derechos de las personas. Es indiscutible que la exigencia de motivación suficiente de sus actos es una garantía de razonabilidad y no arbitrariedad de la decisión administrativa”. A ello, agrega el Fund. 8., del voto del magistrado Eto Cruz, del Exp. N.º 57652007-PA/TC del Tribunal Constitucional: “En esa misma línea se ha pronunciado este Tribunal en la STC N.º 5156-2006-PA/TC (Caso Vicente Rodolfo Walde Jáuregui) al establecer que se vulnera el derecho a la motivación de las resoluciones cuando se emite una resolución que impone una medida disciplinaria sustentada en argumentos de carácter jurisdiccional, es decir, cuando los fundamentos no se encuentran dirigidos a sustentar la sanción impuesta sino que se encuentran orientados a zanjar cuestiones de interpretación jurídica o cuestiones de hecho relacionadas con el proceso judicial, omitiendo examinar los presupuestos de hecho que motivan la imposición de la medida disciplinaria”. En ese sentido, las resoluciones administrativas también deben presentar una motivación o fundamentación suficiente y justa, que respalde su decisión. De otra manera, se incurriría en abierta arbitrariedad, perjudicando así a los administrados, a la vez inobservar el principio de motivación y debido proceso administrativo. VI. PRINCIPIOS DE TIPICIDAD Y LEGALIDAD EN LAS SANCIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS. Acerca del principio de tipicidad, el Tribunal Constitucional, en el Fund. 35., del Exp. Nº 01873-2009-PA/TC, explica: “(…)primero, en determinar qué tipo de infracción se ha cometido; y segundo, qué tipo de sanción corresponde. En el primer caso, el CNM, conforme a la legislación que citó, debía determinar si el acto cometido por el demandante importaba: a. Una irregularidad o una inconducta funcional a título doloso o culposo, b. La transgresión de los principios y deberes de los magistrados, c. La comisión de un hecho grave que, sin ser delito o infracción constitucional, comprometa la dignidad del cargo y la desmerezca en el concepto público, d. La contravención de obligaciones, prohibiciones y demás normatividad sobre deberes de los servidores o funcionarios públicos(…)”. Por otro lado, el principio de tipicidad se torna clave en el análisis del presente caso. Así, en el Fund. 40., de la resolución del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. N° 018732009-PA/TC, se enseña: “Este principio permite que las conductas sancionables estén debidamente delimitadas de modo que quedan proscritas las cláusulas generales o indeterminadas, esto es, aquellas cuyo contenido no es expreso y conocible, sino que tiene que ser ‘llenado’ o concretizado a través de argumentos utilizados para tal efecto, pero por ello mismo, a veces posteriores al acto que se pretende sancionar”. Así también, en el Fund. 41., de dicha sentencia señala: “Entonces, resulta que el tan mentado ‘conocimiento’ de las conductas prohibidas ya no es tal, dado que él órgano administrativo puede ir llenando el contenido de tales conceptos jurídicos inCivil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 131 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE determinados de acuerdo al hecho que pretende sancionar, dejando pues el acto de ‘completar’ el contenido de tales actos a la discrecionalidad o arbitrariedad del ente administrativo”. Agrega, en el Fund. 42.: “Los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados que se ha encontrado en la resolución del CNM, son los siguientes: Conducta e idoneidad propia de la función, Desmerecimiento en el concepto público, Desmedro de la imagen, El Poder Judicial como fuente de inseguridad jurídica, Conducta intachable, Imagen pública, Imagen del Poder Judicial, Modelo de conducta ejemplar, Transparencia de sus funciones públicas, Transparencia de sus funciones privadas, Dignidad del cargo”. Continúa el Fund. 43., señalando: “Qué es lo que se entiende por cada uno de tales conceptos, para efectos sancionatorios, debe encontrarse previamente determinado o establecido; lo contrario importaría que los magistrados tengan prever cuál es el ‘contenido’ que el CNM pueda darles, sobre todo cuando este contenido, de no estar precisado normativamente, será objeto de desarrollo o complementación por parte de la autoridad administrativa, en cada caso en que ello sea necesario, además que, como es obvio, el resultado no necesariamente será igual en todos los casos”. Luego, el Fund. 44., refiere: “En ese sentido, llama la atención que se requiera un magistrado de conducta ejemplar, sin determinarse qué es lo que se entiende por ella (no fumar, no tomar o tomar moderadamente, no drogarse, no maltratar a los miembros de su familia, no tener multas de tránsito, etc.), de modo que no se sabe qué es lo que está prohibido o lo que está permitido. Asimismo, ¿cómo se determina el desmedro de la imagen propia? (porque la prensa así lo dice, por la suma de recortes periodísticos, porque el Colegio de Abogados lo señala, porque la asociación de padres de familia del colegio de sus hijos tiene un mal concepto del magistrado, etc.). Es más, ¿cómo afecta ello al Poder Judicial? (ello puede dar lugar entonces a que cada vez que se evidencia que un juez ha afectado la imagen de aquel poder, ¿será pasible de sanción?; pero previamente, ¿cómo puede o debe afectar dicha imagen? Cabe también preguntar que en caso no se haya afectado dicha imagen, por falta de publicidad del acto incorrecto, ¿el funcionario no será sancionado?”. Así también, es de verse que sobre el principio de tipicidad, el segundo párrafo, del Inc. b., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 1873-2009-PA/TC, preconiza: “Conforme a este principio, los tipos legales genéricos deben estar proscritos y aunque la Administración a veces se conduzca sobre la base de estándares deontológicos de conducta, estos son insuficientes, por sí solos, para sancionar, pues aunque se pueden interpretar como conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, la sanción debe sustentarse en análisis concretos y pormenorizados de los hechos, desde conceptos jurídicos y no sobre la base de juicios apodícticos o que invoquen en abstracto el honor o la dignidad de un colectivo, puesto que los tribunales administrativos no son tribunales ‘de honor’, y las sanciones no pueden sustentarse en una suerte de ‘responsabilidad objetiva del administrado’, lo que nos lleva a revisar el siguiente principio”. 132 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL Pero, “(…)no sólo la conducta prohibida debe estar determinada por ley, sino también la sanción que le corresponde. En esa línea, tanto el principio de legalidad, como su par, el principio de tipicidad, han sido reconocidos por la Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General en su artículo 230 incisos 1 y 4, respectivamente a fin de ser aplicados en la potestad sancionadora de la Administración: ‘1. Legalidad.- Sólo por norma con rango de ley cabe atribuir a las entidades la potestad sancionadora y la consiguiente previsión de las consecuencias administrativas que a título de sanción son posibles de aplicar a un administrado(…), 2. Tipicidad.- Sólo constituyen conductas sancionables administrativamente las infracciones previstas expresamente en normas con rango de ley mediante su tipificación como tales, sin admitir interpretación extensiva o analogía(…)’.”10 Además, sobre el principio de legalidad, el Inc. a., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 1873-2009-PA/TC, establece: “(…)conforme al cual la ley debe preceder a la conducta sancionable, determinando el contenido de la sanción. Corresponde pues a la ley delimitar el ámbito del ilícito sancionable, por expresa prescripción constitucional (artículo 2.24.d.), de modo que no puede ser objeto de regulación reglamentaria, ni mucho menos de precisiones ‘extranormativas’”. En consecuencia, queda claro que para el ejercicio sancionatorio administrativo, resulta de ineludible observancia, los principios de tipicidad y legalidad. Así, en sede administrativa sancionadora, deberá evitarse incurrir la utilización de conceptos jurídicos indeterminados, debido a que desnaturaliza la justeza de la decisión, tornándola en subjetiva como injusta. VII. CONVENCIONALIDAD.En principio, respecto de la interpretación constitucional, resulta imperioso acotar que la Cuarta Disposición Final y Transitoria, de la Constitución Política enseña: “Las normas relativas a los derechos y a las libertades que la Constitución reconoce se interpretan de conformidad con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos y con los tratados y acuerdos internacionales sobre las mismas materias ratificados por el Perú”. A continuación, referir que el Art. V.-, del Título Preliminar del Código Procesal Constitucional, respecto de la Interpretación de los Derechos Constitucionales, juridiza: “El contenido y alcances de los derechos constitucionales protegidos por los procesos regulados en el presente Código deben interpretarse de conformidad con la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos, los tratados sobre derechos humanos, así como de las decisiones adoptadas por los tribunales internacionales sobre derechos humanos constituidos según tratados de los que el Perú es parte”. 10. BAZÁN SEMINARIO, César. ¿Separando la paja del trigo? Destitución de jueces por el Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura entre el 2003 y el 2007. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://www. justiciaviva.org.pe/publica/paja_trigo.pdf. Lima, 2008, p. 59. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 133 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE En segundo lugar, respecto de la interpretación de las normas sobre derechos humanos, de conformidad a lo establecido en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos (que es un acuerdo internacional sobre derechos humanos, ratificado por el Perú), es de resaltar que en el caso Almonacid Arellano vs. Chile, la Corte IDH ha ido precisando el contenido y alcance del concepto de control de convencionalidad en su jurisprudencia, para llegar a un concepto complejo que comprende los siguientes elementos (o: las siguientes características): a) Consiste en verificar la compatibilidad de las normas y demás prácticas internas con la CADH, la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH y los demás tratados interamericanos de los cuales el Estado sea parte; b) Es una obligación que corresponde a toda autoridad pública en el ámbito de sus competencias; c) Para efectos de determinar la compatibilidad con la CADH, no sólo se debe tomar en consideración el tratado, sino que también la jurisprudencia de la Corte IDH y los demás tratados interamericanos de los cuales el Estado sea parte; d) Es un control que debe ser realizado ex officio por toda autoridad pública; y e) Su ejecución puede implicar la supresión de normas contrarias a la CADH o bien su interpretación conforme a la CADH, dependiendo de las facultades de cada autoridad pública.11 Al respecto, en la jurisprudencia referida se aprecia: “(…)el Poder Judicial debe ejercer una especie de “control de convencionalidad” entre las normas jurídicas internas que aplican en los casos concretos y la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. En esta tarea, el Poder Judicial debe tener en cuenta no solamente el tratado, sino también la interpretación que del mismo ha hecho la Corte Interamericana, intérprete última de la Convención Americana”. Así tenemos, que el Inc. 1., del Art. 1., de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, respecto de la obligación de respetar los derechos, juridiza: “Los Estados Partes en esta Convención se comprometen a respetar los derechos y libertades reconocidos en ella y a garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio a toda persona que esté sujeta a su jurisdicción, sin discriminación alguna por motivos de raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opiniones políticas o de cualquier otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social”. GOMES y de OLIVEIRA12, sostienen que la obligación de “respeto” a los derechos humanos previsto en este artículo, excluye la aplicación del principio de reciprocidad consagrado en el Derecho Internacional clásico, toda vez que los Estados Parte de la Convención tienen la obligación de respetar los derechos con independencia de que 11. S/a. Control de convencionalidad. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, del Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Nº 7 http://www.corteidh.or.cr/ sitios/libros/todos/docs/controlconvencionalidad8.pdf, San José de Costa Rica, p. 06. 12. GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Comentários à Convenção Americana Sobre Direitos Humanos. Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, 3a. ed., Sao Paulo, Editora Revista Dos Tribunais, 2010. Citado en: VV.AA. Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Comentario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38682-1522-4-30.pdf?140901164826, 2014, p. 48. 134 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL otro Estado Parte lo realice dentro de su jurisdicción; de donde deriva la naturaleza objetiva de las obligaciones internacionales relativas a derechos humanos. Respecto de la “garantía” de los derechos, se debe tener en cuenta las garantías específicas, tales como: i) La obligación del Estado de asegurar el pleno goce y ejercicio de los derechos, ii) El deber de proteger a las personas frente a las amenazas de agentes privados o públicos en el goce de los derechos, iii) Adoptar medidas de prevención general frente a casos de violaciones graves de derechos, iv) Reparar a las víctimas y v) Cooperar con los órganos internacionales para que estos puedan desarrollar sus actividades de control.13 Por otro lado, corresponde traer a colación el principio pro personae, el que se encuentra contenido en el Inc. 1., del Art. 29, de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, estableciendo: “Ninguna disposición del presente Pacto podrá ser interpretada en el sentido de conceder derecho alguno a un Estado, grupo o individuo para emprender actividades o realizar actos encaminados a la destrucción de cualquiera de los derechos y libertades reconocidos en el Pacto o a su limitación en mayor medida que la prevista en él.”. Seguidamente, es de apreciarse lo establecido por el Inc. 2., del Art. 29, de la misma norma, que señala: “No podrá admitirse restricción o menoscabo de ninguno de los derechos humanos fundamentales reconocidos o vigentes en un Estado Parte en virtud de leyes, convenciones, reglamento o costumbres, so pretexto de que el presente Pacto no los reconoce o los reconoce en menor grado”. Entonces, en resumidos términos el Control de la Convencionalidad, sostiene que las legislaciones internas de cada país, deberán adecuarse a los lineamientos establecidos en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. VIII. BLOQUES DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD Y CONVENCIONALIDAD.Acerca del Bloque de Constitucionalidad tenemos que el Fund. 10., de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. Nº 689-2000-AA/TC, estipula: “Las normas del bloque de constitucionalidad son aquellas que se caracterizan por desarrollar y complementar los preceptos constitucionales relativos a los fines, estructura, organización y funciones de los órganos y organismos constitucionales, amen de desarrollar detalladamente las competencias y deberes funcionales de los titulares de éstos, asi como los derechos, deberes, cargas públicas y garantías básicas de los ciudadanos(…) dicho concepto alude a la aptitud lo obrar político-jurídica o al área de facultades de un órgano u organismo constitucional, lo cual conlleva a calificar la actuación estatal como legítima o ilegítima en función de que el titular responsable de aquel hubiese obrado dentro de dicho marco o fuera de él”. 13. GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Cit., pp. 49-52. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 135 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE Entonces, tenemos que el bloque de constitucionalidad, se encuentra compuesto por la Constitución Política y sus leyes de desarrollo, para cada caso concreto. El mismo, corresponde a una expresión y extensión de un Estado constitucional de derecho del Neoconstitucionalismo. A propósito, la constitucionalización del sistema jurídico o derecho peruano, trajo consigo por ejemplo, la cosa juzgada constitucional, en desmedro de la cosa juzgada legal o meramente judicial. Luego, es de mencionar que la observancia de los preceptos contenidos en la jurisprudencia de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, vá ganando terreno en las legislaciones internas de los Estados, lo que deviene en muy saludable, en tanto que, ya se habla más allá del bloque de constitucionalidad, esto es, del Bloque de la Convencionalidad. El Bloque de la Convencionalidad, se encuentra compuesto por lo juridizado por la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, además, de la legislación interna de los Estados, esto es, de bloque de Constitucionalidad de cada país. El cariz de justeza que aporta la referida Convención, corresponde a una manifestación del Derecho Global, que dio origen a la cosa juzgada internacional, en prevalencia de la cosa juzgada constitucional, por citar un ejemplo. IX. TEST DE RAZONABILIDAD Y PROPORCIONALIDAD.En principio, el Inc. d., del Fund. 12., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 18732009-PA/TC, establece que el: “Principio de proporcionalidad de la sanción, esto es, que la sanción que se imponga, debe corresponderse con la conducta prohibida, de modo que están prohibidas las medidas innecesarias o excesivas. Corresponde, pues, que el órgano que aplica la sanción pondere la intencionalidad o reiteración del acto así como los perjuicios causados”. Al respecto, el Fund. 109., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. Nº 50-2004-AI/TC, establece: “El test de razonabilidad es un análisis de proporcionalidad que está directamente vinculado con el valor superior justicia; constituye, por lo tanto, un parámetro indispensable de constitucionalidad para determinar la actuación de los poderes públicos, sobre todo cuando ésta afecta el ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales. Para que la aplicación del test sea adecuada, corresponde utilizar los tres principios que lo integran(…)”. Por otro lado, el Fund. 15., de la jurisprudencia del TC, Exp. N° 2192-2004-AA/TC, preconiza: “El principio de razonabilidad o proporcionalidad es consustancial al Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho, y está configurado en la Constitución en sus artículos 3º y 43º, y plasmado expresamente en su artículo 200°, último párrafo. Si bien la doctrina suele hacer distinciones entre el principio de proporcionalidad y el principio de razonabilidad, como estrategias para resolver conflictos de principios constitucionales y orientar al juzgador hacia una decisión que no sea arbitraria sino justa; puede establecerse, prima facie, una similitud entre ambos principios, en la medida que una decisión que se adopta en el marco de convergencia de dos principios constitucionales, cuando no 136 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL respeta el principio de proporcionalidad, no será razonable. En este sentido, el principio de razonabilidad parece sugerir una valoración respecto del resultado del razonamiento del juzgador expresado en su decisión, mientras que el procedimiento para llegar a este resultado sería la aplicación del principio de proporcionalidad con sus tres subprincipios: de adecuación, de necesidad y de proporcionalidad en sentido estricto o ponderación”. Y además, el Fund. 15., de la referida jurisprudencia del TC, hace textual mención acerca de la obligatoriedad del uso del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en sede administrativa: “(…)es en el seno de la actuación de la Administración donde el principio de proporcionalidad cobra especial relevancia, debido a los márgenes de discreción con que inevitablemente actúa la Administración para atender las demandas de una sociedad en constante cambio, pero también, debido a la presencia de cláusulas generales e indeterminadas como el interés general o el bien común, que deben ser compatibilizados con otras cláusulas o principios igualmente abiertos a la interpretación, como son los derechos fundamentales o la propia dignidad de las personas. Como bien nos recuerda López González, ‘En la tensión permanente entre Poder y Libertad que protagoniza el desenvolvimiento del Derecho Público y por ello también el del Derecho Administrativo, el Estado de Derecho a través de la consagración que formula el principio de legalidad y de la garantía y protección de los derechos fundamentales, exige un uso jurídico proporcionado del poder, a fin de satisfacer los intereses generales con la menos e indispensable restricción de las libertades’”. Precisamente, respecto de la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, el Inc. 7., del Art. 24º.-, del Reglamento del Procedimiento Administrativo Disciplinario de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial, R. Adm. Nº 243-2015-CE-PJ; establece que en cualquier caso, la autoridad instructora del procedimiento administrativo disciplinario deberá observar las siguientes reglas: “Criterios resolutivos.- Al resolver los procedimientos disciplinarios iniciados, las autoridades deberán seguir los requisitos para la emisión de los actos administrativos establecidos en los artículos 3, 5 y 6 de la Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General, cuidando en todo momento de respetar los principios de legalidad, tipicidad, debido procedimiento, razonabilidad y proporcionalidad en la imposición de las sanciones, así como los criterios establecidos en el artículo 51º de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, y en el artículo 13º del Reglamento que Regula el Régimen Disciplinario de los Auxiliares Jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial”. (el subrayado es nuestro). En tal sentido, queda claro lo imprescindible de fijar la vista en la inclusión y desarrollo del test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad, de manera previa a una decisión judicial o administrativa, a fortiori si es como en el caso in comento, cuando la resolución abraza una naturaleza sancionatoria. X. TETRA ANÁLISIS JURÍGENO.- Como ya lo hemos mencionado en anteriores oportunidades, al presente método de análisis, lo hemos denominado: tetra análisis jurígeno, en razón a la naturaleza Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 137 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE tretafronte de los aspectos que abraza y que son: i) Legalidad.- En razón, a que toda decisión judicial y administrativa, tiene que estar arreglada a ley, ii) Constitucionalidad.- Debido a que, en un nivel supremo, el derecho constitucional está presente en todas las ramas del derecho, en mérito además, a su naturaleza transversal, iii) Convencionalidad.- Ya que las normas internas de cada Estado tienen que ser compatibles con lo establecido por la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, y iv) Legitimidad.- Porque el fin supremo de cada proceso, es resolver o tomar una decisión que sea justa y no solamente legal o constitucional. Es entonces, que a la luz de dicho filtro conjunto de observación, que consideramos se puede arribar a un argumento jurídico macro, micro como sólido. A propósito, el espíritu de la estructura de las consideraciones que abordaremos, puede también ser utilizada para fundamentar por ejemplo, una demanda y su contestación, ante el poder judicial; y a fortiori, para la expedición de sentencias. Así como, para lo propio de las resoluciones administrativas. Y es que, lo más común es que las fundamentaciones se lleven a cabo como máximo a nivel de los dos primeros aspectos que explicaremos a continuación, esto es, únicamente, la legalidad y la constitucionalidad, sobre todo, la legalidad. En ese sentido, la aplicación del mencionado método, nos ayudará a determinar, si una decisión administrativa o judicial, se encuentra situada en los predios de la legalidad, constitucionalidad, convencionalidad, y legitimidad; ya sea, de manera satisfactoria o no, en alguna, algunas o en todas las etapas del referido método. XI. BREVE RESUMEN DE LA RESOLUCIÓN DE LA JEFATURA SUPREMA DE LA OCMA.El documento sub examine, es la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida en fecha 29/01/16, por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura del Poder Judicial (en adelante, OCMA). Por medio de la cual, se impone una medida disciplinaria de suspensión en el ejercicio de toda función en el Poder Judicial sin goce de haber, por el plazo de cuatro meses, al magistrado Alexander Rioja Bermúdez, en su actuación como Juez del primer Juzgado Especializado en lo Civil de la Provincia de Maynas, de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Loreto. Dicha sanción fue propuesta, mediante Resolución Nº 24, de fecha 15/08/14, por la Jefatura de la Unidad de Investigación y Anticorrupción del OCMA. Los cargos que se le imputan son el admitir una demanda de amparo y conceder medida cautelar (Exp. 1425-2011), por lo cual, haber infringido la regla de competencia por razón de territorio establecida en el Art. 51.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional (), que preconiza: “(…)Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del 138 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL demandante(…)”. Y además, que dicha conducta que denota la infracción del deber de observar el debido proceso previsto en el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la ley de Carrera Judicial, Ley Nº 29277, que respecto de los deberes de los jueces establece: “Impartir justicia con(…) respeto al debido proceso” y se subsume en la falta regulada en el Inc. 13., del Art. 48., de la citada Ley, que respecto de las faltas muy graves registra: “No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”. Dentro de los argumentos de defensa del magistrado investigado, se aprecia en la resolución bajo análisis: i) Vía escrito de fecha 13/11/13, señala que admitió la demanda por una omisión involuntaria y teniendo en cuenta la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva que es un principio constitucional contenido en el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional, ii) Que se le pretende sancionar por una supuesta incompetencia no advertida oportunamente, pero que no se ha tomado en cuenta que no se perjudicó a las partes procesales, quienes no formularon queja en su contra y que tampoco se continuó dando trámite al proceso al declarar fundada la excepción de incompetencia, y iii) Que el Colegiado superior no advirtió conducta disfuncional en la tramitación del proceso cuestionado y que dicha instancia declaró la nulidad de lo actuado y revocó la medida cautelar dictada por razones distintas a la incompetencia por razón de territorio. Luego, la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, señala que el Art. 51., del Código mencionado establece sólo dos supuestos que habilitan la competencia territorial para conocer un proceso de amparo (Así, es de verse su contenido: “Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante”); los cuales no se presentaban en el caso bajo estudio. Agregando, que mediante auto de vista de fecha 12/07/12, ello fue expresado por la Sala Civil y Mixta de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Loreto, observándose la competencia territorial del investigado para conocer la referida demanda de amparo y constituyó uno de los motivos por los cuales la resolución que concedió la medida cautelar fue revocada y reformándose dicha medida fue rechazada. En su informe de descargo, el magistrado investigado señala que la tramitación de las cuestionadas pretensiones obedeció a un error involuntario y a la supremacía constitucional de la tutela procesal efectiva, frente a una norma legal, como la contenida en el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional. Al respecto, la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, refiere también que el respeto al debido proceso también lo es, que en el modo de logar tal cometido, debe haber sujeción a las reglas y principios que integran nuestro sistema jurídico, entre ellos el debido proceso, como principio de la función jurisdiccional. Ante la alegación de absolución, por inexistencia de perjuicio a las partes y que no formularon queja den su contra; la misma agrega que, el procedimiento administrativo disciplinario de la OCMA, se rige por el impulso de oficio, aunque la presente investigación se desarrolló en mérito del oficio cursado por el Representante de la Sociedad Civil. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 139 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE Además, indica que habiéndose corroborado la comisión del cargo, se valorará la medida disciplinaria a imponerse y los eventuales atenuantes y que ello se deriva de la aplicación de la razonabilidad. Como factores atenuantes para el magistrado investigado, menciona la revocación de la medida cautelar y el haber declarado fundada la excepción de incompetencia planteada, declarando nulo todo lo actuado. Y el que no se haya verificado que las conductas disfuncionales ejecutadas respondan a un móvil lucrativo o de favorecimiento a un sujeto procesal. Como agravantes, menciona: i) el haberse cometido dos conductas disfuncionales conexas, esto es, admitir a trámite la demanda de amparo y el dictar medida cautelar, ii) contar con dos medidas disciplinarias de amonestación, iii) una multa del 2% de su haber mensual, iv) perturbación del servicio de justicia, v) haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, vi) desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y vii) afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial. XII. ANALIZANDO LA MISMA.12.1. Competencia de la judicatura.Es de verse, que el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional establece: “Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante(…)”. Por otro lado, que respecto del primer supuesto de dicha norma: “el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho”, se aprecia que el magistrado investigado despachaba en Maynas (Loreto) y el lugar donde se habría afectado el derecho es Lima. Acerca del segundo supuesto: “donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante”, se tiene que el domicilio del afectado era la ciudad de Lima. En consecuencia, en vista que la norma legal señalada es expresa y no presenta vacío o deficiencia alguna, se colige que los supuestos no se presentaban favorables o habilitantes para que el magistrado investigado pueda ser competente en el caso bajo estudio. Sin embargo, el admitir el oficio del representante de la sociedad civil, tampco resulta ser de competencia de la OCMA. Así, dicho órgano contralor, de inicio debió declararlo improcedente, por tratarse de un tema jurisdiccional y no funcional. 12.2. Independencia judicial y control administrativo. Al respecto, el profesor CAVANI14 señala que el hecho que la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura, la cual se registra en el Art. 102.- (que juridiza: “La Oficina de Con- 14. CAVANI, Renzo. ¿Juzgando a jueces?. La Ocma y las sanciones por defectos en la motivación. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de https://afojascero.com/2016/04/11/juzgando-a-jueces-la-ocma-y-las-sanciones-por-defectos-en-la-motivacion/. Lima, 2016. 140 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL trol de la Magistratura es el órgano que tiene por función investigar regularmente la conducta funcional, la idoneidad y el desempeño de los Magistrados y auxiliares jurisdiccionales del Poder Judicial. Esta facultad no excluye la evaluación permanente que deben ejercer los órganos jurisdiccionales al conocer de los procesos en grado.”) en adelante, del Decreto Supremo Nº 017-93-JUS, Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial; no hace más que complicar el accionar de dicho órgano contralor, en vista que el referido articulado no haría otra cosa que abrir la puerta para que el mencionado órgano ingrese a interferir en la función jurisdiccional de los magistrados. Además sostiene: “(…)la existencia de una Oficina de Control de la Magistratura(…)ya representa un auténtico desafío para conciliar la necesaria preservación de la independencia e imparcialidad frente a la investigación y sanción que pueda imponerse a los magistrados en el ejercicio de su función jurisdiccional(…)la función jurisdiccional, cuya independencia e imparcialidad deben ser preservadas(…)cualquier tipo de procedimiento administrativo sancionador que pueda terminar en una sanción(…)existe un deber ineludible de controlar la constitucionalidad de la legislación respecto de las sanciones de los jueces, precisamente para que no se violente la regla constitucional que ordena preservar la independencia e imparcialidad”. A propósito, en la resolución bajo comentario, se sanciona al magistrado investigado por haber admitido una demanda de amparo y concedido medida cautelar, por lo cual, infringió la regla de competencia por razón de territorio establecida en el Art. 51.-, del Código Procesal Constitucional, que preconiza: “(…)Es competente para conocer del proceso de amparo, del proceso de hábeas data y del proceso de cumplimiento el Juez civil o mixto del lugar donde se afectó el derecho, o donde tiene su domicilio principal el afectado, a elección del demandante(…)”. Además, por incurrir en la falta regulada en el Inc. 13., del Art. 48 de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que establece: “Son faltas muy graves(…)No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”. Y así también, que dicha conducta que denota la infracción del deber de observar el debido proceso previsto en el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la ley de Carrera Judicial, Ley Nº 29277, que respecto de los deberes de los jueces establece: “Impartir justicia con(…) respeto al debido proceso” Sin embargo, sostenemos que dicho oficio tuvo que ser declarado improcedente, en razón a que los argumentos que contenía el mismo eran de carácter jurisdiccional y no funcional (el admitir una demanda de amparo y concedido medida cautelar, corresponde a predios jurisdiccionales y no administrativos, por ello no habilita a la OCMA para poder tomar conocimiento, y menos aun, sancionar). Ello en mérito a que las normas legales referidas (a excepción de la de competencia territorial), debían ser recurridas con una interpretación constitucional y no meramente legal. Debe tenerse muy en cuenta, que: “La independencia del juez es un tema altamente vulnerable que exige de los órganos contralores garantías mínimas para la preservación de ésta. En atención a ello, la intervención disciplinaria no es irrestricta, todo lo contrario, su ámbito de acción sólo radica en la vulneración de los deberes Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 141 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE procesales o la inconducta de un juez, de tal manera, que dicha actividad administrativa-disciplinaria no colisione con la independencia judicial que el Estado garantiza a todos los jueces y sobre todo con la independencia de la función jurisdiccional”.15 A propósito, cabe mencionar que el tópico del control administrativo disciplinario de los jueces, presenta una naturaleza de cuasi permanente actualidad y coyuntura que requiere urgente atención. En esa línea de pensamiento, nótese que: “No existe consenso respecto de si el control disciplinario de los jueces debe ser externo o interno. Por un lado, quienes abogan por el control interno sostienen que sacar el control disciplinario fuera del ámbito del Poder Judicial menoscaba la independencia de los jueces y pone en riesgo su autonomía al someterlos a presiones e intimidaciones generadas por partes interesadas. De otro, quienes recusan el control interno, alegan que este es poco transparente y se ve menoscabado por una mal entendida solidaridad entre pares. De lo que se trata es de establecer un balance entre la protección a la independencia de los magistrados y la responsabilidad de quienes ejercen la judicatura. En tal sentido, partiendo de la experiencia peruana, creo que el control disciplinario debe ser externo”.16 En ese sentido, somos de la opinión que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, debió liminarmente declarar improcedente la queja interpuesta por el representante de la sociedad civil, en contra del magistrado investigado, en razón a que los argumentos que contenía la misma eran argumentos de carácter jurisdiccional y no funcional. Allende de lo señalado, se debe tener presente que las decisiones jurisdiccionales se apelan en su propio cauce, es decir, en el jurisdiccional (y no en el administrativo), tal y como en el presen te caso lo hizo el Procurador del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas cuando interpuso la excepción de incompetencia, la misma que fue declarada fundada por el magistrado investigado. Ergo, de lo reseñado se colige que la decisión tomada en la resolución bajo comentario, vulnera la independencia judicial, preconizada en el articulado referido de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial y de la Ley de la Carrera Judicial. La misma que es denominada: independencia judicial interna, por el Fund. 18., del Exp. Nº 0004-2006PI/TC del Tribunal Constitucional. 12.3. Tutela procesal efectiva. Por otro lado, amerita dejar constancia que tanto como el magistrado investigado como la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, yerran al utilizar como sinónimos las siguientes instituciones jurídicas: tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, debido proceso y tutela procesal efectiva. 15. LEDESMA NARVAEZ, Marianella. Independencia judicial y control disciplinario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://catedrajudicial.blogspot.pe/2008/01/independencia-judicial-y-control. html, Lima, 2008. 16. UGAZ SÁNCHEZ-MORENO, José Carlos. El control disciplinario de los jueces. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/aportes_dplf_nr2_junio_2007.pdf, Washington, 2007, p. 04. 142 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL Ello, en vista que, a lo que refiere el referido magistrado es solamente a la tutela jurisdiccional, cuando acoge la demanda de amparo y no a la efectividad de la misma. Y solo es debido proceso, cuando ampara la medida cautelar. Tampoco, se refiere a la tutela procesal efectiva, en vista que como ya hemos desarrollado y explicado in extenso, en el acápite intitulado: tutela procesal efectiva; esta última abarca, tanto a la tutela jurisdiccional efectiva como al debido proceso. 12.4. Motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. En relación a la motivación de la resolución bajo comentario, tenemos que en principio ha utilizado como agravantes, términos indeterminados previamente, tal y como se aprecia en la página 06 de la resolución in comento: 1) perturbación del servicio de justicia, ii) haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y iv) afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial. No obstante, al margen que los mismos vulneran el principio de tipicidad, no existe en extremo alguno en la mencionada resolución sancionadora, la obligatoria plasmación de la motivación para la justificación de los referidos términos indeterminados, además de la fundamentación por la cual se demuestra el incurrimiento en los mismos, por parte del magistrado investigado. Vulnerando con ello, no solamente el deber de motivación de las decisiones administrativas sancionadoras, sino también, el debido proceso administrativo sancionador. 12.5. Tipicidad y legalidad en las sanciones administrativas. Otro punto importante, es el principio de tipicidad, el mismo que debió haber observado la referida Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA. Así, incumplió con el referido principio al no haber señalado, descrito y precisado de forma antelada y expresa, en qué consiste y cómo es que el investigado incurrió en: i) la perturbación del servicio de justicia, ii) el haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) la desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y iv) la afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial. Entonces, consideramos que los referidos términos utilizados por la Jefatura Suprema, revisten conceptos jurídicos indeterminados (al no señalar en dichos casos, el tipo de infracción cometida, así como, la sanción correspondiente, tal y como lo preconiza el Fund. 35., ab initio, de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional, Exp. Nº 01873-2009-PA/TC). Además, se ha vulnerado lo preconizado por el Art. 44.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que respecto del objeto de las faltas establece: “Son objeto de control, por la función disciplinaria, aquellas conductas señaladas expresamente como faltas en la ley (…)”. En ese sentido, el contenido o definición de los conceptos jurídicos indeterminados expresados en la resolución de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, no han sido precisados previamente y no se encuentran registrados en norma legal alguna, incurriendo así la misma en doble yerro. No alcanzando la suficiente como obligatoria justificación para la imposición de la señalada sanción. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 143 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE A propósito, de lo establecido como sanción al magistrado, en el Inc. 13., del Art. 48, de la Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que establece como faltas muy graves: “No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”; es preciso dejar constancia, que las sanciones administrativas a los magistrados deben imponerse con una interpretación concordante con lo expresado en la Constitución Política. 12.6. Bloques de constitucionalidad y convencionalidad. Se aprecia que en la resolución sub examine, no se ha hecho mención, ni desarrollado tanto el bloque de constitucionalidad, como el de convencionalidad. Aunque, a juzgar por la naturaleza englobante de bloque de convencionalidad, por sobre el de constitucionalidad, habría bastado que lleve a cabo el de convencionalidad. Ello le habría proporcionado mayor amplitud de enfoque y criterio de interpretación, a la luz de parcelas constitucionales, en lugar de las meramente legales asumidas. 12.7. Test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad. Nos llama poderosamente la atención que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, en primer lugar, únicamente considere la razonabilidad para ejercer el ius puniendi estatal, esto es para sancionar, cuando de manera reiterada el Tribunal Constitucional, ha señalado que para dicho menester, tanto la razonabilidad como la proporcionalidad, deben ir de especial importancia como de inseparable tratativa. Y que en segundo lugar, la misma no haya llevado a cabo el obligado Test de Razonabilidad y Proporcionalidad. Solo lo hizo en cierta forma respecto de la razonabilidad. El referido test de ambos criterios, en casos de sanción resultan inescindibles como indispensables. Mención aparte merece, el que en la resolución sub examine, se haya puesto especial énfasis en los factores agravantes. Sin embargo, resulta preocupante que entre los criterios atenuantes para la determinación de la sanción, no se haya considerado por ejemplo: la diligencia, eficiencia, producción, porcentaje de carga de resolución de expedientes, porcentaje de confirmaciones de resoluciones por la instancia superior, ponencias en eventos académicos, publicaciones académicas, docencia universitaria, felicitaciones institucionales públicas (incluso de la Corte Superior donde labora el magistrado investigado) y privadas, entre otros; que eventualmente pudiera contar a su favor. En ese sentido, la referida Jefatura incurre en infracción a la razonabilidad y proporcionalidad de las resoluciones de sanciones administrativas. 12.8. Tetra análisis jurígeno. Corresponde examinar la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida por la Jefatura Suprema de la Oficina de Control de la Magistratura 144 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL del Poder Judicial, a través del referido método. Así, respecto del referido análisis de sus cuatro estadíos, tenemos: • Legalidad. Con relación a la legalidad, resulta menester comprobar si la resolución bajo análisis, se encuentra ajustada a las normas legales. En ese sentido, tenemos que la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA ha sancionado al investigado por haber infringido: i) la regla de competencia, contenida en el Art. 51., del Código Procesal Constitucional, ii) Impartir justicia con(…) respeto al debido proceso, positivisado en el Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, y iii) el Inc. 13., del Art. 48.-, de la citada ley, que refiere: “Son faltas muy graves: No motivar las resoluciones judiciales o inobservar inexcusablemente el cumplimiento de los deberes judiciales”. No obstante, al haber hecho uso de conceptos indeterminados y subjetivos —i) la perturbación del servicio de justicia, ii) el haber comprometido la dignidad del cargo del juez, iii) la desacreditación frente a la comunidad, y iv) la afectación de la imagen del Poder Judicial— sin haber señalado, descrito y precisado de forma antelada y expresa, en qué consiste y fundamentado cómo es que el magistrado investigado incurrió en los mismos; y allende de ello por haberlos utilizado como agravantes para sancionar, cuando los mismos no se encuentran contemplados en norma legal alguna, vulnera el principio de legalidad. Ello no hace más que refrendar, que la mencionada resolución bajo comentario, no fue expedida acorde a la legalidad, esto es, con la legislación infraconstritucional de la materia. • Constitucionalidad. En el presente punto, corresponde revisar basilarmente lo pertinente de la Constitución Política. Así tenemos, que: el Inc. 2., del Art. 139.-, en relación a los principios y derechos de la función jurisdiccional, sostiene: “La independencia en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. Ninguna autoridad puede avocarse a causas pendientes ante el órgano jurisdiccional ni interferir en el ejercicio de sus funciones(…)”. En el presente punto, amerita traer a colación lo analizado en el acápite III., del presente trabajo, en el cual se fundamente cómo es que la OCMA vulnera la independencia del magistrado investigado. Allende de lo señalado, fijando la vista desde el derecho constitucional, ello se torna más evidente. Al respecto, nótese que precisamente una de las normas legales utilizadas por la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA (Inc. 13., del Art. 48.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial), es la que aborda en el mencionado acápite. De conformidad a lo sostenido, es de verse que la resolución sub examine no devendría en constitucional, en tanto que, vulnera la independencia judicial Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 145 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE del magistrado investigado, registrada en el referido artículo de la Carta Fundamental. • Convencionalidad. Como habíamos señalado, la resolución bajo análisis vulnera el deber de motivación de las resoluciones administrativas sancionadoras. Ergo, se vulnera a su vez, lo contenido en el Art. 8., de la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, que juridiza respecto de las garantías mínimas que le asisten a toda persona. Sin embargo, varias de ellas no han sido observadas de conformidad a lo estatuído en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos. En ese orden de ideas, es de verse que lo contenido en la resolución in comento, no cumple lo sostenido por la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos, en lo referido a las garantías mínimas, esto es, al cumplimiento de la motivación de las decisiones sancionatorias administrativas, independencia judicial, tipicidad y legalidad. • Legitimidad. El presente punto se encuentra relacionado a la conformidad que debe existir con los postulados normativos, con los propios de la justicia. Esto es, con la justeza, más que solamente con la ley o incluso, con la Constitución Política. Así, el presente tipo de análisis se constituye en el más importante, en razón que aterriza en el punto neurálgico de la administración de justicia, es decir, arribar a la justicia misma. Sostenemos que el presente cuarto estadío, al que hemos denominado: legitimidad, deviene en el más importante, debido a que en el supuesto que se eventualmente se haya satisfecho la observación de los tres primeros (esto es: de la legalidad, constitucionalidad y convencionalidad), pero, que sin embargo, el resultado obtenido no sea equiparable al valor justicia, entonces, el argumento se quedará insuficiente, injusto, ilegítimo. En consecuencia, consideramos que la resolución sub examine no se encuentra revestida de la legitimidad esperada, esto es, que no fue interpretada a la luz del mandato constitucional. XIII. CONCLUSIONES.De conformidad a lo analizado, desarrollado y fundamentado, en el presente trabajo, la Resolución Nº 29, de la Investigación Nº 398-2013-LORETO, expedida por la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA; vulnera abiertamente los derechos fundamentales: al debido proceso administrativo, independencia jurisdiccional interna, tipicidad administrativa, legalidad y motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. 146 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL Así, debió liminarmente declarar improcedente la queja interpuesta por el representante de la sociedad civil, en contra del magistrado investigado, en razón a que los argumentos que contenía la misma eran argumentos de carácter jurisdiccional y no funcional; vulnerando el órgano de control administrativo OCMA, la competencia jurisdiccional mencionada. Ello se ratifica, en que para ello, esto es, que mediante el cauce jurisdiccional correspondiente, la procuraduría del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, interpuso la excepción de incompetencia, la misma que fue declarada fundada. Además, tampoco presenta el test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad previo a la sanción, así también, el bloque de convencionalidad. Construir y plasmar lo señalado, le habría las luces suficientes a la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, a efectos de realizar una correcta graduación de la sanción impuesta, que figura excesiva, así como, para evitar vulnerar los derechos fundamentales mencionados. La totalidad de criterios atenuantes para la determinación de la sanción impuesta, no habrían sido considerados en la resolución bajo comentario. Además, la misma no guarda correlación con ninguna de las consideraciones contenidas por nuestra propuesta, denominada: tetra análisis jurígeno. Esto es, que es ilegal, inconstitucional, inconvencional e ilegítima. Se tiene pues, que la mencionada resolución presenta total carencia de solidez en su fundamentación e injusta decisión, convirtiéndola en arbitraria como injusta. Tanto el magistrado investigado como la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, no diferencian los términos: tutela jurisdiccional efectiva, tutela procesal efectiva y debido proceso. Además, en la resolución bajo análisis, dejamos constancia de la configuración de una peligrosa paradoja, a que se refiere el título de la presente entrega. Esto es, que la sanción impuesta vulnera la independencia judicial del magistrado investigado, cuando precisamente se sustenta en el contenido del Inc. 1., del Art. 34.-, de la Ley Nº 29277, Ley de la Carrera Judicial, que establece: “Son deberes de los jueces: Impartir justicia con independencia, prontitud, imparcialidad, razonabilidad y respeto al debido proceso”; debido que la misma de manera coincidente preconiza que es un deber de los jueces impartir justicia con independencia. Y sin embargo, al sancionar al investigado, de manera contradictoria se vulnera así su independencia al cuestionar un ente administrativo, como es la OCMA, su actuar jurisdiccional. Amerita fijar la mirada, al ejercicio del ius puniendi por parte de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA en la resolución in comento, en razón a que si bien es cierto, que la observancia del principio del debido proceso administrativo, reviste un estricto celo y rigor en su manejo, a fortiori lo es en parcela sancionatoria administrativa. Ello, en vista de las sistemáticas vulneraciones a los derechos fundamentales del magistrado investigado. En ese orden de pensamiento, dejamos constancia que el ius puniendi estatal tiene que ser asumido de conformidad al espíritu que abraza el Estado democrático de derecho y sobre todo, el Estado Constitucional de derecho imperantes. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 147 JORGE ISAAC TORRES MANRIQUE Así, como quiera que el magistrado investigado ya enmendó su error al haber declarado fundada la excepción de incompetencia (a la luz de lo señalado por la propia Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, en los atenuantes de la resolución sancionatoria), queda pendiente, entonces, que la misma lleve también a cabo lo propio, es decir, la enmienda de sus errores. Ello, en tanto que el no reconocer ni corregir errores, implica inexorablemente, volverlos a cometer. Finalmente, en palabras de GONZÁLEZ MOORE, quien acuñó la frase: “La sanción es parte de la formación”, sostenemos que la sanción forma y educa, empero, siempre y cuando se encuentre en la vereda de la justeza, legitimidad, que es la quintaesencia de la administración de justicia y en materia sancionatoria administrativa disciplinaria. De otra manera, la sanción pierde el norte y se convierte en abusivo, arbitrario, tiranía, ajusticiamiento. XIV. SUGERENCIAS.La Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, debería reconsiderar su decisión en la resolución in comento y emitir una nueva, a efectos de no vulnerar los derechos fundamentales: al debido proceso administrativo, independencia jurisdiccional interna, tipicidad administrativa, legalidad y motivación de las resoluciones administrativas. Además, sería positivo considere también incluir en la misma, el test de razonabilidad y proporcionalidad previo a la sanción, así también, el bloque de convencionalidad. Somos de la opinión, que en la expedición de la resolución sub examine; debió resolverse a través de sólidos argumentos, concordantes con el espíritu de los expuestos en el presente trabajo. Al respecto, cabe resaltar que la OCMA precisa interpretar las normas de rango legal, de conformidad a lo establecido en la Constitución Política. Cuanto más, si nos encontramos ante un proceso constitucional, como es el de amparo, en el presente caso. Sugerimos la provisión de cursos de capacitación, tanto a los señores magistrados como al personal jurisdiccional, así también de la Jefatura Suprema de la OCMA, respecto de la temática abordada en la presente entrega. Dicha capacitación, deberá ser abordada desde una óptica constitucional, en vista a la naturaleza trasversal del derecho constitucional. XV. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS.- - 148 BAZÁN SEMINARIO, César. ¿Separando la paja del trigo? Destitución de jueces por el Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura entre el 2003 y el 2007. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://www.justiciaviva.org.pe/publica/paja_trigo.pdf. Lima, 2008. CAVANI, Renzo. ¿Juzgando a jueces?. La Ocma y las sanciones por defectos en la motivación. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de https://afojascero.com/2016/04/11/ juzgando-a-jueces-la-ocma-y-las-sanciones-por-defectos-en-la-motivacion/. Lima, 2016. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com REFLEXIONES ACERCA DE LA INTERFERENCIA DEL CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVO EN LA INDEPENDENCIA JURISDICCIONAL - - - - GARCÍA BELAÚNDE, Domingo. Diccionario de jurisprudencia constitucional. Definiciones y conceptos extraídos de las resoluciones y sentencias del tribunal constitucional. Editora Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2009. GOMES, Luiz Flávio y de OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI, Valerio. Comentários à Convenção Americana Sobre Direitos Humanos. Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, 3a. ed., Sao Paulo, Editora Revista Dos Tribunais, 2010. Citado en: VV.AA. Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos. Comentario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.kas.de/ wf/doc/kas_38682-1522-4-30.pdf?140901164826, 2014. LAMA MORE, Héctor Enrique. La independencia judicial en el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/ connect/4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b/D_La_Independencia_Judicial_120912. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=4a0823004cb4a1e680cfae3a763bb84b, Lima, 2012. LEDESMA NARVAEZ, Marianella. Independencia judicial y control disciplinario. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://catedrajudicial.blogspot.pe/2008/01/independencia-judicial-y-control.html, Lima, 2008. PÉREZ DEL BLANCO, Gilberto. La competencia. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://procesalciviluam.blogspot.pe/2012/02/tema-5-la-competencia.html, Madrid, 2012. PRIORI POSADA, Giovanni F. La competencia en el proceso civil peruano. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/10/16, de http://blog.pucp.edu.pe/blog/derysoc/2008/06/05/ la-competencia-en-el-proceso-civil-peruano/, Lima, 2008. S/a. Control de convencionalidad. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, del Cuadernillo de Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos Nº 7 http://www. corteidh.or.cr/sitios/libros/todos/docs/controlconvencionalidad8.pdf, San José de Costa Rica. S/a. ¿Qué es OCMA?. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/04/17, de http://ocma.pj.gob.pe/ site/portal.aspx?view=queesocma, Lima. TORRES MANRIQUE, Jorge Isaac. La tutela jurisdiccional laboral. Acciones esenciales en el avance del nuevo modelo procesal. En Suplemento Jurídica del diario oficial El Peruano, N° 598, Lima, 2006. UGAZ SÁNCHEZ-MORENO, José Carlos. El control disciplinario de los jueces. En línea: Recuperado en fecha 30/09/16, de http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/aportes_dplf_nr2_junio_2007.pdf, Washington, 2007. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 139-168, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 149 7 La riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato The arbitration reform in Brazilian law Giovanni Bonato Professor at the Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil. Doctor (University of Rome – “La Sapienza”). Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, France. Riassunto L’autore analizza la riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato, approvata con la Legge n. 13.129/2015 del 26 maggio 2015 ed entrata in vigore il 27 luglio 2015. La riforma del 2015 non comporta un radicale cambiamento della struttra della Legge brasiliana dell’arbitrato del 1996, consagrando alcune soluzioni elaborate dalla giurisprudenza. L’articolo tratta, in particolare, della disposizione che ammette l’arbitrabilità delle controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, diretta e indiretta. Successivamente, l’autore si sofferma sui seguenti aspetti: la creazione della carta arbitrale; i poteri cautelari degli arbitri; la disposizione sulla lista degli arbitri; la possibilità di emanare lodi parziali. Parole-chiavi: Arbitrato – Brasile – Riforma – Convenzione di arbitrato – Nomina arbitri – Lodo arbitrale. Abstract The Author examines the new Brazilian law on arbitration, which is set out in a Law n. 13,129/2015 dated May 26th, 2015 and came into force on 27 July 2015. The reform of 2015 does not bring any radical change to the main orientations of the Brazilian Arbitration Act of 1996, in particular by incorporting a number of solutions inspired by case law. The article discusses about the inclusion of an express provision authorizing the direct and indirect Public Administration to have recourse to arbitration to resolve Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 151 GIOVANNI BONATO disputes related to disposable patrimonial rights. In turn, the article examines: the creation of the arbitral letter; the inclusion of a specific provision dealing with the provisional remedies; the possibility for the parties to appoint as arbitrator someone who is not part of the list of arbitrators; the inclusion of an express provision authorizing the arbitrators to issue partial arbitral awards. Keywords: Arbitration – Brazil – Reform – Arbitration Agreement – Appointment of Arbitrators – Arbitral Award. Sommario: 1. Introduzione. 2. L’evoluzione normativa del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. 3. Struttura e caratteristiche essenziali del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. 4. Le disposizioni sui rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. 5. Il veto presidenziale sulle clausola compromissorie stipulate in contratti per adesione, in contratti per adesione in rapporti di consumo e in contratti individuali di lavoro. 6. La convenzione di arbitrato contenuta nello statuto di una società per azioni. 7. Le innovazioni rispetto alla nomina degli arbitri. 8. Le modifiche relative al procedimento arbitrale. 9 Le nuove disposizioni su arbitrato e tutela cautelare. 10 La carta arbitrale e il sistema della cooperazione tra giudici statali e arbitri. 11. Le novità relative al lodo arbitrale. 12. Le novità in materia di impugnazione del lodo. 13. Le disposizioni del c.p.c. del 2015 in materia di arbitrato. 1. INTRODUZIONE. La legge n. 13.129 del 26 maggio 2015 (entrata in vigore il 27 luglio 2015) ha introdotto in Brasile alcune modifiche alla «Legge sull’arbitrato», n. 9.307 del 23 settembre 1996 (in seguito indicata con l’acronimo LA)1. 1. 152 Ricordiamo che il progetto di riforma della legge n. 9.307 del 1996 risale all’ottobre del 2013 ed è stato elaborato da una commissione di giuristi, presieduta da Luis Felipe Salomão (giudice presso il Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia) e nominata nel 2012 con atto del Presidente del Senato Federale. Il testo di riforma elaborato dalla citata commissione di giuristi è stato successivamente presentato come progetto di legge (n. 406 del 2013) dal Presidente del Senato e, dopo alcune discussioni in seno alla Camera dei Deputati, è stato inviato alla Presidenza della Repubblica che ha promulgato il progetto di legge, ponendo, tuttavia, tre veti presidenziali sui paragrafi 2°, 3° e 4° dell’art. 4 della legge n. 13.129 del 2015. Sulla riforma brasiliana dell’arbitrato del 2015, si vedano: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, in questa Rivista, 2016, 33; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade, Brasilia, 2016, spec. 63 ss.; Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, San Paolo, 2015; Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, Rio de Janeiro, 2016; Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, San Paolo, 2016; A. Wald, A reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 40, 17 ss.; Id., A reforma da lei de arbitragem, in Revista dos tribunais, 2015, n. 962, 95 ss.; G.E. Nanni, Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO Come già sottolineato dalla dottrina italiana, siamo in presenza di una «significativa risistemazione» della materia2, la quale non va, tuttavia, a sovvertire l’assetto generale dell’istituto. Restano, infatti, immutate le scelte di fondo della LA del 1996, la cui struttura rimane sostanzialmente inalterata3, venendo solo arricchita di due nuovi capitoli (IV-A e IV-B), di alcuni nuovi articoli (22-A, 22-B, 22-C), nonché di nuovi paragrafi in articoli già esistenti. La riforma del 2015 incide, infatti, solo su alcuni aspetti del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, apportando novità in materia di: partecipazione della pubblica amministrazione ad un giudizio arbitrale; convenzione arbitrale statutaria; lista di arbitri; rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrato; cooperazione tra giustizia statale e giustizia arbitrale; interruzione della prescrizione; questioni pregiudiziali non compromettibili; lodi parziali; impugnazione del lodo. Alcune innovazioni relative alla convenzione di arbitrato sono “morte sul nascere”, in ragione del veto della Presidenza della Repubblica (su vedi infra § 5). Oltre alla richiamata riforma del diritto dell’arbitrato del 2015, anche il nuovo codice di procedura civile (approvato con la Legge n. 13.105 del 16 marzo 2015 ed entrato in vigore il 18 marzo del 20164) contiene alcune disposizioni inerenti, 2. 3. 4. P. Guilhardi, Medidas cautelares depois de instituída a arbitragem: reflexões à luz da reforma da lei de arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 45, 125 ss.; S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 47, 37 ss.; M.R. Mannheimer, Mudanças na lei de arbitragem (Lei 9.307, de 23.09.1996). Observações sobre a Lei 13.129, de 26.05.2015. Visão de um antigo magistrado, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 47, 45 ss.; E.A. Cambler, R.F. Krüger Thamay, Jurisdição e arbitragem e o Código de Processo Civil de 2015, in AA.VV., O Novo Código de Processo Civil brasileiro. Estudos dirigidos: sistematização e procedimentos, a cura di T. Alvim, L.H. Volpe Camargo, L. Ziesemer Schmitz, N.G. De Macedo Carvalho, Rio de Janeiro, 2015, 103 ss. Tra i principali manuali di diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato segnaliamo: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, 3° ed., San Paolo, 2009; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, San Paolo, 2013; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, San Paolo, 2014; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, 5° ed., San Paolo, 2015. Segnaliamo anche il volume di E.F. Ricci, Lei de arbitragem brasileira, San Paolo, 2004, in cui sono raccolti i vari saggi pubblicati dall’A. in Brasile sul diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato. Sulla legge n. 9.307 del 1996, ricordiamo, infine, il commento in lingua italiana di J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 1997, 1 ss. In questo senso, si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 1. In questo senso, si vedano: A. Wald, A reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), cit., secondo cui la riforma «soube manter a estrutura e a substância da lei vigente»; F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, in AA.VV., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, 237 ss., spec. 246, che parlano di modificazioni «puntuali», apportate alla legge del 1996. Sul nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano la letteratura è sterminata, ci limitiamo a ricordare le opere della manualistica di diritto processuale civile, tra cui: H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, 50° ed., Rio de Janeiro, 2016; L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 3, 2° ed., San Paolo, 2016; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, 18° ed., vol. 1, Salvador, 2016; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de direito processual civil, 8° ed., vol. I, San Paolo, 2016; C.R. Dinamarco, B. Vasconcelos Carrilho Lopes, Teoria geral do novo processo civil, San Paolo, 2016. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 153 GIOVANNI BONATO «indirettamente o direttamente», l’arbitrato, anche se «in modo tutto sommato marginale»5. Menzioneremo, ad ogni modo, tali novità codicistiche al termine del presente scritto. Nel corso della nostra indagine, avremo modo di constatare come alcune delle nuove disposizione si limitano esclusivamente a consacrare normativamente delle soluzioni elaborate dalla giurisprudenza (risolvendo, anche, dei contrasti sorti all’interno di quest’ultima); altre disposizioni introducono delle innovazione di rilievo e sono finalizzate a migliorare il funzionamento dell’istituto in esame; altre, ancora, abrogano alcuni articoli della LA o semplicemente la attualizzano alla luce delle modifiche legislative intervenute tra il 1996 e il 20156. Prima di analizzare le novità introdotte dalla riforma del 2015, ritieniamo opportuno ricordare, a grandi linee, l’evoluzione normativa dell’istituto arbitrale in Brasile e tratteggiare i suoi aspetti essenziali. 2. L’EVOLUZIONE NORMATIVA DEL DIRITTO BRASILIANO DELL’ARBITRATO. Solo da pochi anni (dal 2002 in poi), l’arbitrato in Brasile cessa di essere oggetto di analisi teoriche e diviene un efficace ed importante strumento di risoluzione delle controversie7. Il cammino che conduce al concreto utilizzo dell’istituto inizia nel 1991 con la c.d. «Operação Arbiter»: l’allora senatore Petronio Muniz dà l’incarico a tre eminenti giuristi (Selma Ferreira Lemes, Carlos Alberto Carmona e Pedro Batista Martins) di elaborare un progetto di legge in materia di arbitrato che andrà poi a costituire il testo della menzionata LA, approvato nel settembre del 19968. Tale cammino prosegue, successivamente, con la pronuncia del Supremo Tribunale Federale di dicembre del 5. 6. 7. 8. 154 A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 1. Nello stesso senso si veda S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 37 ss. In questo senso, si veda H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. II, cit., 566: «Até data recente, o juízo arbitral praticamente não existia no Brasil, a não ser como assento de especulação teórica em doutrina, visto que na experiência concreta não se tinha notícia de qualquer compromisso». Naturalmente l’effettivo utilizzo nella pratica dell’istituto, viene accompagnato dal fiorire di studi teorici. Sull’evoluzione storica dell’arbitrato in Brasile, si vedano, tra gli altri: R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 233 ss.; A. Pereira Gaio Jr., Lei n. 9.307/96: natureza, historicidade e constitucionalidade da arbitragem no Brasil, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. 15 anos da Lei n. 9.307/96, a cura di A. Pereira Gaio Jr., R. Almeira Magalhães, Belo Horizonte, 2012, 1 ss., spec. 9 ss.; E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, Rio de Janeiro, 2016, 9 ss. Sulla «operação arbiter» si rinvia a C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 5 ss., e G. Giusti, Os vinte anos da lei 9.307/1996, cit., 3 ss. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO 2001, per poi concludersi nel luglio del 2002 con la ratificazione della Convenzione di New York sul riconoscimento ed esecuzione dei lodi stranieri del 1958. Alla LA n. 9.307 del 1996 si deve il merito di aver dotato il Brasile di una disciplina dell’arbitrato moderna e funzionale9. La LA ha, infatti, proceduto ad abrogare le disposizioni contenute nel codice civile del 1916 e nel codice di procedura civile del 1973 (all’epoca vigenti), contenenti i due principali ostacoli che si erano, fino ad allora, frapposti all’uso dell’arbitrato: l’impossibilità di instaurare un procedimento arbitrale sulla base di una clausola compromissoria; l’omologazione obbligatoria del lodo, a pena di nullità dell’atto. Sui due richiamati ostacoli è necessario soffermarsi10. In primo luogo, la legislazione anteriore alla LA del 1996 si caratterizzava per l’assenza di una disciplina normativa sulla clausola compromissoria, in quanto il c.c. del 1916 (art. 1039), il c.p.c. del 1939 (art. 1031) e il c.p.c. del 1973 (art. 1074) contemplavano il compromesso, quale unico tipo di convenzione di arbitrato. La giurisprudenza brasiliana permetteva, quindi, l’instaurazione unilaterale del procedimento arbitrale solo sulla base di un compromesso, unica forma di convenzione che poteva dar luogo ad una valida proposizione dell’eccezione di patto compromissorio davanti al giudice statale. Mentre in caso di violazione di una clausola compromissoria alla controparte spettava solo un risarcimento per equivalente, il cui ammontare era di difficilmente determinabile11. In secondo luogo, sia il c.p.c. del 1939 (art. 1043) che il c.p.c. del 1973 (art. 1097) imponevano, a pena di nullità, il deposito obbligatorio del lodo presso la cancelleria del giudice statale: il provvedimento statale di omologazione attribuiva alla decisione degli arbitri l’efficacia della sentenza giudiziale12. 9. Così R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 239. 10. Si rinvia anche a: J. Dolinger, C. Tiburcio, Direito international privado, Direito international privado (parte especial). Arbitragem comercial international, Rio de janeiro, 2003, p. 21 ss., ai quali si rinvia anche per maggiori informazioni in proposito; C. Tiburcio, Cláusula compromissória em contrato internacional: interpretação, validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, in Revista de processo, 2015, n. 241, 521 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 22; Id., A arbitragem no Brasil: em busca de uma nova lei, in Revista de processo, 1993, n. 72, 53 ss. Sulla sfiducia e sull’ostilità di cui è stato oggetto l’istituto dell’arbitrato nel XIX° secolo e in buona parte del XX° secolo, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália. Perspectiva de direito comparado com o sistema brasileiro, in Revista brasileira de arbitragem, 2014, n. 43, 59 ss. 11. Prima dell’avvento della LA del 1996, la clausola compromissoria in Brasile era, in sostanza, solo una vaga promessa di affidare la soluzione della controversia ad arbitri, come viene ricordato in dottrina da: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 4 e 94; C. Tiburcio, Cláusula compromissória em contrato internacional: interpretação, validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, cit., 523 ss.; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5. 12. Sull’evoluzione storica della disciplina del lodo arbitrale e dei suoi rapporti con il provvedimento statale di omologazione, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale. Studio di diritto italiano e comparato, Napoli, 2012, 156 ss. Sul punto si veda, nuovamente, C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 5 e 271, il quale, in senso critico rispetto alla legislazione vigente Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 155 GIOVANNI BONATO I due descritti fattori, che impedirono l’utilizzo dell’arbitrato in Brasile, sono stati eliminati dalla LA n. 9.307 del 1996. La Legge sull’arbitrato del 1996 ha, infatti, l’incontestabile merito di aver introdotto un’esaustiva regolamentazione normativa sulla clausola compromissoria, oggetto degli artt. da 4 a 8 della LA13. Una disciplina che, tuttavia, all’art. 7 della LA prevede la c.d. «formalizzazione giudiziale del compromesso». Qualora una parte non rispetti la clausola compromissoria, è necessario, infatti, rivolgersi al giudice per ottenere, attraverso un procedimento sommario, la conclusione giudiziale del compromesso14. Così descritto, il procedimento brasiliano, di cui all’art. 7 della LA, appare «sulla carta» chiaramente «più farraginoso e meno favorevole all’arbitrato» rispetto a quei sistemi che ammettono la possibilità di instaurare l’arbitrato sulla base della sola clausola compromissoria15. Fortunatamente, dottrina e giurisprudenza hanno ridotto l’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 7 della LA ad ipotesi marginali, quali quella della clausola compromissoria c.d. «bianca» o «vuota» (quella che non contiene le modalità di nomina degli arbitri), nonché all’ipotesi della clausola patologica (di dubbia validità ed efficacia)16. Il procedimento di formalizzazione giudiziale del compromesso, di cui all’art. 7, è visto, quindi, come una «ultima ratio»17 e, per tale motivo, i casi giudiziari 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 156 prima della LA del 1996, ricorda che l’obbligo di assoggettare il lodo al successivo provvedimento di omologazione impediva l’utilizzo dell’istituto nella pratica, in quanto faceva perdere i vantaggi della riservatezza e della celerità dell’arbitrato. La clausola compromissoria, insieme al compromesso, fa parte della più ampia categoria della convenzione di arbitrato (art. 3 della LA). Sulla disciplina della convenzione di arbitrato in Brasile si vedano, in generale: C. Tiburcio, Claúsula compromissória em contrato internacional: interpretação, validade, alcance objetivo e subjetivo, cit., 521 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 77; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 73; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 157; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 153 ss.; G.E. Nanni, Direito civil e arbitragem, San Paolo, 2014, 9 ss. Sul procedimento di cui all’art. 7 LA, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit, 154, anche in riferimento alle ragioni storiche che hanno dato origine alla disposizione; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 218; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 199 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 167 ss. Per queste considerazioni, si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5. E.F. Ricci, Presente e futuro da cláusula compromissória e da sua atuação, in Revista de processo, 2000, n. 100, 88, ss., § 5, che aveva qualificato il procedimento di formazione giudiziale del compromesso, di cui all’art. 7 LA, come un sistema intermedio, tra quello antico (che conosceva solo il compromesso) e quello moderno (che conferisce autosufficienza alla clausola compromissoria); l’A. aveva, quindi, auspicato l’accoglimento anche in Brasile del sistema moderno, giungendo, di fatto, a eliminare l’art. 7. Per alcuni esempi di clausole patologiche, definite anche «problematiche», si veda G.E. Nanni, Direito civil e arbitragem, cit., 86 ss., nonché L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 179 ss. In questo senso, si veda: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 219, il quale ricorda che non è necessario ricorrere all’intervento del giudice statale, ai sensi dell’art. 7 LA, «quando, apesar da negativa ou omissão da contraparte em assinar o compromisso, houver outros meios disponíveis pelos quais também seja possível instaurar a arbitragem». Per l’interpreazione riduttiva dell’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 7 LA, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit, 156, secondo cui il procedimento in analisi si riferisce solo alle clausola compromissorie che Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO in cui si applica l’art. 7 in Brasile sono numericamente ridotti18. Grazie alla riferita interpretazione dottrinale e giurisprudenziale, l’art. 7 è stato, quindi, trasformato «da strumento di ausilio giudiziario farraginoso ed interferente (…) a strumento di utile salvataggio di clausole compromissorie patologiche»19. Inoltre, si deve alla LA del 1996 il merito di aver conferito vita autonoma al lodo arbitrale (denominato dalla LA come «sentença arbitral»20). Tra l’altro, spingendosi più avanti rispetto a quanto previsto nel sistema italiano, il legislatore brasiliano decide «não contenham o elemento mínimo para que se possa instituir o tribunal arbitral (ou seja, o modo de nomear as árbitros). Se tal elemento mínimo (modo de nomear os árbitros) estiver presente, a instituição da arbitragem não dependerá de intervenção judicial»; A. Braghetta, Cláusula compromissória – autosuficiência da cláusula cheia, in Revista dos tribunais, 2002, n. 137, 800 ss., § 2, che parla della «auto-suficiência da cláusula compromissória cheia»; A. Wald, O régime da cláusula compromissória na jurisprudência recente, in Aa. Vv., Aspectos atuais da arbitragem, a cura di A.N. Pucci, San Paolo, 2001, 34 ss. In giurisprudenza, si vedano: Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo, 16 settembre 1999, ricorso n.124.217.4/0, in Revista de direito bancário, do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, n. 7, 336 ss. 18. Per rispondere all’interrogativo posto da A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5, sull’effettivo utilizzo del procedimento di esecuzione in forma specifica della clausola compromissoria, ai sensi dell’art. 7 LA, è interessante citare l’analisi empirica, effettuata congiuntamente dalla Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas (DIREITOGV) e dal Comitê Brasileiro de Arbitragem, sul tema «Ação de Execução Específica da Cláusula Compromissória (“Ação do art. 7º”)», la cui relazione è pubblicata nel sito del citato Comitê all’indirizzo http://cbar.org.br/PDF/ Acao_de_Execucao_Especifica_da_Clausula_Compromissoria.pdf). L’analisi si riferisce ad un periodo temporale che va dal 1996 al 2008 e prendere in considerazione le decisione emanate dai Tribunais de Justiça (organi di secondo grado) e dai Superior Tribunal de Justiça e dal Supremo Tribunal Federal (Corti di vertice), escludendo, quindi, le decisioni di primo grado. Nella richiamata relazione vengono identificati trentaquattro casi di applicazione dell’art. 7 LA e l’analisi viene conclusa con la constatazione di un ridotto numero di sentenze statali pronunciate in materia. Tale circostanza viene attribuita a diversi fattori, tra cui: la prevalenza nella pratica di clausole compromissorie valide ed efficaci rispetto alle clausole compromissorie bianche o patologiche; la conclusione di un accordo tra le parti per stipulare un compromesso, in caso di clausola compromissoria difettosa; la mancata proposizione dell’impugnazione nei confronti della decisione di primo grado, emanata a conclusione del procedimento di cui all’art. 7 LA. Nel 2014 è iniziata una seconda ricerca empirica in materia di arbitrato che riguarda anche l’utilizzazione del procedimento, di cui all’art. 7 LA. Tuttavia, ancora non sono stati pubblicati i risultati di questa ultima ricerca http://cbar.org.br/site/pesquisa-cbar-abearb-2014. 19. Richiamando quanto scritto da A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., nota 6. 20. Come indicato nel testo, la vigente legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato utilizza esclusivamente l’espressione «sentença arbitral» per denominare la decisione degli arbitri e non quella di «laudo» (mentre il c.p.c. del 1939 e il c.p.c. del 1973 contenevano entrambi i vocaboli in questione). Solo l’art. 33, § 2, inciso II, LA, nella sua versione originaria del 1996, conteneva la parola laudo, ma la riforma dell’arbitrato del 2015 ha sostituito, all’interno di tale dispozione, tale vocabolo con quello di sentença arbitral. Si vedano C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 271, e L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 417, quanto all’opportunità di utilizzare il termine sentenza arbitrale nella LA. In ogni caso, nel presente scritto utilizzeremo l’espressione lodo arbitrale per trattare della decisione degli arbitri anche in relazione al diritto brasiliano, poiché riteniamo che sia irrilevante per la determinazione del Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 157 GIOVANNI BONATO di mettere completamente fine al provvedimento statale di omologazione, come specificato dall’art. 18 della LA21. Ai sensi dell’art. 31 della LA, il lodo arbitrale produce, tra le parti e i suoi successori22, gli stessi effetti prodotti dalla sentenza togata ed è titolo esecutivo giudiziale23, nonché titolo per l’iscrizione di ipoteca giuziale24. La LA n. 9.307 del 1996 è stata, tuttavia, un presupposto necessario, ma non sufficiente allo sviluppo concreto dell’arbitrato25. Infatti, l’istituto ha iniziato ad essere concretamente utilizzato nella pratica solo in seguito alla pronuncia (del 12 dicembre 2001) del Supremo Tribunale Federale, con cui è stata dichiarata la legittimità costituzionale dell’arbitrato, posta in dubbio in riferimento all’art. 5, inciso XXXV, Cost., sul c.d. principio di «inafastabilidade da tutela jurisdicional»26. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 158 regime di tale atto l’una o l’altra denominazione normativa, come anche afferma C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, 175. Art. 18 LA dispone che: «O árbitro é juiz de fato e de direito, e a sentença que proferir não fica sujeita a recurso ou a homologação pelo Poder Judiciário». Si deve notare che su questo punto, il diritto brasiliano si presenta più moderno di quello italiano, in cui, come noto, l’omologazione è ancora necessaria per conferire al lodo l’efficacia esecutiva, oltre alla trascrizione nei pubblici registri e all’iscrizione di ipoteca giudiziale (art. 825 c.p.c.). Sull’ordinamento italiano rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, Bologna, 2014, 815, e C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, 2° ed., Padova, 2012, 440 ss. Oltre agli effetti della sentenza giudiziale, la dottrina (nettamente maggioritaria) ritiene che il lodo arbitrale produca la cosa giudicata materiale, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 202; Id., Instituições de direito processual civil, I, cit., 211; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 274 e 390 ss.; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, cit., 173; H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 2, cit., 565 ss. Ma, in senso, contrario, si pone A. de Assis, Processo civil brasileiro, vol. I, San Paolo, 2015, 130 ss., il quale dubita che il lodo sia rivestito della «autêntica autoridade de coisa julgada», negando che il lodo possa produrre la «coisa julgada típica». Inoltre, alcuni autori (E. Parente, Processo arbitral e sistema, San Paolo, 2012, 303 ss.; F. Scripes Wladeck, Impugnação da sentença arbitral, Salvador, 2014, 91 ss.) sottolineano le particolarità della cosa giudicata prodotta dal lodo rispetto a quella prodotta dalla sentenza giudiziale. Per altri riferimenti, sia permesso si rinviare nuovamente a G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale, cit., 159 ss. In tal senso dispone l’art. 515, inciso VII, del c.p.c. del 2015 che include il lodo arbitrale nell’elenco dei titoli esecutivi giudiziali, come, d’altra parte, già prevedeva il c.p.c. del 1973 all’art. 475-N, inciso IV. Sul punto si veda: M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Princípios do processo no novo Código de Processo Civil, San Paolo, 2016, p. 234. Come disposto dall’art. 495 del c.p.c. del 2015 e, prima, dall’art. 466 del c.p.c. del 1973. Vale la pena ricordare l’insegnamento di R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., p. 239; Id., Aspectos contratuais da cláusula compromissória, in Revista do advogado. AASP, 2012, n. 116, 174 ss., secondo cui i pilastri fondamentali della LA che hanno permesso lo sviluppo concreto dell’arbitrato in Brasile sono: l’efficacia della convenzione di arbitrato che permette l’instaurazione dell’arbitrato, nonostante la resistenza di una delle parti; l’autonomia della convenzione di arbitrato; l’abrogazione dell’istituto della omologazione del lodo e l’attribuzione a quest’ultimo della qualità di titolo esecutivo giudiziale; l’impossibilità di ridiscutere davanti al giudice statale quanto è stato deciso nel merito dagli arbitri. L’art. 5, inciso XXXV, dispone che: «a lei não excluirá da apreciação do Poder Judiciário lesão ou ameaça a direito». Per ulteriori riferimenti alla decisione del Supremo Tribunale Federale citata nel testo, si veda L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 5 ss. In ogni caso, già prima di tale Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO Infine, come già indicato, altro fattore rilevante che ha permesso lo sviluppo pratico dell’arbitrato in Brasile è stato il recepimento – con decreto del governo federale n. 4.311 del 23 luglio 2002 – della Convenzione di New York sul riconoscimento ed esecuzione dei lodi arbitrali stranieri del 195827. I tre fattori precedentemente descritti (una nuova e moderna legge sull’arbitrato, la pronuncia del Supremo Tribunale Federale e la ratificazione della Convenzione di New York del 1958), insieme ad una giurisprudenza favorevole del Superior Tribunal de Justiça28, hanno permesso uno sviluppo notevole e progressivo dell’arbitrato in Brasile, come risulta dai dati forniti dalle principali istituzioni arbitrali che operano nel territorio brasiliano29. Possiamo, quindi, senza dubbio, affermare che attualmente il Brasile appartiene, a pieno titolo, a quel gruppo di paesi in cui si incentiva e valorizza l’arbitrato, considerando tale strumento di soluzione delle controversie di pari dignità rispetto al processo statale30. 27. 28. 29. 30. pronuncia, la dottrina dominante si era schierata in favore della costituzionalità dell’arbitrato, si vedano: J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 12 s.; E.F. Ricci, Il problema della legittimità costituzionale dell’arbitrato in Brasile, in questa Rivista, 1999, 49 ss.; A. Wald, Da constitucionalidade da Lei 9.307/96, in Revista de direito bancário e do mercado de capitais, 2000, n. 7, 323 ss. Sul tema, si veda A. Wald, La ratification de la Convention de New York par le Brésil, in Revue de l’arbitrage, 2003, 91 ss. Sulla posizione favorevole della giurisprudenza brasiliana in materia di arbitrato, si vedano le considerazioni di: A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, M. De Melo Vieira, A posição dos tribunais brasileiros em matéria de arbitragem no último biênio (2011-2012), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2012, n. 35, 15 ss., cui si rinvia anche per l’analisi di alcuni casi giurisprudenziali recenti in tema di arbitrato; C.A. Carmona, Superior Tribunal de Justiça, segurança jurídica e arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2012, n. 34, 97 ss. In questo senso, si veda G. Giusti, Os vinte anos da lei 9.307/1996, Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 3 ss., spec. 7 ss. A questo proposito, ricordano A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Ano foi marcado pela democratização da arbitragem e 2015 promete boa safra, in www.conjur.com.br (2015), che, sulla base dei dati forniti dalle principali istituzioni arbitrali che operano nel territorio brasiliano, «nel 2014 sono stati instaurati 310 nuovi casi di arbitrato, rispetto ai 170 circa del 2008; ciò che corrisponde ad un aumento che supera l’80% in numero di arbitrati nel periodo indicato». Sul punto, ricorda anche S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Pesquisa: Arbitragem em Números e Valores, 2015, in http://selmalemes.adv.br/noticias/An%C3%A1lise%20da%20pesquisa%20 arbitragens%20em%20n%C3%BAmeros%202010%20a%202015.pdf, che nell’arco di sei anni (tra il 2010 e il 2015), il numero totale dei procedimenti arbitrali instaurati è stato di 1043, il cui valore complessivo è stato all’incirca di 38 miliardi di Reais. L’analisi empirica dell’A. è stata effettuata nelle sei principali istituzioni brasiliane: Centro de Arbitragem da AMCHAM – Brasil (AMCHAM); Centro de Arbitragem da Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canadá ( CCBC); Câmara de Mediação, Conciliação e Arbitragem de São Paulo - CIESP/FIESP (CIESP/FIESP); Câmara de Arbitragem do Mercado (CAM); Câmara de Arbitragem da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CAM/FGV); Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial - Brasil (CAMARB). Sulla piena parità tra arbitrato e processo statale, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 5 ss.; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade, cit., 63; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 159 GIOVANNI BONATO 3. STRUTTURA E CARATTERISTICHE ESSENZIALI DEL DIRITTO BRASILIANO DELL’ARBITRATO. In relazione alla sistematica, la LA si compone attualmente di nove titoli: I – «disposizioni generali»; II – «della convenzione di arbitrato e dei suoi effetti»; III – «degli arbitri»; IV – «del procedimento arbitrale»; IV-A – «della tutela cautelare e della tutela di urgenza»; IV-B – «della carta arbitrale»; V – «del lodo arbitrale»; VI – «del riconoscimento e dell’esecuzione dei lodi stranieri»; VII – «disposizioni finali». Ai sette capitoli, inizialmente contenuti nella LA, si sono aggiunti, per effetto della riforma del 2015, i due capitoli IV-A e IV-B. Tra le caratteristiche essenziali dell’arbitrato brasiliano, dobbiamo ricordare l’adozione di un modello puramente monista31. L’unica distizione giuridica che si rinviene all’interno della LA è tra è tra lodo arbitrale brasiliano e lodo arbitrale straniero, differenziati secondo un criterio di tipo geografico: il primo è quello emanato all’interno del territorio della Repubblica Federale del Brasile; il secondo è quello pronunciato all’estero e che, pertanto, viene riconosciuto e dotato di esecutorietà attraverso il procedimento di omologazione che si svolge davanti al Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia (artt. 34 e ss. LA)32. Il modello monista non viene messo in discussione dalla riforma del de direito processual civil, I, cit., 214. Non è questa la sede per entrare nel dibattito sulla natura dell’arbitrato, possiamo solo ricordare che la dottrina nettamente maggioritaria propende per la natura giurisdizionale dell’istituto, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 278; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 417; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 5 ss.; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 247, che parla di una «natureza claramente jurisdicional da arbitragem»; F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, cit., 173, secondo cui «a arbitragem, no Brasil, não é equivalente jurisdicional: é propriamente jurisdição»; H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. I, cit., 593 ss., secondo cui il «procedimento arbitral, uma vez instaurado, em tudo se equipara à jurisdição oficial». Ma in senso contrario, ricordiamo l’autorevole opinione di L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, cit., vol. 3, 484, che escludono il carattere giurisdizionale dell’arbitrato. Mentre accoglie la tesi della natura ibrida dell’arbitrato, L. Britto Mejias, Controle da atividade do árbitro, San Paolo, 2015, 30. Quanto al dibattito nell’ordinamento italiano, rinviamo, tra gli altri, a: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. I, cit., 110 ss.; Id., Le nuove frontiere dell’arbitrato, in Riv. dir. proc., 2015, p. 4 ss.; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 790 ss.; G. Bonato, La natura e gli effetti del lodo arbitrale, cit., passim. 31. Sull’arbitrato internazionale, sui modelli monista, dualista e intermediario, si vedano: A. Briguglio, La dimensione transnazionale dell’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 2005, 679 ss.; P. Biavati, Arbitrato internazionale, in Aa. Vv., Arbitrati speciali, a cura di F. Carpi, Bologna, 2008, 391 ss.; A. Bonomi, Monisme et dualisme, in Aa. Vv., Arbitrage interne et international, a cura di A. Bonomi, D. Bochatay, Ginevra, 2010, 167 ss.; G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália, cit., §§ 4 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 452 ss. 32. L’art. 34, § unico, LA, dispone: «Considera-se sentença arbitral estrangeira a que tenha sido proferida fora do território nacional». Sul criterio geografico per determinare la nazionalità del lodo arbitrale in Brasile, si rinvia a: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 439, il quale ricorda che si tratta di una definizione «più obiettiva, più semplice» che permette di superare le difficoltà di qualificazione, nonostante sia «tecnicamente criticabile»; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 445 ss. Ma in senso critico con la scelta del legislatore brasiliano, si veda C. de Melo Valença Filho, Poder judiciário e 160 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO 2015. Ricordiamo che una parte minoritaria della dottrina ha espresso la preferenza per l’adozione di un modello dualista e, quindi, per l’introduzione di un regime differenziato per l’arbitrato internazionale33. Altro tratto saliente del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato è il principio di non interferenza34. Infatti, come recentemente notato dalla dottrina italiana, una volta avviato l’arbitrato, «il giudice brasiliano scompare o quasi»35. Lo dimostrano, tra le altre cose: la disciplina della ricusazione degli arbitri, che viene proposta dinanzi agli stessi arbitri o agli organi dell’istituzione arbitrale (in caso di arbitrato amministrato) e non dinanzi al giudice statale36; l’adozione della regola della priorità temporale della competenza degli arbitri nel controllo validità della convenzione di arbitrato, che esclude il sistema delle vie parallele37; la completa soppressione dell’omologazione del 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. sentença arbitral, Curitiba, 2002, 189 ss. Nel panorama comparatistico, pare essere prevalente il criterio della sede dell’arbitrato per determinare la nazionalità del lodo arbitrale. Sul lodo straniero in generale e per riferimenti al sistema italiano, si vedano, tra gli altri: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 297 ss.; E.F. Ricci, La nozione di lodo straniero dopo la legge n. 25/1994, in Riv. dir. proc., 1995, 331 ss.; A. Briguglio, L’arbitrato estero. Il sistema delle convenzioni internazionali, Padova, 1999, 17 ss.; G. Ruffini, Sede dell’arbitrato e nazionalità del lodo, in Corr. giur., 2000, 1500 ss.; G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália, cit., § 5; R. Maruffi, Sede e nazionalità dell’arbitrato, in Rivista di diritto processuale, 2012, 627 ss.; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 988 ss.; C.A. da Silvera Lobo, A definição de sentença arbitral estrangeira, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2006, n. 9, 62 ss. Sulle conseguenze che derivano dall’applicazione concorrente di differenti criteri di nazionalità, si veda: E.F. Ricci, Il lodo arbitrale con nazionalità plurima: un utile strumento nei rapporti tra Brasile e stati europei, in questa Rivista, 1999, 643 ss.; Id., Lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 217 ss. Per l’opportunità di adottare un modello dualista in Brasile, si vedano: F. Verçosa, Arbitragem interna v. arbitragem internacional: breves contornos da distinção e sua repercussão no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro face ao princípio da autonomia da vontade, in Aa.Vv., O direito internacional contemporâneo. Estudos em homenagem ao Professor Jacob Dolinger, a cura di C. Tiburcio, L.R. Barroso, Rio de Janeiro, 2006, p. 421 ss.; L. Tripodi, Arbitragem doméstica e internacional: o que significam monismo e dualismo no terreno da arbitragem?, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 329 ss., spec. 335. In senso critico con il sistema dualista, si pone C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 438 ss. Come nota, giustamente, A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 5, il quale sottolinea come il principio ispiratore del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato sia «meno intromissione possibile del giudice statuale; ‘assistenza non interferenza’ secondo un efficace slogan» (citando in proposito un conosciuto lavoro di G. Tarzia, Assistenza e non interferenza giudiziaria nell’arbitrato internazionale, in questa Rivista, 1996, 473 ss.). Sul principio di non interferenza e sull’autonomia dell’arbitrato in Brasile, si vedano: F.L. Yarshell, Caráter subsidiário da ação anulatória de sentença arbitral, in Revista de Processo, 2012, n. 207, 13 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 210. A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 6. Sulla disciplina della ricusazione degli arbitri, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 244 ss. Almeno, secondo l’opinione di una parte della dottrina in Brasile, in tema di rapporti tra arbitri e giudici statali si applicherebbe la regola della priorità temporale della competenza degli arbitri nel controllo della validità della convenzione di arbitrato, con la conseguenza che una volta sollevata Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 161 GIOVANNI BONATO lodo, che, come precedentemente indicato, è titolo esecutivo giudiziale fin dalla sua emanazione38. Solo nell’ambito dell’impugnazione del lodo, il giudice statale “torna di scena”, tra l’altro con poteri limitati alla sola fase rescindente, non potendo mai passare alla fare rescissoria (vedi infra n. 12). Delineato il contesto in cui si inserisce la legge n. 13.129 del 2015, possiamo iniziare a commentare il contenuto della riforma del 2015. 4. LE DISPOSIZIONI SUI RAPPORTI TRA ARBITRATO E PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE. La legge n. 13.129 del 2015 inserisce tre nuovi commi al fine di disciplinare i rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione39. Si tratta dei §§ 1° e 2° dell’art. 1, nonché del § 3° dell’art. 2 LA. l’eccezione di patto compromossorio i giudici statali dovrebbero chiudere il processo in rito, senza poter effettuare alcuna analisi sulla validità della convenzione. Le contestazioni sulla validità del patto compromissorio potrebbero, quindi, essere fatte valere con l’impugnazione del lodo. In questo senso, si vedano: E. Coelho Pitombo, Os efeitos da convenção de arbitragem. Adoção do princípio Kompetenz-Kompetenz no Brasil, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof. Soares, a cura di C.A. Carmona, S.M. Ferreira Lemes, P.A. Batista Martins, 2007, 326 ss.; R.F. Alves, A inadmissibilidade das medidas anti-arbitragem no direito brasileiro, San Paolo, 2009, 184; F. Didier, Curso de direito processual civil, I, cit., 645. In realtà, la legge brasiliana non è chiarissima sul punto e, infatti, altri autori sostengono una tesi diversa, secondo cui i giudici statali – una volta sollevata l’eccezione di patto compromissorio – avrebbero il potere di verificare prima facie la validità della convenzione di arbitrato, così: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 177 ss.; R. Resende Beneduzi, Premilinar de arbitragem no novo CPC, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 285 ss. Quanto al diritto italiano, è interpretazione assolutamente dominante, quella secondo cui l’art. 819 ter abbia voluto dettare la regola delle «vie parallele», si veda, per tutti, L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 579 ss. e 677. 38. Sul punto, si veda, nuovamente C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 210 ss. 39. Sul tema dell’arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione, la letteratura è molto ampia, segnaliamo: A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Arbitragem envolvendo entes estatais: a evolução da jurisprudência e a Lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 105 ss.; A. Chateaubriand Martins, Arbitragem e administração pública, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 67 ss.; H.V. Mendonça Sica, Arbitragem e Fazenda Pública, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 273 ss.; E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit.; M.V. Armani Alves, A fazenda pública na arbitragem, dissertação de mestrado (tesi di master), Università di San Paolo (USP), 2016; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, in Revista brasileira de arbitragem, 2016, n. 49, 7 ss.; G.H. Justino De Oliveira, G.B. Schwarstmann, Arbitragem público-privada no Brasil: a especialidade do litígio administrativo e as especificidades do procedimento arbitral, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 44, 150 ss.; Aa.Vv., Arbitragem e Poder Público, a cura di C.A. Guimarães Pereira, E. Talamini, San Paolo, 2010; P. Osternack Amaral, Arbitragem e administração pública, Belo Horizonte, 2012; M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Breve análise sobre a arbitragem em conflitos que envolvem o Estado, in Revista da Procuradoria Geral do Estado de São Paulo, 2012, n. 75, 13 ss.; Id., Arbitragem e estado: ensaio 162 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO In primo luogo, per fare chiarezza sul tema della compromettibilità delle controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, la riforma introduce, all’art. 1, § 1°, la disposizione secondo cui: «La pubblica amministrazione diretta ed indiretta può ricorrere all’arbitrato per dirimere i conflitti relativi a diritti patrimoniali disponibili». Viene, in tal modo, legislativamente confermata la soluzione elaborata da una parte della giurisprudenza (in particolare del Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia) e sostenuta da parte autorevole della dottrina, secondo cui già in riferimento alla versione originaria della LA del 1996 potevano essere considerate valide – alla luce all’art. 1, caput40, LA – le convenzioni di arbitrato stipulate dalla pubblica amministrazione, purché aventi ad oggetto diritti patrimoniali disponibili41. Comunque, nel fugare ogni dubbio in proposito, sobre o litígio adequado, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 45, 155 ss.; C.A. de Salles, A arbitragem em contratos administrativos, Rio de Janeiro, 2011; S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Arbitragem na administração pública. Fundamentos jurídicos e eficiência econômica, San Paolo, 2007. 40. Come ricorda C. R. Dinamarco, Vocabulário do processo civil, San Paolo, 2009, p. 313, il caput è la «testa» dell’articolo, la sua prima parte, in cui si trova la «disposizione centrale», che viene seguita da incisi e paragrafi in cui si trovano «disposizioni complementari». 41. L’art. 1, caput, LA dispone (fin dalla sua versione originale del 1996) che: «Le persone capaci di contrattare potranno ricorrere all’arbitrato per dirimere liti relative a diritti patrimoniali disponibili». Come indicato nel testo, sulla base di tale previsione normativa, alcune sentenze del Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia avevano ritenuto legittima l’utilizzazione dell’arbitrato da parte della pubblica amministrazione, tra le varie decisioni segnaliamo: 25 ottobre 2005, sezione 2°, recurso especial n. 612.439/RS; 17 luglio 2007, sezione 2°, recurso especial nº 606.345; 28 giugno 2006, sezione 1°, mandado de segurança n. 11.308/DF; 20 ottobre 2011, sezione 3°, recurso especial n. 904.813/PR. Giova ricordare che anche prima dell’entrata in vigore della LA del 1996, il Supremo Tribunale Federale nel celebre caso “Lage” aveva ammesso la legittimità del ricorso all’arbitrato in una controversia vertente tra l’amministrazione pubblica federale brasiliana e un soggetto privato, ma in tal caso sussisteva un’espressa autorizzazione legale. Si tratta della decisione emanata nell’ambito dell’agravo de instrumento n. 52.181, del 14 novembre 1973, publicata in Revista trimestral de jurisprudência, 1974, n. 68, 382 ss. Per l’analisi delle citate decisioni rinviamo a: E.B. Baraldi, Arbitragem e contratos com a administração pública, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 30 ss.; A. Wald, A. Gerdau de Borja, Arbitragem envolvendo entes estatais: a evolução da jurisprudência e a Lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, cit., 113 ss. Tra gli autori favorevoli alla compromettibilità delle controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, anche prima della riforma del 2015, si vedano: S.M. Ferreira Lemes, A arbitragem e os novos rumos empreendidos na administração pública: a empresa estatal, o Estado e a concessão de serviço público, in Aa.Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da Lei de Arbitragem, a cura di P.A. Batista Martins, S.M. Ferreira Lemes, C.A. Carmona, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 175 ss.; C. De Melo Valença Filho, Arbitragem e contratos administrativos, in Revista de direito bancário do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, 2000, n. 8, 359 ss.; A. Wald, A arbitragem e as sociedades de economia mista, in Revista de direito bancário do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, 2003, n. 19, 283 ss.; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Arbitragem e prestação de serviços públicos, in Revista de direito administrativo, 2003, n. 233, 377 ss.; J.E. Nunes Pinto, A arbitrabilidade de controvérsias nos contratos com o Estado e empresas estatais, in Revista brasileira de arbitragem, 2004, n. 01, 9 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 50; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Ordem pública e processo, San Paolo, 2011, 20-21; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 87 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 39. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 163 GIOVANNI BONATO l’art. 1, § 1°, è certamente norma da apprezzare42 e mette fine a quella prospettiva più restrittiva – sostenuta da una parte della giurisprudenza (in particolare della Corte dei Conti) e da alcuni studiosi – in base alla quale la pubblica amministrazione poteva ricorrere all’arbitrato solo in presenza di una legge speciale che la autorizzasse espressamente in tal senso e in relazione alle specifiche materie indicate43. In ragione dell’innovazione della riforma in commento, risulta – chiaramente – superata quella posizione dottrinaria più estrema che sosteneva l’esistenza di un assoluto divieto per 42. In senso favorevole all’introduzione dell’art. 1, §1°, si vedano: G. Fernandez de andrade, Arbitragem e administração pública: da hostilidade à gradual aceitação, Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 411 ss.; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3. Il citato art. 1, §1°, LA, pur contenendo una novità di rilievo, non pare risolvere tutti i dubbi sollevati in dottrina rispetto alla concreta individuazione delle controversie arbitrabili, di cui è parte la pubblica amministrazione. Come è stato, infatti, opportunamente dimostrato, i criteri civilistici della disponibilità e della patrimonialità delle situazioni giuridiche non sono di facile applicazione nell’ambito del diritto pubblico, data la mancanza di «un criterio generale che permetta di determinare i diritti disponibili della pubblica amministrazione», da cui deriva la difficoltà di individuare con esattezza l’ambito delle controversie compromettibili, così E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 115 ss., alla quale si rinvia per l’esaustiva analisi dei sei metodi cui si fa ricorso per individuare il concetto di disponibilità dei diritti e, quindi, della compromettibilità delle controversie. Merita approvazione la tesi, secondo cui per determinare l’area della compromettibilità dei conflitti con la p.a., è necessario applicare dei criteri supplementari, oltre a quello della disponibilità, come il criterio di «adeguazione», così: M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Arbitragem e Estado: ensaio sobre o litígio adequado, cit., 155 ss. 43. Ricordiamo che negli ultimi anni diverse leggi speciali brasiliane avevano autorizzato la stipulazione di convenzioni di arbitrato da parte della pubblica amministrazione per determinate materie, tra cui ricordiamo: l’art. 23, XV, della legge n. 8.987 del 1995 (Lei de Concessões), l’art. 93, XV, della legge n. 9.472 del 1997 (Lei Geral de Telecomunicações), l’art. 43, X, della legge n. 9.478 del 1997 (Lei do Petróleo); l’art. 2, § 3º, della legge n. 10.433 del 2002 (Lei do Mercado Atacadista de Energia), l’art. 4º, § 6º, della legge n. 10.848 del 2004 (Lei da Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica); l’art. 11 della legge nº 11.079 del 2004 (Lei das Parcerias Público-Privadas). Per la prospettiva secondo cui la pubblica amministrazione brasiliana poteva ricorrere all’arbitrato solo in presenza di una legge che espressamente disponeva in tal senso, si vedano: L.R. Barroso, Sociedade de economia mista prestadora de serviço público. Cláusula arbitral inserida em contrato administrativo sem prévia autorização legal. Invalidade, in Revista de direito bancário, do mercado de capitais e da arbitragem, 2003, n. 19, 427 ss.; C.A. de Salles, Arbitragem em contratos administrativos, cit., 239-40. Come indicato nel testo, era questo anche l’orientamento della giurisprudenza della Corte dei Conti, da sempre ostile ad ammettere la legittimità dell’arbitrato con la pubblica amministrazione, se non in presenza di un’espressa autorizzazione legislativa, si vedano le seguenti decisioni: 28 maggio 2003, n. 587/2003; 16 luglio 2003, n. 906/2003; 10 aprile 2003, n. 584/2003; 10 marzo 2003, n. 215/2004; 24 agosto 2005, n. 1.271/05; 14 marzo 2006, n. 537/2006. Sulla giurisprudenza della Corte dei Conti in materia di arbitrato, si vedano: C. A. Guimaraes Pereira, Arbitragem e a Administração Pública na Jurisprudência do TCU e do STJ, in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem e Poder Público, a cura di C.A. Guimaraes Pereira, E. Talamini, cit., 131 ss.; E.B. Baraldi, Arbitragem e contratos com a administração pública, cit., p. 50. 164 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO la pubblicazione amministrazione brasiliana di deferire la soluzione delle controversie al giudizio degli arbitri44. Sempre in relazione all’arbitrabilità delle controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, l’art. 1, § 2°, dispone che: «L’autorità o l’organo della pubblica amministrazione diretta competente per la stipulazione della convenzione di arbitrato è la medesima autorità o lo stesso organo che può concludere accordi e transazioni». Si tratta di una disposizione sulla c.d. arbitrabilità soggettiva, rispetto a cui la riforma chiarisce quale l’organo della p.a. brasiliana è legittimato a stipulare compromessi e clausole compromissorie. Infine, nell’art. 2, § 3°, LA, vengono introdotte due regole processuali, di applicazione inderogabile quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un processo arbitrale. Si tratta del necessario rispetto del principio di pubblicità del processo e del criterio della decisione che deve essere secondo le regole di diritto. Rispetto al principio di pubblicità del processo arbitrale, la riforma in commento ribadisce quanto già impone l’art. 37 della Costituzione Federale del 1988: «La pubblica amministrazione diretta e indiretta (…) seguirà i principi di legalità, impersonalità, moralità, pubblicità ed efficienza (…)»45. Dei dubbi, tuttavia, sussistono sulla portata del principio di pubblicità che si impone alla p.a. quando partecipa ad un procedimento arbitrale. Il principio in discorso può essere, infatti, concepito in due modi. In base ad una prima prospettiva, sarebbe necessario preservare, comunque, gli interessi delle parti private dell’arbitrato e, quindi, si dovrebbe ammettere la divulgazione solo della pendenza dell’arbitrato, del lodo, nonché degli altri atti essenziali del procedimento, escludendo l’accesso pubblico alle udienze e ai vari documenti prodotti nel giudizio46. 44. In effetti, una parte (del tutto) minoritaria della dottrina brasiliana considerava inarbitrabili le controversie con la pubblica amministrazione, nel presupposto che quest’ultima fosse posta in posizione di superiorità ed essendo portatrice di situazioni giuridiche soggettive di natura sempre indisponibile, così si vedano: C.A. Bandeira De Mello, Curso de direito administrativo, 26° ed., San Paolo, 2009, 711, secondo cui «É inadmissível que se possa afastar o Poder Judiciário quando em pauta interesse indisponíveis, como o são os relativos ao serviço público, para que particulares decidam sobre matéria que se constitui em res extra commercium e que passa, então, muito ao largo da força decisória deles»; L. Valle Figueiredo, Curso de direito administrativo, 5° ed., San Paolo, 2001, 101-2, il quale sottolineava, tra l’altro, che «as regras de competência processual no tocante às questões da União são de ordem constitucional, não podendo, à evidência, ser derrogadas por legislação infraconstitucional». 45. In senso favorevole all’introduzione espressa del principio di pubblicità nell’arbitrato con la p.a., si veda A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., § 5. Sui principi di pubblicità e di riservatezza in arbitrato, si veda in generale: J.M. Júdice, Confidencialidade e publicidade. Reflexão a propósito da Reforma da Lei de Arbitragem (Lei n. 13.129, de 25 de maio de 2015), in Aa.Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 297 ss. 46. In questo senso, si rinvia a S.L. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 39, la quale esclude che le istituzioni arbitrali debbano agire come delle cancellerie di un tribunale pubblico. Nella stessa direzione, si veda anche anche C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 52, il quale, Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 165 GIOVANNI BONATO Seguendo, invece, una visione più ampia del principio di pubblicità (che, tra l’altro, ci sembra preferibile), quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un arbitrato, è necessario garantire, al pari di quanto accade nel processo statale, la totale trasparenza del processo arbitrale, comprese udienze, fascicoli e documenti, considerando coperti da riservatezza esclusivamente i segreti industriali e commerciali47. Inoltre, rispetto al regime di pubblicità, una questione che le autorità brasiliane dovranno risolvere in futuro è quella dell’individuazione delle modalità con cui divulgare la pendenza di un processo arbitrale, di cui la pubblica amministrazione è parte48. L’altra regola prevista dall’art. 2, § 3°, riguarda le norme per la deliberazione: quando la pubblica amministrazione è parte di un arbitrato, gli arbitri dovranno decidere sempre secondo le regole di diritto, essendo, quindi, vietata la decisione secondo equità49. Oltre agli aspetti espressamente regolati dalla riforma del 2015, altre sono le questioni derivanti dalla partecipazione della pubblica amministrazione ad un processo arbitrale, quali: i criteri da seguire per la scelta degli arbitri e dell’istituzione arbitrale; la lingua del procedimento; l’applicazione di alcune deroghe al procedimento arbitrale; l’esecuzione del lodo nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione. Il legislatore della riforma ha preferito non prendere posizione sui menzionati aspetti50. 47. 48. 49. 50. 166 scrivendo prima della riforma del 2015, ritiene che debba essere garantito «acesso aos interessados à decisão e aos atos essenciais do processo arbitral (quando necessário), preservando-se, porém, o sigilo dos debates e a confidencialidade dos documentos que instruíram o processo arbitral». Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 157-158; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., § 5, secondo cui «o processo arbitral (incluindo as audiências, os debates, as provas colhidas e os documentos apresentados) deverá ser moldado para dar total concreção ao princípio da publicidade». In favore di questa seconda prospettiva, merita di essere ricordato il recente decreto 8 giugno 2015, n. 8.465, recante disposizioni in materia di porti, che ammette l’arbitrabilità di alcune controversie in ambito portuario, indicando al tempo stesso che «tutte le informazioni relative al processo saranno rese pubbliche» (art. 3, inciso IV). Su questo aspetto E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 162, ritiene che: «A regulamentação da divulgação da existência de processo arbitral e de seu desfecho é, portanto, medida que se impôe». Al riguardo A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., § 5, propone le seguenti soluzioni: imporre che sia la stessa p.a. a divulgare l’esistenza del giudizio arbitrale, con la pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale o con altri canali di comunicazione pubblica; permettere alla p.a. di scegliere come camere arbitrali solo quelle che garantiscono l’osservanza del dovere di pubblicità, in via fisica o elettronica. Si veda, sul punto E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 148 ss. In senso parzialmente critico rispetto al divieto di arbitrato di equità con la p.a., si pone S.L. Ferreira Lemes, Anotações sobre a nova lei de arbitragem, cit., 40. Dati gli evidenti limiti della nostra indagine, per la trattazione delle questioni indicate nel testo siamo costretti a rinviare alla dottrina brasiliana che si è recentemente dedicata ai rapporti tra arbitrato e pubblica amministrazione. Si rinvia, pertanto, ai recenti contributi di: E.C. Cleto Marolla, A arbitragem e os contratos da administração pública, cit., 147 ss.; M.V. Armani Alves, A fazenda pública na arbitragem, cit., 175 ss.; A.S. Hatanaka, O poder público e a arbitragem após a reforma Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO 5. IL VETO PRESIDENZIALE SULLE CLAUSOLA COMPROMISSORIE STIPULATE IN CONTRATTI PER ADESIONE, IN CONTRATTI PER ADESIONE IN RAPPORTI DI CONSUMO E IN CONTRATTI INDIVIDUALI DI LAVORO. Come già indicato nella parte introduttiva della nostra indagine, il progetto di legge inviato alla Presidenza della Repubblica prevedeva la modificazione dell’art. 4, § 2°, nonché l’introduzione dei §§ 3 e 4° nell’art. 4. Si trattava di novità tendenti a permettere e/o a facilitare la stipulazione di clausole compromissorie in: contratti per adesione; contratti per adesione in rapporti di consumo; contratti individuali di lavoro, stipulati da coloro che esercitano funzioni di amministratore o di direttore generale. In ragione del menzionato veto presidenziale, la redazione del § 2° dell’art. 4 rimane quella originale del 1996 e non vengono introdotti i nuovi paragrafi 3° e 4° nell’art. 451. Ciò nonostante, è interessante ricordare quale era il contenuto dei tre richiamati paragrafi che il Parlamento avrebbe voluto inserire nella LA. In riferimento alla stipulazione di una clausola compromissoria in un contratto per adesione in un rapporto non di consumo, la vigente redazione dell’art. 4, § 2°, prevede che: «Nei contratti per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace solo se colui che vi aderisce assume l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato o accetta la sua instaurazione, espressamente e per iscritto, in un documento allegato o in grassetto contenente una firma o una specifica approvazione di tale clausola». Tale disposizione tende a proteggere la parte «debole», che non ha predisposto il contratto. La clausola compromissoria relativa ad un contratto per adesione è, infatti, sempre efficace per la parte predisponente (criterio dell’efficacia relativa della clausola), mentre vincola la parte non predisponente solo se redatta con le speciali e rigorose formalità indicate nell’art. 4, § 2°. L’efficacia della clausola compromissoria redatta senza il rispetto delle formalità previste dal citato art. 4, § 2°, resta, quindi, subordinata all’iniziativa della parte non predisponente il contratto per adesione52. La versione dell’art. 4, § 2°, che avrebbe voluto introdurre il Parlamento brasiliano era la seguente: «Nei contratti per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace solo se redatta in grassetto o in un documento separato». Il Parlamento avrebbe, quindi, voluto aumentare e facilitare la diffusione dell’arbitrato rispetto ai contratti per da Lei nº 9.307/1996, cit., §§ 5 ss.; G. Fernandez de andrade, Arbitragem e administração pública: da hostilidade à gradual aceitação, cit., 411 ss.; G.H. Justino De Oliveira, G.B. Schwarstmann, Arbitragem público-privada no Brasil: a especialidade do litígio administrativo e as especificidades do procedimento arbitral, cit., 150 ss. 51. In senso critico, si vedano: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4, il quale parla di «tabù» rispetto ai richiamati veti della Presidenza della Repubblica. 52. In questo senso, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 106 ss.; J.R. de Castro Neves, Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit. 189 ss., spec. 201. Sul tema si rinvia anche a L.F. Guerrero, Convenções de arbitragem e processo arbitral, San Paolo, 2009, p. 16 ss. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 167 GIOVANNI BONATO adesione nei rapporti non di consumo, dotando la clauso compromissoria, relativa a tali rapporti, di un’efficacia piena e bilaterale (per entrambe le parti contrattuali), purché redatta in grassetto o in un documento separato, senza imporre anche la necessità di una specifica approvazione e sottoscrizione di tale clausola53. In riferimento all’arbitrato con i consumatori, l’art. 4, § 3°, oggetto di veto presidenziale, aveva la seguente redazione: «Nei rapporti di consumo creati con un contratto per adesione, la clausola compromissoria è efficace solo se il consumatore prende l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato o concorda espressamente con la sua instaurazione». Il Parlamento voleva, quindi, condizionare l’efficacia della clausola compromissoria all’effettiva accettazione dell’arbitrato da parte del consumatore, il quale avrebbe potuto manifestare la sua opzione per la via arbitrale sia instaurando direttamente il processo arbitrale, sia esprimendo (a lite già insorta) il proprio accordo quanto alla sua instaurazione del processo (avvenuta su iniziativa dell’altra parte)54. Come indicato dai commentatori, la mancata introduzione del citato art. 4, § 3°, non sembra che sia in grado di cambiare la posizione del consumatore in relazione all’arbitrato, nella misura in cui le controversie aventi ad oggetto un rapporto di consumo restano, comunque, compromettibili, alla condizione che si dimostri l’effettiva accettazione del consumatore di ricorrere allo strumento arbitrale, dopo l’insorgere della lite e attraverso una delle seguenti modalità: la stipulazione di un compromesso; l’instaurazione del processo arbitrale da parte dello stesso consumatore; la manifestazione espressa di quest’ultimo relativa all’accettazione del giudizio arbitrale, proposto su iniziativa della controparte sulla base di una clausola compromissoria55. Infine, il § 4° dell’art. 4, parimenti oggetto di veto presidenziale, aveva la seguente redazione: «Qualora il lavoratore ricopra, o sia chiamato a ricoprire, l’incarico o la funzione di amministratore o di direttore statutario, nei contratti individuali di lavoro potrà essere pattuita una clausola compromissoria, che sarà efficace solo se il lavoratore assume l’iniziativa dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato o se concorda espressamente con la sua instaurazione». Si trattava di un timido tentativo del Parlamento di aprire una breccia in favore dell’arbitrabilità delle controversie di lavoro, il cui campo di applicazione 53. J.R. de Castro Neves, Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, cit., 202. 54. J.R. de Castro Neves, Arbitragem nas relações de consumo – uma nova esperança, cit., 201. 55. Così R. Loretti Henrici, L. Mayall M. de Araujo, Relações de consumo, contratos de adesão e arbitragem, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 459 ss., spec. 480. In altre parole, la clausola compromissoria inserita in un contratto per adesione non possiede efficacia vincolante nei confronti del consumatore (come si desume dall’art. 51, inciso VII, del codice di consumo brasiliano), essendo efficace solo rispetto al professionista. Per questa soluzione, si veda Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia, decisione 6 novembre 2012 (recurso especial 1.169.841/RJ), secondo cui nei rapporti di consumo quello che viene vietato è «solo l’utilizzazione imposta dell’arbitrato, ciò che non impedisce al consumatore di scegliere il procedimento arbitrale come mezzo adeguato per la risoluzione degli eventuali conflitti sorti in relazione al professionista» (traduzione nostra). Sull’argomento rinviamo a C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., p. 82 ss. 168 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO sarebbe stato alquanto limitato, essendo circoscritto a quei lavoratori di elevata posizione economica e professionale (amministratori e direttori statutari), rispetto ai quali la clausola compromissoria nemmeno sarebbe stata efficace, essendo necessaria la loro accettazione espressa quanto allo svolgimento del giudizio arbitrale, dopo l’insorgere della controversia56. Pur essendo circondato dalle menzionate cautele, la Presidenza della Repubblica ha ritenuto opportuno mettere il veto sull’art. 4, § 4°, indicando, tra i motivi ostativi alla sua approvazione, quello del rischio dell’assoggettamento al giudizio arbitrale della generalità dei lavoratori subordinati57. Il netto (e probabilmente immotivato) rifiuto della Presidenza della Repubblica, quanto alla possibilità di stipulare clausole compromissorie nei contratti individuali di lavoro58, è un chiaro indice del fatto che in Brasile è ancora molto forte l’ostilità nei confronti dell’arbitrato nel diritto del lavoro59. 56. Per un’analisi dell’art. 4, § 4°, oggetto di veto, si vedano: F. Verçosa, Arbitragem para a resolução de conflitos trabalhistas no direito brasileiro, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende, cit., 483 ss.; A. Chateaubriand Martins, A arbitragem nas relações de trabalho: proposta de tratamento legislativo, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 21 ss. 57. Nel messaggio della Presidenza della Repubblica in cui vengono esplicitate le ragioni del veto all’art. 4, § 4°, si legge che: «O dispositivo autorizaria a previsão de cláusula de compromisso em contrato individual de trabalho. Para tal, realizaria, ainda, restrições de sua eficácia nas relações envolvendo determinados empregados, a depender de sua ocupação. Dessa forma, acabaria por realizar uma distinção indesejada entre empregados, além de recorrer a termo não definido tecnicamente na legislação trabalhista. Com isso, colocaria em risco a generalidade de trabalhadores que poderiam se ver submetidos ao processo arbitral» (in http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Msg/VEP-162.htm). 58. Per una critica alle ragioni del veto della Presidenza della Repubblica sull’art. 4, § 4°, rinviamo a F. Verçosa, Arbitragem para a resolução de conflitos trabalhistas no direito brasileiro, cit., 497. 59. La giurisprudenza dominante del Tribunale Superiore del Lavoro (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) reputa inarbitrabili le controversie di lavoro, qualificando come indisponibili i diritti soggettivi del lavoratore subordinato. In proposito, ricordiamo le seguenti decisioni: 16 settembre 2009, 3° sezione, recurso n. 1599-2005-022-02-00, secondo cui «há incompatibilidade insanável da arbitragem com os princípios norteadores do Direito do Trabalho, especialmente os da irrenunciabilidade e indisponibilidade dos direitos trabalhistas»; 24 marzo 2010, 8° sezione, recurso n. 51085-09.2005.5.10.0014; 20 ottobre 2012, 3° sezione, recurso n. 90500-78.2008.5.05.0031. Per altri riferimenti giurisprudenziali si rinvia a L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 92 Quanto alla dottrina, alcuni autori propendono per l’inarbitrabilità delle controversie di lavoro (C.H. Bezerra Leite, Curso de direito processual do trabalho, 7° ed., San Paolo, p. 110). Mentre altri autori sono favorevoli all’arbitrabilità di tali tipo di controversie, si vedano in questo senso: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 39 ss., secondo cui «As causas trabalhistas (…) são, em princípio, arbitráveis, não havendo necessidade de procurara na Lei qualquer menção específica ao Direito do Trabalho para que o mecanismo de solução de controvérsias seja aplicável também às questões laborais». Infine, per L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 95, sono compromettibili le controversie di lavoro, purché vertenti su una relazione giuridica già estinta (contratto di lavoro già concluso) e il lavoratore prenda l’iniziativa di instaurare l’arbitrato. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 169 GIOVANNI BONATO 6. LA CONVENZIONE DI ARBITRATO CONTENUTA NELLO STATUTO DI UNA SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI. Altra novità rilevante della riforma del 2015 riguarda la disciplina della convenzione di arbitrato inserita nello statuto di una società per azioni, le cui regole vengono dettate dal nuovo art. 136-A della legge n. 6.404, del 15 dicembre del 197660, recante disposizioni sulle società anonime, ossia le società per azioni61. 60. È, in particolare, l’art. 3 della legge n. 13.129 del 2015 che introduce l’art. 136-A nella legge n. 6.404 del 1976. Tuttavia, per ragioni espositive, abbiamo considerato opportuno alterare l’ordine sistematico della riforma e trattare, fin d’ora, del tema della convenzione di arbitrato in materia societario. Sul punto, si vedano: D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária, San Paolo, 2015, 137 ss.; D. Bushatsky, A reforma da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária, oportunidade de reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 145 ss.; M. Barbosa Araújo, Um regime jurídico mais seguro para a arbitragem societária: o art. 136-A da lei das S/A, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 353 ss.; M. Valverde, Apontamentos sobre a adoção do direito de retirada como solução para a questão da vinculação subjetiva à cláusula arbitral estatutária, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 395 ss.; A.C. Weber, Arbitragem e direito societário, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 59 ss.; Id., A cláusula compromissória estatutária e o direito de recesso, Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 1 ss.; F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de recesso, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 673 ss.; F.A. Maciel Müssnich, A cláusula compromissória no direito societário, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 127 ss.; C.L. Marques, C. Costa De Lima, Anotação ao PLS 406, de 2013 sobre arbitragem, in Revista de direito do consumidor, vol. 91, 2014, p. 407 ss.; G. Leporace, Cláusulas compromissórias estatutárias. Análise da proposta de nova regulamentação sob a ótica da lógica econômica e da política legislativa, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, vol. 40, 2014, p. 63 ss.; R. Ramalho Almeida, G. Leporace, Cláusulas compromissórias estatutárias: análise sob a ótica da lógica econômica, política legislativa e alguns problemas práticos, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, vol. 39, 2013, p. 67 ss. Per un’analisi comparatistica della disciplina della clausola compromissoria statutaria, che prende in esame il diritto italiano e quello brasiliano, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, v. 46, 2015, p. 337 ss. 61. Ma F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de recesso, cit., p. 691, ritengono che la disciplina di cui all’art. 136-A, della legge n. 6.404 del 1976, si applichi anche alle società a responsabilità limitata. Non è questa la sede per trattare il tema dell’arbitrato societario nel diritto brasiliano. Possiamo solo ricordare che già con la legge n. 10.303 del 31 ottobre 2001, il legislatore ha chiarito che le controversie in materia societaria sono arbitrabili, introducendo all’art. 109, § 3°, della legge n. 6.404, del 15 dicembre del 1976, la seguente disposizione: «O estatuto da sociedade pode estabelecer que as divergências entre os acionistas e a companhia, ou entre os acionistas controladores e os acionistas minoritários, poderão ser solucionadas mediante arbitragem, nos termos em que especificar». Per gli opportuni approfondimenti, rinviamo alla letteratura specializzata sul punto, tra cui: D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária, cit.; P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, San Paolo, 2012; A.C. Weber, Arbitragem e direito societário, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos 170 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO Nel caput (la prima parte) del citato art. 136-A viene stabilito che: «L’introduzione di una convenzione di arbitrato nello statuto societario, rispettato il quorum dell’articolo 136, vincola tutti gli azionisti della società, salvo il diritto di recesso del socio dissidente mediante il rimborso del valore delle sue azioni, ai sensi dell’art. 45». Il § 1º del medesimo art. 136-A aggiunge che: «La convenzione di arbitrato sarà efficace solo dopo il decorso del termine di trenta giorni, che decorrono dalla pubblicazione del verbale dell’assemblea generale che ha approvato tale convenzione». Il diritto di recesso non è, tuttavia, di applicazione generale, poiché la legge non lo attribuisce ai soci dissidenti quando la convenzione di arbitrato statutaria viene inserita nello statuto di una società per azioni c.d. «aperta» e ricorre, altresì, una delle due condizioni previste dall’art. 136-A, § 2°, della legge n. 6.404 del 197662. La descritta soluzione adottata dalla riforma brasiliana del 2015 in materia di convenzione arbitrale statutaria (che – chiaramente – si ispira alla disciplina dell’arbitrato societario italiano, di cui all’art. 34, comma 6, del decreto legislativo n. 5 del 200363) è quella più conforme con i principi costituzionali in tema di tutela Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 59 ss.; M.D. Gonçalves Vileva, Arbitragem no direito societário, Belo Horizonte, 2004; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 75 ss. 62. In particolare, il primo caso di esclusione del diritto di recesso si ha quando: «l’introduzione della convenzione di arbitrato nello statuto societario costituisce la condizione affinché i valori mobiliari di emissione della società siano ammessi alla negoziazione nei listini della borsa valori o di un mercato regolamentato, fuori dalla borsa, che richieda la diffusione azionaria minina del 25% (venticinque) delle azioni di ogni tipo o categoria» (art. 136-A, § 2°, inciso I). In questo caso, l’esclusione del diritto di recesso si deve al fatto che la società per azioni tenta entrare in livelli differenziati di corporate governance che danno maggiori garanzie agli azionisti di minoranza. In ragione dei vantaggi di cui saranno beneficiati i soci di minoranza dall’ingresso della società in tale livello differenziato, il legislatore ha deciso di non attribuire il diritto di recesso, compiendo una chiara «ponderazioni di interessi», come ricordano F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de recesso, cit., 689. La seconda ipotesi di esclusione del diritto di recesso riguarda l’introduzione di convenzione di arbitrato in uno statuto di una società aperta, le cui azioni sono dotate della caratteristica della liquidità e dispersione nel mercato, «ai sensi dei commi “a” e “b” dell’inciso II dell’art. 137» della legge n. 6.404 del 1976 (art. 136-A, § 2°, inciso II). In questa ipotesi, non è necessario attribuire ai soci di minoranza il diritto di recesso visto che i dissidenti possono vendere facilmente le proprie azioni ed uscire dalla società, senza costringere quest’ultima a rimborsare il valore delle azioni dei soci uscenti. Si vedano ancora F.A. Maciel Müssnich, F.H. Peres, Arbitrabilidade subjetiva no direito societário e direito de recesso, cit., 689, nonché G. Leporace, Cláusulas compromissórias estatutárias. Análise da proposta de nova regulamentação sob a ótica da lógica econômica e da política legislativa, cit., 63 ss. 63. Alcune differenze intercorrono tra la disciplina italiana e quella brasiliana, tra cui: il quorum di approvazione della deliberazione relativa alla convenzione di arbitrato, che in Italia è di due terzi del capitale sociale, mentre in Brasile è della metà delle azioni con diritto di voto; il diritto di recesso che in Italia viene concesso sia ai soci assenti che a quelli dissidenti, mentre in Brasile viene attribuito solo a questi ultimi; l’assenza di casi di esclusione del diritto di recesso in Italia, a differenza di quanto accade in Brasile, divergenza che si spiega con il fatto che l’arbitrato societario italiano non si applica alle società aperte che partecipano al mercato dei capitali ai sensi dell’art. 2325-bis del codice civile; l’applicazione in Brasile dell’art. 136-A della legge n. 6.404 del 1976 solo in caso di introduzione di convenzione Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 171 GIOVANNI BONATO giurisdizionale dei diritti che vietano la previsione di forme di arbitrato obbligatorio64. Si tratta, altresì, di un’innovazione del tutto opportuna65, nella misura in cui mette fine di arbitrato in uno statuto societario, mentre in Italia l’art. 34, comma 6, del decreto legislativo n. 5 del 2003, si applica sia per l’introduzione che per la soppressione di clausole compromissorie (su quest’ultimo punto si veda anche nelle note successive per ulteriori considerazioni). Per un maggiore approfondimento su questi aspetti comparatistici, sia permesso di rinviare nuovamente a G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 344 ss. In ogni caso, indipendentemente dalle richiamate divergenze di disciplina intercorrenti tra i due sistemi posti a confronto, è evidente l’influenza che ha giocato il legislatore italiano su quello brasiliano in relazione all’elaborazione della disciplina della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria, come viene riconosciuto dalla dottrina brasiliana (A. Wald, A reforma da lei de arbitragem, cit., 211; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., …; D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária, cit., p. 137; A.C. Weber, A cláusula compromissória estatutária e o direito de recesso, cit., 13) e da quella italiana (A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3). Sull’arbitrato societario italiano segnaliamo, senza pretesa di completezza: P. Biavati, Il procedimento nell’arbitrato societario, in questa Rivista, 2003, 27 ss.; P. Biavati, E. Zucconi Galli Fonseca, Arbitrato societario, in Aa. Vv., Arbitrati speciali, a cura di F. Carpi, cit., 53 ss.; E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società, Bologna, 2013; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit., 681 ss.; E.F. Ricci, Il nuovo arbitrato societario, in Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 2003, 517 ss.; D. Corapi, A arbitragem no direito societário italiano, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 43, 285 ss.; G. Bonato, L’imparzialità e l’indipendenza degli arbitri alla luce della riforma del diritto societario, in Aa.Vv., Davanti al giudice. Studi sul processo societario, a cura di L. Lanfranchi, A. Carratta, Torino, 2005, 423 ss.; B. Makant, S. Leongo Queiroz, Comentários à nova lei sobre arbitragem societária italiana, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2004, n. 3, 293 ss.; G. Ruffini, La riforma dell’arbitrato societario, in Corr. Giur., 2003, 1524 ss.; L. Salvaneschi, L’arbitrato societario, in Aa.Vv., Arbitrato, ADR, conciliazione, a cura di M. Rubino Sammartano, Bologna, 2009, 202 ss.; B. Sassani, B. Guicciardi, Arbitrato societario, in Digesto discipline privatistiche, sezione civile, aggiornamento, vol. I, Torino, 2007, 119 ss. 64. Se, infatti, la riforma dell’arbitrato non avesse concesso il diritto di recesso ai soci dissenzienti, in conseguenza dell’introduzione della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria, la maggioranza dei soci avrebbe potuto imporre l’arbitrato alla minoranza, con conseguente violazione del divieto costituzionale di arbitrato obbligatorio, su cui si vedano nel sistema brasiliano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 36; A.T. de Abreu Boscolo, G. Valentiniano Benetti, O consensualismo como fundamento da arbitragem e os impasses decorrentes do dissenso, in Revista de direito empresarial, 2014, n. 2, 303 ss.; G. Bonato, Panorama da arbitragem na França e na Itália. Perspectiva de direito comparado com o sistema brasileiro, cit., 59 ss. Quanto alla volontarietà dell’arbitrato nel sistema italiano, si veda N. Trocker, Processo e strumenti alternativi di composizione delle liti nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale, in Aa.Vv., Diritto processuale civile e Corte costituzionale, a cura di E. Fazzalari, Napoli, 2006 439 ss., spec. 471 ss. 65. In tal senso, si vedano: A. Wald, A reforma da lei de arbitragem, cit., 213, secondo cui la «reforma legislativa, ao tentar conciliar tendências contrárias, conseguiu soluções equilibradas e equitativas»; D. Busharsky, A reforma da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária, oportunidade de reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, cit., 145 ss.; M. Barbosa Araújo, Um regime jurídico mais seguro para a arbitragem societária: o art. 136-A da lei das S/A, cit., p. 379. Ricordiamo che la soluzione adottata nell’art. 136-A era stata difesa in dottrina de lege ferenda da L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo arbitral, cit., 65. Tuttavia, in senso critico rispetto alla disciplina dell’art. 136-A, si vedano: D. Franzoni, Arbitragem societária, cit., 137 ss.; M. Valverde, Apontamentos sobre a adoção do direito de retirada como solução para a questão da vinculação subjetiva à cláusula arbitral estatutária, cit., 407-408, il quale ammette che, pur non adottando la soluzione migliore, l’art. 136-A presenta aspetti positivi. 172 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO ad una discussione della dottrina che si era divisa tra: quegli autori che consideravano necessaria l’unanimità di tutti i soci per introdurre una clausola compromissoria nello statuto di una società66; coloro che ritenevano sufficiente una deliberazione assembleare adottata a maggioranza, dalla cui approvazione non sarebbe scaturito un diritto di recesso ai soci di minoranza67; coloro, infine, che limitavano l’efficacia della clausola ai soli soci che avessero espressamente manifestato il proprio consenso al riguardo68. A nostro sommesso avviso, pur avendo accolto una soluzione opportuna, l’art. 136-A in commento ci sembra criticabile nella parte in cui prevede che esclusivamente l’introduzione e non anche la soppressione di una convenzione di arbitrato attribuisca ai soci dissidenti il diritto di recesso69. Sebbene, infatti, non sia possibile riconoscere l’esistenza di un diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato70, come accade, invece, per il diritto costituzionale alla tutela giurisdizionale statale, l’esclusione di una clausola compromissoria contenuta in uno statuto societario dovrebbe conferire anche in Brasile 66. Così C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 110-111, secondo cui: «Caso entretanto a cláusula não tenha sido introduzida no momento da constituição da companhia, somente com o voto de todos os acionistas poderá ser incluída no estatuto (...), eis que estará em jogo direito essencial do acionista». 67. In questo senso, si vedano: P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, cit., 106 ss.; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Extensão da cláusula compromissória a partes não signatárias no direito societário, in Revista do advogado, n. 119, anno 33, 140 ss., spec. 148; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 79; E.S. Munhoz, A importância do sistema de solução de conflitos para o direito societário: limites do instituto da arbitragem, in Aa.Vv., Processo societário, a cura di F.L. Yarshell, G. Setoguti Pereira, San Paolo, 2012, 77 ss., spec. 91. 68. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo arbitral, cit., p. 65, per una opinione de iure condito; M. Carvalhosa, Comentários à Lei das Sociedades Anônimas, vol. 2, 5° ed., San Paolo, 2011, 303 ss. 69. Giova sottolineare, altresì, che né in Brasile né in Italia, la legge prevede alcunché rispetto alle modificazioni di convenzione di arbitrato esistenti. Riteniamo che in tal caso non si applichi il diritto di recesso, trattandosi di modificazioni che non hanno nessuna incidenza sulla scelta tra lo strumento arbitrale e il processo pubblico. Ma in senso contrario, si veda E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società, cit., 88-89. 70. In relazione al sistema italiano, ricordiamo, tuttavia, che una parte della dottrina ha elaborato un «diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato», tra cui: V. Vigoriti, L’arbitrato internazionale in Italia, in Aa.Vv., Nuove dimensioni nei diritti di libertà. Scritti in onore di Paolo Barile, Padova, 1990, 727 ss.; G. Recchia, «Disponibilità dell’azione in senso negativo» ed incostituzionalità dell’arbitrato obbligatorio, in questa Rivista, 1992, 247 ss., spec. 255 ss., secondo cui il diritto all’arbitrato sarebbe un aspetto essenziale del diritto di «disponibilità dell’azione in senso negativo», di cui all’art. 24 Cost.; A. Berlinguer, Scelta degli arbitri e autonomia delle parti tra diritto comune e disciplina delle opere pubbliche, in questa Rivista, 1998, 522 ss. In senso critico quanto all’esistenza di un diritto costituzionale all’arbitrato, si vedano: G. Ruffini, Volontà delle parti e arbitrato nelle controversie relative agli appalti pubblici, in questa Rivista, 2001, 643 ss.; S. Boccagna, L’impugnazione per nullità del lodo, Napoli, 2005, 198; E. Odorisio, Arbitrato rituale e «lavori pubblici», Milano, 2011, 485 ss. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 173 GIOVANNI BONATO il diritto di recesso ai soci dissidenti, parimenti a quanto viene stabilito in Italia dalla disciplina dell’arbitrato societario (art. 34, comma 6, decreto legislativo n. 5 del 2003)71. Da segnalare, infine, che la riforma del 2015 preferisce non prendere posizione su altre questioni inerenti l’efficacia soggettiva della convenzione di arbitrato statutaria, come quelle relative all’efficacia nei confronti di nuovi azionisti e rispetto agli organi sociali72. 7. LE INNOVAZIONI RISPETTO ALLA NOMINA DEGLI ARBITRI. Altra modifica importante voluta dalla riforma del 2015 è contenuta nell’art. 13, § 4°, LA, il quale – secondo la versione attualmente vigente – dispone che: «Le parti, di comune accordo, potranno disapplicare le disposizioni del regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale o dell’ente specializzato che limitano, all’interno di una lista di arbitri, la scelta dell’arbitro unico, del co-arbitro o del presidente del collegio arbitrale, salvo il controllo di tale scelta da parte degli organi competenti dell’istituzione; qualora sorgano delle difficoltà e in caso di arbitrato con pluralità di parti, si osserverà quanto disposto nel regolamento applicabile»73. 71. L’attribuzione del diritto di recesso ai soci dissidenti in caso di soppressione di una clausola arbitrale ci pare, infatti, essere una soluzione più coerente rispetto alla sostanziale parificazione dell’arbitrato con il processo statale, come si ritiene in base ad una visione moderna dell’arbitrato (C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., p. 32; Id., A arbitragem como meio adequado de resolução de litígios, in Aa.Vv., Conciliação e mediação: estruturação da política judiciária nacional, a cura di A. Pellegrini Grinover, A.C. Peluso, M. de Almeida Rocha, Rio de Janeiro, 2011, 199 ss.; Id., Superior Tribunal de Justiça, segurança pública e arbitragem, cit., 97; A. Pellegrini Grinover, Ensaio sobre a processualidade, cit., 63; C.R. Dinamarco, Instituições de direito processual civil, I, cit., 214). In effetti, trattandosi di due strumenti di risoluzione delle controversie posti sullo stesso piano, l’opzione per la tutela statale dovrebbe generare le stesse conseguenze giuridiche della scelta per la tutela arbitrale: i soci di minoranza potrebbero, infatti, avere interesse a restare nella compagine sociale alla condizione che le controversie societarie siano deferite al giudizio di arbitri e non a quello dei giudici statali. In altre parole, la concessione del diritto di recesso non solo in caso di introduzione ma anche in caso di soppressione di una convenzione di arbitrato sarebbe stata – a nostro modesto avviso – la soluzione più ragionevole e opportuna, anche se, come indicato, non costituzionalmente necessaria. 72. Si tratta, infatti, di aspetti dibattuti nella dottrina brasiliana, come abbiamo cercato di ricordare in G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 341 ss. Si rinvia anche a: D. Bushatsky, A reforma da lei e a arbitragem no direito societário: importância da sociedade empresária, oportunidade de reforço e regramento do instituto e proteção ao acionista minoritário, cit. p. 158 ss.; P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem no direito societário, cit., 106 ss.; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Extensão da cláusula compromissória a partes não signatárias no direito societário, cit., 148 73. La cui versione in lingua originale è la seguente: «As partes, de comum acordo, poderão afastar a aplicação de dispositivo do regulamento do órgão arbitral institucional ou entidade especializada que limite a escolha do árbitro único, coárbitro ou presidente do tribunal à respectiva lista de árbitros, autorizado o controle da escolha pelos órgãos competentes da instituição, sendo que, nos casos de impasse e arbitragem multiparte, deverá ser observado o que dispuser o regulamento aplicável». La versione originaria dell’art. 13, § 4°, abrogata dalla riforma del 2015, regolava la designazione del presidente del collegio arbitrale, disponendo che: «Sendo nomeados vários árbitros, estes, por 174 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO La prima parte del citato art. 13, §4°, tratta della lista di arbitri nell’ambito dell’arbitrato amministrato74. Il motivo per il quale il legislatore della riforma ha ritenuto importante intervenire su questo punto deriva dal fatto che, in Brasile, la stragrande maggioranza delle istituzioni arbitrali predispone una lista di potenziali arbitri, all’interno della quale le parti (o gli organi dell’istituzione) devono o possono (secondo il tipo di regolamento) scegliere coloro che saranno indicati per decidere la controversia75. A questo riguardo, alcune istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane adottano il sistema della lista chiusa rispetto all’arbitro unico o al presidente del collegio arbitrale, i quali devono, quindi, essere necessariamente scelti tra coloro che fanno parte dell’elenco predisposto dagli organi dell’istituzione76. Altre istituzioni arbitrali maioria, elegerão o presidente do tribunal arbitral. Não havendo consenso, será designado presidente o mais idoso». Sull’art. 13, § 4°, nella versione attualmente in vigore, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 71 ss.; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 211 ss.; J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 565 ss.; T. Marinho nunes, As listas fechadas de árbitros das instituições arbitrais brasileiras, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 543 ss.; V.C. Monteiro de Barros, A reforma da lei de arbitragem e as listas de árbitros, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 583 ss. 74. Come ricorda J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 572, un’istituzione arbitrale può scegliere tra quattro diverse soluzioni in relazione alla nomina degli arbitri: non prevedere nessuna lista di arbitri e lasciare piena e completa libertà alle parti; predisporre liste aperte che hanno solo un valore indicativo e non vincolante; predisporre delle liste chiuse, obbligando le parti a scegliere gli arbitri all’interno dell’elenco; nominare direttamente gli arbitri. Oltre a quelle indicate abbiamo anche delle soluzioni intermedie, come la previsione di liste semi-vincolanti, su cui si veda nel testo. 75. Per un panorama generale dei regolamenti delle principali istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane, si rinvia a V.C. Monteiro de Barros, A reforma da lei de arbitragem e as listas de árbitros, cit., 589 ss. 76. È la soluzione adottata dalla CAM (Câmara da arbitragem e do mercado), costituita in seno alla BM&FBOVESPA S.A. (Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros), il cui art. 3.2.1 del regolamento dispone che: «O Árbitro Único, que deverá ter necessariamente formação jurídica, será escolhido dentre os membros do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem». L’art. 3.4.1 prevede che: «O terceiro árbitro deverá ter formação jurídica, e ser escolhido dentre os membros integrantes do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem. Na ausência de consenso quanto à sua indicação, esta caberá ao Presidente da Câmara de Arbitragem». Infine, l’art. 3.7, stabilisce che: «Os árbitros indicados pelas partes deverão ser, preferencialmente, membros do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara de Arbitragem. Caso não o sejam, deverão ser confirmados pelo Presidente e por um dos Vice-Presidentes da Câmara de Arbitragem». Quindi, l’arbitro unico o il presidente del collegio dovranno essere scelti sempre all’interno della lista predisposta dalla istituzione arbitrale; mentre solo i co-arbitri potranno essere persone estranee all’elenco, ma la loro nomina dovrà essere confermata dal presidente o da uno dei vice-presidenti della camera arbitrale. Secondo quanto risulta dalla letteura del sito internet www. bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/servicos/camara-de-arbitragem-do-mercado-cam/arbitros (consultato in agosto 2016), la lista degli arbitri è composta da 62 persone, scelte dal consiglio di amministrazione della BM&FBOVESPA. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 175 GIOVANNI BONATO optano, invece, per il sistema della lista semi-vincolante, lasciando libertà in relazione alla designazione dei co-arbitri e limitando la nomina del solo presidente del collegio arbitrale (o dell’arbitro unico) che deve essere scelto tra coloro che sono inclusi nell’elenco, salva espressa autorizzazione da parte del presidente della camera arbitrale, concessa in casi eccezionali e per motivi fondati77. Altre istituzioni, ancora, adottano il sistema della lista aperta di arbitri, che ha solo un valore orientativo e non vincolante, in quanto la camera si limita a suggerire (senza imporre) alcuni nominativi per la formazione del collegio arbitrale78. Poche, infine, sono quelle istituzioni brasiliane che non prevedono nessun tipo di lista di arbitri, né chiusa, né semi-chiusa né aperta79. Possiamo, quindi, affermare con tranquillità che il sistema della lista di arbitri fa parte della «tradizione» dell’arbitrato brasiliano80, il quale pare 77. Si tratta della opzione adottata dalla CAM-CCBC (Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação della Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canadá). Si veda, infatti, l’art. 4.9 del regolamento di tale istituzione, secondo cui: «Decorrido os prazos dos artigos 4.7 e 4.8, a Secretaria do CAM-CCBC notificará aos árbitros indicados pelas partes que deverão, no prazo de 15 (quinze) dias, escolher o terceiro árbitro dentre os membros integrantes do Corpo de Árbitros, o qual presidirá o Tribunal Arbitral. 4.9.1. A expressão “Tribunal Arbitral” aplica-se indiferentemente ao Árbitro Único ou ao Tribunal Arbitral. 4.9.2. Em caráter excepcional e mediante fundamentada justificativa e aprovação do Presidente do CAM-CCBC, os árbitros escolhidos pelas partes poderão indicar como Presidente do Tribunal, nome que não integre o Corpo de Árbitros» (www.ccbc.org.br/Portal/Index). Sul punto C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 73, nota 4, ci riferisce che non ci sono state nomine di presidenti di collegi arbitrali non inclusi nella lista di arbitri predisposta dalla CAM-CCBC. Da ricordare che anche l’art. C.1 del regolamento della CAE (Câmara de mediação e arbitragem das Eurocâmaras) prevede un sistema di lista semi-vincolante per tutti gli arbitri che dovranno essere scelti tra i soggetti inclusi nell’elenco predisposto dall’istituzione, salvo deroga. Infatti, le parti, di comune accordo, e con il consenso dell’organo della camera arbitrale, potranno scegliere come arbitri dei soggetti non contemplati dall’elenco (www.euroarbitragem.com.br/pt/arbRegulamento.php). 78. Si tratta della soluzione adottata dall’art. 5.1 del vigente regolamento della Câmara de Conciliação, Mediação e Arbitragem della CIEPS/FIESP (Federação das Industrias do Estado de São Paulo), il quale dispone che: «Poderão ser nomeados árbitros tanto os membros do Corpo de Árbitros da Câmara como outros que dele não façam parte, desde que não estejam impedidos, nos termos do artigo 5.2». (www.ciesp.org.br/down/cma/Regulamentos_de_Arbitragem.pdf). Allo stesso modo l’art. 4.1 del Regolamento della CAMARB (Câmara de Arbitragem Empresarial – Brasil) lascia alle parti la libertà di nominare come arbitri anche coloro che non sono inclusi nell’elenco. Tuttavia, la stessa disposizione stabilisce che il presidente del collegio arbitrale deve essere «preferibilmente» scelto tra coloro che fanno parte dell’elenco degli arbitri. Il citato art. 4.1. dispone che: «Poderão ser nomeados árbitros tanto os integrantes da Lista de Árbitros da CAMARB como outros que dela não façam parte, desde que sejam pessoas capazes e de confiança das partes, devendo o presidente do Tribunal Arbitral ser preferencialmente escolhido entre os nomes que integram a Lista de Árbitros» (http://camarb.com.br/regulamento). 79. È questo il caso del Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação da AMCHAM (Câmara de Comércio Americana em São Paulo) che preferisce evitare di pubblicare liste o elenchi di arbitri, nemmeno a carattere esclusivamente orientativo per evitare di influenzare, anche solo indirettamente, la volontà delle parti rispetto alla designazione. Si veda sul punto C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 74. 80. Secondo T. Marinho Nunes, As listas fechadas de árbitros das instituições arbitrais brasileiras, cit., 543: «A existência de uma lista de árbitros virou uma tradição no meio arbitral brasileiro»; l’A. aggiunge 176 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO divergere, per tale aspetto, dalla prassi dominante nello scenario internazionale in cui è lasciata piena libertà alle parti rispetto alla scelta degli arbitri, salvo il successivo controllo della istituzione sulla nomina effettuata81. Essendo le liste di arbitri una delle principali caratteristiche dell’arbitrato amministrato in Brasile, è normale che l’art. 13, § 4°, sia stata la disposizione che ha sollevato la discussione più accesa in seno alla Commissione di giuristi che ha elaborato il testo della riforma del 201582. Sul tema si sono, infatti, contrapposte due visioni: quella favorevole ad eliminare il sistema della lista chiusa o semi-vincolante, dovendo essere sempre data prevalenza alla volontà delle parti rispetto alla designazione degli arbitri83; quella tendente ad attribuire all’istituzione arbitrale la possibilità di limitare la scelta degli arbitri con la predisposizione di una lista vincolante, per salvaguardare (in applicazione dell’art. 5, inciso XVII, Cost.84) l’autonomia interna delle istituzioni arbitrali, che sono enti di diritto privato85. La riforma del 2015 opta per una soluzione che è stata definita «conciliativa»86, ma che, di fatto, pone fine al sistema della lista chiusa e della lista semi-vincolante. Come già indicato, infatti, ai sensi del vigente art. 13, § 4°, le parti, di comune accordo, 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. che il sistema della lista chiusa di arbitri costituisce «um dos grandes paradigmas da arbitragem institucional brasileira». Ricorda J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 572, che le più importanti e influenti istituzioni arbitrali internazionali non predispongono liste di arbitri e lasciano piena libertà alle parti quanto alla scelta dei propri giudici privati, prevedendo solo un controllo successivo quanto alla imparzialità e indipendenza. A titolo di esempio ricordiamo né la Camera Arbitrale di Milano (CAM) né la Camera Arbitrale Internazionale di Parigi (ICC) possiedono un elenco di arbitri, come ci ricorda L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 962. Tale circostanza giustifica lo scarso interesse della dottrina italiana rispetto alla tematica della lista di arbitri, di cui troviamo dei riferimenti in U. Draetta, Il “rovescio” dell’arbitrato, Milano, 2010, 141 ss., che si dichiara scettico rispetto a tale prassi, affermando che le liste «finiscono con l’essere di scarsa utilità e poco attendibili», oltre che dannose per le istituzioni e per le parti. Sul punto si veda quanto scritto da due autorevoli membri della Commissione di Giuristi che ha elaborato il testo della riforma dell’arbitrato: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 80 ss., anche alle note 17 e 18, il quale ricorda che l’art. 13, § 4°, ha dato luogo alla «discussão mais ácida» durante i lavori della Commissione; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 212, ci dice che l’art. 13, § 4°, «gerou franca discussão não apenas intra muros, entre os integrantes da Comissão de Juristas, mas também propiciou manifestação de inúmeros especialistas e de várias câmaras arbitrais». A favore di questa soluzione, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 216-217; A.T. Basilio, A. Freire, T. Rodovalho, Modernização da lei de arbitragem – algumas reflexões, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 49 ss., spec. 59, che definiscono il sistema della lista chiusa di arbitri come una «anomalia», creata dalla prassi brasiliana. Dispone la citata disposizione costituzionale che: «é plena a liberdade de associação para fins lícitos, vedada a de caráter paramilitar». Per questa visione, si veda C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 83. Così, nuovamente, C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 84, il quale parla di un testo di «conciliação» a proposito della versione vigente dell’art. 13, § 4°. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 177 GIOVANNI BONATO possono scegliere liberamente gli arbitri, senza tener conto di quanto previsto nel regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale, ma a quest’ultima rimane, comunque, il potere di controllare la nomina effettuata dalle parti. In altre parole, grazie alla riforma, le parti possono indicare come arbitri anche dei soggetti che non fanno parte dell’elenco predisposto dall’istituzione arbitrale, la quale, tuttavia, può opporrsi alla scelta di determinati arbitri87. Se dovesse persistere una divergenza tra le parti e l’istituzione rispetto ai soggetti da nominare come arbitri, quest’ultima può sempre legittimamente rifiutarsi di amministrare l’arbitrato88. La disposizione in commento, di cui all’art. 13, § 4°, è non solo rilevante ma anche opportuna perché, in sostanza, trasforma le liste chiuse e semi-vincolanti di arbitri in liste aperte, dotate di una funzione persuasiva89. La seconda parte del nuovo art. 13, § 4°, dispone che qualora sorgano delle difficoltà in relazione alla nomina degli arbitri, anche derivanti dalla presenza di una pluralità di parti nel procedimento, si applicheranno le disposizioni del regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale. Si tratta di una disposizione, probabilmente, inutile e superflua, dal momento in cui ribadisce la regola già contenuta nell’art. 5 LA90: in caso di arbitrato amministrato, si dovrà seguire quanto disposto dal regolamento dell’istituzione che ha il compito di organizzare il procedimento91. Alla luce di quanto 87. La prassi futura ci dirà in base a quali criteri le istituzioni potranno legittimamente rifiutare la scelta di un determinato arbitro ad opera delle parti. Presumiamo che le istituzioni tenderanno ad accettare la scelta delle parti, a meno che non si tratti di arbitro privo dei requisiti di indipendenza e imparzialità e della necessaria competenza e capacità professionale per svolgere adeguatamente l’incarico. Sull’argomento, si vedano: J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 588, il quale ritiene che l’istituzione potrà rifiutare una nomina di un arbitro considerata «inappropriata»; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 217, secondo cui l’istituzione potrà opporsi alla nomina di quell’arbitro privo dei «requisiti minimi per svolgere, con sicurezza e trasparenza, l’importante ruolo che gli spetta». 88. In materia, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 84; J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., 217. 89. In senso favorevole alla previsione dell’art. 13, § 4°, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e tucci, A liberdade das partes na escolha dos árbitros, cit., p. 216, che parla di una disposizione dettata in base al principio di ponderazione; A. Wald, A reforma da lei da arbitragem (uma primeira visão), cit., che parla di «um justo equilíbrio, garantindo a liberdade e flexibilidade, mas mantendo a ordem e a previsibilidade do processo arbitral que as instituições devem assegurar»; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 203; A.T. Basilio, A. Freire, T. Rodovalho, Modernização da lei de arbitragem – algumas reflexões, cit., 59; J.R. de Castro Neves, A escolha do árbitro como fundamento da arbitragem, cit., 587 ss.; D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, 711 ss., spec. 717. In senso critico, si pone C.A. Carmona, As listas de árbitros, cit., 84. Sarà, naturalmente, la prassi futura a dirci se il nuovo art. 13, § 4°, avrà reali ripercussioni sulla pratica arbitrale e sui procedimenti di nomina degli arbitri. 90. F. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 208 e 499, ritiene che la seconda parte dell’art. 13, § 4°, contenga una soluzione «inutile» e «innocua». 91. Dispone l’art. 5 della LA: «Reportando-se as partes, na cláusula compromissória, às regras de algum órgão arbitral institucional ou entidade especializada, a arbitragem será instituída e processada de 178 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO disposto nella seconda parte dell’art. 13, § 4°, ci pare che la riforma del 2015 abbia perso un’occasione92, lasciando sostanzialmente irrisolto il problema della designazione degli arbitri nell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti. Spetterà, pertanto, alla giurisprudenza brasiliana elaborare una soluzione per permettere la formazione del collegio arbitrale quando l’arbitrato è ad hoc o quando il regolamento dell’istituzione arbitrale non preve nulla rispetto alla pluralità di parti93. acordo com tais regras, podendo, igualmente, as partes estabelecer na própria cláusula, ou em outro documento, a forma convencionada para a instituição da arbitragem». 92. Nella stessa direzione F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 242, sottolinea che la riforma brasiliana del 2015 non ha risolto il problema dell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti, «perdendo un’ottima opportunità al riguardo»; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3, mette in rilievo la timidezza del legislatore brasiliano quanto alla disciplina dell’arbitrato con pluralità di parti. A nostro modesto avviso, sarebbe stato, probabilmente, più opportuno in materia adottare quella che ci sembra essere la soluzione più diffusa in ambito comparatistico: in mancanza di accordo tra le parti sulla nomina di uno o più arbitri, come anche nel caso in cui non ci sia l’aggregazione delle parti in due poli distinti, è il giudice statale (o l’istituzione arbitrale in caso di arbitrato amministrato) a provvedere alla designazione di tutti i membri del collegio, al fine di rispettare il principio della parità delle parti rispetto alla formazione del collegio. Già in precedenza, avevamo sostenuto la nostra preferenza per la soluzione, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 350 ss. Tale soluzione è stata adottata, tra l’altro, dalla riforma francese del 2011 che ha modificato l’art. 1453 c.p.c. secondo cui qualora si tratti di un arbitrato con pluralità di parti e queste non si accordino sulle modalità di nomina, sarà la persona incaricata di organizzare l’arbitrato, o in mancanza, il giudice statale a procedere alla designazione di uno o più arbitri (si veda G. Bonato, L’ultima riforma francese dell’arbitrato, in questa Rivista, 2012, 491 ss., spec. 505). Per le diverse soluzioni previste in Italia nell’arbitrato di diritto comune e nell’arbitrato societario, si rinvia a: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 486; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, I, cit., 578 ss.; E. Dalmotto, L’arbitrato nelle società, cit., 168 ss.; F. Danovi, Gli arbitri e la loro formazione, in Aa.Vv., Arbitrato, ADR, conciliazione, a cura di M. Rubino Sammartano, cit., 351 ss.; G. Bonato, L’imparzialità e l’indipendenza degli arbitri alla luce della riforma del diritto societario, cit., 423 ss.; Id., Arbitragem societária italiana: análise comparativa sobre a abrangência subjetiva da cláusula compromissória e a nomeação dos árbitros, cit., 350 ss. 93. In realtà, la stragrande maggioranza dei regolamenti delle istituzioni arbitrali brasiliane prevede la regola secondo cui in caso di mancata aggregazione delle parti – ai fini della nomina degli arbitri – in due poli, l’istituzione arbitale, senza tener conto di alcuna nomina effettuata dalle parti, designerà tutti i membri del collegio arbitrale. Si vedano in Brasile, le seguenti norme: l’art. 9.5 del Regolamento del Centro de Arbitragem da Câmara Americana de Comércio (AMCHAM); l’art. 30, § 2°, del Regolamento della Câmara FGV de Conciliação e Arbitragem; l’art. 4.16 del Regolamento del Centro de Arbitragem e Mediação da Câmara de Comércio Brasil-Canada (CCBC); l’art. 3.1 del Regolamento della Câmara de Conciliação, Mediação e Arbitragem CIESP/FIESP. La stessa soluzione è prevista nell’art. 12 del Regolamento del 2012 della Corte internazionale di arbitrato di Parigi (CCI), nonché nell’art. 15 del Regolamento della Camera arbitrale di Milano del 2010. Per un panorama dei regolamenti arbitrali brasiliani, si vedano: L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 121 ss.; J.R. Cruz e Tucci, Igualdade é assegurada às partes na composição do painel arbitral, in www.conjur.com.br Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 179 GIOVANNI BONATO 8. LE MODIFICHE RELATIVE AL PROCEDIMENTO ARBITRALE. Tra le novità più rilevanti e di segno indubbiamente positivo, inserite nel capitolo IV della LA che disciplina il procedimento arbitrale, è da segnalare l’art. 19, § 2°, ai sensi del quale: «L’instaurazione dell’arbitrato interrompe la prescrizione retroattivamente, a partire dalla data dell’istanza del suo promovimento, anche se il processo arbitrale si estingue per difetto di giurisdizione»94. La nuova disposizione stabilisce, quindi, che la prescrizione del diritto dedotto in giudizio è interrotta dall’atto dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato, momento che viene a coincidere con quello della costituzione del collegio arbitrale, ossia dell’accettazione della nomina da parte di tutti gli arbitri95. Tuttavia, per evitare che il diritto dedotto si prescriva durante la c.d. fase pre-arbitrale (che va dalla proposizione dell’istanza di promovimento dell’arbitrato alla effettiva instaurazione di quest’ultimo96), la riforma del 2015 ha previsto la regola secondo cui l’effetto interruttivo-istantaneo si produce, in via retroattiva, fin dal giorno in cui l’attore ha formulato l’istanza della instaurazione del procedimento («requerimento 94. Si vedano sul punto: A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3, che parla di un «approdo significativo» della riforma del 2015 quanto all’effetto interruttivo della prescrizione; M.R. Mannheimer, Mudanças na lei de arbitragem, cit., 55, considera l’art. 19, § 2°, una delle modifiche più importanti apportate alla LA dalla riforma del 2015; M. Cunha Azevedo Neto, A interrupção da prescrição arbitral em face das alterações introduzidas na Lei n. 9.307/96, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, Da sottolineare che la nuova disposizione allinea l’arbitrato con quanto previsto in relazione al processo statale dall’art. 240, § 1°, c.p.c., secondo cui: «A interrupção da prescrição, operada pelo despacho que ordena a citação, ainda que proferido por juízo incompetente, retroagirá à data de propositura da ação». Ricordiamo che nel processo di cognizione brasiliano, la domanda dell’attore è portata prima alla conoscenza del giudice e solo successivamente viene notificata al convenuto dopo l’emanazione del decreto di citazione «despacho citatório». Per questo motivo, si prevede la regola secondo cui è il decreto di citazione in giudizio che interrompe la prescrizione del diritto dedotto, ma l’effetto interruttivo si produce retroattivamente, fin dalla data del deposito della domanda introduttiva («protocolo da petição inicial», di cui all’art. 312). Adottando un principio classico del diritto processuale civile, l’art. 240, § 1°, ammette la produzione dell’effetto interruttivo anche nel caso in cui il decreto di citazione a giudizio sia stato emanato da un giudice incompetente (F. Didier Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. 1, 621-622; H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. I, cit., 570-571). 95. Dispone l’art. 19, caput, che: «Considera-se instituída a arbitragem quando aceita a nomeação pelo árbitro, se for único, ou por todos, se forem vários». 96. In effetti, tra il momento della formulazione dell’istanza di instaurazione dell’arbitrato e quello della effettiva costituzione del collegio arbitrale possono trascorrere diverse settimane, se non alcuni mesi, quindi un lasso di tempo che può essere «lungo e fatale» (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 142), se non si prevede una regola di interruzione della prescrizione. Non possiamo addentrarci in questa sede sull’analisi delle fasi di cui si compone l’arbitrato nel sistema brasiliano, rinviamo a: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 110 ss.; P.A. Batista Martins, As três fases da arbitragem, in Revista do advogado AASP, 2006, vol. XXVI, 87 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 238 ss. 180 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO da instauração»)97. In altre parole, una volta instaurato l’arbitrato, la prescrizione si considera retroattivamente interrotta fin dal giorno in cui la parte ha manifestato la propria intenzione di instaurare il giudizio arbitrale, seguendo le regole formali previste dalla legge98. Nel colmare una lacuna esistente nel sistema brasiliano, l’art. 19, § 2°, è certamente da apprezzare, visto che il rapporto tra arbitrato e prescrizione aveva suscitato vari dubbi e incertezze in Brasile99. Tuttavia, una parte della dottrina ritiene (a ragione) ancora non del tutto soddisfaciente la regolamentazione del rapporto tra prescrizione e arbitrato, avendo proposto di modificare anche l’art. 202 c.c. brasiliano, inserendo una disposizione che regoli specificamente le ipotesi di interruzione della prescrizione in caso di arbitrato100. Si tratterebbe, in sostanza, di applicare in Brasile 97. L’art. 19, § 2°, denomina «requerimento da (…) instauração» dell’arbitrato il primo atto con il quale la parte manifesta la propria intenzione di promuovere un giudizio arbitrale. In dottrina vengono utilizzate anche espressioni differenti, quali: «pedido de instituição de procedimento arbitral» o «pedido de instauração da arbitragem» (T.M. Nunes, Arbitragem e interrupção da prescrição, cit., p. 504). Quando l’arbitrato è ad hoc, una parte notificherà all’altra un «convite a vir à arbitragem» (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 141) come dispone l’art. 6: «Não havendo acordo prévio sobre a forma de instituir a arbitragem, a parte interessada manifestará à outra parte sua intenção de dar início à arbitragem, por via postal ou por outro meio qualquer de comunicação, mediante comprovação de recebimento, convocando-a para, em dia, hora e local certos, firmar o compromisso arbitral». Qualora si tratti di un arbitrato amministrato, si seguirà il regolamento della camera arbitrale e la notificazione dell’istanza di promuovere l’arbitrato verrà effettuata con una «iniciativa junto a uma instituição arbitral» (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 141). 98. La soluzione prevista dall’art. 19, § 2°, è coerente, perché l’esternazione dell’intenzione di promuovere il giudizio arbitrale, secondo le forme stabilite dalla legge, costituisce «indiscutível manifestação de irresignação em face de uma situação jurídica não desejada, equivalendo para esse efeito, mutatis mutandi, à iniciativa de um processo perante o Poder Judiciário mediante o ajuizamento da petição inicial» (così ancora C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 143, che prima dell’entrata in vigore della riforma già propugnava la soluzione consacrata nell’art. 19, § 2°, in commento). 99. Per le questioni sorte anteriormente alla riforma del 2015 sul rapporto tra arbitrato e prescrizione, si veda T.M. Nunes, Arbitragem e prescrição, San Paolo, 2014. 100. Per questa prospettiva si veda T.M. Nunes, A arbitragem e a interrupção da prescrição, cit., 531, il quale, in particolare, propone di inserire tra i casi di interruzione della prescrizione, previsti dall’art. 202 del codice civile brasiliano, anche quello: della stipulazione di un compromesso; del deposito dell’istanza di instaurazione dell’arbitrato presso l’organo competente dell’istituzione arbitrale (qualora si tratta di arbitrato istituzionale); della notificazione alla controparte dell’atto con cui l’attore manifesta la propria intenzione di promuovere il giudizio arbitrale. Concordiamo con quanto scritto dall’A., in quanto l’aver ancorato la produzione (retroattiva) dell’effetto interruttivo-istantaneo della prescrizione all’instaurazione dell’arbitrato potrebbe infatti creare un vuoto di tutela, qualora l’attore abbia formulato l’istanza di instaurazione del giudizio arbitrale, ma poi non si giunga all’effettiva costituzione del collegio arbitrale. Nella stessa linea anche D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit., 719, ritiene che sarebbe stato più opportuno stabilire che la prescrizione venga interrotta dal «simples requerimento» dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato e non dall’effettiva instaurazione di quest’ultimo. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 181 GIOVANNI BONATO una regola simile a quella prevista dall’art. 2943 c.c. italiano in relazione alla domanda di arbitrato101. Tra l’altro, poiché l’art. 202 c.c. non tratta dell’arbitrato, tale lacuna potrebbe suscitare dei dubbi in relazione alla produzione dell’effetto sospensivo della prescrizione al giudizio arbitrale, di cui al § unico del citato articolo102. Crediamo che non sussistano fondate ragioni per non applicare l’art. 202, § unico, al processo arbitrale103. Tuttavia, sarebbe stato, probabilmente, opportuno un intervento chiarificatore del legislatore della riforma del 2015 nella direzione precedentemente indicata. Consacrando quanto già utilizzato nella pratica, la riforma del 2015 introduce una disposizione sull’atto di missione, che l’art. 19, § 1°, chiama «adendo», considerato parte integrante della convenzione di arbitrato104. Il citato art. 19, § 1°, dispone, in particolare, che: «Una volta instaurato il procedimento arbitrale, qualora l’arbitro o il collegio arbitrale ritengano che sia necessario precisare una questione che fa parte della convenzione di arbitrato, verrà redatto, con le parti, un documento complementare sottoscritto da tutti il quale farà parte integrante anch’esso della convenzione di arbitrato». Da notare anche la benefica abrogazione dell’art. 25 della LA105, secondo cui qualora fosse sorta una questione pregiudiziale su un diritto indisponibile, dalla quale dipendeva la soluzione della controversia oggetto dell’arbitrato, gli arbitri avrebbero dovuto sospendere il procedimento e rimettere le parti davanti al giudice statale. Decisa dal giudice statale la questione pregiudiziale non compromettibile, la parte interessata avrebbe dovuto depositare presso gli arbitri copia della sentenza passata in giudicato relativa alla questione pregiudiziale e l’arbitrato sarebbe, quindi, proseguito106. L’abrogato art. 25 LA era frutto di una visione superata che incideva 101. Sugli effetti della domanda di arbitrato nel sistema italiano, rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 246 ss. 102. Dispone l’art. 202, § unico, che: «La prescrizione interrotta ricomincia a decorrere dalla data dell’atto che l’ha interrotta o dell’ultimo atto del processo per interromperla». Ciò significa che durante il processo statale la prescrizione non corre e rimane sospesa fino al momento della chiusura del processo con sentenza, come spiega H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de direito processual civil, vol. I, cit., 570: «Verificada a interrupção pela citação, o fluxo prescricional permanecerá paralisado durante toda a duração do processo, recomeçando a correr, por inteiro, do ato que lhe puser fim». 103. Concordiamo pienamente con C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 143, che non applicare l’art. 202, § unico, all’arbitrato «privilegiaria indevidamente as demoras fora do controle do titular do possível direito, em confronto ético com a regra da exceptionalidade da prescrição da vida dos direitos». 104. Come ci ricorda L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 285, in Brasile l’atto di missione viene denominato come «ata de missão», «termo de arbitragem» o anche «termo de referência». 105. L’art. 25 LA è, in realtà, contenuto nel capo V che contiene la disciplina del lodo arbitrale. Tuttavia, per ragioni espositive, abbiamo ritenuto opportuno trattare dell’abrogata disposizione sulla pregiudizialità all’interno del paragrafo relativo al procedimento arbitrale. 106. L’art. 25 LA conteneva una disciplina simile a quella dell’art. 819 c.p.c. italiano (nella versione abrogata e anteriore alla riforma del 2006), come ricordano anche: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, 182 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO negativamente sull’arbitrato e rischiava di ritardare a dismisura la pronuncia del lodo, in ragione dell’attesa della pronuncia incontrovertibile del giudice statale sulla questione pregiudiziale107. L’eliminazione della regola, di cui all’art. 25 LA, è pertanto salutare108: attualmente anche in Brasile agli arbitri potranno conoscere incidenter tantum delle questioni pregiudiziali non compromettibili, come già previsto in Italia grazie alla riforma del 2006109. Infine, relativamente ad aspetti attienti al procedimento arbitrale, possiamo notare che la riforma del 2015 ha preferito non dettare regole sull’intervento di terzi nel giudizio arbitrale110, rimettendo, pertanto, la soluzione delle questioni ad esso inerenti alla giurisprudenza e ai regolamenti delle istituzioni arbitrali111. 9. LE NUOVE DISPOSIZIONI SU ARBITRATO E TUTELA CAUTELARE. Degne di nota sono le nuove disposizioni disciplinanti i rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrato, contenute nel nuovo capitolo IV-A, intitolato «Delle tutele cautelari e cit., 364, anche in nota; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3. Da segnalare che prima della riforma del 2015, in Brasile una parte dottrina aveva proposto un’interpretazione restrittiva dell’abrogato art. 25 LA che avrebbe permesso agli arbitri di conoscere in via meramente incidentale le questioni pregiudiziali non compromettibili (J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 7-8; E.F. Ricci, Lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 176; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 168 ss.). Si trattava di una soluzione analoga a quella proposta in Italia prima della riforma del 2006 per limitare l’applicazione dell’art. 819 (redazione vigente prima del 2006), su cui si veda, per tutti, F. Danovi, La pregiudizialità nell’arbitrato rituale, Padova, 1999, 117 ss. 107. A proposito del sistema della pregiudizialità nel giudizio arbitrale C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 364, parlava di un «sistema antiquado». 108. In senso favorevole all’abrogazione dell’art. 25 LA, si veda F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 508. 109. Sul punto si veda A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 3. Sulla vigente disciplina italiana della pregiudizialità nel giudizio arbitrale si rinvia a: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., p. 641 ss.; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 178 ss. 110. Sul tema dell’intervento dei terzi nel giudizio arbitrale in Brasile, si vedano: P.A. Batista Martins, Arbitragem e intervenção voluntária de terceiros: uma proposta, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2012, n. 33, 245 ss.; N. Mazzonetto, Partes e terceiros na arbitragem, dissertação de mestrado, USP, 2012. 111. N. Mazzonetto, A discussão em torno dos terceiros na arbitragem e a modernização da Lei de Arbitragem Brasileira, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., spec. 460, considera tale scelta del legislatore della riforma del 2015 come opportuna. L’A. ricorda, altresí, che in realtà solo il Regolamento della Câmara de Arbitragem e do Mercado (CAM) contiene, all’art. 6, una disciplina espressa dell’intervento di terzi (http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt_br/servicos/camara-de-arbitragem-do-mercado-cam/ regulamentacao) Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 183 GIOVANNI BONATO di urgenza»112. Viene, conseguentemente, abrogata la disposizione contenuta nella versione originaria dell’art. 22, § 4°, LA, la cui formulazione letterale poteva indurre a ritenere che gli arbitri si sarebbero dovuti rivolgere al giudice statale per ottenere la concessione di una misura cautelare113. Gli articoli 22-A e 22-B, attualmente vigenti, ripartiscono le competenze tra giudici statali e arbitri per l’emanazione di provvedimenti cautelari, nella forma seguente. Prima dell’instaurazione del procedimento arbitrale, le parti si devono rivolgere al giudice statale per ottenere la concessione di misure cautelari o di urgenza (art. 22A, caput). In questa ipotesi, l’art. 22-A, § unico, impone alla parte interessata l’onere di instaurare il procedimento arbitrale entro trenta giorni, decorrenti dalla data di efficacia del provvedimento cautelare o di urgenza, pena l’inefficacia di quest’ultimo114. 112. Sul tema, si vedano: C.C. Vieira Rocha, Medidas cautelares e urgentes na arbitragem: nova disciplina normativa, Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 43 ss.; P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, in AA.VV., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 461 ss.; C. de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz e a distribuição da tutela de urgência, in Aa.Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende, cit., 649 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 289; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4; 113. L’art. 22, § 4°, nella sua versione abrogata, disponeva che: «Salvo quanto disposto nel § 2°, quando sono necessarie misure coercitive o cautelari, gli arbitri possono chiederle all’organo giurisdizionale che sarebbe stato, originariamente, competente per giudicare il merito della controversia». Tale disposizione veniva interpretata in maniera riduttiva, al fine di dotare gli arbitri del potere di emanare misure cautelari dopo la costituzione del collegio. Per maggiori informazioni sui rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrale nel sistema previgente alla riforma del 2015, rinviamo a: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 226, secondo il quale l’art. 22, § 4°, LA, ammetteva, «implicitamente ma molto chiaramente», il potere degli arbitri di emanare misure cautelari; E. Talamini, Arbitragem e a tutela provisória no Código de Processo Civil de 2015, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2015, n. 46, p. 287 ss. P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 463 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 322 ss.; Id., Árbitros e juízes: guerra ou paz?, in Aa.Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da lei de arbitragem, a cura di P.A. Batista Martins, S.M. Ferreira Lemes, C.A. Carmona, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 432 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 359 ss.; F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, cit., 239; C.C. Vieira Rocha, Medidas cautelares e urgentes na arbitragem: nova disciplina normativa, cit., 48 ss. Come vedremo nel testo, la riforma in commento accoglie la menzionata interpretazione dottrinaria e giurisprudenziale in tema di rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrato. 114. Se si tratta di clausola compromissoria valida e pienamente efficace e in caso di arbitrato istituzionale, la parte interessata dovrà promuovere l’instaurazione dell’arbitrato ai sensi dell’art. 5 LA: è la domanda di arbitrato presentata davanti agli organi della istituzione, secondo il regolamento arbitrale, che evita la perdita di efficacia della misura cautelare concessa. Mentre, in caso di arbitrato ad hoc, ai fini dell’art. 22-A, la parte interessata proporre la domanda di arbitrato, manifestando all’altra parte la propria intenzione di dare inizio al procedimento, a mezzo posta o mediante qualsiasi altro mezzo idoneo di comunicazione, dando prova della ricezione dell’atto (P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 472). Ad ogni modo, ricordiamo che è la proposizione della domanda di arbitrato (e non la costituzione del collegio arbitrale) che permette di mantere 184 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO Una volta instaurato l’arbitrato, la compentenza per emanare misure cautelari o di urgenza spetta agli arbitri (art. 22-B, § unico)115, i quali hanno il potere di modificare o revocare la misura concessa in precedenza dal giudice statale (art. 22-B, caput)116. In tema di rapporti tra tutela cautelare e arbitrale, la riforma del 2015 configura un «sistema equilibrato, lodevolmente assai sintetico dal punto di vista del wording normativo e senza fughe precipitose»117; ciò nonostante, il capitolo IV-A solleva alcune perplessità. Innanzitutto, il capitolo IV-A nasce «vecchio»118. Pur essendo temporalmente successiva (di pochi mesi) all’emanazione del c.p.c. del 2015, la riforma dell’arbitrato non tiene conto di quest’ultimo e della nuova sistematica adottata in materia di tutela provvisoria, che si divide in due categorie: la tutela di urgenza (composta, a sua volta, dalla tutela anticipatoria-satisfattiva e dalla tutela cautelare-conservativa); la tutela di evidenza. Inoltre, il richiamo alle misure cautelare e a quelle di urgenza, compiuto dagli artt. 22-A e 22-B, sembra contrapporre i due tipi di tutela in discorso, mentre, come appena accennato, secondo la classificazione processuale brasiliana la tutela di urgenza è una categoria generale che comprende le due forme della tutela cautelare-conservativa e di quella anticipatoria-satisfattiva119. Probabilmente l’efficacia della misura cautelare o di urgenza concessa dal giudice statale, come anche ritengono C. de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz e a distribuição da tutela de urgência, cit., 666. 115. Non essendoci nessuna restrizione normativa, gli arbitri possono emanare ogni tipo di provvedimento provvisorio fondato sull’urgenza, anche di tipo anticipatorio, come riferisce P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 463. 116. Il conferimento agli arbitri del potere di modificare e revocare la misura cautelare, concessa dal giudice statale, era già stata riconosciuta dalla giurisprudenza e dalla dottrina, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit, 322 ss.; Superiore Tribunale di Giustizia, decisione del 21 giugno 2012, agravo regimental 19226/MS, secondo cui «Superadas as circunstâncias temporárias que justificavam a intervenção contingencial do Poder Judiciário e considerando que a celebração do compromisso arbitral implica, como regra, a derrogação da jurisdição estatal, os autos devem ser prontamente encaminhados ao juízo arbitral, para que este assuma o processamento da ação e, se for o caso, reaprecie a tutela conferida, mantendo, alterando ou revogando a respectiva decisão». La soluzione, di cui all’art. 22-B, caput, LA, è, pertanto, opportuna, come anche ritiengono: P. Osternack Amaral, O regime das medidas de urgência no processo arbitral, cit., 470; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4; C. de melo Valença Filho, J. Bosco Lee, O árbitro, o juiz e a distribuição da tutela de urgência, cit., 666, i quali specificano che la revoca e la modifica del provvedimento cautelare, emanato dal giudice statale, può avvenire in sede arbitrale con un lodo o con un’ordinanza. 117. Così A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 4. 118. In tal senso F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 504. 119. Per maggiori ragguagli sulla tutela provvisoria nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano, sia permesso di rinviare a G. Bonato, Tutela anticipatoria di urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione con il sistema francese e con quello italiano, in Revista de processo comparado, 2016, n. 4, e in www. judicium.it, spec. § 4 ss. In questa sede, possiamo solo sottolineare che la terminologia processuale utilizzata in Brasile per la tutela di urgenza è parzialmente differente rispetto a quella usata in Italia. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 185 GIOVANNI BONATO sarebbe stato più opportuno il riferimento alla sola tutela di urgenza all’interno del capitolo IV-A120. In ogni caso, facendo l’art. 22-A riferimento alle sole misure cautelari e di urgenza, deve essere escluso che i giudici statali possano emanare un provvedimento in materia di tutela di evidenza prima dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato, anche in ossequio al principio di non interferenza121. Possiamo, infine, in questa sede, solo accennare al fatto che la legge (né il c.p.c. né la LA) non prevede alcunché quanto all’applicabilità del meccanismo della stabilizzazione della misura anticipatoria di urgenza, di cui all’art. 304 c.p.c., concessa dal giudice statale prima dell’inizio dell’arbitrato (c.d. tutela antecipada pré-arbitral)122. Restano, pertanto, aperte due opzione interpretative. Una prima opzione, in base alla quale sarebbe da ritenere che anche in caso di stipulazione di una convenzione di arbitrato, il provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza, emanato dal giudice statale, sia dotato di effetti ultrattivi e che, pertanto, la parte interessata non sia onerata ad instaurare l’arbitrato123. Seguendo una seconda prospettiva, si potrebbe considerare che l’art. 304 si applichi solo al processo statale e che, pertanto, la conservazione degli effetti del provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza dipenda dall’assolvimento A grandi linee, possiamo notare che l’ambito della tutela di urgenza brasiliana corrisponde a quello della tutela cautelare italiana e, in particolare, che: la tutela anticipatoria di urgenza brasiliana coincide con la tutela cautelare italiana tendente ad anticipare gli effetti della tutela finale (a strumentalità attenuata); mentre la tutela cautelare di urgenza brasiliana corrisponde alla tutela cautelare italiana a strumentalità forte, che ha una finalità essenzialmente conservativa e che tende a cristallizzare una situazione di fatto o di diritto. Per un’esaustiva analisi comparatistica della tutela di urgenza nel sistema brasiliano e in quello italiano, si veda: E. Andrade, A técnica da tutela sumária no direito italiano, in Revista de processo, 2010, n. 179, 175 ss. 120. Così anche F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, cit., 242. 121. In questo senso, si vedano: F.L. Yarshell, L. Britto Mejias, Tutelas de urgência e produção antecipada da prova à luz da Lei n. 13.129/2015, 243. La tutela di evidenza è una delle forme della tutela provvisoria brasiliana che prescinde dalla condizione dell’urgenza. Si rinvia nuovamente a G. Bonato, Tutela anticipatoria di urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione con il sistema francese e con quello italiano, cit., § 4 ss. 122. E. Talamini, Arbitragem e estabilização da tutela antecipada, in Revista de processo, 2015, n. 246, 455 ss., utilizza l’espressione «tutela antecipada pré-arbitral» per riferirsi alla misura emanata da un giudice statale prima dell’instaurazione dell’arbitrato. Come detto nel testo, non è questa la sede per approfondire il discorso sul meccanismo della stabilizzazione della misura anticipatoria di urgenza concessa in via antecedente (alla proposizione della domanda di tutela finale), rispetto al quale sia permesso di rinviare ancora a G. Bonato, Tutela anticipatoria di urgenza e sua stabilizzazione nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano: comparazione con il sistema francese e con quello italiano, cit., § 6 ss. 123. Tale soluzione sembra più in linea con l’idea del nuovo codice di evitare di onerare la parte alla proposizione di un giudizio di cognizione piena sulla tutela definitiva, anche nel caso in cui tale giudizio sia di tipo arbitrale. 186 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO dell’onere di chiedere l’instaurazione del giudizio arbitrale124. La giurisprudenza dei prossimi anni dovrà pronunciarsi sul punto e scegliere tra le due descritte opzioni interpretative. 10. LA CARTA ARBITRALE E IL SISTEMA DELLA COOPERAZIONE TRA GIUDICI STATALI E ARBITRI. Allo scopo di perfezionare il sistema della cooperazione del giudice statale con l’arbitrato, la riforma del 2015 introduce l’istituto della carta arbitrale, cui viene dedicato un apposito capitolo IV-B, che contiene solo l’art. 22-C, ai sensi del quale: «L’arbitro o il collegio arbitrale potrà inviare una carta arbitrale di modo che l’organo giurisdizionale nazionale esegua o faccia eseguire, all’interno della sua area di competenza territoriale, un atto richiesto dall’arbitro»125. L’art. 22-C, § unico, della LA stabilisce, inoltre, che: «Nell’adempimento della carta arbitrale sarà osservato il segreto giudiziario, purché venga dimostrata la riservatezza pattuita nell’arbitrato». Nella stessa linea l’art. 189, IV, c.p.c., indica che le carte arbitrali e gli atti processuali statali relativi a procedimenti arbitrale saranno coperti dal segreto giudiziario (vedi anche infra). Della carta arbitrale si occupa anche il nuovo c.p.c. del 2015 nell’art. 260, § 3°, in cui viene indicato, in maniera dettagliata, il contenuto dell’atto in esame126. La carta arbitrale consiste, sostanzialmente, in una «richiesta di ausilio» formulata dall’arbitro al giudice statale e può riguardare «qualsiasi atto o incombente necessario»127. La riforma del 2015 istituisce, quindi, un meccanismo di comunicazione 124. Per questa seconda soluzione, si veda E. Talamini, Arbitragem e a tutela provisória no Código de Processo Civil de 2015, cit., 313; Id., Arbitragem e estabilização da tutela antecipada, cit., spec. 480-481, secondo cui è inapplicabile il meccanismo della stabilizzazione della misura anticipatoria di urgenza, di cui all’art. 304, rispetto ad una «tutela judicial antecipada pré-arbitral», sussistendo, quindi, un onere per la parte interessata di formulare «un simples requerimento da instauração da arbitragem» (non di proporre una formale domanda di arbitrato), al fine di mantenere gli effetti della misura anticipatoria di urgenza. Seguendo tale prospettiva, sussisterebbe una relazione di necessaria strumentalità tra provvedimento anticipatorio di urgenza e giudizio arbitrale che, invece, il nuovo c.p.c. ha voluto eliminare rispetto al giudizio statale. 125. Nell’introdurre la carta arbitrale la riforma accoglie gli auspici di una parte della dottrina brasiliana e di gruppi di ricerca in materia di arbitrato, tra cui la Comissão de Arbitragem e a Procuradoria-Geral da OAB-RJ e il Grupo de Pesquisa em Arbitragem della PUC-SP, come riferisce F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 312. 126. Come dispone l’art. 260, § 3, la carta arbitrale deve indicare la convenzione di arbitrato, la prova della nomina dell’arbitro e dell’accettazione della sua funzione e, altresí, rispettare i requisiti previsti in generale per gli atti di richiesta di ausilio tra giudici statali, chiamate «cartas de ordem, precatória e rogatória», la cui disciplina si trova sempre nel medesimo art. 260. 127. Così, sinteticamente, A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 6; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, 315, definisce la carta arbitrale come un «ato objeto de pedido de cooperação». In materia, si veda anche M.J. Magalhães Bonicio, Princípios do processo no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 234. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 187 GIOVANNI BONATO formale e completo tra giudici statali e arbitri128. Si ritiene, comunque, che gli arbitri e i giudici statali possano collaborare tra loro in riferimento alla richiesta di informazioni e in materia di prova anche «por intermédio de simples ofício» (una «semplice istanza»), ossia attraverso un atto deformalizzato, non solo quindi usando l’istituto della carta arbitrale129. Deve essere sottolineato che la carta arbitrale non è l’unica forma di collaborazione giudiziaria destinata a permettere un corretto svolgimento del procedimento arbitrale, in quanto la LA contiene anche l’art. 22, § 2, secondo cui «l’arbitro, o il presidente del collegio arbitrale, potrà richiedere all’autorità giudiziaria che ordini la comparizione del testimone recalcitrante, provando l’esistenza della convenzione di arbitrato». Si tratta di un meccanismo di ausilio giudiziario in materia istruttoria già previsto dalla versione originaria della LA del 1996130 e che, come noto, ritroviamo anche nel sistema italiano all’art. 816-ter, comma 3, come modificato dalla riforma del 2006131. A proposito di attività istruttoria e arbitrato, possiamo notare che la riforma brasiliana perde un’occasione, poiché non disciplina l’istituto della testimonianza scritta, che una parte della dottrina brasiliana considera già implicitamente ammissibile132. 11. LE NOVITÀ RELATIVE AL LODO ARBITRALE. Il capitolo V della LA contiene la disciplina del lodo arbitrale che – come già ricordato – produce, tra le parti e i suoi successori, gli stessi effetti prodotti dalla sentenza togata (art. 31 LA), è titolo esecutivo giudiziale (art. 515, inciso VII, c.p.c.)133, nonché titolo per l’iscrizione di ipoteca giudiziale (art. 495 c.p.c.)134. Il lodo arbitrale 128. Così F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, 315; J.T. de Paiva Muniz, J.M.R. Martins da Silva, A carta arbitral, in AA.VV., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende, cit., 311 ss., spec. 323. 129. In tal senso, si vedano: J.T. de Paiva Muniz, J.M.R. Martins da Silva, A carta arbitral, cit., 315, che ritengono ammissibile l’uso della «semplice istanza» quando non si richiede l’uso di potere coercitivo. 130. Così C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 317. 131. Sul punto, si vedano: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit., 263, che valuta positivamente la disposizione in esame «ai fini della effettività della tutela apud arbitros»; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 443, che parla di «salutare innovazione». 132. Per C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 320 ss., l’istituto della testimonianza scritta sarebbe già ammissibile nel giudizio arbitrale. Sulla testimonianza scritta nel diritto italiano dell’arbitrato, di cui all’art. 816 ter, comma 3, c.p.c., si vedano: C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, II, cit., 265, con considerazioni critiche rispetto ai principi dell’immediatezza e alla garanzia costituzionale del contraddittorio; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 442, che ritiene la testimonianza scritta uno «strumento di accelerazione dell’istruttoria». 133. Sul punto, si vedano L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 3, cit., 513, i quali criticano l’art. 515, VII, c.p.c., nella parte in cui conferisce la natura di titolo esecutivo giudiziale al lodo, in quanto sarebbe stato più opportuno, nell’ottica degli AA., denominare l’atto in discorso come «título semi-judicial» e prevedere un regime specifico di esecuzione. 134. Sulla disciplina in generale della sentenza arbitrale, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 268 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 173 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 414 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 319 ss. 188 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO diviene incontrovertibile, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità (ação de declaração de nulidade)135. La riforma del 2015 incide anche sul capitolo V, introducendo alcune novità rispetto al lodo e alla sua impugnazione (queste ultima saranno trattate nel paragrafo successivo). Rispetto alla decisione arbitrale, adottando una soluzione già contemplata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza, la riforma aggiunte una nuova disposizione, di cui all’art. 23, § 1°, ai sensi del quale: «Gli arbitri possono emanare lodi parziali»136. La previsione della possibilità di emanare lodi parziali è un’innovazione legislativa opportuna, in quanto, nel codificare una prassi già presente nella pratica brasiliana dell’arbitrato137, chiarisce ogni dubbio sul potere degli arbitri di organizzare in maniera più flessibile la decisione della controversia, frazionandola in più decisioni138. Viene, conseguentemente, modificato l’art. 33, § 1°, relativo all’impugnazione per nullità, al cui interno si distinguono due tipi di lodi: quello «finale» (che definisce il giudizio arbitrale)139, quello «parziale»; per entrambi i tipi di lodi, il termine per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità è di 90 giorni che decorrono dall’avvenuta comunicazione della decisione arbitrale o del provvedimento che conclude il procedimento di correzione-integrazione140. La lettera dell’art. 33, § 1°, non sembra lasciare dubbi 135. Come indicato precedentemente, in Brasile la dottrina nettamente dominante ritiene che il lodo arbitrale produca la cosa giudicata materiale, una volta decorso il termine di 90 giorni per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità, sebbene non manchino posizione diverse (vedi retro § 2). 136. Sulla disciplina dei lodi parziali nella LA riformata, si rinvia a: E. Arruda Alvim, Sentença parcial e arbitragem – inovações do projeto de lei n. 406/2013, do Senado Federal, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem e mediação. A reforma da legislação brasileira, a cura di C.C. Vieira Rocha, L.F. Salomão, cit., 87 ss.; J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem brasileira, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 535 ss.; A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 17 ss. Per l’ammissibilità dei lodi parziali anche prima della riforma del 2015, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 344 ss.; Id., Ensaio sobre a sentença arbitral parcial, in Revista de processo, n. 165, 2008, 9 ss.; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 176 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 431; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 335 ss.; G. Giusti, R. Dalmaso Marques, Sentenças arbitrais parciais: uma análise prática, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2010, n. 26, 46 ss. 137. A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 2, parla di una disposizione che va a colmare una «mera dimenticanza normativa». 138. Così F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 507. 139. La dottrina (J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 545) parla anche di «sentença arbitral global». 140. Dispone l’art. 33, § 1°, che: «A demanda para a declaração de nulidade da sentença arbitral, parcial ou final, seguirá as regras do procedimento comum, previstas na Lei nº 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973 (Código de Processo Civil), e deverá ser proposta no prazo de até 90 (noventa) dias após o Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 189 GIOVANNI BONATO in riferimento all’onere di impugnare immediatamente il lodo parziale, escludendo la possibilità di una sua impugnazione differita insieme al lodo finale141. Se non impugnato nel termine di 90 giorni, il lodo parziale diviene, pertanto, immutabile e incontrovertibile142. Al contrario di quanto avviene nel sistema italiano, in cui l’art. 827 c.p.c. fornisce un’indicazione rispetto al contenuto del lodo parziale e di quello non definitivo143, il legislatore brasiliano non prevede nessun criterio in relazione al contenuto del lodo parziale, limitandosi a contrapporlo al lodo finale144. Anche basandoci su quanto scritto dalla dottrina brasiliana, possiamo, senza dubbio, affermare che è un lodo parziale quello con cui gli arbitri decidono una o alcuna delle domande cumulate, rinviando la decisione delle altre domande ad un successivo lodo145. È parimenti un lodo parziale quello di condanna generica146. Riteniamo che sia un lodo parziale anche quello con il quale gli arbitri affermano la propria competenza a decidere la controversia, dichiarando, ad esempio, la validità della convenzione di arbitrato147. Gli arbitri emanano, al contrario, una decisione interlocutoria – una «ordem processual», recebimento da notificação da respectiva sentença, parcial ou final, ou da decisão do pedido de esclarecimentos». 141. Così A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., 32; J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 550; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 398; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., p. 179. Anteriormente alla riforma del 2015 si vedano: D. Armelin, Notas sobre sentença parcial e arbitragem, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, n. 18, 2008, 300 ss.; E. Parente, Processo arbitral e sistema, cit., 277. 142. In questo senso E. Arruda Alvim, Sentença parcial e arbitragem – inovações do projeto de lei n. 406/2013, do Senado Federal, cit., 98 ss.; A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., p. 32. 143. Sui lodi definitivi, lodi parziali e lodi non definitivi nel sistema italiano, si rinvia a: Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., p. 849 ss.; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 379 ss., e 502, il quale esclude la possibilità di impugnabilità differita dei lodi parziali. 144. Lo notano, infatti, A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., p. 27, i quali sottolineano che: «Para a distinção entre sentença parcial e sentença final, aplica-se somente o critério de seu efeito de encerramento ou não do procedimento arbitral». 145. Così J.A. Fichtner, S.N. Mannheimer, A.L. Monteiro, A sentença parcial na reforma da lei de arbitragem brasileira, cit., 543; C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 177. 146. Così C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 177; G. Giusti, R. Dalmaso Marques, Sentenças arbitrais parciais: uma análise prática, cit., 51. 147. Per questa prospettiva, si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 176, anche in nota; A.C. Dall’Agnol, P.C. De castro e martini, A sentença arbitral parcial: novos paradigmas?, cit., p. 25. È chiaro che è un lodo finale quello con il quale gli arbitri dichiarano la propria incompetenza a decidere la controversia (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 176, nota 188). Per il sistema italiano ricordiamo che L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 851, considera come parziale quel lodo con cui gli arbitri decidono sulla propria potestas iudicandi; mentre C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 390, ritiene che siano lodi non definitivi su questioni, quelli che «risolvono, in senso non definitivo del giudizio, una o più ‘questioni’, pregiudiziali di rito o preliminari di merito» 190 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO ossia un’ordinanza arbitrale – qualora decidano in senso non ostativo e, pertanto, senza definire il giudizio una questione pregiudiziale di rito (diversa da quella vertente sulla validità della convenzione di arbitrato) o una questione preliminare di merito148. Assumono, naturalmente, la forma dell’ordinanza arbitrale («ordem processual») anche i provvedimenti cautelari emanati dagli arbitri, nonché gli atti relativi alla organizzazione e all’istruzione del procedimento arbitrale. Sempre all’interno del capo V, due piccoli, ma importanti, ritocchi vengono apportati in riferimento al procedimento di correzione e integrazione del lodo, di cui all’art. 30 LA, che in Brasile ha lo scopo di: correggere errori materiali della decisione arbitrale (inciso I); chiarire incertezze, dubbi e contraddizioni della decisione (inciso II); permettere la pronuncia su un punto non deciso (inciso II)149. La nuova redazione dell’art. 30, prima parte, permette alle parti di fissare per la proposizione dell’istanza di correzione-integrazione del lodo un termine diverso da quello previsto dalla legge (cinque giorni) dalla comunicazione della decisione arbitrale. In base alla nuova redazione dell’art. 30, § unico, le parti possono, altresì, fissare un termine diverso da quello di dieci giorni, indicato dalla legge, per l’emanazione del provvedimento arbitrale che conclude il procedimento di correzione e integrazione. Nell’art. 33, § 1, viene, infine, specificato che il termine di novanta giorni per proporre l’impugnazione del lodo decorre dalla comunicazione della decisione che decide sull’istanza di correzione e integrazione150. 12. LE NOVITÀ IN MATERIA DI IMPUGNAZIONE DEL LODO. Prima di trattare delle novità introdotte dalla riforma del 2015 in materia di impugnazione del lodo, è opportuno ricordare che la LA prevede un’unica impugnazione esperibile nei confronti del lodo, chiamata «ação anulatória» 151. Si tratta di un’impugnazione a critica vincolata che può essere proposta per limitati vizi di nullità di 148. Al contrario di quanto accade in Italia, non esiste nel sistema brasiliano la categoria dei lodi non definitivi su questioni, che risolvono alcune delle questioni insorte senza definire il giudizio arbitrale. 149. Non è questa la sede per approfondire il procedimento di cui all’art. 30 LA, possiamo ricordare che si tratta di un istituto simile a quello degli embargos de declaração del processo statale, meccanismo che tende a correggere e integrare una decisione giurisdizionale, si rinvia a: A. Chateaubriand Martins, Correção e interpretação da sentença arbitral: novas perspectivas para antigas controvérsias, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 553 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 398 ss. L’ambito di applicazione del procedimento di correzione e integrazione del lodo in Brasile è chiaramente più ampio di quello italiano, contenuto nell’art. 826 c.p.c., sul quale si vedano: L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 830 ss.; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 459 ss. 150. Sulle modificazioni di cui agli artt. 30 e 33, § 1°, si veda A. Chateaubriand Martins, Correção e interpretação da sentença arbitral: novas perspectivas para antigas controvérsias, cit., 557 ss. 151. Per l’utilizzo della terminologia «ação anulatória», si vedano: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 244, il quale sottolinea l’efficacia «desconstitutiva» (o anche «constitutiva negativa») dell’impugnazione in discorso, nella misura in cui tende ad eliminare dal «mondo giuridico» Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 191 GIOVANNI BONATO natura processuale152, il cui catalogo – dettato dall’art. 32 – si presenta più chiaramente snello rispetto a quello previsto in Italia dall’art. 829 c.p.c. sulla impugnazione per nullità153. Essendo quello brasiliano un catalogo alquanto ridotto, buona parte della dottrina ritiene necessario adottare una «interpretazione integrativa» dell’art. 32 LA, introducendo alcuni vizi di nullità, come la violazione dell’ordine pubblico154 e, in generale, ogni tipo di violazione delle garanzie costituzionali del «giusto processo» commessa dagli arbitri155. Rimane, in ogni caso, esclusa la possibilità di dedurre errores il lodo impugnato; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 479 ss.; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 398. 152. Alcuni autori brasiliani considerano più tecnicamente più corretto parlare di annullabilità del lodo (J.C. Barbosa Moreira, La nuova legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato, cit., 13; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 398; P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 266 ss.), mentre altri ritengono sia preferibile parlare di nullità (C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 244; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 481). 153. Sull’impugnazione per nullità del lodo nel diritto italiano, si rinvia a: S. Boccagna, L’impugnazione per nullità del lodo, Napoli, 2005, passim; C. Punzi, Disegno sistematico dell’arbitrato, vol. II, cit., 507 ss., il quale qualifica l’impugnazione per nullità come una «figura sui generis» che dà luogo ad un giudizio attribuito «alla competenza in unico grado della corte d’appello»; E. Marinucci, L’impugnazione del lodo arbitrale dopo la riforma, Milano, 2009; L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 919 ss. Anche alla luce dell’analisi del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, concordiamo con L. Salvaneschi, I motivi di impugnazione del lodo: una razionalizzazione?, in questa Rivista, 2015, 233 ss. spec. p. 242, che in Italia sarebbe opportuno «un nuovo intervento razionalizzatore della disciplina che regola gli esiti del giudizio di nullità» del lodo arbitrale. 154. La dottrina dominante ritiene che, nonostante non venga stabilito direttamente dall’art. 32, il lodo nazionale sia nullo in caso di contrasto con l’ordine pubblico, anche in ragione del fatto che la contrarietà all’ordine pubblico è espressamente prevista come motivo ostativo al riconoscimento di un lodo straniero dall’art. 39, inciso II. In questo senso, per tutti, si vedano: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 418, secondo cui «o sistema brasileiro è coerente, de modo que tanto as sentenças arbitrais nacionais quanto as sentenças arbitrais estrangeiras estão sujeitas à mesma condição geral de validade, qual seja, não atentar contra a ordem pública»; R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Ordem pública e processo, San Paolo, 2011; J. Schledorn de Camargo, A ação anulatória com base na violação à ordem pública, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 313 ss., spec. 324, secondo cui «o sistema arbitrale deve ser interpretado com coerência e, assim, repelida a sentença arbitral nacional que também afronte a ordem pública»; V. Galíndez, O novo marco legal da arbitragem no Brasil: é suficiente?, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 708. 155. A favore di una «interpretazione integrativa» del catalogo dei vizi di nullità del lodo, si veda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 243, secondo cui provocano la nullità del lodo la violazione di ogni tipo di garanzia costituzionale del processo, «anche quelle indirette o riflesse e nonostante non siano espressamente previste» dall’art. 32 LA; l’A. indica quali cause di nullità non espressamente previste, la nullità del lodo derivante dalla pronuncia di incostituzionalità, da parte del Supremo Tribunale Federale, della legge su cui il lodo si è fondato, nonché la contrarietà del lodo con una súmula vinculante (ossia una massima giurisprudenziale del Supremo Tribunale Federale dotata di effiacia vincolante). Per la stessa prospettiva «integrativa», si veda già E.F. Ricci, Lei brasileira de arbitragem, cit., 72 ss., il quale ammette come motivo di nullità (nonostante non venga espressamente previsto dalla legge) anche la contrarietà del lodo con una precedente decisione, statale o arbitrale, passata in giudicato, in modo simile a quanto avviene nel sistema italiano (art. 829, 192 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO in iudicando nei confronti del lodo156, mentre con l’impugnazione per nullità si può allegare un vizio di tipo revocatorio del lodo, quale quello della corruzione dell’arbitro (art. 32, inciso VI)157. Ricordiamo che la competenza per decidere sull’impugnazione del lodo viene attribuita ad un giudice di primo grado158 e si deve seguire il procedimento di cognizione ordinario, come indicato dall’art. 33, § 1°159. Sempre in relazione alla impugnazione per nullità, non è senza interesse sottolineare che la legge brasiliana sull’arbitrato in nessuna ipotesi prevede che la decisione nel merito della controversia sia affidata al giudice dell’impugnazione del lodo160, in ossequio al principio di autonomia dell’arbitrato e di non interferenza della giurisdizione statale su quest’ultimo161. In base alla disciplina di cui agli artt. 32 e 33, in Brasile il giudice statale può procedere al solo annullamento del lodo, al quale può seguire o meno il rinvio della decisione della controversia agli arbitri (vedi infra). La soluzione brasiliana è chiaramente differente da quella vigente in Italia, dove, come noto, l’art. 830 c.p.c. adotta «un sistema a carattere misto», in forza del quale in n. 8, c.p.c.). A favore di un’interpretazione integrativa, si veda anche P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 279-280. In senso contrario, propendono per la tassatività dei motivi di nullità del lodo: C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 399, il quale (come indicato alla nota precedente) ammette, tuttavia, la nullità della decisione arbitrale per contrarietà con l’ordine pubblico; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 388. Mentre ; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 483, parla di un catalogo dei motivi di nullità del lodo «quasi tassativo». 156. Come ricorda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 235. 157. Ai sensi del citato art. 32, inciso VI, il lodo è nullo se viene dimostrata la «prevaricação, concussão ou corrupção passiva» dell’arbitro, di cui A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 7, sottolinea la natura di vizio di tipo revocatorio. 158. Sul punto scrive C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 251, che sarebbe «ragionevole» affidare alla competenza originaria degli organi di secondo grado (os tribunais) il potere di conoscere direttamente sull’impugnazione per nullità del lodo; ciò che, tuttavia, richiederebbe una revisione costituzionale, in ragione di quanto disposto dalla Costituzione brasiliana del 1988, cui spetta la disciplina della competenze originaria degli organi di secondo grado. 159. Si veda sul punto la ricerca empirica della Fundação Getulio Vargas, da cui si evince la rarità dei casi di annullamento del lodo in Brasile (http://cbar.org.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PesquisaJurisprud%C3%AAncia-CBAr-Relat%C3%B3rio Preliminar.pdf). Per un’analisi di alcune pronunce di nullità del lodo, si veda anche N. Mizrahi Lamas, Ações anulatórias de sentença arbitral, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 169 ss. 160. C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 424: «anulado o laudo, não pode o juiz togado passar ao exame da causa»; P. Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 267. 161. C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 239, scrive che: «Nem seria sistematicamente aceitável dar ao juíz togado a competência para redecidir o mérito da causa já julgada pelos árbitros, pois isso colidiria de frente com o desenho brasileiro da autonomia da arbitragem e com a própria função institucional desta no sistema de meios de solução de litígios»; C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 424, parla di una tecnica che «tende a prestigiar o juízo arbitral, desestimulando o recurso à ação impugnativa», Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 193 GIOVANNI BONATO alcune ipotesi il giudizio rescissorio spetta alla Corte d’appello, mentre in altre ipotesi la decisione della causa viene rimessa al giudizio degli arbitri162. All’infuori della ação anulatória non vengono previsti altri tipi di impugnazioni. Nel silenzio della legge sul punto, la dottrina maggioritaria ritiene, quindi, inammissibile la ação rescisória (impugnazione simile alla revocazione del sistema italiano)163. La legge arbitrale brasiliana non prevede nemmeno nessun tipo di rimedio esperibile da un terzo contro il lodo, quale ad esempio il recurso de terceiro prejudicato, di cui all’art. 996 c.p.c. del 2015164. Ciò non significa che il terzo non si possa difendere con altri strumenti, quali un mandado de segurança165, un’azione di accertamento negativo166 e, secondo alcuni autori, utilizzando la stessa ação anulatória167. Descritta per sommi capi la disciplina dell’impugnazione del lodo, possiamo tornare a trattare della riforma del 2015 e, a questi fini, segnaliamo, innanzitutto, due modificazioni di ordine lessicale. All’interno dell’art. 32 il primo motivo di nullità del lodo riguarda, attualmente, la nullità della convenzione di arbitrato e non più solo la nullità del compromesso, come avveniva in base alla versione originale della LA del 1996168. Inoltre, nell’art. 33 si utilizza l’espressione «declaração» di nullità della 162. La comparazione tra il diritto brasiliano e quello italiano su questo punto conduce C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 239, ad affermare che in Brasile l’arbitrato gode di una maggiore autonomia. Anche alla luce dell’analisi del diritto brasiliano dell’arbitrato, concordiamo con L. Salvaneschi, I motivi di impugnazione del lodo: una razionalizzazione?, in questa Rivista, 2015, 233 ss. spec. p. 242, che in Italia sarebbe opportuno «un nuovo intervento razionalizzatore della disciplina che regola gli esiti del giudizio di nullità» del lodo arbitrale. Per uno studio di diritto comparato in materia, rinviamo a E. Marinucci, Esito ed effetti dell’impugnazione giudiziaria del lodo arbitrale: note di diritto comparato, in Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 2000, 1327 ss. 163. Per l’inammissibilità dell’ação rescisória nei confronti del lodo, si vedano: F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 388; F.L. Yarshell, Ação anulatória de julgamento arbitral e ação rescisória, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2005, n. 5, 95 ss.; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 546; D. Armelin, Notas sobre a ação rescisória em matéria arbitral, in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2004, n. 1, 12 ss., spec. 14; L. Britto Mejias, Controle da atividade do árbitro, cit., 205 ss. 164. Si tratta di un rimedio che, con tutte le dovute differenziazioni, assomiglia all’opposizione di terzo dei sistema italiano, come ritiene C.R. Dinamarco, Litisconsorcio, San Paolo, 2009. 165. Sul mandado de segurança, si veda, per tutti, E. Andrade, Il c.d. “mandado de segurança” individuale nel diritto processuale civile brasiliano, in Riv. dir. proc., 2010, 631 ss. 166. Per questa prospettiva, si veda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 237. 167. Ammettono l’esperibilità dell’impugnazione per nullità ad opera del terzo, G. Recena Costa, M. Carvalho Engholm Cardoso, Limites subjetivos da sentença arbitral e legitimidade do terceiro para ajuizar ação anulatória, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 595 ss., spec. 618 ss., 168. Sul punto F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 510, parla di correzione di un equivoco redazionale della legge del 1996. È chiaro che la nullità della clausola compromissoria provocava la nullità del lodo anche precedentemente alla riforma del 2015. Come ricorda C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 400, il legislatore brasiliano del 1996 aveva commesso lo stesso errore che si trovava nel c.p.c. italiano anteriormente alla riforma del 2006. 194 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO sentenza arbitrale, in luogo di quello «decretação» di nullità che era contenuta nella versione originaria della LA169. A parte il citato mutamento terminologico, restano inalterati i vizi che possono dar luogo ad una pronuncia di nullità del lodo, fatta salva l’abrogazione del vizio di omessa pronuncia, di cui all’art. 32, inciso V (in ragione dell’introduzione della figura del lodo complementare, su cui vedi infra). Una novità di rilievo è costituita dall’abrogazione della disposizione che stabiliva in quali casi il giudice dell’impugnazione si limitava a dichiarare la nullità del lodo e chiudeva, pertanto, il giudizio con lo svolgimento della sola fase rescindente (art. 33, § 2°, inciso I, nella versione originaria170) e in quali casi il giudice doveva, invece, disporre il rinvio della causa agli arbitri per l’emanazione di un nuovo lodo (art. 33, § 2°, inciso II, nella versione originaria)171. La vigente redazione dell’art. 32, § 2°, prevede che il giudice dell’impugnazione valuti, caso per caso, se la decisione di merito debba essere rimessa o meno agli arbitri172. Altra novità importante della riforma del 2015, inserita all’interno del capo V della LA, è quella del lodo arbitrale complementare, la cui disciplina è contenuta nel nuovo art. 33, § 4°, ai sensi del quale: «La parte interessata potrà promuovere un giudizio per chiedere la pronuncia di un lodo arbitrale complementare, qualora l’arbitro non abbia deciso su tutte le domande dedotte nel procedimento arbitrale». Si tratta di un dispositivo, già conosciuto in ambito comparatistico173, che permette alla parte di 169. Si tratta di una modificazione lessicale appropriata, poiché la nullità del lodo non viene decretata ma dichiarata dal giudice dell’impugnazione. 170. Erano i seguenti casi di nullità del lodo determinati da: nullità della convenzione di arbitrato; pronuncia da parte di chi non poteva essere arbitro; dolo dell’arbitro; scadenza del termine; violazione dei principi fondamentali del processo arbitrale, di cui all’art. 21, quali il principio del contraddittorio, dell’uguaglianza delle parti, dell’imparzialità dell’arbitro e del suo libero convincimento. 171. Erano i residuali casi di nullità del lodo, ossia: mancanza di uno dei requisiti del lodo, di cui all’art. 26; pronuncia fuori dai limiti della convenzione di arbitrato; omissione di pronuncia. Sul regime previgente si veda C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 398 ss. 172. Dispone l’attuale art. 33, § 2°, che: «La sentenza che accoglie l’impugnazione dichiara la nullità del lodo, nelle ipotesi dell’art. 32, e determina, se è il caso, che l’arbitro o il collegio arbitrale emani un nuovo lodo arbitrale». F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., p. 512, scrive che la decisione sulla rimessione della controversia agli arbitri, a seguito della dichiarazione di nullità del lodo, dipende dalle circostanze del caso «a ser avaliado e decidido no processo». In senso favorevole alla nuova disposizione, nella misura in cui permette al giudice statale di valutare le circostanze del singolo caso, si vedano: F. Zech Sylvestre; T.A. Rocha Lima, Aspectos processuais da ação de nulidade de sentença arbitral: perspectivas reformistas, in Aa. Vv., Arbitragem. Estudos sobre a lei n. 13.129, de 26-5-2015, a cura di F.J. Cahali, T. Rodovalho, A. Freire, cit., 559 ss., spec. 580; A. Briguglio, Prospettive d’indagine e spunti comparatistici considerando la “legge sull’arbitrato” brasiliana anche dopo la novella del 2015, cit., § 7, secondo cui si tratta di «una scelta normativa che vuol essere il più possibile adeguata alla varietà di situazioni». 173. Si veda l’analisi di R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, in in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 195 GIOVANNI BONATO esperire un’azione davanti al giudice statale al fine di sanare il vizio di omissione di pronuncia e, quindi, di ottenere che gli arbitri statuiscano sulle domande proposte, ma non decise174. In conseguenza della riforma in commento, il vizio di omessa pronuncia non costituisce più un caso di invalidità del lodo (come accadeva prima del 2015175) e le parti hanno, attualmente, la facoltà di utilizzare il procedimento di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, LA, chiedendo che il giudice statale disponga che gli arbitri si pronuncino sulle domande non decise. Siamo, quindi, in presenza di un meccanismo di integrazione della decisione arbitrale176, attraverso un lodo complementare, che si fonda sulla cooperazione tra giudice statale e arbitri e che costituisce una novità di rilievo e salutare177, di cui la pratica dovrà specificare la disciplina di dettaglio e i rapporti con altre azioni previste dalla LA, come con il procedimento di correzione dell’art. 30, inciso II, che prevede la pronuncia su un «punto» omesso dagli arbitri178. In ogni caso, Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 629 ss., sia per il diritto brasiliano che per un panorama di diritto comparato sul lodo complementare. 174. L’esperibilità dell’azione davanti al giudice statale, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, ci pare residuale ed è subordinata alla previa proposizione dell’istanza davanti agli arbitri di pronunciarsi sulla domanda non decisa attraverso il procedimento di cui all’art. 30, inciso II, LA (simile agli embargos de declaração). In tal senso si veda F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., p. 403. Naturalmente la parte interessata non ha l’onere di proporre l’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, per chiedere una statuizione di merito sulla domanda non decisa, avendo in ogni caso la facoltà di riproporre tale domanda all’interno di un nuovo giudizio arbitrale. In tal senso, in relazione ai casi di omessa pronuncia, si veda C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., p. 198. Tra i casi in cui si ammette l’emanazione di un lodo arbitrale complementare rientra anche quello in cui gli arbitri non abbiano determinato il quantum della prestazione debitoria, limitandosi alla pronuncia di una condanna generica sul solo an debeatur, come specificato da H. Theodoro Jr., Curso de processo civil, vol. II, cit., 591. 175. L’art. 32, inciso V (attualmente abrogato), disponeva: «È nula a sentença arbitral se: … V – não decidir todo o litígio submetido à arbitragem». In ogni caso, anche prima della riforma del 2015, la pronuncia sulle domande non decisa sarebbe spettata sempre agli arbitri. Si veda sul punto C.A. Carmona, Arbitrato e processo, cit., p. 407. 176. L’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, LA, in materia di lodo complementare, non sembra essere un’impugnazione in senso tecnico, trattandosi piuttosto di un «meccanismo peculiare di correzione della sentenza arbitrale ‘incompleta’» (così R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, cit., 646). D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit., 724, considera la figura del lodo complementare come un meccanismo di «exercício do direito ao esgotamento da jurisdição» degli arbitri. 177. In senso favorevole all’introduzione dell’art. 33, § 4°, si vedano: F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 403; D. Levy, Os presságios da reforma arbitral brasileira: as 10 metas para os seus 20 anos, cit., 724. 178. Il procedimento di correzione, di cui all’art. 30, II, LA, sicuramente potrà essere utilizzato in caso di mancata pronuncia su un punto o questione allegata dalle parti, ma anche per chiedere la pronuncia su una domanda non decisa. L’azione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, concorre con il menzionato procedimento di correzione, potendo la prima essere esperita una volta che siano scaduti i termini per la proposizione del secondo. La LA non indica, nemmeno, quale sia il collegio arbitrale competente a emanare il lodo complementare. Secondo F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 403, sarà lo stesso collegio arbitrale a pronunciarsi 196 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO l’azione diretta ad ottenere l’emanazione del lodo complementare è facoltativa, perché la parte interessata può sempre instaurare un nuovo arbitrato per avere la pronuncia sulla domanda non decisa179. Ugualmente in materia di impugnazione, si è proceduto a modificare l’art. 33, § 3°, della LA, disponendo che: «La dichiarazione di nullità della sentenza arbitrale potrà essere richiesta anche con l’opposizione all’esecuzione, ai sensi degli articoli 525 e seguenti del codice di procedura civile, qualora si proceda all’esecuzione forzata giudiziale»180. L’opposizione all’esecuzione non deve essere proposta necessariamente entro il termine di 90 giorni decorrente dalla comunicazione del lodo, potendo essere fatta valere anche successivamente. In ragione di ciò, è necessario indagare quale sia la conseguenza della scandenza del termine per proporre l’impugnazione per nullità del lodo sul giudizio di l’opposizione all’esecuzione dello stesso. Sul punto gli studiosi brasiliani si sono divisi in due orientamenti contrapposti. Una parte della dottrina non limita temporalmente la possibilità di dedurre in sede di opposizione all’esecuzione i motivi di nullità del lodo, di cui all’art. 32, LA, che possono essere dedotti anche oltre la scandenza del termine di novanta giorni181. Ma altra parte autorevole della dottrina – che appare maggioritaria – ritiene opportuno adottare una «visione sistematica» dell’art. 33, § 3°, in materia di opposizione all’esecuzione del lodo, evitando che il debitore possa contestare con tale rimedio i vizi del lodo, di cui all’art. 32, una volta decorso il termine di novanta giorni182. Tale sulle domande non decise, «evitando o enorme custo de repetição de providências, e até o risco de decisões contraditórias, caso fossem trazidos novos árbitros». Mentre secondo R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, cit., 644, il giudice statale potrà disporre che sia un nuovo organo arbitrale a emanare il lodo complementare. 179. Lo nota anche R. Castro de Figueiredo, A anulação das sentenças arbitrais “incompletas” e a sentença arbitral complementar, cit., 645, il quale, infatti, sottolinea come rispetto all’instaurazione di un nuovo arbitrato il procedimento di integrazione, di cui all’art. 33, § 4°, si rivela «poco attraente» dal punto di vista del tempo necessario per ottenere la decisione del giudice statale sull’istanza della pronuncia di un lodo complementare. L’A. individua un vantaggio nell’esercizio dell’azione di integrazione in discorso nella finalità di indurre l’arbitro «a modificare il proprio risultato del lodo originario». 180. Questa la versione in lingua originale dell’art. 33, § 3°, LA: «A decretação da nulidade da sentença arbitral também poderá ser requerida na impugnação ao cumprimento da sentença, nos termos dos arts. 525 e seguintes do Código de Processo Civil, se houver execução judicial». Nel testo abbiamo tradotto la parte «impugnação ao cumprimento da sentença» come opposizione all’esecuzione del lodo. Si tratta di una libera traduzione diretta a facilitare la comprensione del rimedio in discorso ai lettori italiani. 181. Così L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 3, cit., 512, i quali scrivono: «Na impugnação à execução fundada em sentença arbitral, poderá o executado deduzir, além da matéria elencada no art. 539, § 1°, todas as causas de nulidade desta decisão, contempladas pelo art. 32 da Lei de Arbitragem». Nella stessa direzione, si veda A. de Assis, Processo civil brasileiro, vol. I, cit., 136. 182. Parla della opportunità di adottare una «visão sistematica do tema» C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 430. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 197 GIOVANNI BONATO interpretazione restrittiva, quanto ai motivi spendibili con l’opposizione all’esecuzione, si fonda sulla necessità di evitare lo «stato di incertezza», che deriverebbe dal consentire la deducibilità dei vizi di nullità anche dopo la scadenza dei novanta giorni per proporre la ação de declaração de nulidade183. In base a questa prospettiva, è necessario distinguere due situazioni: anteriormente alla scadenza del termine di novanta giorni, ci cui all’art. 33, il debitore può decidere di dedurre con l’opposizione all’esecuzione anche i vizi di nullità del lodo; successivamente alla scadenza di detto termine, il debitore può allegare con l’opposizione solo difese spendibili contro un titolo giudiziale184. 13. LE DISPOSIZIONI DEL C.P.C. DEL 2015 IN MATERIA DI ARBITRATO. Da segnalare, infine, le novità in materia di arbitrato contenute nel c.p.c. del 2015, tra cui meritano menzione: l’espresso riconoscimento normativo dell’arbitrato (art. 3); un nuovo regime dell’eccezione di patto compromissorio (art. 337); regole sulla riservatezza dei «procedimenti giudiziali ausiliari dell’arbitrato» (art. 189, inciso IV); la superiorità delle convenzioni internazionali e della legge sull’arbitrato del 1996 sulle disposizioni del c.p.c. in materia di delibazione di sentenze straniere (art. 960, § 3°)185. 183. C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., 430. L’elaborazione di tale soluzione pare risalire a E.F. Ricci, Reflexões sobre o art. 33 da lei de arbitragem, in Revista de processo, 1999, n. 93, 45 ss., § 7, cui hanno aderito diversi studiosi, tra cui: C.R. Dinamarco, A arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 272; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit. 370; L. de Faria Beraldo, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 459 ss.; Assamu Nagao, Do controle judicial da sentença arbitral, cit., 287; J. Schledorn de Camargo, A ação anulatória com base na violação à ordem pública, cit., 327-328. In questo senso si vedano anche le opinioni, elaborate prima della introduzione della legge n. 11.232 del 2005 (la c.d. legge sul cumprimento della sentenza), da: P. Batista Martins, Anotações sobre a sentença proferida em sede arbitral, in Aa. Vv., Aspectos fundamentais da Lei de Arbitragem, Rio de Janeiro, 1999, 418 ss. 184. Così, molto chiaramente, C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit., p. 430-431, il quale in relazione alla seconda situazione descritta nel testo scrive: «terá o impugnante, em tal hipótese, perdido, por inércia, o direito de levar ao conhecimento do juiz togado qualquer uma das matérias enumeradas no art. 32 da Lei. Enfrentará o impugnante as mesmas limitações impostas ao executado que ataca a sentença judicial condenatória». Tra l’altro, ricordiamo che tale sistematica è stata consacrata espressamente in Portogallo dalla Legge di arbitrato volontario, n. 63 del 2011, all’art. 48, rubricato «Motivi dell’opposizione all’esecuzione», ai sensi del quale: «1 - À execução de sentença arbitral pode o executado opor-se com qualquer dos fundamentos de anulação da sentença previstos no n.º 3 do artigo 46.º, desde que, na data em que a oposição for deduzida, um pedido de anulação da sentença arbitral apresentado com esse mesmo fundamento não tenha já sido rejeitado por sentença transitada em julgado. 2 - Não pode ser invocado pelo executado na oposição à execução de sentença arbitral nenhum dos fundamentos previstos na alínea a) do n.º 3 do artigo 46.º, se já tiver decorrido o prazo fixado no n.º 6 do mesmo artigo para a apresentação do pedido de anulação da sentença, sem que nenhuma das partes haja pedido tal anulação». L’art. 46 della citata legge portoghese tratta dell’impugnazione del lodo. 185. Art. 960, § 3, secondo cui: «A homologação de decisão arbitral estrangeira obedecerá ao disposto em tratado e em lei, aplicando-se, subsidiariamente, as disposições deste Capítulo». Sul punto, si veda: F. Didier, A arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, in Revista Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, 2013, vol. 79, n. 4, 73 ss., spec. 80, con giudizio favorevole sulla citata disposizione. 198 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com LA RIFORMA BRASILIANA DELL’ARBITRATO La prima parte (caput) dell’art. 3 c.p.c., contenuto nel capitolo I (del titolo unico del libro primo) dedicato alle «norme fondamentali del processo civile, stabilisce che: «A nessuna minaccia o violazione di un diritto verrà negata tutela giurisdizionale». Il § 1° del medesimo articolo dispone, inoltre, che: «L’arbitrato è ammesso nella forma stabilita dalla legge». L’art. 3, § 1°, c.p.c., si limita, quindi, a codificare l’interpretazione data dal Supremo Tribunale Federale quanto alla costituzionalità dell’arbitrato e qualifica formalmente l’arbitrato come un mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie186. Nella stessa linea l’art. 42, c.p.c., dispone che: «Le cause civili saranno risolte e decise dal giudice nei limiti della sua competenza, salvo il diritto delle parti di instaurare un processo arbitrale, nella forma stabilita dalla legge»187. L’art. 337, inciso X, § 5°, c.p.c., qualifica come eccezione in senso stretto l’eccezione di patto compromissorio, escludendo, pertanto, che sia rilevabile d’ufficio dal giudice188. Il nuovo c.p.c. del 2015 accoglie, quindi, la soluzione elaborata dalla maggioranza della dottrina brasiliana e si allinea, altresì, alla tendenza assolutamente dominante nel panorama comparatistico che riserva alla sola parte interessata il potere di sollevare l’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato189. Risulta, attualmente, superata la tesi, elaborata sotto l’imperio dell’abrogato c.p.c. del 1973, secondo cui il compromesso dava luogo ad un’eccezione in senso stretto, mentre la clausola compromissoria costituiva un’eccezione rilevabile d’ufficio dal giudice190. Qualora il convenuto non alleghi tempestivamente l’eccezione di patto compromissorio, l’art. 337, § 6°, c.p.c., 186. Così R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 252. Ricordiamo, per ragioni di completezza, che i successivi paragrafi che compongono l’art. 3 c.p.c. tendono a valorizzare i mezzi di autocomposizione delle controversie, disponendo che: lo Stato dovrà promuoverne l’utilizzo, quando ciò sia possibile (§ 2°); l’utilizzo della conciliazione, mediazione e di altri mezzi consensuali di risoluzione dei conflitti dovrà essere stimolato «da giudici, avvocati, difensori pubblici e pubblici ministeri anche nel corso del processo statale» (§ 3°). Sul punto, rinvia a W. Pimentel, O CPC de 2015, mediação e arbitragem: um sistema geral de solução de conflitos, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, cit., 339 ss. 187. L’art. 42 del c.p.c. del 2015 riproduce sostanzialmente l’art. 86 del c.p.c. abrogato e ci pare essere una disposizione ridondante, essendo già desumibile dal sistema (così, ancora, R. de Carvalho Aprigliano, Jurisdição e arbitragem no novo Código de Processo Civil, cit., 254) 188. L’art. 337 c.p.c. indica quali sono le eccezioni che il convenuto ha l’onere di allegare nella comparsa di risposta. Il § 5° dell’art. 337 dispone che: «fatte salve la convenzione di arbitrato e l’incompetenza relativa, il giudice conoscerà di ufficio le materie indicate in questo articolo» (nostra libera traduzione). Sulla disciplina dell’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato nel nuovo c.p.c., si vedano: R. Resende Beneduzi, Premilinar de arbitragem no novo CPC, cit., 285 ss.; M. Lamego Carpenter, Primeiras impressões sobre a convenção de arbitragem e o agravo de instrumento no CPC/2015, in Aa. Vv., A reforma da arbitragem, a cura di L. De Campos Melo, R. Resende Beneduzi, 357 ss.; F.J. Cahali, Curso de arbitragem, cit., 186 ss. 189. In questo senso, si vedano: E. Talamini, Arguição de convenção arbitral no projeto de novo Cógido de Processo Civil (exceção de arbitragem), in Revista de arbitragem e mediação, 2014, n. 40, 81 ss., cui si rinvia anche per riferimenti comparatistici; L.F. Guerrero, Convenção de arbitragem e processo arbitral, cit., 128; C.R. Dinamarco, Arbitragem na teoria geral do processo, cit., 92-93. 190. Era la tesi di C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem e processo, cit. 485. Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com 199 GIOVANNI BONATO qualifica tale omissione come «accettazione della giurisdizione statale e rinuncia al giudizio arbitrale». La legge brasiliana non specifica, tuttavia, se tale rinuncia sia condizionata o meno alla pronuncia di una decisione di merito nel processo statale191. Sempre in materia, ricordiamo, altresì, che, ai sensi dell’art. 485, inciso VII, quando il giudice accoglie l’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato, il processo si chiude con una sentenza di rito che non decide il merito della controversia. Qualora, invece, l’eccezione in discorso venga respinta con decisione interlocutoria (che non chiude il processo), il convenuto potrà proporre l’impugnazione dell’agravo de instrumento, ai sensi dell’art. 1.015, inciso III192. L’art. 189, inciso IV, c.p.c., prevede una deroga al principio di pubblicità degli atti processuali in caso di arbitrato: sono coperti da segreto di giustizia gli atti processuali «in materia di arbitrato, inclusi i processi relativi all’esecuzione della carta arbitrale, purché la riservatezza, concordata nell’arbitrato, sia dimostrata nel giudizio»193. 191. Stando alla formulazione dell’art. 819 ter, comma 1, c.p.c. italiano, la rinuncia alla giurisdizione arbitrale dipende dalla mancata allegazione dell’eccezione di convenzione di arbitrato e dalla pronuncia di merito del giudice ordinario. Sul punto, rinviamo a L. Salvaneschi, Arbitrato, cit., 674 e 591 ss. 192. In materia, si veda M. Lamego Carpenter, Primeiras impressões sobre a convenção de arbitragem e o agravo de instrumento no CPC/2015, cit., 362 ss. Nel c.p.c. brasiliano vigente, l’agravo de instrumento è il mezzo di impugnazione esperibile contro quelle decisioni interlocutorie (atti che non definiscono il giudizio) che la legge indica espressamente come impugnabili (art. 1015), si rinvia a: L.R. Wambier, E. Talamini, Curso avançado de processo civil, 16° ed., vol. 2, San Paolo, 2016, 537; L.G. Marinoni, S. Cruz Arenhart, D. Mitidiero, Novo curso de processo civil, vol. 2, cit., 533. 193. Sul tema, si vedano: J.R. Cruz e Tucci, Le garanzie costituzionali della pubblicità degli atti processuali e della motivazione delle decisioni nel nuovo c.p.c. brasiliano, traduzione a cura di G. Bonato, in Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 2015, 1221 ss., § 2; R. Garcia da Fonseca, O segredo da justiça e a arbitragem, cit., 397 ss. 200 Civil Procedure Review, v.8, n.3: 169-218, sept-dec., 2017 ISSN 2191-1339 – www.civilprocedurereview.com